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Since the turn of the century, tax and cash benefit policies for households undertaking paid 
work, referred to as ‘in-work benefits’ in this thesis, have become common among 
democratic capitalist countries, including European countries. These policies are often 
associated with the goals of alleviating in-work poverty and reducing unemployment as they 
‘make work pay’ by topping up inadequate earnings for some working households. The rise 
of in-work benefits therefore signifies at least a partial break with the ideal that participation 
in paid work guarantees financial independence from the state, which has been historically 
embedded in varied institutional configurations across capitalist countries. Yet, gaps in 
comparative research on trends and variation in in-work benefits make it hard to assess the 
significance of this shift. Claims about in-work benefits as being driven by socio-economic 
pressures (e.g. labour market risks in deindustrialised societies), political compromise and 
ambiguity, and the (neo)liberalisation of political economy, may not apply across contexts, 
especially given the variation in in-work policies identified in some studies. 
 
Addressing these gaps, this thesis develops a conceptual framework, which draws on 
comparative political economy and social policy perspectives, to interpret cross-national and 
temporal variation in in-work benefits, considering the socio-political dimensions of policies 
underexamined in comparative research. Specifically, it compares the orientation of 
countries’ in-work policies to forms and degrees of dependence on the state, labour market 
and the family. Using data on countries’ tax-benefit systems, and estimating countries’ 
expenditure on in-work benefits using a tax-benefit simulator, this framework is applied to 
a systematic comparison of in-work benefits in European Union member states (EUMS), 
covering the period 2006 and 2017. It includes: a mapping of two ‘archetypal’ in-work 
benefits and two forms of ‘possible’ in-work benefits; analysis of policy expenditure from 
2006 to 2017; and a comparison of policy rules and design features, operationalising the 
‘dependency relationships’ framework. In line with the systemic frameworks underpinning 
the research, the findings are contextualised with indicators of historical and contemporary 
context, including social policy legacies and socio-economic pressures, across EUMS. 
 
This thesis provides further evidence that tax and benefit policies that bring the state more 
firmly into the domain of income maintenance for working people are common across 
EUMS. Such policies were implemented and/or expanded more recently in Nordic, Central 
and Eastern and Southern European countries. Yet, both the variation identified in EUMS’ 
in-work policies in this research,  which are summarised into five ideal-typical models, and 
the different ways in-work benefits appear to relate to institutional and socioeconomic 
context, indicate that the ideals and interests underpinning in-work policies cannot be 
understood in homogenous terms. The findings also cast doubt on the notion that in-work 
benefits will become increasingly prevalent over time. The thesis leads to several 
recommendations for future research, including analysis of specific cases, selected from the 
five models identified, to further examine the interaction of historical institutions, socio-
economic factors and political dynamics on in-work benefit policymaking.  
7 
 
List of abbreviations 
ALMP  Active labour market policy 
CME  Coordinated Market Economy 
CTC Child Tax Credits (UK) 
EITC1 Earned Income Tax Credit (generic term for policy, or policy name in US, Sweden, 
Denmark) 
ETC Employee Tax Credit (Slovakia) 
EU  European Union 
EUMS  European Union Member States 
FIS Family Income Supplement (UK, Ireland) 
IWB In-work benefits 
IWCT In-work cash transfer  
LME  Liberal Market Economy 
MISSOC  Mutual Information System on Social Protection 
MWP ‘Make work pay’ 
MS Member States (of the European Union) 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
PAYE Pay as You Earn 
RSA Active Income of Solidarity/ ‘Revenue de Solidarité Active’ (France) 
UC  Universal Credit (UK) 
VofC  Varieties of Capitalism 
WFTC Working Families Tax Credit (UK) 
WMTC Working Mother Tax Credit (Spain) 
WTC Working Tax Credits (UK) 
                                                     
1 A full list of in-work cash transfer and earned income tax credit policies analysed in the thesis is provided in Appendix F 




In broad terms, in-work benefits comprise tax-benefit policies that supplement the earned 
income of households undertaking paid work. There is a general consensus that in-work 
benefits originated in the US and the UK in the 1970s, with means-tested schemes targeting 
working households with children. Similar policies then became more widespread across 
other democratic capitalist countries from the late 1990s onwards2 (Millar, 2009; Immervoll 
and Pearson, 2009; Kenworthy, 2015; Cousins, 2014). Even in countries classified as Liberal 
welfare states, and more so elsewhere, the use of the tax-benefit system to explicitly 
supplement the wages of households implies a break with the past. Broadly, the ideals and 
institutional arrangements of democratic capitalism have traditionally placed the onus on 
employers to pay adequate wages (Sloman, 2018). Participation in paid work has been seen 
as a means for financial independence from the state and as a route out of poverty, first 
mainly for men in post-war arrangements, then increasingly so for women, for whom work 
became seen as a way to gain financial independence from men (Lewis, 2001; Vosko, 2010). 
Since the end of the 20th century, the goal of employment has also been promoted with 
reference to other groups in society that were previously exempted from ‘activation’ 
schemes. 
Across much of the literature, in-work benefits are viewed one of a suite of policies 
governments employ to address challenges associated with deindustrialisation and 
concurrent social, economic and demographic changes, namely the ‘twin problems’ of 
poverty among working households (in-work poverty) and unemployment (Immervoll and 
Pearson, 2009). These problems are associated with cyclical economic downturns and 
longer-term processes of de-industrialisation and globalisation, as the diminishing 
productivity gains of service-oriented economies, immigration and global economic 
competition have resulted in a weakening of employment protections and wages, leading to 
increasingly insecure and precarious forms of employment (Clasen, 2019; Grover and 
Stewart, 2002; Picot, 2018). Moreover, social and demographic changes have increased the 
demands on welfare states and the need for more citizens to participate in paid work to meet 
these demands (Marchal and Marx, 2018). 
                                                     
2 Although different labels have been given to similar schemes in non-liberal contexts, the labels in-work benefits, in-work 
provision, and in-work policies are applied throughout this thesis. Other labels include ‘employment-conditional earning 
subsidies’ and ‘make work pay policies’(Pearson and Scarpetta, 2000; Kenworthy, 2015; Bennett and Millar, 2005). The 
latter in particular is based on an agenda promoted by international actors and typically includes a broader range of 
provisions. The challenges in defining in-work benefits for comparative research, and the different approaches taken in the 
literature, are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. In-work benefits are (re)conceptualised and operationalised for the 
cross-national research undertaken in this thesis is in Chapters 3 and 4.  
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Beyond this contextualisation, however, there are competing arguments and assumptions in 
literature concerning the determinants and implications of governments’ use of in-work 
benefits. At one end of the spectrum, a predominant strand of evaluative research tends to 
emphasize the link between problems of unemployment and poverty ‘traps’ and the financial 
(dis) incentives created by tax-benefit systems, designed for previous models of work, e.g. 
standard employment (Bargain and Orsini, 2006; Liang et al., 2012; Immervoll and Pearson, 
2009).  By targeting tax and benefit policies on low income working households, paid work 
becomes more financially viable than unemployment and the benefits received by those out 
of work, especially when governments cannot afford to reduce out-of-work benefits any 
further (Immervoll and Pearson, 2009). Moreover, as specific groups, including women and 
those with low skills, are more likely to be exposed to labour market insecurities, in-work 
benefits become a possible route for reducing inequalities by supporting those with 
additional needs (e.g. families with children) to escape poverty through work (Pearson and 
Scarpetta, 2000). This strand of argumentation, emphasizing individual financial 
(dis)incentives reflects and social policies, is apparent in ‘activation’ and ‘make work pay’ 
agendas, promoted by national governments and as well as the European Union, the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Marchal and Marx, 
2018; Immervoll and Pearson, 2009; OECD, 2003; Bonoli, 2005).  
At the other end of the spectrum, critical political economy and sociological perspectives 
argue in-work benefits are more likely to be in the interests of employers, enabling them to 
pay lower wages and in turn increasing profits, at the expense of the public, and to the 
detriment of the organisation and coordination of labour (Grover and Stewart, 2002; 
Farnsworth, 2015; Rubery et al., 2018). In-work benefits, in this view, are concurrent with 
the (neo)liberalisation of advanced capitalist societies, whereby the erosion of workers’ 
rights and employers’ responsibilities requires the state to facilitate, legitimate and enforce 
‘precarious’ employment through a combination of means-tested in-work subsidies and 
reforms to out-of-work benefits (Grover and Stewart, 2002). Alongside in-work benefits 
oriented towards precarious work, punitive and stigmatising out-of-work support, is 
conditioned upon job search and requirements to take on poor quality jobs, and, in some 
cases, unpaid labour for the purposes of skills development (Dwyer and Wright, 2014; 
Fletcher and Wright, 2018). Such arguments, however, are based primarily on research in 
liberal contexts.  
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There is also a third, less-developed interpretation, which emphasizes the differences in 
countries’ in-work benefits, and considers the possibility that national in-work benefit 
policymaking is constrained by historical institutional arrangements associated with 
distinctive models of democratic capitalism, as opposed to being a wholly convergent form 
of policy development (Kenworthy, 2015, p.24). While researchers across the spectrum, 
state that in-work benefits vary across countries, this is often conceived of as a trade-off in 
terms of two main policy goals, alleviating in-work poverty or reducing unemployment, 
relating to the design of policies, and through a technocratic lens (Immervoll and Pearson, 
2009). How this variation relates to context is rarely considered in comparative research. 
A small number of case studies, mostly of UK and the US, do indeed examine the social and 
political and economic determinants and consequences of in-work benefits in select contexts 
(Vlandas, 2013; Clasen, 2019; Grover and Stewart, 2002; Grover, 2005; Grover, 2016; 
Howard, 1997; Ventry Jr, 2000a; Clegg, 2015). These studies highlight the wavering forms 
of support and rationale given to in-work benefits, among the left and right, in the life course 
of in-work benefit policy making. They also illustrate that national models of policies 
considered in-work benefits do not straightforwardly resemble the archetypal models 
associated with the US and the UK, thus a wider net is needed to capture similar policy 
developments across diverse contexts. For example, some countries’ in-work benefits are 
‘within’ income maintenance benefits primarily targeted on the unemployed.  
Despite these competing interpretations and accounts of in-work benefits, which indirectly 
and directly illuminate the social, economic and political salience of in-work benefit reforms, 
most research efforts have centred on the ‘effectiveness’ of in-work benefits with respect to 
policy goals, e.g. alleviating in-work poverty and unemployment. Comparative research at a 
broader level, in terms of the number of countries and time period covered, has not sought 
to explore questions about the role of in-work benefits, why they are implemented in some 
contexts and not others, and why actual policies vary in scale, design and form, and what 
they signify for the future direction of welfare states. 
Yet, a major stumbling block in addressing these puzzles is that there is also limited evidence 
of where, when and the extent to which governments have implemented in-work policies. 
These evidence gaps constrain efforts to develop and ‘test’ theories about the varied role of 
in-work benefits and their relationship to historical and contemporary contexts of European 
countries in recent decades. Indeed, a number of inter-linked issues appear to hold back 
cross-national in-work benefits research. These are: (1) the inconsistent conceptualisation 
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and definition of in-work benefits in the literature; (2) the predominant technocratic and 
apolitical analysis of this ‘novel’ area of policy and how it varies across contexts and; (3) 
limited cross-national and time-series data on in-work benefits, including on the cost and 
scale of schemes.  
The thesis therefore aims to make inroads on questions about the role of in-work benefits 
through comparative research on in-work benefits in 27/28 European Union Member States 
(EUMS) from 2006 to 20173. The rationale and motivation for focusing EUMS is outlined 
below. However, at the core of the thesis is the argument that systematic empirical analysis 
of in-work benefit policies across de-industrialising countries, exhibiting variance in socio-
economic and institutional factors, is key for understanding the extent and ways in which in-
work benefits vary across countries, and the significance of this variation. The timing of the 
research is pertinent as, on the one hand, there are suggestions in-work benefits have become 
a routine consideration for policymakers to ‘make work pay’ (Kenworthy, 2015). On the 
other, the future of in-work benefits appears to be flux, including in the UK, one of the 
earliest adopters of these policies, where the previous model of separate income maintenance 
policies for in and out of work households is, at the time of writing, being replaced by one 
scheme merging means-tested benefits for working and unemployed households (Millar and 
Bennett, 2017).   
Drawing on the overlapping fields of comparative political economy, welfare state and social 
policy, in-work benefit variation is (re)conceptualised and examined systematically, towards 
the aim of better understanding the role of such policies in capitalist democratic countries, 
including the extent to which countries’ provisions align with or deviate from historically 
embedded political, social and economic interests and ideals associated with national 
contexts (Hall, 2016). A secondary aim of the thesis is to examine how this variation relates 
to some of the salient aspects of context outlined above, including socio-economic and 
institutional factors. 
More specifically, in-work benefits are (re) conceptualised in this thesis as a distinctive area 
of policy development that implies a novel role for the state in the domain of direct income 
maintenance for working households. Such policies are considered distinctive because they 
                                                     
3 The study period overlaps with the UK’s ‘Brexit referendum’ in 2016 in which the public voted in favour of ending the 
UK’s membership of the European Union 52% to 48%. However, during the time period covered by the study, the UK was 
a member of the EU; it did UK did not officially withdraw its Membership of the European Union until 31 January 2020, 
after the House of Commons passed the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 on 23 January 2020. It is 
therefore referred to as a member state in the research. Croatia became a member of the European Union in 2013. It was 
therefore not an EU member country throughout the entire study duration and thus the total EUMS covered by the research 
is 27 to 28.  
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imply a shift in the logics and arrangements concerning the role of the state in income 
maintenance from, mainly providing income maintenance during gaps in earned income (e.g. 
unemployment benefits) and for other needs that are not directly related to work (e.g. child 
benefits). Moreover, they also alter the role of the state (Picot, 2018), employers and other 
actors and institutions involved in determining the adequacy of wages (Millar, 2009; 
Sloman, 2018; Picot, 2018).  This (re)conceptualisation feeds into a threefold typology to 
classify in-work benefits and related policies as either ‘archetypal in-work benefits, possible 
in-work benefits or not in-work benefits and to establish the policy parameters of this 
investigation. 
First, archetypal in-work benefits mirror those of the US and the UK in the form of 
refundable earned income tax credits and in-work cash transfers, both targeted explicitly on 
working households. These are included in the investigation. Alongside this non-refundable 
earned income tax credits are also analysed as a possible form of in-work benefit. These 
represent a slight variant on refundable earned income tax credits, the main difference being 
such measures can only reduce tax liabilities, and not lead to a transfer or ‘refund’. The third, 
possible in-work benefit examined in this thesis are unemployment benefits that can be 
combined with paid work (“adjusted unemployment benefits”) 4. 
The latter is considered a de-facto in-work benefit in Germany (Clasen, 2019) but could be 
in use elsewhere. This category has social and political relevance for our understanding of 
the development of in-work benefits over time because they blur the distinction between 
working and non-working recipient that have been historically salient in some tax and benefit 
systems (Clegg, 2015). Moreover, they may also be indicative or a more cumulative or 
gradual form of shift towards in-work benefits, in contexts where ‘path-breaking’ Liberal-
style in-work benefits cannot be implemented (Kenworthy, 2015; Palier, 2010; Clasen, 
2019). A low bar for including adjusted unemployment benefits was set out at the start of 
the investigation – these policies are then examined comparatively to assess whether they 
constitute in-work benefits.  
Moreover, the thesis also develops a ‘dependency relationships’ analytical framework for 
comparing variation in in-work benefits across countries and over time5.  Developed using 
                                                     
4 These provisions do not constitute an exhaustive list of in-work benefits, but comprise what are argued to be three of the 
most important to understand the development of such provisions across democratic capitalist countries in recent years. 
Additional policies often referred to in discussions about in-work benefits are also classified using the typology set out in 
Chapter 3 that were not examined in this study due to the constraints of the research. 
5 The concept ‘dependence’ is not employed according to political discourse about ‘welfare dependence’ (Daigneault, 
2014b, p.4). Rather it is intended to capture the different sources of welfare upon which citizens rely and the logics and 
interests underpinning policies oriented towards different forms and degrees of dependence (and responsibility) between 
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Esping-Andersen’s (1990) welfare regime theory as well as social policy and welfare state 
research concerning the institutional forms of provisions through a socio-political lens (e.g. 
Howard, 1997; Morel et al, 2016; 2018), the framework considers the logics and interests 
underpinning in-work benefits pertaining to the extent to which and ways in which citizens 
depend on the labour market, state and family for income while participating in paid work 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990; 1999). The thesis thus critically engages with existing concepts 
that encapsulate forms and degrees of dependency (e.g. decommodification), considering the 
context of post-industrial economies, and the focus on in-work benefits, a novel form of 
income maintenance provision.  
On the latter, the research largely refrains from the interpretation of in-work benefit with 
reference to their effects in ways that have been carried out for other policy areas (e.g. re- or 
de-commodification) as it is largely beyond the scope of the analysis to study the interaction 
of in-work benefits with other policies. Moreover, such concepts are limited when 
understanding the changed and varied nature of state, familial and labour market dependence 
in capitalist democratic countries. For example, dependence on highly targeted and invasive 
form of in-work benefits delivered through the social security system encompasses a 
distinctive form of dependence to that on minimally invasive and privileged tax benefits 
(Titmuss, 1958; Morel et al., 2018).  
Finally, this thesis also explores the extent to which variation in countries’ in-work benefit 
policies relates to historical context, notably social policy legacies, and contemporary 
context, in terms of the socio-economic pressures and changes in institutions indicative of 
the liberalisation of countries’ political economy outlined partly above. On the former, a 
welfare regime framework is employed as a heuristic device as a means of examining the 
relevance of historical similarities and differences across countries for understanding in-
work benefit variation. The dependency relationships framework developed for this thesis 
and applied to the analysis of countries’ in-work benefits, speaks to whether and how policies 
are linked to the varied political, social, economic and cultural objectives historically 
embedded in institutions and policy logics across groups of countries. As is the case for other 
types of policy ‘innovation’, national specifications of in-work benefits could retain some of 
the logics of past policymaking, visible in their ‘micro-institutional features’ (Clegg, 2014, 
p.160). 
                                                     
citizens, notably with and through the family, the state and employers, created by and feeding into forms and degrees of 




For example, in-work benefit policies oriented towards a sole-earner or breadwinner model 
of care and work in conservative-corporatist regimes could indicate a continuation of a 
conservative familial policy approach and logic that is embedded in these contexts, despite 
the ‘needs’ and political preferences that might be created in de-industrialised contexts for 
policies that encourage two-earner households (Leibetseder, 2013; Lewis, 1992).  Whereas 
the orientation of in-work benefits in these contexts towards a dual-earner model (e.g. 
individualised provisions) would imply a break from these historical roots. Therefore, the 
extent to which in-work benefits can conceived of as completely ‘path-breaking’ depends on 
the form and the size of provisions.  
Although avoiding a functionalistic interpretation of the relationship between socio-
economic context and in-work benefit variation, the analysis of in-work policies focuses on 
labour market risks associated with deindustrialisation that in-work benefits are often 
considered as a ‘response’ to, including underemployment, unemployment and in-work 
poverty. Similarly, the suggestion that in-work benefits are part of the (neo)liberalisation of 
political economy is examined across a diverse range of contexts, using indicators of 
institutional change typically associated with this process: collective bargaining coverage, 
trade unions density and replacement rates.  
1.1 Aims, research questions and scope  
In concise terms, the aim of the thesis is to better understand the role of in-work benefits 
across diverse capitalist democratic countries, including change over time in the use, form 
and size of national in-work policies. A secondary aim is to contribute evidence that can feed 
into debates about the conceptualisation and definition of in-work benefits for comparative 
research across countries and over time that goes beyond the technical lens applied in many 
studies of in-work benefits. The research questions addressed in the thesis are:  
1) What is the nature and extent of variation in in-work benefits in EUMS? 
a. Have in-work benefits become more commonplace in recent years? 
b. How common are archetypal in-work benefit policies associated 
with liberal regimes? 
2) To what extent and in what ways do EUMS’ in-work benefit policies vary 
in their orientation towards dependence on the labour market, state and the 
family?   
3) How does variation in EUMS’ in-work benefits policies map on to 
historical and contemporary context?  
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The first question concerns the core, descriptive aim to chart variation in the use, form and 
size of in-work benefits across a diverse range of capitalist democratic countries over time. 
The sub-questions capture more substantive claims about the prevalence of these policies 
across capitalist democratic countries and, more specifically, questions over the form that 
such provisions take, e.g. do they resemble the traditional ‘liberal’ in-work policies 
associated with the US and the UK. The second question is borne out of the theoretical 
framework, specifically the development of the dependency relationships framework 
outlined above, which aims to examine cross cutting logics and interests informing national 
in-work benefit strategies, focusing primarily on the design and form of provisions as 
indicators of the orientation of policies towards different degrees and forms of dependency. 
The third question captures the exploratory aspect of the research, which contextualises 
variation in-work benefits with respect to historical (social policy legacies) and 
contemporary contextual factors that have been linked to variation in in-work benefits over 
time and across countries, as outlined above.   
In line with these aims and questions, and practical considerations concerning the limits to 
comparative data on in-work benefits, the thesis focuses on all 27/28 EUMS from 2007 to 
2017. Given the gaps in in-work benefits research, the spatial (all EUMS) and temporal 
dimensions (2006 to 2017) of this thesis were chosen to facilitate an exploration of a 
moderate number of countries which are subject to ‘convergent pressures’, such as 
deindustrialisation. The time period also covers the global financial crisis of 2007-08, the 
subsequent recession, and the recovery period, facilitating an exploration of trends and 
variation in in-work benefits in a changing economic context, which has had different 
implications across EUMS (Theodoropoulou, 2018).  
Similarly, these countries also exhibit variation in the factors associated with in-work benefit 
variation to be explored in this thesis. First, EUMS represent a range of welfare regimes, 
which are used to situate policies. For example, the proportion of people in work and at risk 
of poverty has increased slightly in recent years among EUMS, with the average in-work 
poverty rate at 8.3% in 2008 and 9.6% in 2016. Yet, countries vary considerably, with just 
3.1% of employed people being at risk of poverty in 2016 in Finland compared to 18.9% in 
Romania in the same year. Similarly, unemployment in European Union member states 
declined on average in the three years prior to the global economic crisis, but then increased 
markedly from 2008 to 2012. Unemployment is particularly pronounced in Southern 
European countries. For example, the unemployment rate in Greece in 2016 was 23.6%; 
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19.6% in Spain; and 11.7% in Italy, while the EU average for 2016 was 8.6% (10% for the 
Euro-area) (Eurostat, 2019).  
In addition, collective bargaining, which puts the onus on employers to pay adequate wages 
through negotiations between employers, their representatives and trade unions, has declined 
in recent years in EUMS, especially following the financial crisis. Yet, the proportion of the 
workforce covered by such arrangements varies from ‘very low’ (20-40%) in the likes of the 
UK, Ireland, Greece, Slovakia; to ‘very high’ (80-100%) in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, the Netherlands and Slovenia (Eurofound, 2015, p.43). The focus on EUMS 
also increased the range of data sources which facilitated more in-depth analysis of 
provisions and enhanced the reliability of the findings.  
Moreover, the research questions are addressed through the empirical component of the 
thesis different angles across a number of strands to build a multi-faceted picture of in-work 
benefit variation considering both the qualitative and quantitative dimensions of policies. 
The strands include: 
i. A systematic mapping of in-work benefits across EU-Member States, 
examining the composition of EU Member states with/without in-work 
benefits, at two time points: 2008 and 2016.  
ii. Quantitative analysis of in-work benefit expenditure describing variation 
across countries and time, covering 2006 to 2017. 
Both the findings on the variation in countries with/without the in-work policies mapped in 
this thesis, and variation in expenditure, are contextualised using indicators of socio-
economic and institutional context. 
iii. The operationalisation of the dependency relationships framework, focusing 
on the state and the family, through a comparison of the form, rules and 
design features of policy for 2016.  
iv. A separate, systematic comparison of the orientation of EUMS’ in-work 
benefits towards different forms and degrees of dependence on the labour 
market, including the development of a composite indicator of the orientation 
of each policy sub-type towards non-standard and standard employment.  
In line with the exploratory nature of research question 3, the latter two parts are also 
contextualised using indicators of labour market risks and social policies that emerge as 
potentially salient during the analysis.  
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Each part of the investigation varies in terms of the time-points and countries covered. For 
example, an initial mapping of in-work benefits in the first phase of the empirical research 
for 2008 and 2016 identifies provisions in 18 and 20 countries. Analysis of policy design 
and rules focuses only on 2016 policies, whereas analysis of expenditure could only be 
conducted for 14 countries and two provision types (earned income tax credits and in-work 
cash transfers). Despite the limited policy parameters, the expenditure analysis provides the 
most insights into change over time using time-series data for 2006 to 2017.  
Moreover, as much of the heavy lifting of the thesis centres on describing policy variation 
across a wide range of countries and collecting and analysing data from various sources 
towards these ends, the analysis of the relationship between variance in in-work benefits and 
context is ‘exploratory’. The methods employed are not extensive enough to develop or test 
causal theories. The empirical analysis is intended to describe, analyse and thus contribute 
to theory-building for future explanatory research on in-work benefits. It also applies and 
thus assesses the validity of the conceptual framework described above for defining and 
analysing variation in in-work benefit policies across countries and time.  
1.2 Structure of thesis  
As a relatively under-researched area of social policy, the following chapter (Chapter 2) aims 
to describe and understand how, where and why in-work benefits have developed as an area 
of policy across time and countries based on existing research. It focuses specifically on the 
literature on in-work benefits (and related policies with varied nomenclature). The chapter 
first summarises research on the form, scale, goals and effectiveness of provisions in the US 
and the UK, as countries from which in-work benefits are said to originate. The focus then 
broadens to assess the evidence and arguments about similar reforms elsewhere. It identifies 
three main gaps in in-work benefits research from a comparative perspective relating to 
empirical evidence and conceptual and theoretical development, and outlines the main 
arguments in the literature about why in-work benefits are used and their consequences, that 
have thus far not been ‘tested’ in comparative research.  
Chapter 3 builds on these arguments, drawing on the comparative political economy and 
welfare state literature, as well as perspectives emphasizing the socio-political dimensions 
of social policy, to develop a framework for structuring and interpreting comparative 
analysis of in-work benefits in EUMS. The framework foregrounds political economy and 
sociological perspectives to make sense of in-work benefits because these policies are seen 
to tap into (and seemingly disrupt) logics and institutional arrangements concerning the role 
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and responsibility of the state, as well as that of employers and the family, in providing 
resources, in offsetting or exacerbating inequalities in capitalist democracies. Indeed, the 
notion of in-work benefits is at odds with the broad ideal that paid work guarantees 
independence from the state, at least in the domain of direct income maintenance. At the 
same time, logics and arrangements concerning the role and balance of the state, market and 
family have not been uniform across countries, nor have they remained static over time. The 
social, economic and political transformations from the latter half of the 20th century are oft 
described as an unravelling the institutions and logics of industrial capitalism.  
The first part of the framework there sets the broad backdrop for making sense of in-work 
benefit trends and variation. It argues that in-work benefits should be situated both with 
reference to historical context, at both the broad, regime level, and the micro-institutional 
level (e.g. policy design) and contemporary context, including certain socio-economic 
pressures and areas of institutional change, as these multiple factors may help to make sense 
of variation in in-work benefits. It also introduces concepts characterising change and 
continuity from this literature, e.g. path dependence.  
The second part the framework homes in and presents a more detailed framework for making 
sense of variation in the extent and form of in-work policies across countries and over time. 
It draws on key concepts illuminating the salient features of social policy variation across 
capitalist democracies, in particular the varied ways policies shape and structure, 
qualitatively and quantitatively, citizens are dependence on the state, the (labour) market, 
and the family, in order to maintain a socially acceptable standard of living, including de- 
and re- commodification and de-familialisation (Esping-Andersen, 1990; 1999; Orloff, 
2009).  
Overall, the framework leads to a tentative definition of in-work benefits that sees policies 
as broadly distinctive because they combine state dependence (for income maintenance) with 
dependence on the labour market.  It also outlines the ‘dependency relationships’ analytical 
framework for comparing the orientation of in-work benefit policies towards different 
degrees and forms of dependence on the state, labour market and the family. Analysing 
policy variation through this lens is intended to provide a means of making inferences about 
the relationship between in-work benefits and historical and contemporary context, e.g. 
social policy legacies and socio-economic pressures.  
The methodology and data are justified and appraised in Chapter 4. The use and 
interpretation of cross-national policy analysis based on expert descriptions of policies and 
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simulated data to compare policy development across national contexts are discussed in light 
of paradigms in cross-national social policy and welfare state methodologies. The study 
design and the operationalisation of the key concepts, including the dependency 
relationships framework, is also set out, followed by a description and justification of the 
data sources, collection and analysis. The comparative data on in-work benefits collected 
specifically for the project fed into the development of a new database, EU-IWB, to be made 
available to other researchers in the future. The methodology also reflects on the challenges 
involved in conducting cross-national comparative research on a policy area that is 
inconsistently defined and, relatedly, for which there is limited standardised, cross-national 
data, as well as the lessons learned from conducting the research that could feed into future 
work comparing in-work benefit policies across contexts.   
The empirical work is presented across three chapters: Chapter 5 presents the initial mapping 
of in-work benefits in EUMS in 2008 and 2016 and the analysis of EUMS’ expenditure using 
the data generated specifically for the project using the tax-benefit simulator, EUROMOD, 
and household panel input data (Institute for Social and Economic Research, 2019; 
Sutherland and Figari, 2013). Due to data limitations, the analysis of expenditure covers 
earned income tax credits and in-work cash transfers only. Both attempts to capture trends 
and cross-national variation in in-work benefits are contextualised, applying a welfare 
regime framework to structure the analysis, and with indicators of the socio-economic and 
institutional variation. Chapter 6 presents the initial analysis of EUMS’ in-work benefits 
employing a dependency relationship framework, focusing on the policy rules and designs 
that are indicators of the orientation of provisions towards qualitative and quantitatively 
different relations with the state and the family. Chapter 7 presents the analysis of the labour-
market orientation of EUMS’ in-work benefits based on policy rules and design features for 
2016, assessing the orientation of policies towards standard or non-standard work. Chapter 
8 summarises the main findings and discusses the interpretation of the empirical components 
holistically. Finally, Chapter 9 restates the research motivation, the questions and the 
approach employed in this thesis. It ends by setting out the study limitations and suggestions 
for future work.   
1.3 Summary of thesis 
In sum, this thesis adds to existing evidence that in-work benefits, broadly defined as policies 
implying a fundamental role for the state in the domain of income maintenance for working 
households, are in place across a diverse range of EUMS. Many EUMS already had such 
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provisions in place at the point of the first mapping of relevant provisions carried out for this 
thesis for 2008. Yet, schemes were introduced more recently in some Southern and Central 
and Eastern European countries after this time point, indicating policies may be used as a 
welfare state ‘evolves’. In broad terms, the use of such measures could be considered a 
(partial) break with the logics and institutional arrangements of democratic capitalist 
countries, and the interests and ideals underpinning them, that have positioned paid work as 
a means for achieving financial independence from the state, and whereby the state’s role in 
income maintenance has largely been confined to other risks, including unemployment 
(Sloman, 2018).  
Crucially, however, the findings add further evidence to the argument that developments in 
in-work benefits are not uniform across capitalist democratic countries (Immervoll and 
Pearson, 2009; Kenworthy, 2015). The development and application of an analytical 
framework for identifying and comparing the salient features of in in-work benefits (and 
policies categorised as ‘possible in-work benefits’) illuminated variation in the orientation 
of countries’ provisions towards degrees and forms of dependence on the state, labour 
market and family, as well as changes over time. In very few cases did EUMS’ in-work 
policies resemble the archetypal ‘liberal’ in-work benefits associated with the UK and the 
US, which took the form of means-tested in-work cash transfers or refundable earned income 
tax credits, predominantly for low-income working households with children. Later reforms 
in the UK also depart from this model.   
More specifically, cross national variation identified using this framework was condensed 
into what were seen as five distinctive in-work benefit approaches or models.  
The first can be summarised as the archetypal, means-tested social in-work benefit that 
explicitly target working households, associated with historical policies in liberal contexts 
that encourage interdependency within families and tie together the labour market activity 
of recipients within a household. The second takes the form of fiscal in-work benefits 
targeted on the basis of familial and gender considerations, which are mainly oriented 
towards a modified breadwinner model. As tax policies, these comprises a less invasive and 
most likely privileged form of state dependence as a fiscal benefit (refundable earned income 
tax credits). The third is also a fiscal in-work benefit but targeted on the basis of earnings 
and/or employment relationship and also takes the form of refundable tax credits. The fourth 
is summarised as fiscal, universalist non-refundable earned income tax credits, premised on 
an active worker model. The fifth model, labelled implicit in-work cash transfers, is 
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characterised by an orientation towards a punitive and potentially stigmatising form of state 
dependence for income maintenance and an orientation towards precarious forms of 
dependence on the labour market.  
Moreover, the findings on in-work policies were contextualised throughout the investigation, 
to explore the relationships between variation in the use, cost and orientation of provisions 
and indicators of historical and contemporary context.  
The extent to which variation in policy types aligned with social policy legacies was indeed 
facilitated by the dependency relationships framework, which was based on ideal-type 
models of countries’ balance of state, market and the family. There were a number of 
examples of a continuation of policy logics. For example, conservative ideals, especially 
concerning the models of work and care within families and the targeting of provisions on 
the basis of employment statuses, play out in the design and rules of Bismarckian and some 
Southern regime provisions. The findings also comprise evidence of a stark continuation of 
expansive, more universal approach to social policy associated with Nordic regime 
countries. Yet, the latter is somewhat paradoxical, as provisions are effectively expansive 
cuts in income taxation, which could erode the fiscal base (and associated support) for the 
Nordic welfare state.  
Relatedly, the findings indicate that in-work benefits have occurred alongside forms of 
liberalisation in some EUMS, e.g. Sweden.  However, for some countries, the findings point 
to institutional constraints on liberalisation, despite an expansion in in-work benefits in 
recent years. For example, the expansion of an earned income tax credit in Denmark has not 
coincided with the erosion of unemployment protections, based on the indicators used in this 
study. The extent to which in-work benefits play a role in these processes is thus an important 
question for future research (e.g. do they undermine support for expenditure on 
unemployment benefits?). Moreover, the findings comprise tentative evidence that 
increasing socio-economic pressures within some national contexts is linked to increases in 
in-work benefit expenditure, but the relationships observed were also not uniform, indicating 
that socio-economic pressures are likely to be mediated through national political and 
institutional factors. The exploratory analysis and in-work benefit expenditure data provokes 
the need for substantial development in order to more robustly assess claims about these 
relationships.   
22 
 
2 THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF IN-WORK 
BENEFITS 
The aim of this chapter is to build an understanding the origins and development of in-work 
benefits in capitalist democratic countries based on the literature. Although it is often argued 
that in-work benefits, loosely defined, rarely featured in the tax-benefit systems of most 
capitalist democratic countries until a trend towards such policies from the late 1990s and 
early 2000s onwards, there have been very few efforts to systematically study trends and 
cross-national variation in this area of social policy. The literature reviewed in this chapter 
is therefore broad, with different foci and perspectives, but when combined serves as a useful 
starting point for understanding cross-national variation in in-work benefits, and 
developments over time. Although not the focus of most in-work benefits research, the 
chapter also considers arguments about the political, economic and social drivers and 
consequences of the wider use of in-work benefits in capitalist democratic countries. 
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.1 starts with a comparative overview of in-
work benefits in the US and the UK, as they are widely considered two of the first countries 
to implement in-work benefit policies. Section 2.2 extends the focus to other European and 
OECD countries, which illuminates the varied and conflicting ways of conceptualising and 
defining of in-work benefits in the literature, and the gaps in the evidence base on trends and 
cross-national variation in in-work benefits.  In Section 2.3, several competing arguments 
about the role and purpose of in-work benefits in capitalist democratic countries are 
discussed in more detail, as these relate to the tensions over how to define and conceptualise 
in-work benefits for cross-national research. Section 2.4 summarises the gaps and limitations 
of research on in-work benefits in a comparative perspective and argues these gaps limit the 
possibilities for developing and testing explanations for in-work benefit variation across 
countries and over time. The chapter ends by outlining the first, descriptive research question 
and set of sub-questions that emerge as a result of the literature review. 
2.1 The development of in-work benefits in the US and the UK 
In-work benefits were not a standard part of post-war welfare states and the implementation 
of such policies across capitalist democratic countries has been uneven. Many researchers 
trace the origins of in-work benefit policies to the US and the UK the mid-1970s6 and then 
                                                     
6 Grover and Stewart (2002) and Grover (2005, p.12) associate in-work benefits in the 20th 
and 21st century with the Speenhamland system in Britain up until the 1834 new Poor Law. 
Bennett and Hirch (2001, p.65) argue wages fell directly as a result of the Speenhamland 
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to other ‘liberal’ or English-speaking countries in the decades that followed (Immervoll and 
Pearson, 2009; Millar, 2009; Kenworthy, 2015). In-work benefits, loosely defined, are 
understood to have not been used outside of the Anglo-Saxon countries until the late 1990s 
and the early 2000s. The development and form of in-work benefits in the US and the UK 
constitutes a key reference point for comparisons with other contexts (Pearson and Scarpetta, 
2000, p.13; Cousins, 2014). Moreover, the form of in-work benefits in liberal welfare 
regimes becomes pivotal when assessing arguments about why in-work benefits have 
become more widespread.   
To start with the US, its main in-work benefit is the federal Earned Income Tax Credit 
(EITC). Enacted in 1975 and still in place, the federal EITC is a refundable tax credit, 
meaning it reduces tax liabilities for eligible working households, but can result in a transfer 
for eligible households who are not liable to pay any tax because of low earnings (Meyer, 
2010; Falk and Crandall-Hollick, 2016; Sykes et al., 2015). To be eligible, ‘tax filers’ must 
have a wage earner in the family, have a low to medium income and claim the credit when 
they file an annual tax refund (Meyer, 2010; Cousins, 2014, p.107). Originally, the EITC 
was introduced as a temporary measure during the 1974 recession to encourage economic 
growth. Its stated aims were reducing unemployment and reducing expenditure on welfare 
by incentivising people with dependent children to obtain employment (Falk and Crandall-
Hollick, 2016, p.10). These aims – to reduce unemployment, welfare dependency and in-
work poverty – remain central (Falk and Crandall-Hollick, 2016, p.10) 
The EITC has also grown in cost and coverage over time. When introduced in 1975, 
expenditure on the EITC was $1.25 billion and it had 6.2 million recipients (Falk and 
Crandall-Hollick, 2016, p.18). By 2015, $68.1 billion was spent on the EITC, which was 
received by 28.82 million tax filers, or approximately 18 per cent of the labour force 
(Cousins, 2014, p. 107). Since its inception it has become ‘largest anti-poverty program for 
the non-aged in the United States’(Meyer, 2017, p.1). The long-lasting nature of the EITC 
and its deliberate expansion over time are illustrative of its popularity. Studying the EITC in 
the US alongside other forms of ‘fiscal’ welfare, Howard (1997, p64) argues:  
                                                     
system, but three main differences prevented this effect with the later schemes: 1. Statutory 
minimum wages, 2. ‘A more developed public notion of welfare underpinned by taxation,’ 
and 3. The varied income sources of working households which are no longer dependent on 
one adult male’s wage (Bennett and Hirsch, 2001).  
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‘It is hard to think of another government program that has received such universal 
acclaim among political elites. Considering the prevailing skepticism, if not hostility, 
toward public assistance programs, the popularity of the EITC is remarkable’.  
The EITC’s expansion often occurred alongside cuts to other areas of social policy, notably 
Medicare and federal employee pensions, indicating a degree of immunity to fiscal pressures 
(ibid, p.140). Howard (1997) attributes the EITC’s popularity to its institutional form as a 
tax policy. Although initially ‘hidden’ within tax legislation (Howard, 1997), the EITC 
became far more visible over time, with politicians on the left and right claiming credit for 
the measure by directly campaigning to protect or expand the EITC, or avoiding association 
with cost containment (Howard, 1997, p.72). Meyer (2010) also suggests that a significant 
feature in the popularity of the EITC is its orientation towards working households with 
children.  
The development of in-work benefits in the UK is somewhat distinctive. The stated aims of 
in-work benefits in the UK are similar to those in the US and have remained fairly constant 
over the years. However, in contrast to the continuity and expansion of the EITC in the US, 
the development of in-work benefits in the UK is more erratic, sometimes closer and 
sometimes further away from the US model of in-work benefits (Clegg, 2015), with the 
political support for in-work benefits shifting in recent years.  
This started with the Family Income Supplement (FIS), which introduced in the UK 1971, a 
few years before the EITC. FIS’ main aim was to reduce in-work poverty for families with 
children (Millar, 2009).  Similarly, however, it was only for households with dependent 
children, on the condition that one parent was working, Unlike the EITC, however, FIS was 
part of the social security system. Another difference was that households had to demonstrate 
they were working 30 hours per week to be eligible for the benefit (Millar, 2009, p.235), 
thus there was thus more of an emphasis on work hours than its counterpart.  
FIS, however, was minor in the history of the UK’s in-work benefits (Clegg, 2015, p.494). 
It cost just £8 million per annum and covered 160,000 families when introduced (Grover and 
Stewart, 2002, p.135). It was replaced by (or some say, revamped as) Family Credit by the 
Conservative government of 1988. This provision continued to solely be for working 
households with dependent children, with lone parents eligible at lower hours of work than 
couples.  Yet, Millar (2009, p.235) argues it was this change that ‘really established wage 
supplementation through means-tested benefits as a legitimate, and integral, function of the 
social security system’.  
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After just under a decade, Family Credit was replaced in 1999 by the short-lived Working 
Families Tax Credit (WFTC) under the New Labour government. The provision was 
administered by the tax office and could be paid direct by employers with wages. This was 
intended to associate the tax credit with work, not welfare (Clegg, 2015; Millar, 2009). And 
UK policy makers supposedly looked to the US’ EITC for inspiration. Clegg (2015, p.494) 
also argues the reforms were a ‘conscious act of political communication’ which emphasized 
the rewards of working and boosted the status of those in the administrative system, moving 
them away from means-testing and welfare.’ 
Fairly short-lived, WFTC paved the way for the ‘next generation’ tax credits in the form of 
Working Tax Credit (WTC) and Child Tax Credit (CTC) (Millar, 2009, p.240)7, which led 
to the rapid expansion and increasing costs of tax credits in the UK. Similar to previous 
reforms, the stated aims of these tax credits were to tackle child poverty, to ‘make work pay’, 
and to create incentives to increase earnings (Millar, 2009).  This shift was in part reflecting 
an aim to ‘modernise’ the system to make it simpler and more effective (Millar, 2009, p. 
237). There were also concerns about tackling fraud and low take-up that previous systems 
were vulnerable to (Godwin and Lawson, 2012). 
Following this period of expansion, expenditure on in-work benefits in the form of CTC and 
WTC began to decline from 2011/12, the result of reforms to curb expenditure on these 
benefits as part of wider austerity measures implemented by the Conservative - Liberal 
Democrat coalition government (Clegg, 2015). For example,  the rates of WTC were frozen 
for three years (Grover, 2011). Eventually, WTC (and CTC) were to be phased out, 
following legislation in 2012 introducing a new programme, Universal Credit (UC). 
Universal Credit replaces six means-tested in- and out-of-work benefits (Income Based 
Jobseeker’s Allowance, Housing Benefit, Working Tax Credit, Child Tax Credit, Income 
Related Employment and Support Allowance and Income Support) with a single payment 
(Cousins, 2014). From 2013, the UK has thus been engaged in a major reform of the system 
of benefits and tax credits for people of working age.  
The stated aims of Universal Credit are echo some of those of previous measures: ‘encourage 
people on benefits to start paid work or increase their hours by making sure work pays; make 
it easier for people to manage the move into work; simplify the system, making it easier for 
                                                     
7 In-work benefits in the UK (and the US) had up until this point been defined on the basis that eligibility rules required at 
least one member of the recipient household to be in work – even though the levels of earnings and hours of work that gain 
access changed over time in both countries. Adhering to this criterion, CTC should not be considered an in-work benefit as 
non-working households are also eligible. This becomes problematic when considering variation in expenditure on in-work 
benefits overtime and when comparing with other countries.   
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people to understand, and easier and cheaper for the government to administer; reduce the 
number of people who are in work but still living in poverty; and reduce fraud and error’ 
(DWP, 2015). Although there was broad political support for the principles of the policy 
initially, the implementation and roll out of the new system, which was ongoing at the time 
of writing, has not gone smoothly, and many have become increasingly critical of some of 
the design features. In this vein, Dwyer and Wright (2014, p.27) note the controversies and 
failures concerning the reforms gradual implementation, including technical mishaps, as 
well as built-in design features that are expected to exacerbate poverty among a large 
proportion of recipients compared to the previous system.   
In terms of the ‘in-work’ part of Universal Credit, by merging tax credits and benefits into 
one payment, the policy blurs the previously sharp distinction in the UK social security 
system between in- and out-of-work recipients (Clegg, 2015). Universal Credit also 
introduces work-related behavioural conditions for ‘low-paid insecure and part-time workers 
and their partners’ (Dwyer and Wright, 2014). Those subject to ‘in-work conditionality’ are 
required to demonstrate they have sought to increase their hours and/or earnings if below a 
certain level. Non-compliance can result in financial sanctions in the form of the reduction 
or suspension of benefit payments. Monitoring and punitive behavioural requirements are a 
well-known feature of out-of-work benefits in the UK since the 1990s, but in-work 
conditionality has been seen as a significant extension of the sanctions regime into the 
working population (Dwyer and Wright, 2014). 
Dwyer and Wright (2014, p.30-31) argue this departs from previous policy logics whereby 
working recipients were shielded from the stigma and harm of a punitive conditionality 
regime, which assumes recipients of welfare are ‘free loaders’ or ‘work shy’. They also argue 
it is at odds with the logic of the reform itself to reduce ‘welfare dependence’ as ‘those who 
have succeeded in succeeded in finding a job will not be rewarded with the legitimacy of a 
respectably-named tax credit to top-up low wages or a life free from behavioural 
intervention’ (ibid, p30). The political and social legitimacy of this transformation of in-
work benefits therefore appears uncertain as the policy is gradually implemented (Abbas and 
Chrisp, 2018; Abbas and Jones, 2018; Jones et al., 2019).  
With a few exceptions, much of the research on in-work benefits in the US and the UK has 
focused on the evaluating policy effectiveness against stated aims, e.g. whether provisions 
reach target populations in order to effectively reduce unemployment and in-work poverty 
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(Brewer et al., 2005; Gregg et al., 2012; Kolm and Tonin, 2011). Some researchers have also 
investigated the wider economic impact on wages and employment, for example.  
Evidence of the effectiveness of the EITC in meeting policy objectives is summarised in 
several literature reviews (e.g. Brewer et al., 2006; Cousins, 2014; Nichols and Rothstein, 
2015; Van der Linden, 2016). In short, the evidence on poverty is mixed, with one study 
finding the EITC reduced poverty by one per cent, and another arguing that the EITC is 
regressive within low income ranges as it provides support to those with higher earnings 
(Cousins, 2014, p.108-109). In terms of employment, the EITC has been found to have a 
substantial and significant effect on lone parents’ labour market participation but a negative 
participation effects for second earners (Brewer et al., 2005).  There is also some evidence 
to suggest the EITC reduces the hours worked among recipients (Cousins, 2014, p.108). 
Other studies provide evidence of the policy’s wider effects. For example, one study found 
the EITC depresses wages, but this varied according to the characteristics of the recipient 
and the generosity of the scheme (Van der Linden, 2016, p.6) 
In the UK, Brewer et al’s (2006) analysis of the WFTC, finds positive and significant effects 
of the WFTC on lone mothers’ labour market participation. Later research evaluating the 
combined effects of WTC and CTC finds positive employment effects for single women and 
lone mothers (Cousins, 2014, p.104).  Research examining the life-cycle effects, also 
reviewed by Cousins (2014), shows that the effects of in-work benefits on full-time 
employment is much lower and that there is a limited effect on earnings. The success of in-
work benefits in reducing poverty is linked to the value of credits for working households. 
Relative child poverty was found to fall steeply between 1998 and 2004, during which there 
was major investment in tax credit schemes (Gregg et al., 2012, p.2). In contrast, austerity 
measures and the move to Universal Credit are associated with an enhanced risk of in-work 
poverty for some household types and some have begun to explore the experiences and 
effects of in-work conditionality from the perspectives of recipients and employers (Wright 
et al., 2018; Jones et al., 2019).   
There have thus been similar policy aims attached to in-work benefits in the US and the UK 
to increase work incentives and to reduce in-work poverty, especially for families with 
children. There has also been a concern with reducing government expenditure on and 
‘dependence’ on out-of-work benefits (Cousins, 2014). However, the stated aims of 
provisions and their actual effects are not clearly aligned, indicating there are likely other 
objectives and interests cutting through policies in these contexts. Stigmatising and 
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derogatory notions of welfare dependence have been particularly prominent in both 
justifications for expanding in-work benefits and concurrent cuts to out-of-work benefits 
(Grover and Stewart, 2002). In later years, ‘make work pay’ became a prominent yet 
ambiguous policy goal associated with in-work benefits and other policies (e.g. minimum 
wages) (Bennett and Millar, 2005).  However, the administrative (status-based) and material 
privileging of low-income working households in the UK are being eroded through austerity 
measures and Universal Credit, according to some critics.   
In both the US and the UK, governments have expanded in-work benefits over time. The US 
system has stayed fairly constant in its use of the tax system for delivery throughout while 
the UK has used both the tax and social security systems at different times. Both countries 
policies extended to households without children over time. Despite these differences, as is 
discussed in more detail below, the use and form of these policies in the US and the UK are 
seen as in keeping with the wider use of means-testing and targeted social policy common 
to liberal welfare regimes and, in some accounts, the low wages and inequalities associated 
with (neo)liberal political economy.  
How then does the development of in-work benefits in two countries perceived to be 
relatively similar in terms of political economy and welfare institutions compare with other 
contexts? The next section extends the discussion to more countries and focuses on the way 
in which research has set about making cross-national comparisons, bringing in different 
political and policy contexts.  
2.2 The rise of in-work benefits across diverse contexts  
This section reviews a handful of studies, situated predominantly in the grey literature8, to 
build a picture of developments in in-work benefits, albeit with different nomenclature, in 
countries other than the US and the UK from the late 1990s. It also draws on a smaller body 
of academic studies focusing on in-work benefits in select contexts, and broader studies 
analyse in-work benefits as part of a wider group of provisions or policy agenda. The 
literature discussed in this section comprises evidence that in-work benefits, loosely defined, 
have become more common since the turn of the century and that policies vary along 
numerous lines. However, in-work benefits are inconsistently defined in the literature and 
                                                     
8 Grey literature is a broad term used to refer to literature that is not peer reviewed or published by an academic publisher, 
including reports by think tanks. The bulk of the literature on in-work benefits that captures cross-national variation across 
countries takes the form of reports or working papers. In many cases these are detailed and useful, but there is no 
methodology discussing and describing the data sources, collection, analysis etc. Many are also snapshot studies. 
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there are several methodological shortcomings in existing cross-national research, limiting 
comparative insights into trends and variation in-work benefits over this time period.   
In-work benefits and related measures were identified in a number of OECD countries from 
the late 1990s and early 2000s. Pearson and Scarpetta’s (2000) often-cited report on ‘make 
work pay’ (MWP) policies group the in-work benefit schemes in the US and the UK, as 
discussed above, with related policies in France and Canada. In the report, MWP policies 
are defined partly by their shared aims, ‘both to promote low-paid employment and to 
increase the incomes of those near the bottom of the income distribution’ (Pearson and 
Scarpetta, 2000, p.17). The main target group of these policies are people on the margins of 
the labour market with little work experience and/or low skills. However, the policies 
discussed in the report vary in the ‘stress they give to each of these two objectives’, which 
the authors link to differences in the form and design of policies (Pearson and Scarpetta, 
2000, p.17). 
The report argues that the French policy, a rebate for family contributions and social security 
contributions introduced in 1996, is institutionally distinctive to the policies in the US and 
the UK; and therefore, not within the same category of in-work benefits (Pearson and 
Scarpetta, 2000, p.14). Where in-work benefits are means-tested and more targeted on a 
specific part of the low-skilled population, tax or social security rebate policies are 
distinctive as they apply to all workers with earnings below a certain level. The authors also 
maintain these differences are reflected in the costs of policies, with tax reductions costing 
more because they are less targeted.  
Indeed, expenditure on France’s rebate was greater as a percentage of GDP (0.6) than the 
US’ EITC in the same year, which was approximately 0.3 per cent of GDP. But the rebate 
was close to the predicted cost of the UK’s WFTC (0.66 per cent GDP) for the same year 
(ibid).  Therefore arguments for separating out such policies do not necessarily hold when 
considering the increasing costs of US and the UK’s in-work benefits (Bargain and Orsini, 
2006, p.668). Targeting also constitutes an important within-category distinction in many 
policy areas and the extent of targeting or universality is a basis for comparing policies 
within the same category (Oorschot and Roosma, 2015; Esping-Andersen, 1990). The 
approach in the report to separately categorise schemes targeting employers, such as 
reductions in employer social security contributions, and employees, such as those described 
above, is arguably more meaningful as these comprise very different target groups in terms 
of risks, needs and status. Even still, the idea that the main beneficiaries of typical in-work 
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benefits are the working households that receive them is contested in the literature discussed 
below, which stress the relationship between in-work benefits and the interests of employers 
(Farnsworth, 2015). We return to this point later.  
Later comparative reports provide further evidence of in-work benefits, or  ‘employment 
conditional benefits’, in 2003, in Anglo-Saxon countries as well as in Belgium, France and 
the Netherlands (OECD, 2003). While most schemes detailed are in English speaking or 
Anglo-Saxon countries, the identification of policies in additional continental European 
countries captures what might be considered a significant shift (Kenworthy, 2015; Bosch 
and Gautié, 2009).  Moreover, the category of employment conditional benefits in this 
literature is important as variants of it reappear throughout the grey literature making use of 
OECD sources (OECD, 2018). The category includes earned income tax credits and in-work 
cash transfer schemes like those in the US and the UK, but also tax allowances, reductions 
in social security contributions (notably in Germany and in Belgium), as well as social 
assistance benefits with mechanisms that allow recipients to combine their benefits with 
earned income. 
The US and UK’s archetypal in-work benefits, described above, and the OECD’s category 
of employment-conditional benefits are similar in the emphasis on eligibility requirements 
concerning recipients’ participation in paid work and because they imply a novel role for the 
state in income maintenance for working households. Yet, not all policies grouped under this 
category are solely for working recipients. For instance, social assistance benefits are 
categorised as employment-conditional benefits if they contain mechanisms such as earnings 
disregards, exempting a proportion of recipients’ earned income from the means-test that 
determines entitlement to the benefit. One of the main arguments for including benefits 
where employment is not an eligibility requirement is that they are ‘functionally equivalent’ 
policies that could have similar effects on the net incomes of working households (Immervoll 
and Pearson, 2009, p.18).  
There are further examples of claims about trends in in-work benefits and inconsistencies in 
the policy parameters of research. For example, Bargain and Orsini (2006, p.669) later 
commented that ‘the idea of in-work transfers has been spreading in continental Europe too’. 
An OECD (2011) definition cited by Vandelannoote and Verbist (2017, p.2) describes 
employment conditional earning subsidies as ‘permanent work-contingent tax credits, tax 
allowances, or equivalent work-contingent benefit schemes, designed with the dual purpose 
of alleviating in-work poverty and increasing work-incentives for low-income workers’. 
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Thus, both the institutional form and the objectives of policies form the basis of the 
definition.  
Another OECD paper in 2009 identified ‘employment conditional earning subsidies’ in 16 
out of 30 OECD countries (Immervoll and Pearson, 2009). However, the authors argue that 
not all transfers and tax concessions constitute in-work benefits, instead stressing that ‘the 
defining feature of IWB is that they are conditional on employment and that they create 
distinct incentives for some groups to increase working hours or work effort’ (Immervoll 
and Pearson 2009, p.16). Moreover, Immervoll and Pearson’s (2009, p.18 - 19) report 
provides a detailed snapshot of both ‘temporary’ and ‘permanent’ in-work benefits in OECD 
countries. The temporary schemes align more closely with active labour market policy 
targeted predominantly on the unemployed, not ‘wage-subsidisation’ per se. Permanent 
schemes, however, are identified for 14 OECD countries in 2007. Alongside English-
speaking OECD countries, policies are identified in Korea, Slovak Republic, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Finland, Sweden, France, Germany and Hungary. The list does not 
appear to be exhaustive (the others note that ‘smaller programmes may exist in other 
countries’) but the variety of countries beyond liberal welfare states is noteworthy.   
The types of schemes identified are earned income tax credits, social security reductions for 
employees and in-work cash transfers (ibid). Social assistance schemes that can be combined 
with earnings are not included. Some of the earned income tax credits are ‘refundable’ like 
the US model, whereas others can only reduce tax liability but do not lead to a transfer i.e. 
they are ‘non-refundable’. There is little detail of the costs of schemes, but the authors point 
to variation in policy design and identifies several salient aspects, including: whether 
benefits are only for working parents, if the number of children affect the benefit amount, 
how much work or earnings are required to be eligible for the benefit, the benefit unit, taper 
rate, and rules concerning the treatment of earnings and work hours (Immervoll and Pearson, 
2009, p.19–24).   
The report also details the technical trade-offs involved in designing in-work benefits. A key 
fault line is between whether the family or individuals are the benefit unit. In short, family 
provisions being better suited to redistribution, whereas individual provisions are better 
geared towards employment goals, as they ‘avoid the adverse effect on second-earners’. 
Approximately 50% of the policies identified are only available for households with 
children. The authors attribute this to a ‘particular concern for child poverty and wellbeing, 
and recognition that work is the most promising route out of poverty’ (Immervoll and 
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Pearson, 2009, p.19). The lens through which in-work benefit variation is analysed differs 
to some of the research discussed for the US and the UK that illuminated the social and 
pollical dynamics underpinning, for example, ‘fiscal’ in-work benefits (Howard, 1997, 
Clegg, 2015) or conditionality (Wright et al., 2018). Yet, the analysis illuminates that there 
are likely to be competing interests and logics at play concerning the design of policies that 
are likely to important for comparing policies across contexts.  
Moreover, the most recent cross-national (working) paper on ‘employment conditional 
earning subsidies’ identifies schemes in 17 countries, including many non-English speaking 
countries (Kenworthy, 2015). They are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, 
Sweden, United Kingdom and the United States. Unlike Immervoll and Pearson (2009), the 
schemes included were not solely targeted on working households. For example, social 
assistance policies with earnings disregards facilitating the receipt of social assistance with 
paid work, identified in Denmark and Portugal, appear in the list of relevant provisions in 
the report (Kenworthy, 2015, p.29).  
In sum, the reports discussed above provide examples of various policies that resemble, to 
varying degrees, in-work benefits in the US and the UK. However, they arguably do not 
constitute robust evidence of trends and variance in in-work benefits. Most focus on one 
point in time and discuss examples of policies and their features but it is not clear how and 
why certain policies are identified and included in the analysis. There is only patchy detail 
on expenditure (i.e. for select countries and years) on in-work benefit policies, constituting 
limited insights into variation in the ‘commitment’ to in-work benefits across countries and 
time9. For example, even as the number of countries increases, it may be that some have 
retrenched in-work benefits over time (Clegg, 2015). Finally, the lens applied to interpret 
variation in the form and design of policies is mostly technocratic in line with the evaluative 
emphasis in the reports. As the purpose of these papers is to provide policy context and a 
summary of literature on the effectiveness of in-work benefits, these limitations are not 
detrimental to their purpose. Nevertheless, the studies constitute limited empirical 
foundations for understanding of the development of in-work benefits cross-nationally and 
over time, especially the political and social dimensions that have been drawn out in some 
of the literature on the US and the UK.  
                                                     
9 Nearly all of the literature discussed thus far uses OECD Employment Conditional Earning Subsidies data, which does 
not contain indicators of expenditure and is only available for select years (OECD, 2010). 
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Some of these gaps are partly filled by academic research applying either a broader or 
narrower lens. A study by Marchal and Marx (2018, p.22) contributes robust insights into 
cross-national variance in in-work benefits and change over time through analysis of 
government policies ‘supporting’ families with low-wages through simulations across 15 
EU member states for the period 2001 – 2012, looking at ideal-type model households. They 
find further evidence of the ‘fiscalization’ of support for low-wage workers in European 
countries as governments use tax allowances, tax credits and social insurance rebates to 
reduce the liabilities of these populations and boost net incomes (Marchal and Marx, 2018). 
This finding is based on the substantial tax reductions in some countries studied where taxes 
were still relatively high at the start of the period studied (Marchal and Marx, 2018, p. 25–
26). Additionally, households without children are found to be more likely to have their 
incomes boosted solely through tax measures whereas households with children are also 
reliant on benefits. As Marchal and Marx (2018, p.28) state: 
‘Benefiting from child tax allowances and tax credits, tax liabilities for low-wage 
families with children were already very low to begin with, but even so, further 
decreases were common. By 2012, average tax rates for low-wage families with 
children in most countries approached zero.’ 
Unlike the reports discussed above, there is a clear methodology underpinning this research, 
which simulated income components for model households using a database compiled 
through consultations with country level experts (Marchal and Marx, 2018). However, the 
analysis is concerned with changes in net income components, not with the details of policies 
for each country, such as when they were introduced, their form and design, and how much 
they cost. Such details are, given the cases of the US and the UK, important indicators of the 
variation in the social and political dimensions of provisions. Additionally, the workers in 
all model households were working full-time at minimum wage. For couple households, one 
was assumed to be working full-time and the partner inactive. Policies targeting and/or 
available to households with different working hours and arrangements are therefore not 
covered in this analysis.  
There are also two national case studies of the politics of in-work benefits in Germany and 
France. The explanations they provide for the introduction of schemes in these contexts is 
discussed in the next section. The main point here is that the studies illuminate the different 
approaches to in-work benefits apparent in non-liberal countries. First, Vlandas’ (2013) case 
study of France discusses two in-work benefit provisions: a refundable tax credit, the 
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‘Employment Bonus’, (‘Prime Pour l’Emploi’, or PPE) introduced in 2001 (Vlandas, 2013, 
p.120), and a social security benefit, ‘Active Income of Solidarity’ (‘Revenue de Solidarité 
Active’, or RSA), introduced in 2008. RSA merges social assistance and lone parent benefits 
and can be received by households in and out of work (Vlandas, 2013, p.121). Just one 
element of RSA, (‘RSA activité’ or RSAA) constitutes an in-work benefit as it ‘targets those 
that do have a job but earn less than a certain threshold (ibid)10.  The study shines light on 
the cost of the RSA policy as a whole (1.5 billion euros) but not the in-work benefit element, 
RSAA11. 
Clasen (2019) analyses the development of Germany’s main in-work benefit scheme 
introduced in 2005. Similar to the UK’s Universal Credit and France’s RSAA, Germany’s 
‘integrated minimum income scheme’, officially unemployment benefit II or ‘basic 
allowance for jobseekers’, known also as ‘Hartz IV’, is ‘the principal national IWB system 
in Germany (Clasen, 2019, p.6). Although it is a social assistance/ unemployment benefit, 
about a quarter of all recipients are in paid employment (ibid). Thus, in both France and 
Germany, de facto in-work benefit policies that do not possess some of the key features of 
archetypal in-work benefit policies but are considered in-work benefits in these national 
contexts.  
In-work benefits also feature in comparative accounts of other policy categories and agendas. 
For example, in-work benefits are also grouped with active labour market policies (ALMP), 
as ‘incentive reinforcement’ policies (Bonoli 2010). However, when looking at the details 
of studies of these broader policy areas, the empirical analysis of in-work benefits is limited 
to non-existent as research on ALMP has been primarily concerned with policies targeting 
the (long-term) unemployed and the comparative data employed to research ALMP reflects 
this (e.g. Bonoli, 2013)12. In-work benefits are also defined on the basis of what they are not. 
For example, in a study of social investment, Hemerijck (2013, p.132), refers to in-work 
benefits along with other ‘proactive’ reforms (in contrast to ‘passive’ out-of-work income 
support) that ‘were designed to accommodate markets, under conditions of austerity, rather 
                                                     
10 The money for the RSA was to be raised through new taxes, unlike most other social security policies in France (Vlandas, 
2013,p.121). However, take-up of RSA activité was low, limiting its redistributive effects. In part this is attributed to 
recipients’ behaviour as being driven by concerns other than financial incentives (ibid). 
11 There are additional examples of institutionally diverse policies being classified as in-work benefits in the academic 
literature. For example, social security contribution reductions or exemptions are also classed as in-work benefits in some 
countries, notably Belgium and Germany, where these payments are traditionally high (Peeters et al., 2008). 
12 Bonoli (2013, p.128) discusses the introduction of a non-transferable tax credit in the Netherlands in the 2001 tax reform 
alongside the individualisation of the tax system, which can also ‘be paid out as cash for those who have no income from 
work’. He argues the main beneficiaries were dual-earner couples.  
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than to correct them’ – and thus not clearly aligned with social investment. This description, 
however, feeds into explanation, which we return to below.  
The premise that in-work benefits accommodate the market is echoed in studies of the UK 
and the US, where authors conceptualise in-work benefits as ‘corporate welfare’ or 
‘neoliberal’ social policy. Both consider in-work benefits to be publicly funded provisions 
that primarily serve the interests of employers, as they are able to pay lower wages and 
increase profits at public expense (Farnsworth, 2015). Relatedly, in-work benefits in the UK 
and other English-speaking countries have been conceptualised as ‘neoliberal workfare’ and 
associated with the decline of labour market institutions that put pressure on employers to 
ensure income security among working households, and with the changing role of social 
security to subsidise low wages and offer less protection to households out of work (Grover 
and Stewart, 1999; Grover and Stewart, 2002).  
Another strand of research considers in-work benefits alongside other benefits and services 
received by working households, mainly focused on alleviating hardship, reducing 
inequality or promoting other outcomes (e.g. health). For example, according to McKnight 
et al. (2016, p41), ‘[t]here are a number of different forms of in-work benefits such as 
assistance with housing costs, help with medical expenses, food vouchers or assistance with 
the cost of school meals…’. These studies focus on the entire package of benefits and 
services received by working households, rather than the variation in policies employed 
across countries towards these ends.  
In sum, the ways of defining and conceptualising in-work benefits in the literature can be 
summarised as follows:  
1) In-work benefits are defined by their institutional characteristics, e.g. eligibility tied 
to being in paid work (relatively restrictive definition in terms of policies 
included/excluded).  
2) In-work benefits are ‘functional equivalent’ policies (looser institutional 
parameters). 
3) In-work benefits defined in relation to ‘twin’ policy goals of reducing 
unemployment and alleviating in-work poverty. 
4) In-work benefits are a sub-category of an overarching agenda, such as ‘make work 
pay’. 
5) In-work benefits conceptualised in relation to political economy, e.g. (neo)liberal 
political economy/ corporate welfare/ social investment.   
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These approaches are not mutually exclusive. However, the assumptions about how and why 
to compare in-work benefit policies and the conceptualisation of policy for cross-national 
comparison differ across the approaches. For example, research defining in-work benefits in 
relation to the stated policy aims tend to (although not necessarily) view policies in a 
technocratic/apolitical light, overlooking the interests which are seen as embedded within 
in-work benefits in the fifth approach. These differences are discussed further in the next 
section.  
In sum, in-work benefits and closely related policies have become more commonplace across 
capitalist democratic countries from the late 1990s onwards. Yet, the lack of systematic 
research into in-work policies across countries and over time, coupled with the contested 
definition and ways of conceptualisation in-work benefits, limit what we know about the 
extent of in-work benefit trends and variation. This poses problems for developing and 
assessing theories of why in-work benefits vary across countries and time, which are 
considered in the next section.  
2.3 Explanations for the rise of in-work benefits  
The final substantive part of this chapter examines theories and arguments about why 
governments implement and reform in-work benefits, and why policies vary across countries 
and time. It draws on wider claims and assumptions in the grey and evaluative literature on 
in-work benefits, and on the small body of research into the politics and the political 
economy of in-work benefits. 
Across most of this literature, the introduction of in-work benefits is associated with socio-
economic pressures. For example, the introduction of in-work benefits in the 1970s in the 
US is associated with economic downturn and problems of unemployment, poverty and 
inflation that became more pronounced during this period (Falk and Crandall-Hollick, 2016, 
p.10). In the UK, Millar (2009) argues FIS was introduced as a temporary measure because 
of heightened concerns about poverty among working households also during a time of 
economic downturn. Grover and Stewart’s analysis (2002, p.136) shows that advocates of 
reforms saw in-work benefits as a policy tool that would help to offset deprivation among 
working families with low earnings in the challenging economic context of the 1970s.  
These arguments about socio-economic pressures are modified in later accounts of in-work 
benefits and related measures across other OECD and European countries from the late 
1990s onwards (Immervoll and Pearson, 2009; Kenworthy, 2015; Marchal and Marx, 2018). 
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In this work, in-work benefits are widely understood to be policy tools for countering ‘in-
work poverty’ as well as unemployment and underemployment. The processes driving these 
problems are understood to be related more concretely to the longer-term restructuring of 
the economy and society, including deindustrialisation, globalisation, tertiarization, ageing 
societies, women’s increased labour market participation, and immigration. The fiscal 
constraints, economic competition and concerns with individual-level financial barriers to 
employment created by tax and benefit systems also feed into these narratives.  
While these factors and processes are commonly referenced in relation to in-work benefits, 
arguments about the relationship between these factors and the implementation of in-work 
benefits differ across studies and are largely not followed through with empirical research. 
For example, some researchers argue governments ‘respond’ to problems of unemployment 
and in-work poverty with in-work benefits and/or related measures. Commenting on make 
work pay policies, including in-work benefits, Immervoll and Pearson (2009, p.5) state: 
‘The twin problem of in-work poverty and persistent labour market difficulties of 
low-skilled individuals has been one of the most important drivers of tax-benefit 
policy reforms in OECD countries in recent years.’ 
Such arguments about in-work benefits and related reforms are common but also ambiguous 
in the theorised relationship between such ‘problems’ and policymaking. For example, it is 
not clear exactly how and in what circumstances national governments implement reforms 
to counter these problems. Moreover, it is also unclear when and why countries experiencing 
these pressures would opt for in-work benefits over other ‘make-work-pay’ policies and, 
further still, which model of in-work benefits they would implement. These arguments thus 
lean towards ‘unduly functionalist’ theories of policy making, which overlook the political 
aspect of policy decisions (Clasen, 2019, p.10) i.e. the competing interests and values in 
democratic capitalist societies that feed into preferences among voters and political actors 
for certain policy responses.  
Some researchers identify additional pressures and processes that make in-work benefits 
more likely, such as policy agendas at the supranational and international level in which in-
work benefits are advocated as an appropriate policy response to the risks associated with 
the prevailing socio-economic context (Hemerijck, 2013). In particular, the European Union 
has encouraged its member states to address inadequate incomes through work using a 
variety of tools, including in-work benefits (Marchal and Marx, 2018). As employment has 
become an increasingly important goal of social policy, policy makers have been encouraged 
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to take action to ensure that it does indeed ‘pay’ to work. As Marchal and Marx (2018, p.19) 
explain:  
‘Increasing the number of people in work was at the core of the Lisbon Strategy and 
it remains central to the current Europe 2020 strategy…. The notion that ‘a job is the 
best protection against poverty’ became a central tenet of EU policy during the 
Lisbon era and thereafter.’ 
These arguments overlap with agendas and initiatives promoted by the OECD and the 
European Union from the 1990s and internal pressures to rebalance financial incentives, by 
retrenching ‘passive’ policies, such as earnings-related out-of-work benefits, and 
introducing or expanding tax and transfer measures that were oriented around financial 
incentives to work (Hemerijck, 2013, p.129–132; Clasen and Clegg, 2006).  As with 
arguments about socio-economic context, such explanations have not been the focus of in-
work benefits research. Researchers have not specified how and when the EU’s agenda 
influenced national governments to implement in-work benefit reforms. Indeed, studies of 
other policy areas identify national political and institutional factors as shaping countries’ 
responses to these agendas (Garritzmann et al., 2017).  
We get somewhat closer to understanding in-work benefits with respect to problem pressures 
in studies emphasizing the interaction of political, economic and social factors. For example, 
Bargain and Orsini (2006) point to the perceived constraints on governments in 
deindustrialized societies, which make expenditure on in-work benefits more permissible 
over other social policies. They argue: 
‘Such instruments are often seen as more politically acceptable than a rise in social 
assistance and more desirable given the fear of increasing work disincentives; they 
are also seen as more efficient than an increase in the minimum wage, which might 
push up wage rates above the market equilibrium (Bargain and Orsini, 2006, p. 669).  
Spending on in-work benefits is therefore understood as more politically legitimate than, for 
example, expenditure on social assistance and unemployment benefits, and could be 
employed to address concerns about unemployment and poverty simultaneously (Grover and 
Stewart, 2002; Hemerijck, 2013; Millar, 2009). And arguments about financial 
(dis)incentives prominent in policy discourse may help to explain why in-work benefits are 
used in some contexts (Hemerijck, 2013, p.131; Grover, 2005; Bennett and Millar, 2005). 
However, the explanation as to why governments may prioritise in-work benefits over 
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minimum wages downplays the political differences between these strategies (Millar, 2009, 
p.234).  
Moreover, differently designed in-work benefit policies are also understood to reflect 
priorities given the trade-offs (De Luca et al., 2012; Marx et al., 2012). For example, 
household means-tested schemes such as those in the UK and the US are most effective in 
targeting resources on low earners but they also create strong work disincentives for second 
earners in a household (mainly women) (McKnight et al., 2016; Immervoll and Pearson, 
2009). As such, reducing unemployment and/or poverty could be understood to be a high 
priority, even if it restricts women’s capabilities. Where there are flatter wage distributions, 
in-work benefits can be expensive as the eligible population is larger and benefit levels will 
need to increase more sharply to incentivise earnings above a certain level (Immervoll, 2012; 
Immervoll and Pearson, 2009; Kenworthy, 2015). McKnight et al. (2016, p.71) also point 
out that in-work benefits in some Southern European countries are harder to target because 
there are several adults in a household.  Yet, as outlined above, these studies mainly 
conceptualise trade-offs in technical terms.  
The limits of these perspectives for understanding how and why countries vary in their use 
of in-work benefits are highlighted in research on why governments use in-work benefits 
and the processes behind reforms in select contexts. For example, Howard (1997) finds that 
at the time the EITC was introduced, minimum wages, minimum income schemes, public 
employment programmes and further child allowances were rejected as a means for raising 
living standards for the working poor by politicians. Opposition to minimum wages and 
public employment schemes by Republicans was on the grounds that such measures 
constitute an unacceptable level of state intervention in the ‘market’ at a time where there 
had been a rejection of Keynesian economics (Ventry Jr, 2000b).  Instead of investment, tax 
cuts for both individuals and business, and cuts in other forms of public expenditure, had 
become the preferred response that was seem to be conducive to growth.  
Yet, the EITC, a form of expansion, was permissible as it was interpreted as ‘anti-welfare’, 
which aligned with preferences for limited state intervention and social and political 
opposition to ‘welfare dependence’ among certain parts of the population ( Howard, 1997; 
Ventry Jr, 2000, p. 983). At the same time, as a means-tested benefit for the working poor, 
it was also interpreted as anti-poverty and pro-work, in line with Democrats’ ideals and 
interests in meeting the demands of parts of the electorate that were vital for its success. 
Thus, a shift in the overarching economic paradigm, along with political party ideology and 
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the ability of political actors to see the EITC as a targeted tax measure as aligning with the 
interests of their core constituents or supporters, were pivotal to its introduction and 
longevity.  
Two prominent researchers of the political economy of in-work benefits in the UK, Grover 
and Stewart (2002), identify similar justifications for in-work benefits across the political 
spectrum throughout history. However, oriented in the Neo-Marxism of the French 
Regulation School, in-work benefits, as with other social policies, are theorised as being 
subservient to dominant mode of production and consumption. They argue that income 
maintenance policies, including in-work benefits, ‘can be understood as being more than just 
the state’s response to the existence of individual financial need and ‘are closely related to 
and are shaped by wider concerns relating to economic efficiency’ (Grover and Stewart, 
2002, p.21, 175). From this perspective, the accumulation regime – that is, ‘the specific 
configuration of economic activity’ for economic growth and consumption  – is always 
maintained and legitimated by the ‘social mode of economic regulation’, which from the 
1970s included in-work benefits and out-of-work benefits oriented towards enforcing 
participation in low paid work (Grover and Stewart, 2002, p.4).  
More specifically, the authors position in-work benefits as being part of the shift from 
Keynesian accumulation, supported by social policy based on the insurance principle of 
paying people while out of work, to neoliberal accumulation, defined by ‘liberalising of 
markets, the promotion of free markets, deregulation of free individuals from the control of 
the state and a commitment to, and encouragement of, internationalised markets’ (Grover 
and Stewart, 2002, p.6). The supporting social policy of the latter is one ‘whereby people in 
low-paid and/or part-time employment are subsidised through wage-top ups (in-work 
benefits and ‘tax credits’)’ (ibid).  
While the argument that in-work benefits are part of (neo)liberal market economies has some 
merit in that in-work benefits have the longest history in the US and the UK, the theory is 
not elaborated for other less ‘liberal’ welfare states. This is especially important given that 
in some countries in-work benefits may be targeted on a specific part of the population, and 
therefore not necessarily signify a more expansive low wage subsidisation approach 
(Immervoll and Pearson, 2009, p.18). In a similar vein, certain sub-types of in-work benefits 
appear to reform or reconfigure other aspects of tax and benefit systems (e.g. reductions in 
social security contributions). It is not clear whether this diverse range of measures in terms 
of the institutional form and varied design signal a uniform area of policy development and 
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the role of existing institutions in creating (positive or negative) ‘feedback effects’ (Weaver, 
2010).  
The role of in-work benefits across diverse contexts speaks to debates about convergence 
and divergence of social policies across advanced capitalist countries, which are considered 
further in the theoretical framework chapter of this thesis (Chapter 3). Nevertheless, it 
highlights that one of the unknowns about in-work benefits is the extent to which policies 
align with or depart from countries’ historical institutions, and whether they reproduce the 
logics or interests of previous policies or indeed serve to adjust or erode them.  
Kenworthy’s (2015) discussion paper ends by exploring some of these themes. He argues 
that moderate or high in-work cash transfers or tax credits are more common in countries 
with low collective bargaining and weak unions– what he calls the ‘Anglo-Path’ for 
employment conditional earning subsidies (Kenworthy, 2015, p.24). In contrast, he provides 
examples of ‘small, sector specific or temporary’ in-work benefits in countries with stronger 
unions and higher collective bargaining coverage. The exception to this is Germany, which 
is seen as going down the ‘Anglo-path’. It is also implied that there may be a third model of 
in-work benefits with features of social democratic social policy, based on the case of 
Sweden, which introduced a large, near-universal earned income tax credit in 2007 (ibid). 
Relatedly, Vlandas (2013) argues in-work benefit reforms in France are indicative of a 
deviation from the institutional parameters of Bismarckian social policy on a number of 
counts, including the targeting of social policy on ‘labour market outsiders’ in an insider-
oriented context. Thus, there may be different interests driving reforms across countries and 
over time, with varied significance depending on the context in which they are employed.  
Despite different theoretical staring points, our understanding of why in-work benefits have 
become more widespread is constrained by a lack of systematic comparative research on in-
work benefits, including where and when in-work benefits are used, the form these take, and 
the size/importance of these schemes (relative to other kinds of social policy). Thus, theories 
of how and why countries vary in their use of in-work benefits are limited in terms of 
understanding how, if at all, they apply to other contexts. The lack of consensus over what 
policies constitute in-work benefits and why also represents a ‘a dependent variable 
problem’ for comparative in-work benefit research (Clasen and Siegel, 2007). 
In sum, there are several explicit and implicit theories as to why more governments have 
used in-work benefits, in their varied forms, but such questions are not the main focus of in-
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work benefits research to date. There are many examples of functionalist assumptions and/or 
theory that is underdeveloped. National case studies are helpful in highlighting the role of 
political, economic and social drivers of reforms and further illuminate the idiosyncrasies of 
national provisions, but it is not clear how/if these apply to other countries (and points in 
time), especially those with different political economy configurations.   
2.4 Conclusion  
This chapter reviewed the literature on the origins and development of in-work benefits as a 
foundation for cross-national comparative research on in-work benefits in EUMS. This 
review has identified three main gaps in in-work benefits research from a comparative 
perspective. These are:  
1. The limited systematic research into in-work benefits cross nationally and over time. 
2. Inconsistencies in the definition and conceptualisation of in-work benefits creating a 
‘dependent variable problem’. 
3. The competing and untested theories and assumptions about the drivers of in-work 
benefit variation, which are ill-equipped to deal with the diversity apparent in the 
design and form of provisions across countries. 
The lacunae in the literature are interrelated. Gaps in systematic research into in-work 
benefits cross-nationally and over-time, and the predominance of evaluative in-work benefits 
research underpinned by neo-functionalist and/or technocratic assumptions, provide limited 
scope for developing theory about variation in countries’ policies across countries and time, 
including whether such policies are employed at all, and then the scale and design of those 
in place. As in-work benefits in a comparative perspective have mainly been studied through 
a technical lens, the empirical evidence on in-work benefits is structured in a way that is hard 
to probe from other angles.  
A promising angle for understanding in-work benefits were arguments that aimed to 
conceptualise and theorise about in-work benefit variation with respect to the varied political 
economy of advanced capitalist countries (Kenworthy, 2015).  This angle is underexplored. 
A key argument to be considered in comparative research, which for some may have 
normative weight, is whether countries’ in-work benefits symbolise a direction of travel 
down the Anglo- or neoliberal path, or whether in-work benefits are used to different ends 
across varied welfare states. Yet, what can be loosely referred to as ‘convergent pressures’ 
such as socio-economic pressures and liberalisation, are also likely to be significant, even if 
the effects of these factors play out differently across national contexts.  
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The review in this chapter thus leads one main research questions and two sub-questions.   
1) What is the nature and extent of variation in in-work benefits in EUMS? 
a. Have in-work benefits become more commonplace in recent years? 
b. How common are archetypal in-work benefit policies associated 
with liberal regimes? 
The first research question is broadly descriptive and concerns the gaps in the evidence base 
on cross-national variation and changes over time in in-work benefits in capitalist democratic 
countries. For practical and theoretical reasons that are elaborated in the subsequent chapters, 
the thesis focuses solely on EUMS, as these represent a diverse range of welfare states and 
there is scope for systematically comparing developments, drawing on multiple data sources.  
The first sub-question is specifically concerned with the debate in the literature about 
whether in-work benefits have become more widely used in EUMS in recent years. The 
third, related question, concerns whether policies that could be categorised as in-work 
benefits across varied contexts resemble the means-tested in-work cash transfers and  
targeted refundable earned income tax credits historically associated with the UK, or whether 
different approaches, similar to those outlined in Section 2.2 for Germany and France, for 
example, are used.  
In order to structure and interpret the empirical components of the research addressing these 
questions, a conceptual and theoretical framework is developed in the next chapter that aims 
to situate in-work benefits with reference to the wider political economy and social policy 
context in which they are used. This forms the basis of the (re)conceptualisation of in-work 
benefits in this thesis and is used to establish the policy parameters of the research. The 
framework also brings in broader theories and analytical tools for situating in-work benefits 
with respect to differences and similarities across capitalist democratic countries historically, 
and arguments about the nature and extent of change over the period that in-work benefits 
are said to have become more widely used, to set the broader backdrop of the research. 
Furthermore, moving beyond the technical lens applied in comparative in-work benefits 
research, part of the framework is developed to identify and compare the salient features of 
in-work benefit policies, considering the logics and interests about the role of the state, the 
family and the (labour) market in capitalist democratic countries. Two additional research 
questions, based on the framework, are also set out at the end of the next chapter (Chapter 
3).   
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3 A TWO-PART FRAMEWORK FOR INTERPRETING 
TRENDS AND VARIATION IN IN-WORK BENEFITS 
This chapter sets out the theoretical and conceptual framework, which draws on the 
comparative political economy and welfare state literature, as well as perspectives 
emphasizing the socio-political dimensions of social policy, to structure and interpret 
comparative analysis of variation in in-work benefits across EUMS – a sample of capitalist 
democratic countries – and over time.  
The aim of the chapter is not to develop hypotheses about in-work benefit variation to be 
tested in empirical analysis. The main argument against doing so is that current scholarly 
understanding of in-work benefits in a comparative perspective is limited by gaps in the 
evidence base and the limits to current definitions and ways of conceptualising in-work 
benefits for comparative research. A priori theorisation about the determinants of in-work 
benefit variation would therefore be a highly speculative exercise, with unclear boundaries 
in terms of actual instruments and the salient features of policies. The main purpose of the 
framework is therefore to shape the structure, focus and interpretation of a wide-reaching 
study exploring the development of in-work benefits in EUMS.  
Yet, in line with the literature informing the framework, in-work benefits cannot be 
understood independently of context. As we understand them, in-work benefit policies have 
implications for the role and responsibility of the state, as well as that of employers and the 
family, in providing resources to those engaged in paid work, which could serve to reinforce 
or disrupt existing socio-economic and political dynamics. Similarities and differences 
across EUMS are therefore important for understanding how and in what ways in-work 
benefits contribute or break away existing arrangements and their associated outcomes. Such 
questions are at the core of analyses distinguishing between capitalist democratic countries 
historically, as well as questions about the nature and extent of change in democratic 
capitalist countries in recent decades, corresponding with de-industrialisation among other 
forms of social, economic and political transformation.  
The framework is developed in two main parts, split across two main sections in this chapter: 
The first part (Section 3.1) sets up the ‘big picture’ with which to interpret trends and 
variation in in-work benefits. After setting out the characteristics and usefulness of ideal-
type frameworks of variation in political economy and social policy capitalist democratic 
countries, arguments about the influence of contemporary pressures on social policies in 
these contexts are also considered for the framework.  
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The second part (Section 3.2) of the chapter develops the conceptual framework for more 
focused analysis of variation in in-work benefit policy that speaks to historical and 
contemporary context. It does so by homing in on the concept of ‘dependency’ as a key fault 
line across capitalist democracies, reflecting interests and logics concerning the role and 
responsibility of the state, family and the market. It sets out a ‘dependency relationships’ 
framework, which is used to tentatively define in-work benefits and compare the salient 
features of policies, considering the ways and extent to which provisions are oriented 
towards fostering or reinforcing different forms and degrees of dependence on the state, the 
labour market and the family for working households.  
The two sections are thus inexorably linked.  The perspectives that focus on historical and 
contemporary context discussed in the first part of the chapter inform the dependency 
framework in the second half of the chapter, which examines the design features of in-work 
benefit policies.  This in turn also helps to develop a comparative understanding of variation 
in in-work benefits with respect to context.   
3.1 The big picture: Contextualising trends and variation in-work benefit policies in 
capitalist democracies  
This section sets out broader part of the theoretical framework, which draws on overlapping 
bodies of work from comparative political economy, welfare states and social policy13. 
Notwithstanding the theoretical diversity within this literature, these perspectives lead to an 
interpretation of social policy and therefore in-work benefits as a constituent part of an 
interconnected set of historically constituted institutions. Such institutions are underpinned 
by and reinforce social, political, economic and cultural dynamics within countries. More 
substantively, it builds on ideal-typical models at the core of this literature as analytical tools 
for situating in-work benefits in relation to the (varied) historical institutional context of 
capitalist democratic countries. It also considers arguments about challenges and changes in 
de-industrialising societies leading to similar policy responses that are relevant for in-work 
benefits. Key concepts linking the interaction and role of the state, the market and the family 
as sources of welfare to the features of social policies are adapted later in the chapter for 
comparative analysis of in-work benefits. The consideration of contemporary and historical 
context thus shapes the broad framework as a means for exploring and interpreting trends 
and variation in in-work policies. The questions emerging from this part of the framework 
and the implications for the research are summarised in the final sub-section.  
                                                     
13 Political theory and sociological influences also feed into this literature.  
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3.1.1 Historical comparative context: the (varied) role of social policy in capitalist 
democratic countries 
At the crux of the framework is the argument that in-work benefits, as with other social 
policies, cannot be understood independently of political-economic and social dynamics at 
the national level, that are crystallised in institutional configurations. This broad theory of 
social policy is illuminated in holistic, ‘systemic’ frameworks in comparative historical 
institutionalism and welfare state literature that identify ‘…linkages across all of the major 
institutions which define capitalist political economies,’ including social policies (Thelen, 
2012, p.138). In broad terms, institutions are defined as ‘the humanly devised constraints 
that structure political, economic and social interaction…’ consisting of both informal 
constraints (e.g. customs and traditions) and formal rules (e.g. laws) (North, 1991, p. 97). 
Social policies are considered a form of institution by some scholars, such as Pierson (2004, 
p165) who argues policies are ‘central rules governing their [individuals and social 
organisations] actions… [that] specify rewards and punishments associated with certain 
behaviours’. 
Arguments concerning the role of institutions in structuring future policymaking that are 
central to these frameworks are thus important for considering the possibilities for the 
adoption of in-work benefit policies across countries14 (Emmenegger, 2010; Pierson, 2000). 
For example, notions of path-dependent policymaking are understood to occur as institutions 
shape preferences of political actors (and the public) by baking in interests and logics in 
existing arrangements, thus leading to broadly distinctive patterns of policy development 
across democratic capitalist countries  (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Hall, 2016; Pierson, 2000; 
Hall and Thelen, 2009; Lynch and Rhodes, 2016). 
However, as set out below, there are several important arguments that challenge 
institutionalist theories of path-dependency, which point to social, political and economic 
transformation in deindustrialising societies. Indeed, in-work benefits have been considered 
a path-breaking policy outside of liberal welfare states (Vlandas, 2013). Analysing in what 
ways and to what degree in-work benefits depart from past institutions therefore becomes an 
important question for research aiming to understanding the political, economic and social 
                                                     
14 There are multiple theories within this literature about why (and how) capitalisms and social policies vary. But in broad 
terms path-dependency is seen to occur as political and/or economic actors are unwilling or unable to stray from established 
institutions due to the costs or consequences in doing so, and/or the rewards in serving the same established interests and 
logics, known as “feedback effects”. For example, political actors or parties may lose voters if they overhauled existing 
institutional arrangements, and/or they would disrupt the equilibrium that allows the model of capitalism invested in over 




dynamics associated with in-work benefits, which can feed into future theoretical models 
attempting to explain variance between countries.     
As such, historical variation across welfare states, especially in institutions concerning work 
and the income of working households, is an important part of the context for this 
examination of in-work benefits. For this, I turn to two well-known ideal-type models of 
varied forms of democratic capitalism and welfare states which, helpfully for analytical 
purposes, condense and simplify complex and multi-faceted differences and similarities 
between countries. The first is Hall and Soskice’s (2001) seminal Varieties of Capitalism 
(“VofC”) framework, which is a cornerstone of a much broader field of comparative political 
economy (CPE) because of its identification of two broad models of democratic capitalism 
in advanced capitalist countries – ‘coordinated market economies’ (CMEs) and ‘liberal 
market economies’ (LMEs). The second is from Esping-Andersen’s (1990) seminal welfare 
regimes contribution in the Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism and its threefold typology 
of conservative, social democratic and liberal welfare regimes. Building on this typology, an 
additional regime consisting of southern European or Mediterranean countries is commonly 
identified (Ferrera, 1996).  
Starting with VofC, the institutions in countries classified as CMEs are oriented towards a 
more regulated form of capitalism. In terms of wages, an area that in-work benefits cut into, 
CME institutions ‘support high levels of co-ordination among producer groups… facilitating 
co-ordinated wage bargaining’ (Hall, 2017, p.4; Hall and Soskice, 2001, p.8). The second 
policy domain relevant for in-work benefits, social benefits and notably unemployment 
benefits, are typically insurance-based and earnings-related with high replacement rates 
(Thelen, 2014). In contrast, LMEs are characterised by less regulation, and lower and often 
means-tested social benefits. The relationship between employers and labour representatives 
is less cooperative and producer groups do not hold ‘veto player’ status in in public policy 
making (Hall and Soskice, 2001, p.8). In broad terms, capitalism in CMEs is considered 
more egalitarian than in LMEs as the state is less reluctant to ‘interfere’ with the market in 
the latter.    
Six countries are classified as LMEs, including the USA, Britain, Australia, Canada, Ireland 
and New Zealand(Hall and Soskice, 2001, p.19), most of which are associated with longer 
running in-work benefits (Immervoll and Pearson, 2009). Ten countries are classified as 
CMEs, including Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Finland and Austria (Hall 
and Soskice, 2001, p21). The remaining EUMS the authors examine, which include Italy, 
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France, Spain, Portugal and Greece, are considered more ambiguous and they suggest that 
there may be a distinctive ‘Mediterranean’ political economy, which has liberal qualities in 
labour relations, and a distinctive kind of coordination based on the size of the agrarian sector 
and considerable state intervention (ibid). 
These broad differences in political economy are alluded to in the literature on in-work 
benefits set out in the previous chapter. While comparative research is limited, it is suggested 
that in-work benefits do not fit with traditional CME arrangements as policies on wages and 
income maintenance policy involve negotiations between employers and labour 
representatives, and in some contexts the state) (Kenworthy, 2015). Thus, if wages should 
be set at a level that both employers and labour representatives deem acceptable, publicly 
funded ‘wage subsidies’ would be irrelevant or illegitimate in terms of the perceived and 
negotiated responsibility of employers. In broad terms, the use of in-work benefits in CMEs 
may therefore be considered ‘path-breaking’. In contrast, LME institutions are oriented 
towards economic competitiveness through less intervention in the market and low wages. 
In the VofC logic, if low wages are at odds with the functioning of LMEs (e.g. by increasing 
unemployment as a result of poor financial incentives), the institutional arrangements are 
such that the state can intervene without social partners as veto players, using means-tested 
in-work provisions to top up low wages and offset disincentives. Although not referring to 
VofC explicitly, a version of this argument has been made about the political economy of 
in-work benefits in the UK (Grover and Stewart, 1999).  
While situating in-work benefits with respect to a wider set of political economy institutions, 
the analysis of income maintenance policies using the VofC framework is limited for 
interpreting variation in the qualitative features of in-work benefits, identified as a site of 
variation in the studies outlined in Chapter 2, and the objectives and interests these are 
oriented towards (OECD, 2003; Immervoll and Pearson, 2009). Moreover, VofC emphasizes 
the relationships between rational economic actors in the historical evolution of institutions 
in capitalist democracies and it side-lines what elsewhere are identified as significant socio-
political and cultural factors shaping labour market and social policy historically15.  
                                                     
15 At the core of framework is the institutional preferences of economic agents, which, when faced with ‘external’ economic 
changes, are seen to be ‘relatively inelastic’, with ‘marginal’ institutional reform in line with ‘the logic of the institutional-
make up,’ being the most likely process (Hall and Soskice, 2001, p.220). More flexible and nuanced interpretations of 
different capitalisms and social policy regimes, which emphasize political dynamics and interests over the economic 
efficiency focus of VofC, formed the basis of the framework. However, VofC is pivotal to the literature integrated into the 
framework and its insights into corporatist institutions, such as collective bargaining, are important for situating in-work 
benefits with regards to concerns about liberalisation.  
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In contrast, Esping-Andersen (1990, p.26-28) paid more attention to the varied mobilisation 
of the interests of socio-political groups, including the role of political ideology and religion, 
alongside economic factors. He applied and developed this theory through empirical analysis 
of the rules and features of social policies, using concepts that bridged the gap between these 
complex socio-political and economic dynamics and variation in the design and rules of 
actual social policies16.  
The first of these concepts, de-commodification is defined as the ‘degree to which [welfare 
states] permit people to make their living standards independent of pure market forces’ 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990, p.17; 21). Second, stratification refers to how ‘existing status or 
class differences’ are reinforced or reduced through social policies in the welfare state, which 
was seen as a ‘system of social stratification in its own right’(Esping-Andersen, 1990, p.23, 
44; Powell and Barrientos, 2004, p.85).  Later, the importance of  the family as a source of 
welfare was properly acknowledged following critique from feminist scholars ‘that 
dependency on the family was as problematic as dependency on the market’ (Mathieu, 2016, 
p.576–577), captured in the concept of de-familialisation, meaning the extent to which 
welfare states ‘… maximise individuals’ command of economic resources independently of 
familial or conjugal responsibilities’17 (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p.45; 1996). Overlapping 
with these, the concept of the welfare mix was also used to differentiate between regimes on 
the basis of the balance of ‘the state, market and the family’ in the production of welfare 
across regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p.26; Powell and Barrientos, 2004, p.86). 
As these concepts were premised primarily on a male-breadwinner model of industrial 
capitalism and were intended to be applied to analysis of multiple policies, representing 
entire welfare states, their applicability for considering how in-work benefits relate to a 
wider social, political and economic context is not straightforward. Indeed, adapting and 
integrating these concepts is the focus of the second part of the framework. Yet, to set out 
the historical context of welfare regimes, and more specifically the characteristics of income 
maintenance policies (representing important ‘policy legacies’) that could shape variation in 
in-work policies, the three welfare regimes in Esping-Andersen’s (1990) and Ferrera’s 
                                                     
16 Ferrera’s (1996) typology of European countries, adding the Southern/ Mediterranean regime, similarly analysed the 
conditions for granting social security benefits and eligibility rules and considered the relationship between policy design 
and socio-political and economic features of these countries. 
17 Responding to criticism that the original typology was gender blind Esping-Andersen’s (1999) later work also gave 
greater recognition to the role of families and gender inequalities in the production of welfare historically, and the role of 
the state in post-industrial societies in particular in reducing economic dependence on the family (Jenson, 1997). 
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(1996) typologies are outlined in Table 3.1, with a focus on the income maintenance policy 
features associated with the logics and ideals of each regime.   
The regimes were characterised as follows. First, the Liberal (or Anglo-Saxon) regime is one 
of low de-commodification, namely because of the limited generosity and strict needs-based 
entitlements in social provisions through means-testing (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p.48). 
These features make social transfers stigmatising and thus social policy was seen to reinforce 
inequalities between those in and out of work, in line with ‘liberal work-ethic norms’ which 
cast state dependence as anti-social (ibid, p49).  The use of social policy to facilitate the 
market often means conservative ideals about the role the family and notably women are 
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Notes: Summary of the features of income maintenance policies in welfare regimes and their associate 
variety of capitalism summarised from Esping-Andersen (1990, 1996), Ferrera (1996), and the summary of 
welfare regimes and their characteristics in Arts and Gellisen (2002).  Varieties of Capitalism (VofC) as 
per Hall and Soskice (2001).  
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secondary. This characterises the welfare states of English-speaking countries such as the 
UK, the US, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand and Canada.  
A second, smaller, cluster of countries comprises the Social Democratic regime (Esping-
Andersen, 1990, p27), or Nordic regime (Ferrera, 1996). The cross-cutting support for social 
democratic parties across social groups led to high de-commodification and the promotion 
‘equality of the highest standards’ through the welfare state. The principle of universalism 
in access to social rights across classes is paramount and benefits and services are designed 
to facilitate female employment resulting in high de-familialisation (1999, p45). This model 
is dependent on the tax revenues from full employment (ibid, p28) and therefore infuses 
socialism with liberalism in promoting a strong state in return for employment ‘activation’. 
The archetypal Social Democratic countries are Sweden, Denmark and Norway. Ferrera 
(ibid) includes Finland in this regime, while Austria, Belgium and Netherlands are in Esping-
Andersen’s typology (1990) only.  
The Conservative/Corporatist/Bismarckian regime countries includes Belgium, 
Netherlands, Luxembourg and Austria (Ferrera, 1996), Germany and France (both), and Italy 
and Finland (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Historically, these welfare states did not evolve with 
‘market efficiency and commodification’ as core principles (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p27). 
The state took on the role of providing most of the protections and services of corporatism, 
with private insurance and fringe benefits playing a minor role. As social rights are attached 
to class and status, class-based social divisions are reinforced, and redistribution is limited. 
The power of the church in shaping this regime means that principles of traditional family-
hood are evident in the exclusion or minimal coverage of non- or partially working women 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990, p27).  
The Southern European regime includes Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece in Ferrera’s 
(1996) typology. These are typified by social policies that are highly fragmented, especially 
around work-based status, with different schemes for ‘private employees, civil servants and 
the self-employed, often with widely differing regulations concerning contributions and 
benefit formulas’ (Ferrera, 1996a, p.19). This is particularly pronounced in Italy and Greece 
where there are separate ‘micro-schemes’ for certain occupational groups. Fragmented 
schemes can be highly generous while assistance benefits are minimal to non-existent. Thus, 
in these contexts there is a history of ‘hyper-protected beneficiaries’ and large numbers of 
under-protected citizens (Ferrera, 1996a, p.20). As such, it creates a dualism that is more 
pronounced than in Conservative regimes. Moreover, ‘particularistic-clientelistic’ relations 
52 
 
are considered an ‘endemic feature of the whole range of south European policies, including 
income maintenance’ (Ferrera, 1996, p.25)18.  
As welfare regimes and VofC are combined in comparative research (Schröder, 2013) the 
overlap is also set out in Table 3.1. The Social Democratic and Conservative/Corporatist 
welfare regimes overlap with the CMEs while LMEs correspond to the Liberal welfare 
regime. On the latter, Hall and Soskice (2001, p.50-51), maintain that ‘[v]irtually all liberal 
market economies are accompanied by ‘liberal’ welfare states, whose emphasis on means-
testing and low levels of benefits reinforce the fluid labor markets that firms use to manage 
their relations with labor’. There is more variation in CME’s social policy regimes but 
pensions and high replacement rates for unemployment benefits are a common characteristic 
(ibid).  
In the studies of in-work benefits and related measures described in the previous section, 
forms of in-work benefits were identified across countries representing all four of the 
regimes outlined above but the relevance of welfare regimes and historical institutions is not 
the focus of the research, with a few exceptions. For example, Vlandas’ (2015) study of in-
work benefits in Bismarckian France suggested the reform in question was path-breaking 
because it was financed through general taxation (instead of insurance) and because it was 
targeted on ‘labour market outsiders’ thus violating the historical targeting of resources to 
protected insider occupational groups. Yet, research into how in-work benefits from or 
indeed align with social policy legacies across a diverse range of countries, and thus whether 
in-work benefit variation falls along welfare regime or VofC lines, is underexamined and 
the framework above provides a historical reference point.  
Both frameworks, however, have been subject to much criticism, ranging from the methods 
used to compare and classify countries to the use of typologies for comparative research 
altogether19. For this study of EUMS, a limitation is that Central and Eastern European 
(CEE) countries are not covered by the ideal-type frameworks discussed so far and yet they 
make up just under a third of EUMS studied in this thesis. Whether these countries cluster 
                                                     
18 Ferrera (1996, p.25) suggests resources are exchanged for electoral support for policies for ‘inadequate work incomes’: 
‘The weak sectors of the south European labour markets (i.e. those characterized by a structural lack of employment demand 
and therefore by irregular and often ’black’ employment) have offered a favourable ground for the emergence and 
expansion of a ‘clientelistic market’ in which state transfers to supplement inadequate work incomes are exchanged for 
party support, often through the mediation of trade unions, at the individual level’. However, the exact type of provision 
referred to is unclear.   
19 There are also many other criticisms of the welfare regime framework, including that regimes typologies are based on a 
narrow range of social provisions, notably income maintenance; the grouping of countries on methodological and 
theoretical grounds (Arts and Gelissen, 2002); the definition and measurement of social policies and outcomes that formed 
the basis of the typologies (Bambra, 2006).  
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into a welfare regime is contested (Cook, 2010; Rys, 2001). As Fenger (2007, p.13) explains 
with respect to all CEE countries (not just EUMS):  
 ‘The region encompasses a wide variety of countries that range from the affluent 
enclave of Slovenia to the impoverished, military state of Belarus, and from the new 
EU member states whose developments and institutional framework have been 
heavily influenced by the negotiations with the European Commission….’ 
On the other hand,  analysis shows CEE countries differ  from other European welfare states 
with respect to social expenditure, trust and socio-economic indicators (Fenger, 2007). Cook 
(2010, p.18) argues CEE welfare states combine elements of egalitarian communism, 
conservative Bismarckian social insurance and liberal pressures from international actors.  
As these analyses shine very little light on the micro-institutional features of income 
maintenance policies as in the above accounts, the framework is left open to explore the form 
of in-work benefits in CEEs from which the relevance of policy legacies can be inductively 
derived.  
Despite this specific limitation, in line with numerous comparative studies of social policy 
and political economy, both the welfare regimes and VofC framework are employed as a 
heuristic tool for contextualising differences and similarities across countries.  In this vein, 
a common misconception of such frameworks is that they are ‘structurally deterministic’ 
and represent ‘frozen landscapes’(Esping-Andersen, 1990, p.24): given the diversity of 
countries with in-work benefits identified in some studies, and the novel features of in-work 
benefits, the notion that welfare states do not stray from previous policy legacies is 
challenged. The changes and challenges that some argue undermine the use of these 
frameworks are considered further in the next section. It concludes that applying these 
frameworks to structure comparative research into in-work benefits lends itself to identifying 
when and the extent to which broad differences and similarities between countries in these 
frameworks matter for in-work benefit variation, which can be used to make inferences about 
the logics, ideals and interests shaping and shaped by in-work benefit policies.  
3.1.2 Contemporary comparative context: new risks, pressures and challenges  
The broad frameworks above provide a means for interpreting analysis of in-work benefit 
policies with respect to historical institutional variation, which has implications for the social 
provisions available to (groups of) citizens in democratic countries and the patterns and 
extent of inequalities. Yet, researchers have questioned the validity of ‘static’ comparative 
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frameworks in what many consider to be the drastically different context of democratic 
capitalism of the late 20th and early 21st century. In contrast to ‘divergence’ arguments that 
stress ongoing differences in institutions and outcomes in capitalist democratic countries, 
‘convergence’ arguments – of which there are multiple substantive versions – stress that 
countries are increasingly similar, attributing similarities to a range of economic, political 
and social factors, namely deindustrialisation, demographic changes and social changes, 
including women’s entry into the labour market. Financial crises are also seen to exacerbate 
structural pressures facing welfare states and lead to convergent policy reform.  
There is, however, a more ‘open’ or nuanced, middle ground perspective, positioning 
historical institutions as an important factor shaping contemporary political processes while 
considering the role of other endogenous and exogenous factors in influencing national 
policy making and outcomes. This appears more fruitful for interpreting the variation in in-
work benefits across capitalist democracies in recent decades. This sub-section therefore sets 
out the arguments concerning the substantive changes and pressures that are most relevant 
for making sense of in-work benefit trends and variation, followed by arguments about how 
these are mediated through national institutional contexts. Taken as a whole, this highlights 
the important aspects of contemporary ‘context’ that in-work benefits that can be 
operationalised in order to contextualise in-work benefit reforms.  
The first set of arguments concerns transformations in the socio-economic and demographic 
context associated with de-industrialised societies taking place from the 1970s, as well as 
cyclical pressures such as financial crises, and the ‘new’ social risks these create (Bonoli, 
2006). In this view, the decline of industry and the shift to service-oriented economies 
exacerbates income inequalities between lesser and more educated/skilled groups (Wren, 
2013). The former having previously held stable, full-time and secure jobs in industry, 
become unemployed and/or take on low skilled, insecure and lower paid forms of work in 
services. The latter are able to seek out opportunities in internationalised and service oriented 
labour markets. The limited productivity returns and the high global competition in the low-
skilled service labour markets is associated with higher risks of unemployment, 
underemployment and in-work poverty for these groups. And although socially progressive, 
the shift away from the male breadwinner model associated with industrial capitalism to the 
‘adult-worker’ model whereby women are ‘no longer excused from employment for the 
purposes of caregiving’ (Kowalewska, 2017, p.3), and changing family structures, including 
more lone parent households, also create additional risks of poverty (Bonoli, 2007).  
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Relatedly, transformations in society and the economy are seen to create a context of 
“permanent austerity” (Pierson, 2001) as countries follow a similar trajectory of 
retrenchment, especially for ‘passive’ welfare benefits (e.g. unemployment benefits). And, 
since the 1990s, in this context, certain forms of expenditure are seen as more legitimate, 
characterised as the turn towards ‘active’ social policy, which foregrounds the goal of higher 
employment rates, especially for previously ‘inactive’ groups, such as lone mothers, and is 
associated with certain policy instruments and measures (Bonoli, 2010; Hemerijck, 2013; 
Marchal and Mechelen, n.d.). In a similar vein, recently scholars have argued there may be 
‘convergent’ trends in the increased use of tax policies (fiscal welfare) as it can be hidden or 
masked in public expenditures, and because it ties the provision of welfare more closely to 
paid employment in line with the ‘activation’ logic to use taxation to increase financial 
incentives to undertake paid work (Morel et al., 2018; Marchal and Marx, 2018). Similar 
arguments are made with respect to social investment and the Third Way ideology, whereby 
researchers either identify or a propose a shift in the welfare state from de-commodification 
to one that balances the needs of globalised economies and social goals20 (Hemerijck, 2015; 
Garritzmann and Häusermann, 2016).  
Another set of arguments emphasises the political-economic shifts including globalisation 
and the shift of power away from national governments, which become less able to regulate 
markets and turn to retrenching social protections in order to compete economically. In 
contrast to the VofC or regime framework above, the liberalisation thesis posits that political 
economies are all converging on a [liberal] single model of capitalism’, involving the 
deliberate erosion of social rights, de-regulation and the marketisation and privatisation of 
previously public spheres, in order to compete in competitive global markets, leading to 
more pronounced inequalities (Streeck and Thelen, 2005, p1-2). As part of this, researchers 
point to the state’s role in recommodification, across social policy and labour market 
institutions (Greer, 2016). As defined by Greer (2016, p.165), re-commodification 
constitutes any ‘institutional change that reinstates the discipline of labour market 
competition on workers, whether in or out of work and whether through reforms to welfare 
states, industrial relations, or labour markets’. The social policy reforms associated with this 
process include a reorientation of social policy to facilitate less regulated and protected 
employment (Baccaro and Howell, 2011; Jessop and Peck, 2003). Moreover, critical 
                                                     
20 The convergence of ideas and ideologies are associated with processes such as ‘policy learning’, ‘policy transfer’ and 
‘agendas setting’ (Palier, 2013; Clegg, 2014; Hemerijck, 2015; Peck and Theodore, 2001). 
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perspectives the use of punitive mechanisms, including increasing conditionality, or 
‘workfare’ (Wiggan, 2015; Daigneault, 2014b).  
Again, overlapping with previous points, new international governance structures and 
strengthening political-economic ties between countries are exogenous factors that some see 
as driving social policies and other institutions down similar pathways. Notably, given the 
emphasis on EUMS, the European Union and its economic and social agenda, with the 
European Monetary Union, and debt crisis, is seen to limit nation states’ ability to determine 
their policy pathways (Theodoropoulou, 2018; Marchal and Marx, 2018; Papadopoulos and 
Roumpakis, 2013). The EU has also promoted activation and social investment policies in, 
for example, the Lisbon Strategy and Europe 2020 (De la Porte, 2017). De la Porte (2017, 
p142-45) argues that while EU governance does not apply to ‘national social security, the 
principles of distribution, the access to social rights or the levels or generosity of various 
benefits’ it exhibits soft and hard power over EUMS states, including on the levels of 
expenditures and the forms of social and labour market policies adopted. It also has 
developed legislation for freedom of movement (ibid). 
There are thus various ways these arguments could help interpret trends and variation in in-
work benefits. First, in-work benefits are almost always framed as being oriented towards 
new social risks including unemployment and under-employment and in-work poverty, 
especially for those on the ‘margins’ of the labour market (Vlandas, 2013; OECD, 2003).  
They are also seen as tied to the activation turn because of the timings of the increased use 
of in-work benefits from the 1990s onwards and because the tying of benefit eligibility to 
labour market status and the emphasis on individual financial incentives to tackle the 
problems of unemployment aligns with the activation logic (Bonoli, 2010). Similarly, in-
work benefits have also been attributed to a compromise between ‘left’ and ‘right’ goals in 
their redistributive and employment-focused aims (Clasen, 2019). As outlined in the 
previous chapter, convergence arguments are applied speculatively to in-work benefits as an 
indicator that countries are moving down an “Anglo path” or liberal form of capitalism by 
offsetting low wages through the tax and transfer system, while weakening social democratic 
and/or corporatist institutions and social provisions21 (Kenworthy, 2015, p.24; Vlandas, 
2013; McKnight et al., 2016). Rubery et al. (2018) also consider in-work benefits a re-
                                                     
21 Much is contested about what (neo)liberalisation is but key processes traced to the 1970s and 1980s across many accounts 
include the deregulation of markets, a commitment to global markets, fiscal constraint (‘balanced budgets’) and welfare 
state retrenchment, the weakening of social democratic or corporatist arrangements outlined above, and the embedding of 
market ideals and practices into more of public and private life (Hemerijck, 2018; Baccaro and Howell, 2011). The 2007-
2008 global economic crisis and the political, economic and social ‘turmoil’ that ensued is associated with accelerated 
austerity and further liberalisation of political economies as a response to economic downturn (Farnsworth, 2015). 
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commodifying policy further normalising non-standard precarious employment as a route 
out of unemployment. Finally, scholars also link in-work benefits and EU reform agendas 
but they do not research this link explicitly (Marchal and Marx, 2018). 
While the link between these changes and pressures and the increased use of in-work benefits 
is plausible, research examining convergence in other areas of policy evidence considerable 
variation between countries in the types and extent of activation and austerity measures 
pursued and in the forms of liberalisation. For example, Bonoli’s (2010) comparison of 
active labour market policies (ALMP) finds that the idea of ALMP spread across Western 
European countries but found considerable variation in actual policy instruments and 
objectives and how they interact with the institutional context in which they are used. This 
is attributed to institutional and ideational differences across countries which interacted with 
a changing economic context. Thus, the interplay between institutions and the contemporary 
pressures outlined above also plays out at in the policies introduced, even if linked by an 
overarching logic. Similarly, assessing the extent of policy convergence in social assistance 
in European countries, Clegg (2014, p.148) finds: 
‘Distinctive policy legacies are embedded in the micro-institutional structures of 
contemporary minimum income protection systems, such as the different approaches 
to categorical differentiation within means-tested benefits …’ 
Thus, even where there are broader shifts in logics and context, the design features of policies 
retain some elements of previous logics, signalling a form of incremental change rather than 
an outright transformation. Situating in-work benefits with respect to historical and 
contemporary factors is therefore important for understanding the interests and logics on 
which they are based. 
Considering the influence of the EU and economic crises, Theodoropoulou et al. (2018, 
p.358) find that amid a context of reinforced fiscal pressures on EUMS, labour market policy 
reforms before the recent crisis and after 2010, continue to be underpinned by common 
principles (e.g. activation, welfare adjustment and flexicurity) and an overall more austere 
approach to social policy, but that there are significant differences in the strategies and 
outcomes across contexts with ‘diversity across and within labour market regimes’ more 
prominent than convergence. However, they also find austerity is most prominent in 
countries reliant on international financial support following the debt crisis and those more 
ideologically oriented towards austerity – namely the UK (ibid). Although examining the 
direct influence of the EU on in-work benefit policies is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
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examining trends and variation in in-work benefits among EUMS provides more substantive 
evidence of policies in this context in order to assess claims about diversity in the instruments 
used, which can feed into theory development about how, when and why convergent 
pressures at the EU level influence national policy trajectories.  
At a broader political-economy level, Thelen’s (2014) varieties of liberalisation combines 
the liberalisation thesis with VofC and contends that liberalisation pressures interact with 
historical institutions and contemporary political dynamics to create three institutionally 
distinctive patterns of liberalisation, leading to different levels and forms of inequality, 
across countries. The form of liberalisation characterised as ‘deregulation’ comprises ‘the 
active (political) dismantling of coordinating capacities’, which is most likely in LMEs, such 
as the UK, as employers and unions are weak, leading to higher inequality (Thelen, 2014, 
p.147) (Hall and Soskice, 2001). 
The second, ‘dualization’ occurs in CMEs with stronger co-ordination between employers 
and labour, with (tripartite) or without the state (Thelen, 2014, p.147). In continental 
European countries, high co-ordination has centred on the protection of certain sectors or 
occupations and institutions have not adapted to changing labour markets, especially 
increases in non-standard employment. As such ‘traditional arrangements for insiders have 
remained, a periphery of labour market outsiders has grown that is not organised 
(represented) and unregulated’.  
Finally, the third pattern of liberalisation, ‘embedded flexibilisation’ (Thelen, 2014, p.147-
148), is epitomised by ‘flexicurity’ as institutions are ‘reoriented’ based on a new logic in 
light of market pressures. It is more likely to occur in tripartite CMEs where the state is 
involved in coordination, such as Denmark. Economic and social goals are pursued by 
reorienting social protection and labour market policies towards a flexible labour force 
through high investment in skills and education of the unemployed. Thelen’s (2014) analysis 
chimes with the literature on dualization of labour markets which emphasizes ‘varieties of 
dualization’ referring to different patterns of inequalities relating to employment status 
between workers. Considering how in-work benefits relate to the structure of post-industrial 
labour markets therefore becomes an important question for comparative research. 
Moreover, the perspective highlights the need to consider institutional reforms as part of a 
wider package in order to understand in-work benefits with respect to ‘liberalisation’ instead 
of assuming homogeneity across countries.  
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3.1.3 Summary and implications for research 
The broad framework for contextualising in-work benefit variation in the empirical analysis 
is summarised in Figure 3.1. Analytically, the role of historical and contemporary context 
can be considered with respect to in-work benefit reforms across two levels: the regime or 
model of capitalism and the micro-institutional level. Moreover, three broad concepts are 
also useful for contextualising in-work benefits with respect to institutions in terms of 
understanding policies as a form of change or continuity in capitalist democratic countries: 
(1) path-dependency whereby the status quo in terms of both logics and actual instruments 
is maintained; (2) reconfiguration or incremental reforms, whereby logics and/or instruments 
may be shifted, but not to the extent where there is a complete break with the past; and (3) 
path-breaking reform implies a stark shift of logics and/or instruments.  
In order to contextualise in-work benefits historically with respect to wider models of 
capitalism or welfare regimes we can make use the ideal-type models set out above as 
heuristic devices. Contemporary context, notably indicators of liberalisation – labour market 
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basis that these factors are likely to be mediated by national institutions in shaping the extent 
and form of countries’ in-work benefits.  
3.2 Zooming in: Analysing variation in actual in-work benefit policies   
This section sets out the second part of the framework developed specifically for this thesis 
to analyse the (varied) role of in-work benefits across democratic capitalist countries and 
over time, building on the roots outlined in the previous sections of this chapter. The broad 
premise of this framework is that variation in-work benefits can be understood in a 
comparative perspective by considering how policies shape the extent to which citizens 
depend on the market, the state and the family as sources of welfare.  
The concept of ‘dependency’ or ‘dependence’ is not employed according to political 
discourse about ‘welfare dependence’ (Daigneault, 2014b, p.4). Rather it is utilised as a catch 
all term for interdependence of citizens on one another, and in capitalist democracies the 
varied ways this interdependence is marketized and socialised through the state and the 
family, which, as we saw above, has played out differently across democratic countries over 
time. The framework draws extensively on comparative political economy, including the 
concepts of the welfare mix, re-commodification, stratification and de-familialisation 
discussed above, and other perspectives explicitly or implicitly analysing policy with respect 
to dependency.  Yet, given the contexts of deindustrialised welfare states, it argues that 
previous notions of dependence associated with variation in income maintenance policies 
cannot be straightforwardly applied to in-work benefits for three reasons: the significant 
difference between in-work benefits and out-of-work benefits, the shifting context in which 
they are used, and the fact that this thesis focuses primarily on in-work policies in isolation. 
The concepts associated with different forms of dependence are thus adapted in this section. 
Other literature is brought in to further interpret the socio-political dimensions of in-work 
benefits variation with respect to the state, labour market and family.  
To reiterate this important point, the framework is intended to help to interpret the 
orientation of policies and not policy outcomes (e.g. de- or re-commodification). This 
reflects that the analytical focus of this thesis is predominantly on one area of policy, with 
some partial analysis of context, and not the interaction of in-work benefits with other social 
policy and labour market institutions. That being said, contextualising analysis of in-work 
benefits is likely to shine light on the wider ‘implications’ of in-work benefit variation within 
a ‘regime’ or country context, even if it cannot provide concrete answers about the effects 
of policies and how they interact with the wider setting to determine the extent and ways in 
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which citizens within and across countries are reliant on the state, market and family as 
sources of welfare.   
In this vein, dependency is conceptualised both qualitatively and quantitatively. For 
example, there is a historic literature distinguishing between ‘fiscal’ (tax) and social welfare 
(Titmuss, 1958; Orton and Davies, 2009; Morel et al., 2018). The state can distribute 
resources to citizens through the tax and the benefit system or, put differently, both forms of 
welfare constitute a form of state ‘dependence’ for citizens. However, fiscal and social 
welfare are associated with different experiences for recipients, which shape social relations: 
fiscal welfare is in broad terms understood to be less stigmatising and less invasive than 
forms of social welfare, fostering a division between those who rely more or less on each 
form. Social and fiscal welfare can also have distinctive politics, as the latter has often been 
less visible in public debate over resources, and thus better protected from debates about 
fiscal constraints leading it to be termed a privileged form of welfare, as it may be protected 
from retrenchment. And, linked to the first point, those that receive fiscal welfare are 
therefore less likely to see themselves as recipients of welfare and therefore may be less 
likely to support other forms of welfare state expenditure and indeed support retrenchment 
and tax cuts.   
The first sub-section in this part of the framework sets out how the umbrella concept of 
‘dependence’ is used for defining in-work benefits relative to other policies and institutions 
that they are sometimes conflated with. The second section sets out how this concept is 
further specified to identify the salient features of in-work policies for comparing their 
orientation towards different forms and degrees of dependence across countries and over 
time. Analysis of these features is expected to illuminate differences and similarities in the 
objectives and logics underpinning in-work benefits across countries as three key sticking 
points where conflict and inequalities play out. But it also provides a way of looking 
backwards within countries, to understand if there is a continuation of the logics and interests 
underpinning in-work benefits relating to forms of dependence in the development of 
welfare states as set out above.   
3.2.1 Depending on the state to make work pay? The distinctiveness of in-work benefits  
As we saw in the previous chapter, there is not a consensus on how to define in-work 
benefits, posing problems for comparing across countries and time. Employing the 
dependency relationships framework, this section proposes a conceptualisation of in-work 
benefits that is used to identify relevant policy instruments for cross-national variation. 
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Following a discussion of in-work benefits and overlapping policy areas through the lens of 
the dependency relationships framework, it argues that in-work benefit policies can be 
considered distinctive to other social policies because they combine dependence on paid 
work (the labour market) with dependence on the state for direct income maintenance for 
the households that receive them. This at least partially disrupt ideals and institutional 
arrangements concerning the (in)dependence from the state that paid work is supposed to 
bring for workers, notably in the domain of income maintenance. And, on the flipside, the 
ideals and arrangements placing the onus on employers to pay sufficient wages.   
Both of these arguments are broad and require caveating when we consider the institutional 
reality of the different ways working (and non-working) households depend on the state and 
the labour market for their livelihoods. Yet, in broad terms, these considerations provide a 
means for identifying relevant provisions and broadly theorising about the social, economic, 
cultural and political significance of policies, to then be considered with respect to national 
contextual idiosyncrasies in actual policies and the wider context in which they are used.  
Defining in-work benefits with respect to family dependency is less clear cut, because of 
historical variation in institutions and ideals concerning the family as discussed in the 
previous section.  
Applying this lens to policies commonly included in studies of in-work benefits and related 
measures comprises a means for categorising policies as in-work benefits or not. For 
example, policies like the UK’s Working Tax Credits, explicitly for working households 
with earnings, result in the combination of wages (market dependence) and cash transfers 
(state dependence). This implies a ‘break’ from the historical onus on employers to provide 
earnings at a level that is sufficient to meet living standards (Farnsworth, 2015; Sloman, 
2018). Broadly, this is based on a certain logic and balance of interests and is reflected in 
explicit policy goals that trumpet participation in paid work as a way to reduce dependence 
on the state and a way of achieving financial independence, either from the state and/or from 
other members of the family (Walker and Wiseman, 2003; Vosko, 2010).  
In an immediate sense, in-work benefits partly disrupt the institutional arrangements 
supporting this ideal, such as collective bargaining, employment legislation and statutory 
minimum wages, that regulate the levels of earnings received by workers and the hours and 
regularity of their work. In this vein, Picot (2019, p.3) conceptualises these institutions as 
ways in which states regulate wages and categorises them as direct and indirect forms of 
wage regulation.  The former is defined as public rules that ‘directly and explicitly’ concern 
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wages, the prime example being statutory minimum wages.  Indirect regulation is defined as 
‘the public rules that affect wage setting in the market or collective bargaining’ (ibid, p.4). 
This occurs in the market sphere (e.g. through employment contracts) and through the legal 
frameworks influencing collective bargaining. The extent and ways in which in-work 
benefits are an institutional shift can thus be considered using the typologies of political 
economy outlined above.  
Picot (2019, p.4) also conceptualises in-work benefits through this lens as a form of indirect 
wage regulation, as employers take the level of benefits into account when deciding wages. 
This relates to the important point that there are other institutions and factors affecting the 
sufficiency of wages and there are many indirect ways citizens depend on the state to ensure 
wages are sufficient, including the levels of taxation and social security contributions and 
the costs and availability of other services used by working households – and indeed what 
level of earnings is deemed sufficient is also socially and politically defined. In this vein, 
economists refer to out-of-work income maintenance as a ‘reservation wage’, highlighting 
the overlap between the institutions affecting wage levels and other forms of income 
maintenance (Atkinson, 1987). Changes or dysfunctions in these other policy areas or in the 
wider context can also affect the sufficiency of earnings, e.g. inflation.  
But even still, a novel feature of in-work benefits through the dependency relationships lens, 
is that they tie together workers’ dependence on employers/ the labour market for wages and 
on direct dependence on the state for income maintenance while in paid work.  Broadly 
speaking, direct income maintenance has been primarily for individuals during periods when 
they are not working or cannot work, such as old age, unemployment and sickness (Millar, 
2009; Sloman, 2018; Bennett and Millar, 2005). 
Relating to many of these points, Hacker’s (2011) distinction between pre- and re-
distributive strategies can be applied to in-work benefits to understand their significance. In 
this distinction, tax and benefit policies constitute redistributive strategies and pre-
distributive policies are those influencing the initial ‘distribution of economic power and 
rewards’ through ‘the structure of labour and product markets’ (Hacker, 2011, p.35 in 
Sloman, 2018, p.2).  Pre-distributive strategies intervene in the labour market to reduce 
market inequalities before they occur, and redistributive strategies are those that correct 
inequalities after they have occurred. Thus, redistributive strategies are filtered through the 
state and imply a reduction in economic power and reward for workers. Moreover, 
redistributive strategies can undermine future policy efforts to reduce inequalities, as 
64 
 
excessive reliance on redistribution fosters backlash, making taxes more salient and feeding 
into the conservative critique that government simply meddles with “natural” market 
rewards (Hacker, 2011, p. 36).  
This corrosive element of re-distributive policies is echoed in the liberalisation arguments 
outlined above. Similarly, Farnsworth (2015, p.25) suggests in-work benefits could be 
considered a form of corporate welfare, as they benefit employers who are able to pay lower 
wages, and Picot (2018, p.5) argues they make it possible for employers to pay low wages 
and hypothesises that they are more likely to occur in political economies where employers 
have political influence. As with the discussion above, these arguments may help us to 
contextualise variation in the extent to which in-work benefits are employed across 
countries, namely in terms of interpreting possible interests associated with shifting 
dependency for working households. Yet, the pre- and re-distributive distinctions does not 
go far enough in helping us understand why in-work benefits differ to other policies that 
constitute a form of dependence on the state, e.g. housing benefits. 
The dependency relationships framework requires us to go beyond functional equivalents 
and consider the socio-political features of in-work policies. Unlike, for example, housing 
benefits or childcare provisions, in-work benefits are not earmarked for spending by 
recipients for specific purposes or needs. In-work benefits are therefore closer to ‘wages’ 
that can be spent ‘freely’.  
While this eliminates a number of policies, other kinds of cash benefits received by working 
households could be spent ‘like wages’, such as social assistance benefits with earnings 
disregards, unemployment benefits compatible with earnings, and merged in- and out-of-
work benefits, all of which were introduced in the previous chapter. Moreover, another forms 
of income maintenance for working households not included in the literature on in-work 
benefits are short-time working schemes. All of these provisions are not so easily 
distinguishable from in-work benefits and may within certain contexts be considered akin to 
in-work benefits, beyond the functional equivalence argument, in terms of shifting 
dependency relationships and combining earnings and income maintenance.   
Using the dependency relationships framework and existing evidence on in-work benefits, 
it is possible to differentiate between instruments concerning the incomes of working 
households in order to classify provisions as in-work benefits or not. At the same time, the 
definition proposed in this section is intended to be further probed through empirical 
investigation and it is open to the tensions concerning other income maintenance policies, 
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especially provisions included in other studies of in-work benefits and the recent 
development of relevant policies that are ill-understood in a comparative perspective, such 
as the United Kingdom’s Universal Credit and Germany’s UBII, which confuse what was 
previously assumed to be the defining features of ‘in-work benefits’: that they explicitly 
target households or individuals undertaking paid work.  
To this end, a typology is developed which is used to classify relevant policies into three 
categories: (1) archetypal in-work benefits, (2) possible in-work benefits, and (3) not in-
work benefits (Figure 3.2). It is applied to policies that have been discussed in the context 
of in-work benefits and ‘make work pay’ policies (Immervoll and Pearson, 2009; 
Kenworthy, 2015; Marchal and Marx, 2018). The green section includes the archetypal in-
work benefit policies based on the US and the UK: earned income tax credits and in-work 
cash transfers. The defining features of these policies that relate to the shifts in dependency 
as described in this section are numbered 1 and 2. The features numbered 3 and 4 are not 
‘essential’ but they characterise these archetypal policies.  
The orange section includes income maintenance policies that do not explicitly or solely 
target working households but have been ‘adjusted’ so that they effectively fulfil the same 
function. For example, unemployment benefit policies that can be combined with earnings 
through work, referred to here as ‘adjusted unemployment benefits’22.  
The prime example of this is Germany’s ‘Unemployment Benefit II’, a merged social 
assistance and out-of-work benefit, which provides a subsidy to low-income, part-time 
workers (Clasen, 2019). The categorisation of social assistance benefits that can be 
combined with earnings as de facto in-work benefits is less clear-cut as social assistance 
benefits in a number of countries are effectively earmarked benefits, made up of different 
elements for different needs, such as housing. Other tax policies and social security 
contribution reductions or exemptions also represent a grey area and they imply a less direct 
form of dependence on the state for working households.23. 
                                                     
22 The label ‘adjusted unemployment benefits’ is influenced by Finland’s unemployment benefits with a similar name that 
were identified in the research presented in this thesis. Although based on the empirical component of the thesis, it was 
worked into the theoretical framework after the investigation for consistency. Elsewhere adjusted unemployment benefits 
are referred to as part-time unemployment benefits.  
23 By this logic, we would exclude non-refundable tax credits as they do not lead to a transfer to working households. 
However, even refundable tax credits will be non-refundable for some eligible households – i.e. not resulting in a transfer. 
Moreover, whether or not tax credits are refundable could depend on the structure of income taxation and the size of the 
tax-free allowance. As such, a distinction was not made between refundable and non-refundable tax credits prior to 
empirical investigation.   
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Finally, the red section includes policies that are not considered in-work benefits. It includes 
policies that put the onus on employers to ensure earnings are adequate, such as minimum 
wages, policies facilitating or containing collective bargaining and employment regulations 
that permit or restrict insecure/part-time work, for example (Picot, 2018). It also includes 
services and other benefits that cannot be conceived of as wage replacements subsidies 
because they are earmarked for specific purposes and/or needs not specifically relating to 
the labour market.  In addition, short-time working schemes are somewhat closer to in-work 
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Fig 3.2 Identifying relevant policies for a comparison of in-work benefits using the 
dependency relationships framework  
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or temporarily laid off, but they are related to cyclical pressures in advanced economies and 
therefore do not constitute a fundamental shift in the dependency relationships of working 
households (Arranz et al., 2018).  
A key question that is likely to be context dependent is whether an explicit in-work eligibility 
for in-work benefits sets these provisions apart from other forms of income maintenance that 
are akin to wages without an explicit targeting of in-work households (in the orange section).  
In broad terms, in-work benefits have been conceptualised as distinctive because they are at 
odds with the ideal of dignity associated with being ‘financially independent’ from the state 
through work (Dwyer and Wright, 2014). The explicit targeting of in-work benefits on those 
in work potentially constitutes an admission on the part of the state to make up for the 
inadequacies of policies to ensure wages are sufficient, either from the side of employers or 
other policies affecting the net incomes of working households, such as taxation and 
contributions, and those affecting costs and availability of services.  
At the same time, it could stand as a recognition of the deservingness of working households 
in tax-benefit systems (van Oorschot, 2000b; Oorschot and Roosma, 2015; Howard, 1991), 
including of the need to provide extra supports for households experiencing labour market 
risks. Moreover, in a context where employment statuses are more fluid, other income 
maintenance policies that are tied to labour market risks, such as part-time or ‘adjusted’ 
unemployment benefits, and are effectively permanent may indicate a new form of in-work 
benefit that is responsive to new forms of work (Clasen, 2019). Thus, a key question for 
comparative research concerns the targeting of provisions, explicitly or implicitly, on 
working households and the definition of work in these policies.  
The extent to which these provisions are considered to disrupt or break from the previous 
institutional arrangements and ideals depends on the starting point or the base line, as well 
as the extent to which such strategies are adopted and the nature of accompanying reforms 
(e.g. the wider policy package).  
Overall, this typology and conceptualisation of in-work benefits comprises a starting point 
for understanding the historical, social and political salience of variation in in-work benefits 
across countries and over time. It helps to examine how these policies imply a break from 
the logics and arrangements of capitalist democracies concerning adequate wages and the 
role of the state in income maintenance. The institutional arrangements concerning 
employers and the role of the state in the regulation of wages has, as in the frameworks set 
out in the first half of the chapter, historically varied across capitalist countries anyway. 
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Thus, the extent to which in-work benefits disrupt or reinforce these logics depends on the 
baseline for comparison. Moreover, what this part of the framework has flagged is that even 
when narrowing down policy instruments, there is likely to be variation the orientation of 
in-work benefit policies towards different forms and degrees of dependence on the state and 
the labour market and the family, which was overlooked in this section. The next sub-section 
thus develops the framework for comparing actual in-work benefit policies across countries.  
3.2.2 The varied orientation of in-work benefits towards dependence on the labour 
market, state and the family   
Having established the distinctive features of in-work benefits in order to identify the 
relevant instruments that could be examined through empirical investigation, this section 
sets out the precise conceptualisation of dependency with respect to variation in in-work 
policies. This part of the conceptual framework is premised on the notion that dependency 
has both quantitative and qualitative dimensions, in that policies might be oriented towards 
varied forms and degrees of dependence on the labour market, state and family. It proposes 
a framework for making inferences about policy orientation towards different forms and 
degrees of state, market and family dependence, through comparative analysis of policies.  
To reiterate an important point, the emphasis is on policy orientation not outcomes, as 
policies are the focus of the thesis: there is not the scope to consider how they interact with 
a wider context in addition to paying close attention to their design and form. Dependency 
on different sources is also inexorably linked and separating them out for analysis involves 
necessitates a simplification of the inter-connectedness of forms of dependence. Yet, 
separating out forms of dependence and analysing policies in this respect involves a more 
varied approach for making inferences about the logics and objectives of policies. The 
framework is thus intended to serve as a means for situating in-work benefits with respect to 
historical and contemporary political, social, economic and cultural objectives and 
outcomes, as it fuses historical accounts of variation in income maintenance policies across 
welfare regimes with considerations about the objectives and pressures that might be 
influencing policies in contemporary welfare states.   
Starting with the quantitative dimensions of dependence, as with the concept of de-
commodification in Esping-Andersen’s (1990) analysis, dependence is not binary and can 
be considered as a continuum. The level of in-work benefits serves as an indicator of the 
orientation of policies towards the degree of state dependency for the households that receive 
them. However, the generosity of in-work benefits is not necessarily an indicator of de-
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commodification (less dependence on the market) as it was for income maintenance policies 
in Esping-Andersen’s (1990) analysis. As outlined above, the commodifying properties of 
in-work benefits depend on other changes in social policies (Rubery et al., 2018).  
At the same time, we can start to understand the interaction between state and market by also 
comparing the quantitative dimensions of the orientation of policies towards the degree of 
dependence on the labour market. For example, in-work benefits, like the UK’s Working 
Tax Credits, may contain a lower limit on the hours of work needed to be eligible for the 
benefit. Such policies therefore enforce a minimum degree of labour market dependence to 
be eligible for the benefit. In terms of the family, in very crude terms, we might consider 
policies that are individualised to be oriented towards less familial dependence than 
household/ family in-work benefits (Daly, 2011). That is, if in-work benefits contain no rules 
or requirements concerning other members of a family unit or a household, the allocation of 
resources is not contingent on the behaviour, attitudes or resources of other family members, 
nor is there an expectation or requirement within in-work provisions that family members 
share resources between them.  
At the same time, in-work benefits also likely vary in their orientation towards qualitatively 
different forms of dependence on the state, labour market and family. For example, in-work 
benefits with behavioural requirements for which there are penalties for non-compliance 
engage recipients in a punitive dependency relationship with the state compared to in-work 
benefits that provide the same level of resources without behavioural requirements and 
penalties (Grover and Stewart, 1999; Fletcher and Wright, 2018). Means-tested cash benefits 
are also associated with stigma, invasion and costs to recipients in terms of the time taken to 
claim and prove eligibility, thus affecting the experiential aspect of state dependence 
(Bennett et al., 2009). 
Qualitative differences in terms of the nature of state dependence fostered through in-work 
benefits also speak to theories of ‘the social division of welfare’, notably the distinction 
between fiscal and social welfare (Titmuss, 1958; Orton and Davies, 2009). Theoretically, 
tax policies and in-work benefits delivered through the social security system are proxies of 
varied ideals and interests concerning the role of the state in the domain of income 
maintenance for the groups in receipt of policies (Morel et al., 2016). Fiscal policies are 
likely to constitute a more privileged form of state intervention for both ‘symbolic’ and 
‘material’ reasons (Morel et al., 2018, p.551). For example, historically, tax systems have 
provided advantages for households with higher earnings, whereas means-tested social 
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security, in particular, is associated with out-of-work groups and those in the greatest need. 
This is especially the case in Liberal contexts where social security is highly targeted at the 
poorest and is highly conditional, and where recipients have been construed as lazy, 
undeserving and/or as people that are cheating the system (Holden, 2003; Lodemel and 
Trickey, 2001). Research on the UK and the US discussed in the previous chapter stressed 
the political and sociological importance of the distinction between tax credits and social 
security in the US (Clegg, 2015; Howard, 1997). The orientation of in-work benefits towards 
different forms of state dependence could feed into or offset existing inequalities in access 
to resources provided by the state.  
Relatedly, in-work benefits may also be oriented towards qualitatively different forms of 
labour market participation. For example, in-work benefits could be oriented towards 
precarious employment simply by restricting access on the basis of employment status, 
earnings and contract type (e.g. part-time) (Rubery et al., 2018). Precarious’ workers 
insecurity could be exacerbated depending on the other forms of dependency in-work 
benefits are oriented towards, e.g. a conditional form of state dependence (ibid). The labour 
market orientation relates also to the concept of stratification in that the targeting of in-work 
support on the margins of the labour market could reinforce or exacerbate inequalities 
between ‘outsiders and ‘insiders’, e.g. through broader targeting of provisions or by meeting 
the needs of those subject to greater labour market risks (Vlandas, 2013). Other forms of 
labour market segmentation and inequalities have been identified in post-industrial welfare 
states (Schwander and Häusermann, 2013), and in-work benefits may reinforce or offset 
these divides, e.g. by targeting on the basis of employment and other characteristics, such as 
gender, that feed into labour market segmentation in some contexts.  
Finally, in-work benefits could also vary in their orientation towards qualitatively different 
forms of familial dependence. For example, rules concerning spouses and children are likely 
to reflect differences in the orientation of policies and potentially reflect institutional norms 
and gendered ideals about whether and to what extent women (especially women with 
children) should participate in the labour market (Cain, 2016; Vosko, 2010). Gendered forms 
of dependence have been apparent in different countries and time periods. For example, 
Lewis (2001, p.153) commenting on the decline of the male breadwinner, argues ‘female 
dependence [on men] was inscribed in the model, whereas the “adult worker model” ideal is 
based on reducing this form of dependence. Others point to the prominence of the 1.5 earner 
model. There has also been an emphasis on lone mothers in social security benefits has 
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reflected a political shift in towards reducing their ‘dependence on state benefits’, which was 
framed as being about increasing ‘independence’ from the state through work, without 
recognition that this work was predominantly minimal in terms of hours (ibid, p157). Again, 
the emphasis is on orientation, as the effects of these policies on the extent to which 
recipients are reliant on other members of a household or the employer will depend upon the 
wider system in which they are used, thus making it hard to evaluate the effects (de-
familialisation) of in-work benefits.  
Figure 3.3 depicts this conceptual framework and its operationalisation with respect to 
specific policy features. Similar to Esping-Andersen’s approach (1990), the rules that govern 
access to benefits in the form of eligibility rules and restrictions on entitlements and the 
levels of benefits are important across all three domains. As such, the framework facilitates 
analysis of the role of policy legacies in shaping countries’ strategies and these are briefly 
discussed below. However, these have been adapted and other policy features added given 
the emphasis is not just on de-commodification but also on the ways in-work benefits are 
oriented towards different forms and degrees of dependence on the state, family and the 
labour market.   
First, the orientation of countries’ in-work benefits towards particular kinds and degrees of 
labour market dependence are captured in rules concerning employment status and earnings. 
Access to in-work benefits may be restricted to and, therefore, orient recipients towards a 
particular form and degree of work through rules and design features restricting or 
facilitating hours of work, employment types and earnings.  
If in-work benefits are shaped by policy legacies, restrictions based on contract type and 
occupation are more likely in Bismarckian or Southern regimes given the historical tradition 
of status-based entitlement to social security. However, given the changes in labour markets 
outlined above, a key question is whether in-work benefits are targeted at standard 
employment relationships that have traditionally been favoured by such arrangements – or 
those on the margins of the labour market and, therefore, the social security system, e.g. 
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In Nordic regimes, schemes are less likely to restrict access on the basis of employment 
status and will be more encompassing with respect to earnings. Regarding Liberal regimes, 
employment status would be far less important than the needs or means of workers and 
provisions are expected to be narrowly targeted on lower income households. As in the UK 
or Germany, some in-work benefits may facilitate or encourage more fluidity in people’s 
relationships with the labour market. Whether the status of being in work is explicit and 
distinctive is also salient for our understanding of how in-work benefits facilitate 
relationships between citizens and the labour market.  
The level (aka ‘generosity’) of in-work benefits is a key indicator of the orientation of 
provisions towards different degrees of state dependence. The targeting of benefits, the 
‘conditions of conduct’ and the fiscal or social form of in-work policies are key indicators 
of the nature of this dependency relationship (Clasen and Clegg, 2007, p.167). Where in-
work benefits are conditional on behavioural requirements, that are propped up by sanctions, 
they imply a more punitive form of dependency relationship.  
Whether in-work benefits are fiscal or social are also broad proxies for whether the 
relationship with the state is privileged or not. Means-tested and stigmatised social welfare 
is more likely in Liberal regimes, whereas universal fiscal provisions with less stringent or 
no means- or needs-tests would be characteristic of the Nordic regimes.  
Finally, the role of in-work benefits in structuring dependence on the family is likely to be 
reflected in eligibility requirements concerning household composition and the 
characteristics of a means test. For example, in-work benefits means-tested at the household 
level bring the state into the domain of income maintenance for recipient households, but 
they are also oriented towards interdependence among family members by assuming and 
enforcing the sharing of resources among members of the same household. If policy legacies 
play out in in-work benefit reforms, we would expect policies to foster or encourage inter-
family dependence and possibly single earner models in Bismarckian and Southern regime 
countries, whereas Liberal countries would also encourage familialism in terms of the 
sharing of resources for low-income households through means tests. The in-work policies 
of Nordic states are more likely to be individualised.  
3.2.3 Summary and implications for the research 
In sum, this section of the framework developed and applied concepts associated with 
different forms and degrees of dependence on the labour market, family and the state, which 
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point out the inequalities associated with these dependencies within and across countries, in 
order to establish (a) the distinctive characteristics of in-work benefit policies relative to 
other overlapping policy areas and (b) the salient aspects of in-work benefit policies for 
cross-national comparison. On the first, the typology led to a three-fold categorisation of 
policies into archetypal in-work benefits, possible in-work benefits and not in-work benefits. 
To examine both the prevalence of more traditional forms of in-work benefits and examine 
the ‘novel’ ways states may be using the tax-benefit system to provide income support to 
working households, the empirical investigation will focus on the two archetypal forms: in-
work cash transfers and refundable earned income tax credits. Using the case of Germany as 
a key reference point (Clasen, 2019), it will also examine whether EUMS have in place 
unemployment benefits that can be combined with earnings, referred to in this thesis as 
‘adjusted unemployment benefits’.  
The salient aspects of policy design and rules that are indicators of the orientation of in-work 
policies towards forms and degrees of dependence on the labour market, state and the family. 
This represents a ‘wish list’ and the operationalisation of the framework for the empirical 
investigation is discussed in the Methodology (Chapter 4). The interrelatedness of different 
forms of dependence was also discussed.  
Finally, the framework was developed with reference to historical and contemporary context, 
with a view to exploring and developing arguments about how and why in-work benefit 
variation relates to context. For example, if policies across diverse welfare states are all 
oriented towards a dual-earner model, then this would be characterised in the more 
conservative welfare states of further evidence of policy recalibration towards activation. In 
contrast, if the investigation shows that in-work benefits in conservative welfare states are 
oriented towards a breadwinner model, then this would be indicative of a continuation of 
policy logics, in this domain. Importantly the emphasis of the framework is on policy 
orientation, not their actual effects, given the constraints in the thesis.  Both parts of the 
framework and the research questions that were developed as a result are summarised int eh 
concluding section.   
3.3 Conclusion 
This chapter developed the framework for a comparative analysis of in-work benefits across 
diverse contexts in recent decades. It comprised of two main parts. The broad part of the 
framework for contextualising in-work benefit variation outlined the historical and 
contemporary context that can be used to start to interpret trends and variance in in-work 
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benefit policies across EUMS across two levels: the regime or model of capitalism and the 
micro-institutional characteristics of policies. Moreover, it pinpointed three broad concepts 
that are also useful for contextualising in-work benefits with respect to institutions in terms 
of understanding policies as a form of change or continuity in capitalist democratic countries: 
(1) path-dependency whereby the status quo in terms of both logics and actual instruments 
is maintained; (2) reconfiguration or incremental reforms, whereby logics and/or instruments 
may be shifted, but not to the extent where there is a complete break with the past; and (3) 
path-breaking reform implies a stark shift of logics and/or instruments.  
The second part of the framework was developed to further analyse the (varied) role of in-
work benefits across democratic capitalist countries and over time, building on the roots 
outlined in the previous part of the framework. The broad premise of the framework was that 
variation in in-work benefits can be understood in a comparative perspective by considering 
how policies shape the extent to which citizens depend on the market, the state and the family 
as sources of welfare.  
It first set out how the umbrella concept of ‘dependency relationships’ can be used to define 
in-work benefits relative to other policies that they are sometimes conflated with, which was 
summarised in a three-fold typology of in-work benefits, not in-work benefits and possible 
in-work benefits. This provides the list of policies which can be drawn from for empirical 
analysis of in-work benefits. A key argument made in the chapter was that the ‘possible’ in-
work benefits can be better understood through empirical research comparing policy 
instruments and considering how they fit into context.   
The second section set out how the concept of dependency relationships is further specified 
to identify and compare the salient features of in-work policies. Analysis of these features 
is expected to illuminate differences and similarities in the objectives and logics 
underpinning in-work benefits across countries as three key sticking points where conflict 
and inequalities play out. But it also provides a way of looking backwards within countries, 
to understand if there is a continuation of the logics and interests underpinning in-work 
benefits relating to forms of dependence in the development of welfare states as set out 
above.   
Both parts of the framework thus serve to structure the focus of and contextualise the broad 
comparison of in-work benefits stipulated in the primary research question:  
1) What is the nature and extent of variation in in-work benefits in EUMS? 
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The second part of the framework led to a more specific question:   
2) To what extent and in what ways do EUMS’ in-work benefit policies vary 
in their orientation towards dependence on the labour market, state and the 
family?   
This also serves as a basis for further clarifying the definition of in-work benefits developed 
here through empirical investigation.  The sub-themes underpinning both of these questions, 
based on the framework, involve situating in-work benefits with respect to socioeconomic 
factors, and both the contemporary and historical institutional context. This can be 
formulated as a broad question as follows:  
3) How does variation in EUMS’ in-work benefits policies map on to 
historical and contemporary context?  
Thus, these questions and themes will be explored in the empirical analysis in Chapters 5 to 
7.  The next chapter outlines the methodology, the construction of the data and approach to 






4 METHODOLOGY  
This thesis employed a cross-national comparative methodology to describe and analyse 
variance in in-work benefit policies in capitalist democratic countries. Supporting the 
theoretical aims to examine a diverse range of countries, the research examines in-work 
benefit variation in EU Member States (EUMS) from 2006 to 2017. This chapter describes 
and justifies the methodology. Section 4.1 outlines the research aims, questions and 
reasoning. Section 4.2 sets out the research design, which comprised of multiple, 
overlapping strands of the research into EUMS’ in-work benefits, and it also situates the 
research within the field of cross-national comparative methodologies. Additionally, it 
outlines the operationalisation of the conceptual framework. Section 4.3 describes the data 
sources and the procedure that was followed for data collection. The methods that were 
employed to analyse the data are outlined section 4.4 and are also further specified in the 
empirical chapters (5 to 7). Section 4.5 reflects on the challenges and lessons learned from 
conducting cross-national research on in-work benefits, a novel and ill-defined area of policy 
which poses several challenges relating to finding and analysing data suitable for 
comparative research.  The final section summarises the main points of the chapter.    
4.1 Aims, questions and reasoning  
The research aimed to describe the extent and nature of variation in EUMS’ in-work benefits, 
including when and where policies are used and the form they take. Through the application 
of the framework set out in Chapter 3, which draws on political economy, comparative 
welfare state and social policy literature, the research also aimed to examine the orientation 
of in-work benefit policies to forms of dependency on the state, labour market and the family. 
Variation on these overlapping forms of dependency are likely to reveal differences in the 
objectives of policies and the analysis led to consideration of the logics and interests 
underpinning countries’ in-work benefit policies. Another overlapping aim of the research 
was to contextualise trends and variation in in-work benefits, using ideal-type frameworks 
and indicators of the institutional and socio-economic context to aid the interpretation of 
how and why these policies relate to historical and contemporary context24.  The research 
questions set out below capture these research aims: 
                                                     
24 In this thesis, the terms ‘nation’ and ‘country’ are used interchangeably. Both terms have controversies. Clasen (1999, 
p3) posits country is a ‘political construct’. Hantrais, (1999, p.98) argues nation is a ‘contested and loaded concept’ as 
‘borders shift’ and there is diversity within nations. The focus here is on nations’ ‘administrative and legal structures’ (ibid) 
‘as given contexts for actors and institutions’ (Clasen, 1999, p.3).  
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1) What is the nature and extent of variation in in-work benefits in EUMS? 
a. Have in-work benefits become more commonplace in recent years? 
b. How common are archetypal in-work benefit policies associated 
with liberal regimes? 
2) To what extent and in what ways do EUMS’ in-work benefit policies vary 
in their orientation towards dependence on the labour market, state and the 
family?   
3) How does variation in EUMS’ in-work benefits policies map on to 
historical and contemporary context?  
As per the framework outlined in Chapter 3, the study was partly deductive in that the 
policies to be investigated and the salient features of policies and the conceptual framework 
for analysing variance in design and features were set out prior to the investigation (Mahoney 
and Terrie, 2008; Ebbinghaus, 2012). Yet, there was an inductive element exploring the 
relationship between in-work benefit variation and a number of contextual factors, namely: 
socio-economic factors and indictors of the extent of liberalisation across countries; and, 
regime typologies as a heuristic device for exploring the role of historical policy legacies 
and their associate logics (Rose, 1991, p.449). Moreover, the research design was broad in 
scope to examine the validity of the definition and conceptualisation of in-work benefits for 
cross-national research that was set out based on theory, which was re-evaluated throughout 
the research. Towards this aim, two archetypal in-work benefit sub-types (in-work cash 
transfers and refundable earned income tax credits) and two possible in-work benefit sub-
types (non-refundable earned income tax credits and adjusted unemployment benefits), as 
defined in Chapter 4, were included in the investigation. They are defined again below. The 
next sections describe in more detail how the research was designed in line with these 
questions and aims. 
4.2 Research design and parameters  
In broad terms, the study comprised an explicit cross-national comparative policy analysis, 
including comparison over time (Kennett, 2004; Clasen, 1999; Clasen, 2004). It began with 
an all-encompassing investigation into all 27/28 EUMS’ tax-benefit systems and then the 
focus narrowed, to different degrees, in each of the three parts of the investigation, into 
countries with in-work benefits, as per the definition of in-work benefits set out in the 
framework. The research, however, did not follow a linear process, partly because of the 
timings of the publication of data sources and the time taken to access some of the data. It 
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was also somewhat iterative, and insights from different phases of the research fed into each 
constituent part. The different strands of the research are summarised below.  
4.2.1 The components of the empirical investigation  
The empirical investigation comprised of multiple components as in-work benefits were 
probed from different angles to feed into a multi-faceted description and analysis of the 
extent and nature of variation across EUMS from 2006 to 2017. The components are 
summarised in the order they are presented in the thesis, starting with top-level detail about 
trends and variation across all EUMS, and then homing in on countries with in-work benefits 
for the subsequent parts of the analysis.  
The first strand consists of an initial mapping out of the provisions listed above in EUMS 
for two time points: 2008 and 2016. This part of the investigation was intended to capture 
differences between countries in the form and use of policies. Presented alongside this is a 
comparison of variation in government expenditure on in-work cash transfers and earned 
income tax credits (refundable and non-refundable) across countries and time. Illuminating 
trends in in-work benefit ‘effort’ across countries, this part of the analysis represents a 
significant step forward in comparative research on in-work benefits as a result of a lack of 
expenditure data on in-work benefits. Both parts of the analysis contextualised with data on 
socio-economic context, as well as indicators of liberalisation in other areas of social and 
labour market policy, to explore possible ‘explanations’ for cross-national and temporal 
variation in the use of these policies. 
The second strand of the research examined more closely the actual policies used. The 
dependency relationships framework, focusing on policy orientation towards state and 
familial forms and degrees of dependency, was operationalised through analysis of policy 
form, rules and design. This part of the investigation contributes further evidence of the 
extent to which and ways in which EUMS’ in-work policies vary. The analysis was 
conducted for 2016 only because of the constraints on the research, so it does not directly 
examine changes over time. Yet it contributes evidence that can be compared with historical 
and future in-work benefits research. The analysis was also contextualised, considering in 
particular the relevance of (historical) institutions in shaping the ‘micro-institutional’ 
features of in-work benefits.  
The third and final empirical component of the study comprised a systematic comparison of 
one element of the labour market aspect of the theoretical framework, identified as 
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significant given the direct link to paid work in in-work policies. Given concerns about 
labour market inequalities post-industrial labour markets, and the conflicting arguments 
about the role of in-work benefits in exacerbating of offsetting risks associated with non-
standard work in particular, the analysis compared the extent to which in-work benefits in 
EUMS were oriented towards ‘standard’ or ‘non-standard’ work. Quantitative indicators 
were developed to aid the systematic comparison of the non-standard orientation of in-work 
benefits. Again, the analysis of policy design was for 2016 only, however, the analysis had 
a temporal dimension in considering the role of historical and contemporary context, notably 
indicators of the structure of EUMS’ labour markets, in line with the third research question 
and in a way that speaks to the broad themes discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 about the 
relationship between labour market risks and in-work benefits.   
4.2.2  Situating the methodology   
The research presented in this thesis drew on cross-national comparative methodologies 
from social policy and the broader field of comparative welfare states and political economy 
research. It employed an explicit cross-national methodology in that it compared phenomena 
across countries (as opposed to an implicit method focusing on one country but using 
concepts developed from other countries) (Rose, 1991, p.447). Even though ‘convergent’ 
pressures and contemporary contexts are likely to create new needs and demands for 
policies, and ideologies and power-structures have in some cases more than others disrupted 
national political processes, such ‘convergent’ pressures are still mediated through national 
contexts. Thus, the methodology prioritises an understanding of national-specifications of 
in-work benefits, instead of assuming homogeneity or universalism, in order to ascertain 
where, when and which cross-cutting interests and ideals lead to variation in nations’ in-
work benefit policies, which are also key to understanding policy outcomes both in the short-
run and longer-term on the possibilities of future political processes (Hall, 2016; Hantrais, 
1999).   
As outlined by Hantrais (1999, p.94) the comparative methodology employed in this thesis 
comprised a mid-way point between comparative methodologies that, on the one hand, 
consider social reality to be ‘context free’, and those on the other which see it as ‘context 
bound’: instead seeing social reality ‘…as context dependent, but the context itself serves as 
an important explanatory variable and an enabling tool, rather than constituting a barrier to 
effective cross-national comparisons’.  
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The conceptualisation of in-work benefits in this thesis resonated above the level of the 
nation state in a broad sense implying a wider shift in logics and in the tools of contemporary 
capitalism concerning dependency on the state and the labour market for working 
households. Yet, beyond this, national provisions were the main focus of the research, as 
national factors are likely to interact with historical and contemporary context to produce 
different versions of in-work benefits, with different effects.  
Towards this end, the research drew on one of two methodologies pioneered by Esping-
Andersen’s (1990) Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, which compared policy design and 
rules using a conceptual framework to compare across countries and to analyse the historical 
and political contingency of policymaking, as well as the relationship between power, policy 
preferences and the ongoing development of policies in line with predominant interests and 
logics (Clasen et al., 2015a; Mabbett and Bolderson, 1999; Hesse-Biber and Johnson, 2015) 
However, as outlined below, countries (or cases) were not selected on the basis of ideal-
types, instead, the aim was to explore the outcome of interest (in-work benefits) across 
countries which have previously clustered into ideal-types, in versions of capitalism, welfare 
regimes and associated frameworks (Ragin, 1987). Yet, the analysis was structured 
according to ideal-types, comparing both across countries and regimes, to explicitly facilitate 
exploration of the (different) ways policy legacies shape in-work benefits across countries 
(Emmenegger et al., 2015, p.7).  
The main empirical focus was therefore on (descriptions of) policy rules and design features 
and on policy expenditure, in order to ‘understand’ in-work benefits from a comparative 
perspective. The ontology underpinning this focus is one which sees social policies as multi-
faceted and multi-dimensional phenomena. While the interpretation and construction of 
policies in national contexts plays out on both the experiences of receiving them and what 
they mean to political actors (different dimensions), policies are also understood to constitute 
an empirical reality, which can be ‘accessed’ by researchers employing different techniques, 
each with their own merits and drawbacks (Daigneault, 2014a). Different methods for 
studying in-work benefits can lead to distinctive, overlapping, complementary and even 
contradictory insights regarding what policies are and the aims and ideals they are oriented 
towards.  
Specifically, the study design prioritised policy design, rules and expenditure, which were 
understood to comprise a  formalised, codified output of a political process, which actors’ 
preferences and institutional factors have fed into (Daigneault, 2015). The focus on 
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qualitative and quantitative features of in-work benefits was informed by critiques of one-
dimensional studies of social policy or entire welfare states examining only expenditure as 
an indicator of ‘welfare stateness’ or ‘effort’ (Clasen, 1999, p.2); and drew instead from 
perspectives whereby qualitative features of policies are researched as a means for 
understanding the social, political and economic objectives policies are informed by and 
shape.  
The analysis of policy expenditure, therefore, was intended to add another facet to the 
analysis of the qualitative features of policies. Although expenditure can change for a variety 
of reasons, comparing countries’ in-work benefit expenditure across countries and over time 
captured, at a fundamental level, the amount of national resources that were directed towards 
provisions, the salience of which was interpreted using the theoretical framework 
considering the qualitative and quantitative dimensions in tandem.  
The main focus of the empirical investigation was on the ‘dependent variable’. The extent 
to which the methodology engages with context differs from both deep-immersion and case-
oriented studies found in both historical institutionalism and comparative social policy and 
welfare state research (Lynch and Rhodes, 2016; Mahoney and Terrie, 2008; Vlandas, 2013; 
Clasen and Clegg, 2006), and the multi-level statistical analyses which often employs many 
contextual variables to analyse their (mediated) effects.  
This was because the research aim concerning trends and variance in in-work benefits in 
capitalist democratic countries tipped the scales in the favour of a broader-brush study, 
focusing on the incidence of in-work benefits and their characteristics; which could then feed 
into more theoretically informed research into the determinants and processes in a smaller 
number of select cases. In this sense, there was a trade-off between deeper immersion to 
understand polices in national and/or regime contexts and the processes involved, and an 
understanding of the broader development of an under-researched yet contentious area of 
social policy across a wider range of countries and time.  Yet, both are seen to have merits 
for building theory and understanding social phenomena (Carmel, 1999; Ebbinghaus, 2012).  
However, the statistical analysis of quantitative in-work benefit expenditure data and the 
indicators of socio-economic and institutional context in the second element of the research 
(Spicker, 2018; Clasen and Siegel, 2007) took a particular form.  Unlike in some positivist 
and universalist large-N statistical studies, indicators of socio-economic and institutional 
context were factored into the analysis to explore the possible interaction between these 
processes and pressures and national policymaking, which were assumed to be different in 
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national contexts (Spicker, 2018). For example, high levels of in-work poverty (according 
to standardised measures across EUMS) could create perceptions within certain countries 
that in-work poverty is a problem a government must respond to with in-work benefits; 
elsewhere political and/or institutional factors could lead actors to emphasize alternative 
strategies, or not perceive in-work poverty as a pressing problem, e.g. because of the socio-
political groups affected (Clasen, 2019; Vlandas, 2013; Häusermann et al., 2013). 
Finally, the methodology departs in a number of significant ways from the “evaluative” 
paradigm predominating in-work benefits research. Evaluative researchers typically employ 
qualitative and quantitative methods to analyse the effects of specific types or ‘packages’ of 
policies on various outcomes (J Bradshaw and Finch, 2002). A typical example would be 
studying the effects of in-work benefit policies on poverty, employment, inequality, wages, 
social inclusion and gender equality, in specific contexts (Immervoll and Pearson, 2009; 
Brewer et al., 2012; Brewer et al., 2005). Questions about power and broader social, 
economic and political consequences of in-work benefits do not typically feature in these 
studies. Moreover, explanatory questions about why policies vary are rarely considered 
(Mabbett and Bolderson, 1999, p. 36–37, 41).  
Yet, this research shares with many evaluative studies the focus on policy design and rules, 
and the techniques employed to analyse the data, including a systematic comparison of 
policy design guided by the development of indicators to compare countries’ policies (Knotz 
and Immervoll, 2018) and the recognition of the complex relationship between design, 
context and outcomes (Mabbett and Bolderson, 1999, p.40). The latter point highlights the 
limits (and opportunities) for analysing in-work benefits in isolation and an understanding 
that the analysis is of policy orientation rather than its actual effects on dependency 
relationships. In this vein, the descriptions of legislative frameworks could differ to the 
actual implementation of policies, e.g. because of policy failure. Yet, the focus on actual 
policies and their relationship to the political, social and economic context, could lead to the 
identification of discrepancies in formal rules and the experiences and implementation of 
policies on the ground in future research (Knotz and Immervoll, 2018).  
The next section describes and justifies the spatial and temporal parameters of the research.   
4.2.3  Cross-national and temporal comparison    
The research comprises a series of cross-national comparisons over-time. It starts with a 
broad focus on all 27- 28 European Union member states (Croatia joined in 2009) from 2006 
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to 2017 as there was limited evidence of variation in in-work benefits over time and across 
countries, especially on expenditure, from which to select cases: a broader account of trends 
and variation filled this vacuum. The wide scope of all EUMS also addresses a bias in in-
work benefit research that has neglected Central and Eastern European and Southern 
European countries, which is likely due to assumptions about their different economic and 
political histories and stages of welfare state development.  
One drawback of only including EUMS concerns the welfare regime framework and the 
exclusion of Liberal & Nordic regime countries from outside of the EU, e.g. US, Australia 
and Norway, which are included in other studies (Marchal and Marx, 2018). Yet, as 
discussed below, more data were available for EUMS, meaning there was a trade-off 
involved between maximising the validity of the research by triangulation of data, for what 
is still a diverse range of countries, versus, thinner or patchier analysis, with limited 
opportunities for triangulation, on, for example, OECD countries (Soentken and Weishaupt, 
2015, p.594).  
To restrict the scope of the study so that it remained manageable but still facilitated 
exploration of changes and structural and cyclical pressures, the time-based sampling of the 
investigation prioritised medium-term trends by setting the temporal parameters of the study 
from 2006 to 2017. There were also trade-offs in terms of the level of depth and breadth with 
regards to analysis of policy design. The analysis of expenditure is carried out annually from 
2006 to 2017; the mapping of in-work benefits is carried out for two snapshots in 2008 and 
2016; the analysis of policy design was only carried out for 2016. This is because the process 
for collecting data for expenditure was less time-intensive than searching tax-benefit systems 
for relevant policies, and for collecting and analysing data on policy design features and 
rules. The snapshots do not capture changes occurring between the time-points. However, 
the frameworks emphasize an understanding of in-work benefits with reference to ongoing 
processes in capitalist societies (e.g. liberalisation) and the sampling lends itself to drawing 
conclusions about medium-term changes in in-work benefits that are interpreted through 
historical frameworks (Pierson, 2001; Lynch and Rhodes, 2016; Thelen and Streeck, 2005).   
4.2.4 Operationalising the conceptual framework  
The research employs a conceptual framework for analysing varied and complex policies 
across countries which requires a level of abstraction for comparison (Clasen, 1999). Yet, 
this cannot be too vague or be so restrictive that it loses meaning beyond a set context 
(Collier and Gerring, 2009). Careful operationalisation of concepts the ‘tool in cross-national 
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comparative research’ is imperative (Hamblin, 2009, p.93): it bridges the gap between the 
abstract concepts and empirical observations and guides data collection and analysis (Clasen 
et al., 2015a).  Both concepts and operationalisation pose challenges and risks in terms of 
finding appropriate and logical empirical reference in comparative research, namely 
‘construct equivalence’  (Mabbett and Bolderson, 1999, p.45; Mills et al., 2006). There are 
particular challenges in operationalising concepts for cross-national comparison: 
untranslatable language, different administrative categories and different labelling and 
formation of policies all generate difficulties and complexities(Collier and Gerring, 2009; 
Carmel, 1999).  
The previous chapter outlined the conceptualisation of in-work benefits for cross-national 
comparison as policies that imply combine dependence on the state for income maintenance 
with dependence on employers for wages. Policies were categorised as: (1) archetypal in-
work benefits; (2) possible in-work benefits and (3) not in-work benefits. A range of policies 
could fit this conceptualisation. However, weighing up practical considerations about what 
is feasible given the resources of the study as well as theoretical relevance of different 
instruments within this typology, three kinds of provision were selected for the empirical 
investigation. The first, in-work cash transfers, represent an archetypal in-work benefit. The 
second area – earned income tax credits – if refundable represents an archetypal in-work 
benefit in the typology and represents a possible in-work benefit if non-refundable. 
However, refundable and non-refundable earned income tax credits were bunched together 
for parts of the analysis to simplify the interpretation of what is already a variegated 
definition. The legitimacy of doing so was questioned throughout the research as more was 
learned about these policies.  The third kind - adjusted unemployment benefits – also 
represents a ‘possible in-work benefit’. A low initial threshold was set for including 
unemployment benefits that can be received while the recipient is undertaking paid work. 
Including these provisions thus provided an opportunity to question whether in fact they 
should be considered a form of in-work benefits through a wide-ranging comparison of the 
amount and kinds of what that recipients can carry out while in receipt of unemployment 
benefit in EUMS. 
These policy sub-types are broadly based on administrative categories of benefits but also 
refer to specific design features of policies. However, administrative categories and policy 
labels are not the same across countries, and policies may therefore be inconsistently 
included or excluded across countries on the basis of these categories alone. As such, the 
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identification of in-work benefits in EUMS was guided by a detailed list of inclusion criteria 
for each sub-type that goes beyond administrative categories and labels. This is outlined in 
Table 4.1.  
The inclusion criteria were intended to transcend administrative categories or labels, which 
could differ across countries. Yet, a few anomalous or problematic in-work benefit policies 
did not neatly fit with the sub-categorisation of in-work benefits employed. The first of these 
is the UK’s Universal Credit, which is categorised as an in-work cash transfer. However, 
Universal Credit merges several in and out of work means-tested benefits into one. As the 
Table 4.1 Inclusion criteria for comparative research into in-work benefits  
Sub-type  Inclusion Criteria  
In-work cash 
transfers 
• Cash transfers  
• In social security system  
• Not earmarked for specific goods or services  
• Exclusively for households or individuals with employment 
status as employees, self-employed or any or form of paid 
participation in the labour market, as stated in eligibility 
criteria  
• May have additional eligibility criteria (e.g. working 
parents only)  
Earned income 
tax credits  
• In tax system  
• Tax credits are refundable (can reduce tax liabilities below 
zero and thus lead to a transfer) or non-refundable (can 
reduce tax liabilities but not below zero)  
• Eligibility criteria/rules mean recipients must have earnings 
(from work) or they explicitly mention the in-work 
employment status of recipients 
• May have additional primary eligibility requirements (e.g. 




• Cash transfers in the form of unemployment benefit  
• Contributory or non-contributory, earnings-related, flat rate 
or means-tested 
• Primary eligibility criterion is unemployment status, but 
there must be at least one of the three following in-work 
levers:  
o Earnings disregards (some earned income does not 
count towards assessment of eligibility or 
entitlement); 
o Eligibility criteria/ policy rules state that 
participation in paid work is allowed alongside 
receipt of benefit; 
o A phase out so that the benefit is phased out with 
earnings, rather than entitlement stopping 
immediately with any earned income.  
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benefit can be received by individuals, both in and out of work, it spans across the adjusted 
unemployment benefit and in-work cash transfer sub-categories. Yet, the emphasis on 
means-testing, examined further in the empirical analysis, makes the policy more closely 
resemble in-work cash transfer policies in other countries. 
The second ‘problematic’ policy was Italy’s Family Allowances. The classification of the 
benefit as an in-work benefit rests on the eligibility rule that 70 per cent of income to be 
from earnings and recipients must be ‘employees’. However, unemployment benefits also 
constitute earnings in Italy (Rastrigina et al., 2018). Those entitled to claim Family 
Allowances are ‘employees and their families’ but it is also paid to (former) employees who 
are either unemployed or retired. In some studies, the policy is categorised as a family/child 
policy, but the emphasis on employment income (or former employee status) was considered 
a significant enough emphasis on work for it to be considered an in-work benefit in this 
investigation. Moreover, households with or without children are eligible for the benefit. The 
definition and classification of the policy is put into a comparative perspective in the findings 
presented in this thesis.  
Some of the policies classified as earned income tax credits also test the boundaries of sub-
types. The names of some relevant provisions suggest they are not in-work benefits (e.g. 
Slovakia’s Child Tax Credits). However, eligibility for Slovakia’s Child Tax Credit requires 
a parent to be employed and earn at least six times the minimum wage annually or be in self-
employment with gross revenues equivalent to six times the minimum wage.  Thus, in order 
to be eligible, recipient households must be in work, which was not stated in child tax credits 
in other countries. There were similar examples of tax credits that were named in line with 
the need or specific group they were targeting (e.g. lone parents) but eligibility was 
conditional on paid work.   
Finally, adjusted unemployment benefits were included in the study based on a low threshold 
in that the rules or design means that recipients can undertake paid work while receiving the 
benefit, regardless of what happens to their earnings. Yet, these policies varied considerably 
in terms of the amount of earnings and work, and the kinds of work, that were permitted. In 
many countries, this is likely to be ‘too low’ for them to be considered de-facto in-work 
benefits. This was put in a comparative perspective in the analysis presented in Chapter 7.  
Table 4.2 summarises the way in which the dependency relationships framework, discussed 
in Chapter 3, of state, family and market, was operationalised in the research. It examines 
both the qualitative and quantitative dimensions of policy design while considering the 
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interaction of different elements of policy design and the rules of these relationships. The 
‘degree’ or ‘strength’ of the relationship is operationalised differently to the ‘quality’ or 
‘form’ of the dependency relationships in-work benefits are oriented towards.  
For example, the levels of in-work benefits formed the main indicator of the degree to which 
there was an orientation towards state dependency provisions, with higher levels indicating 
an orientation towards more state dependency than lower levels. At the same time, the 
quality of this dependency relationship will be affected by the form and design of the 
provision, with an earned income tax credit more likely to symbolise a light-touch and non-
stigmatising form of state support, in comparison to in-work support within unemployment 
Table 4.2 Orientation of in-work benefits towards different degrees and forms of state-
family-market dependence   
Dependency relationships  Operationalisation  
State  
(i.e. how much and what kind 
of relationship with the state 
are in-work benefits oriented 
towards?) 
Degree of relationship:  
• Whether in-work benefits are used  
• Levels/ generosity of benefits (more generous 
imply oriented towards higher degree of state 
dependence than less generous)  
Quality of relationship:  
• Whether in-work benefits are fiscal (tax) or 
social  
• The extent of targeting in in-work benefits  
• The presence and strength of behavioural 
requirements and conditionality  
Labour market  
(i.e. what type and what level 
of labour market relationship 




Degree of relationship:  
• Earnings and work hours restrictions/ 
requirements (higher earnings requirements and 
restrictions require policies are oriented 
towards fuller labour market participation)   
Quality of relationship:  
• Work status, hours and earnings restrictions/ 
requirements   
Family 
(i.e. what kind and what 
amount of dependence among 
family members are in-work 
benefits oriented towards?)** 
Degree of relationship:  
• Means-test (individualised or familial)  
Quality of relationship:  
• Rules and requirements concerning family-
members, e.g. child-based eligibility, couples 
work requirements  
Notes: * The operationalisation of the labour market orientation of in-work benefits is discussed further 
below (Section 4.4.3) ** The family unit was not defined a priori; family is conceptualised differently 
across welfare states and regimes, the analysis mostly centred on analysis of rules concerning spouses 
and children, but for some policies broader rules concerning dependents were also salient.  
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benefits. In the latter case, behavioural conditions and sanctions for non-compliance indicate 
policies are oriented towards a more punitive dependency relationship with the state.  
The association between certain features and the degree and nature of dependency 
relationships is theoretical. It assumes fiscal welfare has different social and political 
dynamics to social welfare and that the targeting of policies on specific groups also has 
sociological and political relevance (Titmuss, 1958; Morel et al., 2018; Oorschot and 
Roosma, 2015). Yet, the social and political dynamics and the nature of tax and social 
security policies and their association with stigma, for example, is also likely to vary across 
contexts (e.g. systems with more narrowly targeted, means-tested benefits could be more 
stigmatising) (Baumberg, 2016; Oorschot and Roosma, 2015). The merits of this assumption 
can be examined further with the actual empirical investigation into policies in the research, 
but it cannot be accessed completely through the research design.  
As stated above, indicators of contemporary and historical context were also fed into the 
analysis to aid the interpretation of the findings. For example, welfare regimes were used to 
explore the role of social policy legacies in shaping countries’ in-work benefit policies 
(qualitatively and quantitatively). Indicators of socio-economic context were selected on the 
basis of the arguments in the theoretical framework about the significance of labour market 
risks and in-work benefit trends. Moreover, indicators of social and labour market policies 
also fed into the analysis, to explore the relationship between the use and extent of in-work 
benefits and arguments about (different forms of) liberalisation, that in-work benefits are 
argued to be a part of.  
The conceptual framework guided the data collection and analysis, which is outlined in the 
next two sections of this chapter.  
4.3 Data sources and collection: EU-IWB  
Prior to this research project, there was no cross-national dataset on in-work benefits for the 
time-period studied, which would allow analysis of in-work benefit variation in line with the 
conceptual and theoretical framework. Therefore, a new and unique dataset on in-work 
benefits in EU countries – ‘EU-IWB’ – was designed and created. The EU-IWB dataset 
contains variables on in-work benefit types, design, rules and expenditure and was structured 
and organised in line with the research aims. The sources feeding into the dataset and process 
of data collection and processing are described below.  
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4.3.1 Data on countries’ tax-benefit systems 
The study began by looking for sources of data for comparison of the extent and form of 
variation in and across advanced democratic countries in recent decades. The most 
comprehensive comparative dataset on the design features and rules of in-work benefits, and 
thus by default whether countries had in place such provisions were the OECD’s 
employment conditional earning subsidies tables (e.g. OECD, 2010). However, on their own 
this data did not meet the needs of the research. The policies included in the dataset only 
partly overlapped with definition of in-work benefits set out in Chapter 2; data were 
“processed” by the OECD, which meant interpretation of variance across policies would be 
constrained by a lens which did not completely align with the operationalisation of concepts 
outline above (Kennett, 2001). Similar issues have been identified for comparative studies 
of active labour market policy (Clasen et al., 2015a).  Moreover, the only other data on in-
work benefits in OECD countries was also produced by the OECD. Given the contested 
definition of such provisions, and the potential for ‘missing’ relevant reforms, relying on one 
overarching data source would limit the scope for triangulation and thus could hinder the 
reliability of the study.   
Instead, data on in-work benefit policy design and rules were collected from several sources. 
The main data source and first port of call were ‘country policy descriptions’ produced by 
the OECD (2019a) for its tax-benefit model. These took the form of detailed reports of 
national tax benefit systems, namely ‘the rules to calculate tax and benefit amounts as they 
apply to the family types that are within the scope of the OECD tax-benefit model’ (ibid). 
They are also “processed” but to a lesser degree than the Employment Conditional Earning 
Subsidies tables mentioned above. At the time of conducting the initial mapping phase of 
the research, the most recent reports available included policy details corresponding to 2016. 
Through email correspondence with the OECD in the early phases of the research I 
anticipated 2017 and 2018 reports would be published in time to be incorporated into the 
research. However, a delay in the release of the most recent data meant the data on policy 
types and design was collected for 2008 and 2016 only25. 
Either way, there were several advantages to using the OECD’s country policy descriptions 
as the main initial data source. First, they follow a broadly standardised template for 
describing social benefits and tax systems for all OECD countries and additional EU 
                                                     
25 Later reports were released during later stages of the analysis and are used as supplementary sources. However, 2018 
data were not properly incorporated into the study due to the delay. 
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countries. Importantly, the structure of the reports was conducive for assessing tax and social 
benefit policies against the inclusion criteria. For example, they include the ‘employment 
conditional earning subsidies’ policy category, which overlaps with the in-work benefits 
definition outlined above but the reports included other policy areas that could also be 
searched for in-work benefits. Descriptions of unemployment benefits in the data also 
indicated if such provisions can be received alongside earned income, aiding the 
identification of ‘adjusted unemployment benefits’. Moreover, reports were available in 
English for most countries (the mother tongue of the researcher) and were produced by 
policy experts on each country, overcoming some of the issues for comparative researchers 
face when navigating complex systems they are unfamiliar with, bolstering the validity of 
the findings (Marchal and Marx, 2018, p.22).  
Data were also collected from tax-benefit country reports produced by EUROMOD, a tax 
benefit simulation model for the EU developed at the University of Essex (Sutherland and 
Figari, 2013). EUROMOD country reports are similar to the OECD policy descriptions in 
that they comprise of detailed descriptions of national (and some regional) policies that make 
up countries’ tax benefit systems (EUROMOD, 2019). They do not include an ‘in-work 
benefits’ category and descriptions of unemployment benefits do not consistently state 
whether the benefit can be received alongside paid work (as is the case in the OECD reports).  
In the few cases where policies are categorised as ‘in-work benefits’, this tended not to 
include earned income tax credits or adjusted unemployment benefits. Nevertheless, in 
conjunction with the OECD reports, the EUROMOD reports were used for corroboration – 
e.g. to check the policies identified in the OECD reports meet the inclusion criteria. They 
also contained additional details facilitating the analysis of policy rules and design in line 
with the framework. They were also used in the cases where data could not be collected from 
the OECD reports. For example, in the case of Belgium and France, OECD country 
descriptions are only in French and the report for Ireland for 2016 is missing26.  
An additional source, the Mutual Information System on Social Protection (MISSOC) 
comparative database, was used when further clarification was needed on adjusted 
unemployment benefits as in some cases it was not clear from the OECD and EUROMOD 
reports whether unemployment benefits could be combined with paid work. In a few cases, 
national data sources, usually in the form of descriptions of policies on government websites 
(in English), or legislative documents, were accessed as a last resort where, for example, an 
                                                     




aspect of policy rules or design was unclear or not detailed in the above sources. Finally, 
national sources were used when trying to identify the dates policies were introduced or 
abolished as this is not typically detailed in the sources described above. A full list of all of 
the sources are provided in Appendix A.  
The relevant data were collected from these sources first for 2016 and then 2008 according 
to the following process:  
i. The employment conditional earning subsidies section of OECD country 
descriptions were checked for relevant policies. Policies meeting the inclusion 
criteria were added to a provisional list organised by sub-type.  
ii. Other policy categories were checked for policies defined as in-work benefits for this 
study (earned income tax credits and unemployment benefit) and the relevant policies 
added to the provisional list of policies.  
iii. The list of policies drawn up from the OECD country descriptions was cross-checked 
with the EUROMOD country reports.  
Once the provisional list had been cross-checked, data on the following were added to the 
EU-IWB data set: whether or not countries had in-work benefits for 2008 and 2016, the name 
of the policy in English and in the local language (where given), policy sub-type (initial 
classification), and relevant policy features and rules for the analysis, e.g. eligibility criteria 
concerning employment status. These additional details were taken from all sources as rarely 
did one source contain all the required information.  
There were a number of challenges involved collecting data on in-work benefits in EUMS. 
First, countries’ tax and social benefit systems are complex and idiosyncratic. There are 
specific challenges in researching tax systems, as taxation is less likely to be within the 
repertoire of social policy researchers’ knowledge. Tax measures are difficult to interpret 
even when described in a “standardised” format for international comparison.  While care 
was taken to collect data just for earned income tax credits, the different use of labels and 
ways of describing tax systems across countries means there is some uncertainty involved in 
the mapping of schemes. 
In a similar vein, there were challenges categorising policies into the three broad sub-types: 
in-work cash transfers, earned income tax credits and adjusted unemployment benefits. 
Policy labels did not always reflect the policy sub-type. The main example of this is the 
UK’s Working Tax Credit, which is closer to an in-work cash transfer (Clasen, 2019). The 
use of multiple data sources that were standardised for purposes of international comparison 
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mainly helped to address confusion about whether to include or exclude policies, but such 
problems reflect the limits of one researcher conducing cross-national comparative research 
across a moderate number of countries.   
Moreover, the details and features of policies for operationalising the conceptual framework 
comparing policies with respect to dependency relationship in the main sources was also 
inconsistent across countries and for data were not available for all provisions for all the 
features and rules outlined in section 4.2.4. For example, concerning the orientation of in-
work benefits towards different degrees on state dependency, in some cases it was not 
possible to calculate the levels of a certain policy from the information in the country reports. 
It was not possible to calculate the level of many of the ‘adjusted unemployment benefits’ 
so they were omitted from this part of the analysis. In-work cash transfers descriptions 
included details on levels but often the examples or thresholds given were for different 
household types. Where possible, using the information available, levels were calculated for 
similar household types across countries, but these were not perfect matches.  
The comparison of the levels of earned income tax credits was more straightforward as many 
are individualised and do not include as many rules concerning means and household 
composition. The descriptions of policies regularly included the maximum amount or a clear 
formula for calculating this using data on wages for a given country/year. However, the 
descriptions of these provisions typically detailed the maximum level of the credit, thus it 
represented the most extreme version of the orientation of the policy towards state 
dependence for working households.  
Despite these caveats, as this data was available for most countries, it was possible to build 
a near complete comparative picture of the maximum levels of earned income tax credits, 
which revealed quite striking differences across (groups of) countries on this dimension of 
variation.  Similar issues concerning patchy data were apparent for many aspects of the 
dependency relationships framework for comparing policy design and rules. This is 
discussed in relation to the labour market aspect of the framework below in section 4.4.3.  
4.3.2 Estimating expenditure data   
The lack of standardised cross-national data on in-work benefit expenditure creates a 
challenge for comparative research. The closest existing dataset available was the OECD’s 
(2019b) Social Expenditure database (‘detailed data’). However, in-work benefits were 
inconsistently characterised and labelled under each country. National or administrative data 
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on public expenditure disaggregated at the programme level could not be sourced for all 
countries or policies. The lack of standardisation across national datasets creates issues of 
reliability.  
To address this problem, in-work benefit expenditure was estimated using a tax-benefit 
simulation model. Tax-benefit models use household level input data to estimate the amount 
of ‘entitlements’ for tax benefits and social benefits for individuals or households within a 
given country. Even if earned income tax credits do not lead to a transfer to the recipient, 
they are still a form of ‘revenue forgone’ in that the state does not receive the taxation it 
would should they were in place and are thus increasingly considered a form of public 
expenditure (Morel et al., 2018, p.550). Tax-benefit models can therefore be used to estimate 
government expenditure on a given policy by totalling the entitlements for all 
individuals/households for a weighted representative sample of each country (Barrios et al., 
2016).   
EUROMOD, a model of national tax-benefit systems for all 27-28 EU Member States 
(Sutherland and Figari, 2013), had several strengths for this research. First, it is developed 
following standardised procedures by national experts for EUMS and is therefore intended 
to produce output for meaningful comparison across countries. The years covered by the 
model vary across countries, but it covered all of the countries with in-work benefits and 
possible in-work benefits from 2007 to 2017. Moreover, the coordinators and developers of 
EUROMOD run training workshops in the UK, which I attended, in order to gain the 
technical expertise to carry out the simulations27. The developers and coordinators for 
EUROMOD were consulted on my proposed use of the model to estimate expenditure and 
some specific questions about estimates I had generated using the model.  Some of my 
queries were sent to the country experts who develop the models for each EUMS to check 
for discrepancies (I return to this point below). The dialogue and ‘checking’ process between 
the researcher, the coordinators of the model, and the national experts/ developers, add to 
validity of the findings.  
However, there were some drawbacks. One of the main limitations of using EUROMOD 
was that it was not possible to estimate expenditure on adjusted unemployment benefits for 
all countries. Mainly this was because unemployment benefit entitlement was not calculated 
at all in the model for various reasons, e.g. because the household level input data did not 
include sufficient detail to calculate entitlement, such as work history. Thus, expenditure 
                                                     
27 Nuffield-EUROMOD-UK training: 1-2 April 2019, Open University, London.  
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data were only estimated for the two in-work benefit sub-types: earned income tax credits 
and in-work cash transfers. It was not possible to estimate expenditure data for Finland as 
the policy identified for this country was not modelled in EUROMOD.  
The input data (that feeds into the model to calculate entitlement and liabilities) takes the 
form of household panel data covering a representative sample of the working age population 
in each country for set years. It is processed by EUROMOD so that it can be used for time-
series analysis and so that it is compatible with the model, e.g. benefits are uprated 
(Sutherland and Figari, 2013). For most countries and years, the input data is EU-SILC, 
provided by Eurostat, with some exceptions, e.g. the UK uses the Family Resources Survey. 
The full list of input data and information about access that was granted for the research is 
in Appendix B. Expenditure on in-work benefits was estimated by running the model version 
I1.0+ 2006 through to 2017 with the ‘best fit’ input data. The output shows how much each 
individual receives/owes under each social security and tax policy in the model. The model 
calculates the monthly entitlements/liabilities for all programmes even if not received 
monthly in practice. Moreover, if a benefit/tax is at the household level, it is split across 
members of the household. 
The relevant policies in the output were identified from the first element of the research 
using the OECD country descriptions and EUROMOD country reports. These policies were 
then identified in the model interface. As the initial phase of the research was carried out for 
two time points, and the expenditure analysis was annual, some additional policies were 
identified for the interim years that were not captured in the mapping phase of the research 
following further examination of the EUROMOD country reports for other years. Moreover, 
some policies identified in the initial mapping were not in the model: Finland’s earned 
income tax credit and the UK’s Universal Credit. Thus, expenditure data could not be 
estimated for Finland at all and the UK’s expenditure data is partial as it is based on Working 
Tax Credit expenditure only. The full list of policies for which expenditure is estimated is 
displayed in Table 4.3. The descriptive summary statistics of the expenditure dataset 





Table 4.3 Overview of expenditure dataset (in-work cash transfers and earned income tax credits only) 
 MS Policy  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
# years 
missing  
AT  Sole Earners’ Tax Credit 99 99 99 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 99 4 
AT  Lone Parents’ Tax Credit 99 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 1 
AT  Employees’ Tax Credit 99 99 99 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 0 3 
BE Tax Credit on Low Activity Income Credit Y Y Y Y Y 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
BE Tax Credit on Low Activity Income + Fiscal workbonus 0 0 0 0 0 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 0 
DK Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) 99 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 1 
EE Non-Refundable Credit Low Income Workers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Y  0 0 
FR ‘Revenue de Solidarité Active’ (RSAA) 0 0 0 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y x x 0 
FR Activity Allowances (PDA) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Y Y 0 
FR Work Premium (PPE) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 0 0 0 
IE Family Income Supplement (FIS) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 0 
IE PAYE Tax Credit Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 0 
IE Earned Income Tax Credit 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Y Y 0 
IT Family Allowances Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 0 
IT PAYE Tax Credit / Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 0 
IT  Self-Employed Credit / Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 0 
IT 80 Euro Bonus/ Fiscal Bonus  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Y Y Y Y 0 
LU Employee Tax Credit  0 0 0 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 0 
LU Self-Employed Tax Credit 0 0 0 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 0 
MT In-Work Benefit 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Y Y Y 0 
NL Work Credit Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 0 
NL Income Dependent Combination Credit  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 0 






Table 4.3 (Continued) 
 MS Policy  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
# years 
missing  
SK Employee Tax Credit (ETC)  0 0 0 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 0 0 
ES Working Mother Tax Credit Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 0 
ES Working Lone Parent Tax credit  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Y Y Y 0 
ES Working Large Families Credit 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Y Y Y 0 
SE Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) 0 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 0 
UK Working Tax Credits (WTC) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 0 
  Valid per year 23 28 28 30 30 30 30 29 29 29 27 27   
Notes: Expenditure data estimated by the author for the above policies and years using EUROMOD and input data (Appendix B), unless stated otherwise. Additional information is 
provided on the limits and any discrepancies in the data as follows: ‘/’ Cannot confirm if policy was in place or missing data; ‘99’ Missing data; ‘Y’ Expenditure data generated for 
year/ policy; ‘0’ Policy expenditure 0 because policy not in place, Green fill indicates expenditure estimated by author using EUROMOD. Yellow fill indicates a discrepancy in 





After running the model for the relevant countries and years, annual expenditure for each of 
the relevant policies was calculated using the EUROMOD output data in Stata Statistical 
Software28 by: (1) multiplying the individual entitlement to the benefit by the population 
weights included in the EUROMOD output data, (2) multiplying this by 12 to get the annual 
amount received and (3) summing this to get the total entitlement for that policy for the year. 
The calculation was carried out for all relevant policies in each country (where more than 
one policy was in use).   
For each country, the total entitlement for all relevant policies was aggregated by sub-type, 
which were then aggregated for total expenditure figure. The process was repeated for each 
year (2006 – 2017) to generate time-series in-work benefit expenditure data. Finally, annual 
country expenditure data were also calculated as a proportion of public expenditure and as a 
proportion of GDP to facilitate comparison across countries and time. The GDP and public 
expenditure indicators are described below, and the analysis of the expenditure data is 
discussed in section 4.4.  
Several steps were taken to validate the estimates of expenditure on in-work benefits. The 
details of validation are provided in Table 4.4. First, estimates of annual expenditure for each 
relevant policy were validated using the EUROMOD country reports, some of which include 
in the appendices estimates of annual expenditure for policies in the models by the experts 
for each country that develop the EUROMOD model. These are in the form of total 
entitlement estimates for each policy. A total of 14 policies were validated. However, 15 
policies could not be validated because this information was not available in the country 
reports, including all policies in Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.  
Comparing my estimates with those in the appendices, a discrepancy of 6 per cent of the 
experts’ estimate was considered sufficient, as some discrepancies can be expected due to 
updates to the EUROMOD model, rounding, or the use of different ‘best fit’ input data (there 
are several versions of input data for each year) 29. For 11 policies, there were matched or 
within the acceptable range. For policies in Ireland, Spain and France, discrepancies were 
beyond acceptable parameters and advice from EUROMOD experts was sought.  
 
                                                     
28 StataCorp. 2017. Stata Statistical Software: Release 15. College Station, TX: StataCorp LLC. 
29 Personal correspondence with EUROMOD developers.  
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Table 4.4 Validation of expenditure data estimates using EUROMOD 
EUMS Policy Comparison with CR Cautions 
AT Sole Earners’ Tax Credit Not in CR No validation 
AT Lone Parents’ Tax Credit Not in CR No validation 
AT Employees’ Tax Credit Not in CR No validation 
BE Tax Credit on Low Activity 
Income Credit 
Not in CR No validation 
BE Tax Credit on Low Activity 
Income + Fiscal workbonus 
Not in CR No validation 
DK Earned Income Tax Credit 
(EITC) 
Match No external validation 
EE Non-Refundable Credit Low 
Income Workers 
Match Over external 
FR ‘Revenue de Solidarité 
Active’ (RSAA)  
Match Under external 
FR Activity Allowances (PDA) Overestimate Slightly over 
FR Work Premium (PPE) Approx. 6% under Slightly under 
IE Family Income Supplement 
(FIS) 
Approx. 3% over No external validation, 
IE PAYE Tax Credit Not in CR No validation 
IE Earned Income Tax Credit Not in CR No validation 
IT Family Allowances Match Slightly over 
IT 
PAYE Tax Credit 





Policies aggregated in CR but 
within range 
Partial validation 
IT 80 Euro Bonus/ Fiscal 
Bonus  
Approx. 4% under Slightly under 
LU Employee Tax Credit  Not in CR No validation 
LU Self-Employed Tax Credit Not in CR No validation 
MT In-Work Benefit Approx. 20% under Over 
NL Work Credit Not in CR No validation 
NL Income Dependent 
Combination Credit  
Not in CR No validation 
SK Child Tax Credit Not in CR No validation 
SK Employee Tax Credit (ETC)  Not in CR No validation 
ES Working Mother Tax Credit Nearly double None** 
ES Working Lone Parent Tax 
credit  
Not in CR No validation 
ES Working Large Families 
Credit 
Not in CR No validation 
SE Earned Income Tax Credit 
(EITC) 
Approx. 6% over CR Slightly over 
UK Working Tax Credits 
(WTC) 
Match. Over 
Notes: Validation procedure as described in main text involved the author checking her estimates of 
expenditure using EUROMOD against those reported in EUROMOD Country Reports (CR), including 
EUROMOD experts’ calculations of expenditure and national expenditure data. Not all EUROMOD 
CR contained relevant data. Policy experts from EUROMOD were consulted over discrepancies for IE, 




Varied reasons ascribed to the discrepancies required different solutions. For example, in the 
case of Spain, my estimates were modified slightly. The national expert stated that the 
procedure I had followed to estimate expenditure was correct. Yet, they also suggested 
adjusting the calculation so that it excluded two regions within Spain with a different tax 
regime to improve the accuracy of the national expenditure estimate. For the UK and two 
years for a provision in France, it was not possible to thoroughly investigate unacceptable 
discrepancies. In these cases, the country experts’ estimates, as in the relevant reports, were 
used instead of my own.  
However, just because my estimates passed the expert test, this does not necessarily mean 
they are accurate estimates of expenditure on set policies, as tax-benefit models rely on input 
data and are not perfect accounts of expenditure. Helpfully, the EUROMOD country experts 
also run their own validation exercise by comparing their model estimates for entitlement to 
national administrative data or national expenditure statistics. This shows that EUROMOD 
under- or over-estimates expenditure for some tax and benefit policies. The discrepancies 
are usually attributed to input data, e.g. they do not capture changes in circumstances within 
a year, which could affect entitlement. If the EUROMOD estimate is above or under the 
administrative/external statistics, this is indicated in the third column of Table 4.4. As a 
whole the table thus summarises the cautions for interpreting the data. Even where 
administrative statistics and EUROMOD did not match, I continued to use the EUROMOD 
expenditure data for reasons of consistency and replicability. However, such discrepancies 
suggest a cautious reading of the comparative analysis of in-work benefit expenditure in 
particular is advisable. 
A related note about the expenditure analysis, which is not an issue with the use of 
EUROMOD to estimate expenditure per se, is that the expenditure analysis only includes 
expenditure on earned income tax credits and in-work cash transfers.  Some countries may 
be high spenders on other policies classified as possible in-work benefits in Chapter 3 (e.g. 
social security contribution reductions), but low spenders on these two provisions. This 
potentially becomes a problem when using expenditure data to show trends and variation 




4.3.3 Historical and contemporary context  
As described above, a welfare regime framework was used to structure most of the analysis 
to facilitate the exploration of the relevance of regimes across the different ways of 
comparing in-work policies (e.g. micro-institutional versus expenditure). Additional 
indicators of socio-economic and institutional context also feed into the analysis based on 
the arguments set out in the theoretical framework. The main socio-economic indicators 
were in-work poverty, unemployment and underemployment. These were explored because 
researchers regularly link the rise of in-work benefits or similar measures to these pressures 
and/or they are considered the main goals that governments implementing in-work benefits 
aim to address, as discussed in Chapter 2 and 3. The main institutional variables are 
collective bargaining coverage, unemployment replacement rates and trade union density, 
which were selected based on political economy literature associating the weakening or 
transformation of these institutions/ policies with (forms of) liberalisation (Thelen, 2012). 
The data sources and description of these indicators are detailed in Appendix C and 
Appendix D respectively.  
4.4 Data analysis  
This section describes and justifies the analysis of data for each phase of the research.  
4.4.1 Mapping and in-work benefit expenditure   
The ‘mapping’ of policies at two points is descriptive and does not need much explanation 
independently of the presentation of the findings. In brief, it starts by outlining the number 
of countries with or without policies, and each country’s policy sub-types. Totals and 
percentages are also calculated for regimes and countries to quantify cross-national variance. 
The totals and percentages reflect which countries had any number of policies that were 
classified as one of the three types. The number of policies per country are not tallied or 
counted, as this gives the false impression of ‘effort’ across countries. The second element 
of the research describes variation in expenditure on in-work benefits for the EU as a whole, 
which is then broken down by regime and country, and according to sub-type.  
As the first cross-national time series expenditure data on in-work benefits, the data were 
also used to explore the relationship between expenditure and the socio-economic and 
institutional changes. Yet, a decision was taken not to stretch the analysis too far because of 
the limitations of the expenditure data dataset. For example, the data only covered two in-
work benefit sub-types out of the three defined for the study. Moreover, there are other 
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policies that could count as in-work benefits that were not included in the study. As such, 
the expenditure data is better thought of as expenditure on two specific in-work benefit sub-
types, not in-work benefit expenditure as a whole. The exclusion of other possible in-work 
benefits means the dependent variable to be modelled through statistical analysis would be 
skewed towards these types. Similarly, as the expenditure data is only for two sub-types of 
in-work benefits, it covers only 14 countries. This is below the number of countries that 
some argue is necessary for country-level regression analyses, e.g. at least 25 countries are 
needed for linear models, and 30 for logit models (Spicker, 2018, p.221). The data were not 
normally distributed because some countries had zero in-work benefit expenditure for some 
years during the time-period, e.g. Malta introduced its in-work benefit in 2015 (2007 to 
2017). The combination of the distribution, the interest in country-fixed effects, and the 
dependent variable problem limited the possibilities for other forms of statistical analysis.   
However, in order to address the aim to explore relationships between changes in 
expenditure over the time-period and factors that have been associated with the rise of in-
work benefits in the literature, correlational analysis was carried out for in-work benefit 
expenditure and socio-economic and liberalisation variables. This correlational analysis was 
carried out at the country-level, as the theoretical framework stipulates that socio-economic 
pressures and related changes in political economy may have different effects depending on 
the country. The analysis is not immune to the problems outlined above but conducting it at 
the country level leads to a transparency that aids the interpretation of the data. The details 
of the analysis are discussed along with the results in Chapter 5.  
4.4.2 State and family orientation  
Following on from this, the conceptual framework is applied to analyse the varied orientation 
of policies towards different degrees and forms of state and family dependency relationships, 
focusing on 2016 only. The analysis is described throughout the chapter. Yet, limits to the 
data constrain the analysis. For example, the data on the levels of benefits varied across 
countries and the most consistently available data was on maximum levels. Although 
representing the top end, this analysis tells us something about how far policies can stretch 
to bring the state into the domain of income maintenance for (some) working households. 
The main point of the analysis is to examine the orientation of provisions, not their actual 
effects on dependency. The analysis mainly examines the orientation of provisions towards 
different degrees and forms of dependency within the family, including whether there is a 
policy focus on certain household types. Again, the data limited what was possible with this 
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analysis. However, the analysis pinpoints some salient differences between policies that 
could be followed up in the future using different methods that were beyond the scope of 
this study that focused mainly on descriptions of policies (e.g. model households using a tax-
benefit simulator).   
4.4.3 Labour market orientation  
The final stage of the analysis systematically compares the policy features and rules within 
in-work benefits as indicators of the orientation of policies towards different degrees and 
forms of labour market dependency. More specifically, the purpose of this analysis was to 
compare policies considering whether they are oriented towards standard or non-standard 
forms of employment. This addresses an assumption in the literature that in-work benefits 
are primarily targeted on (and facilitate) precarious, non-standard work in de-industrialised 
labour markets (Rubery et al., 2018). And some definitions of in-work benefits specify that 
they are targeted on low paid work (Immervoll and Pearson, 2009).  
Yet, as per the framework, the investigation was open to there being different objectives and 
logics about paid work underpinning national policies. It sought to examine the orientation 
of in-work benefits towards qualitative and quantitatively different forms of labour market 
dependency. In the first instance, the analysis compares aspects of policy design and rules 
that illuminate the varied orientation of policies towards different forms and degrees of 
labour market participation, including eligibility rules concerning work hours, earnings and 
employment status. It also looked at whether eligibility rules and requirements concerning 
the work type, hours and earnings were restricted by the recipient’s spouse/partner. In the 
second instance, to facilitate cross-national comparison, these features were coded and 
quantified in order to produce a composite indicator of the orientation of policies towards 
standard or non-standard work.   
Both parts of the analysis rest on a conceptualisation of non-standard and standard 
employment with respect to multiple characteristics.  For example, in-work benefits with 
eligibility rules restricting access to recipients working up to eight hours per week indicate 
the policy is oriented towards a ‘non-standard’ employment relationship in contrast to 
policies whereby eligibility requires recipients to work full-time, a key characteristic of 
standard employment (Spasova et al., 2017). If the same policy also includes eligibility rules 
restricting access to the self-employed, then this would be further evidence the benefit is 
oriented towards ‘non-standard’ work. The rules restricting the earnings or work among 
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members of a household are coded as restricting the degree of labour market participation 
on an individual basis.  
The description of policy rules in the first part of the analysis provide detailed insights into 
variation in the labour market orientation of individual policies in EUMS along multiple 
dimensions. In the second part of the analysis, the weighting and summing the sub-indicator 
scores into composite indicators provide a means of quantitatively comparing the labour 
market orientation of policies within countries in a way that brings together these different 
dimensions. Composite scores at the country and regime level (e.g. average and range of 
scores) therefore also provided a means for condensing a large amount of information in 
order to systematically compare cross-national and regime-level variation in the labour 
market orientation of policies. The analysis of the labour market orientation of in-work 
benefits therefore partly resembles and is inspired by fuzzy sets qualitative comparative 
analysis (fsQCA)(Ragin, 2000), on the one hand, and comparative social policy research that 
codes and quantifies features of policies into one composite indicator, to capture variation 
when comparing across a medium to high number of countries30, on the other hand.  
The first, fsQCA, was developed by Ragin (1987, 2000), to bridge the gap between 
qualitative (case-oriented approaches) and quantitative analysis (variable-oriented analysis). 
Researchers using fsQCA develop and apply a theoretically derived coding schema to 
determine case membership to ideal types (e.g. welfare regime or activation model) or “sets”, 
thus enabling the quantitative coding of qualitative features. They apply principles and 
procedures for determining cases’ membership to multiple sets in line with fuzzy logic 
(degrees of membership), rather than ‘simple set theory’ (y/n membership) (Lee, 2013, 
p.1902).  Thus, fsQCA is employed to examine cases more holistically and heterogeneously 
than in variable-oriented research and facilitates a closer application of theoretic discourse 
than is often possible with variable research. Yet, it is more systematic and, some argue, 
reliable, than case-oriented methods, because it requires researchers to be opaque in their 
analysis of cases.  It is also used when many countries are included in the research as it 
reduces the volume and complexity of data often employed in qualitative case-oriented 
methods (Kowalewska, 2017).  
This has been applied in comparative welfare state and social policy research to assess entire 
welfare states’ conformity to ideal-type models. For example, Kvist (1999) examines how 
far Nordic welfare states resemble the Nordic model and change over time, looking at three 




different policy areas (Child and Family Support, Unemployment Measures and Welfare for 
the Elderly) and based on theory and in-depth knowledge, establishes the features of policies 
in each of these areas that represent the Nordic model (e.g. the size of the effect of family 
allowance on net income), and then determines a threshold for being counted as in or out of 
the Nordic set for each policy feature (Kvist, 2007a). He then establishes a principle for set 
membership for each policy area and repeats the same process for all policy areas. The total 
membership score to all policy areas determines membership to the Nordic set. Similarly, 
Kowalewska (2017), compared how ‘de-activating’ a range of policies were for lone mothers 
in 22 countries, leading to the identification of seven lone mother activation models.  
In this thesis, fsQCA speaks to the theoretically driven interest in the varied orientation of 
policies towards different degrees and forms of dependence on the labour market, which it 
attributes to the interplay of a range of policy features and rules that concern work and 
earnings. Moreover, within a given country, there may be multiple provisions with varying 
labour market orientation, and it is possible that coding countries’ in-work policies could 
help to identify the extent to which countries belong to a given set concerning labour market 
objectives, for example.  
However, unlike Kvist (1999) and Kowalewska (2017), this thesis deals with a narrower set 
of policies and it may be a stretch to assess whether these comprise a ‘regime’ or ‘model’ in 
terms of labour market orientation, which is the substantive focus of this part of the analysis. 
Not least because the purpose of this thesis is to better understand the dimensions of variation 
by exploring different aspects of policy design: it could be that all in-work policies are in 
fact similar, e.g. all oriented towards non-standard work. The somewhat exploratory aims of 
the research are at odds with the theory-driven aspects of fuzzy-set ideal type analysis.  There 
were also significant methodological barriers in that the data available across the indicators 
to operationalise variation in the labour market orientation of policies, as described below, 
thus limiting the consistent scoring of policies that is required for such analysis. The analysis 
carried out here may therefore be best thought of as preliminary stages of fsQCA, which 
could be developed for future research using more complete data to construct more reliable 
indicators, and with a sounder theoretical base for deciding on the relationship between 
policy dimensions and set membership.  
Instead, in line with Immervoll and Knotz’s (2018, p.25) analysis of activation requirements 
for jobseekers, following a detailed description of policy rules and design features, which 
were coded into sub-indicators, the simpler method of summarising these features into an 
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overall measure of the orientation of policies towards non-standard employment or standard 
employment was employed. Doing so reduces multi-dimensional variation onto one axis, 
but facilitates systematic comparison at the policy, country and regime level.  
The sub-indicators and the weighting for the composite indicators each are outlined in Table 
4.5. Sub-indicators capture various design features and rules concerning paid work. There 
are 16 sub-indicators in total. However, separate ‘composite’ indicators were developed (A-
C) for each sub-type that are made up of slightly different sub-indicators, with 6 to 8 sub-
indicators making up the composite of each indicator for each sub-type.  This reflects 
differences in the data on rules and policy design for each sub-type of in-work benefit 
included in the study and, relatedly, the distinctive features common to each sub-type 
(EUROMOD and OECD reports).  
The scoring schema for each sub-indicator is displayed in the Table 4.5. These are 
standardised across all sub-indicators between 0 and 1. A score of 1 indicates the policy is 
oriented towards non-standard work (in terms of earnings and non-standard employment 
types) and scores closer to zero suggest that policies are oriented towards standard 
employment with substantial earnings.  A score of 0.5 indicates no strong orientation towards 
either end of the spectrum.  
There is overlap across the three sub-types for sub-indicators 1 (employment status) and 12 
(spouse earnings). The former measures policies on whether they restrict eligibility on the 
basis of employment status. A policy scored 1 if access is restricted to self-employment or 
some other kind of non-standard employment, e.g. accessory work; 0.5 if those undertaking 
standard and non-standard forms of work were eligible; and 0 if access to the benefit was 
restricted to employees only. Policies were given a score of 0 on indicator 13 if the policy is 
individualised with respect to work and earnings and 1 if the labour market participation of 
the main recipient is tied to that of the spouse (e.g. a recipient and partner could earn up to a 
certain level for the recipient to be eligible for the benefit). The tying together of labour 
market participation among members of a couple is considered one way in which policies 
are likely to restrict the total work done within a household.  
The remaining sub-indicators were linked thematically but not measured the same way 
across sub-types. In-work cash transfer policies (A) received a score of 0 if minimum work 
requirements were akin to full-time hours (33 hours/ 5 days of work per week); 0.25 if 
equivalent to 4 days work per week; 0.5 if 2-3 days per week; 0.75 if 1 day per week and 1 
if there were no minimum work hours. The latter scored the highest as it indicates no 
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emphasis within the policy to incentivise a particular minimum degree of labour market 
participation. Sub-indicator (6) captures the point at which the benefit is withdrawn as 
earnings increase over a certain level of earnings, with higher withdrawal rates receiving 
higher scores. Phasing in (sub-indicator 7) means the benefit increases as earnings increase 
(until a certain level typically) yet this was a binary indicator due to lack of detail in the data. 
Similarly, there is also a binary indicator for the minimum level of earnings to be eligible 
for the benefit (0 = yes, 1 = no). 
Eligibility to in-work cash transfers is typically based on means tests and household 
characteristics. Nevertheless, sub-indicator (10) is a ‘rough’ guide to the amount of earnings 
eligible households can receive while remaining eligible, with 0 indicating benefits could be 
received by households with earnings over the average wage and 1 for those where it could 
not. For some policies, this depended on household type (e.g. number of children) – and 
policies where this is the case scored 0.5. In addition to spouse earnings (12), a spouse hours 
indicator (13), captures any rules that mean couples can jointly make up eligibility 
requirements for work hours, which could effectively limit the participation of either earner.   
Adjusted unemployment benefits (B) were compared on the basis of whether there are 
restrictions based on work hours (3) limiting the hours or days per week, months or year 
recipients can work while receiving unemployment benefits. Rules were calculated into 
weekly amounts. The most restrictive being 1-8 hours or 1 day per week (scoring 1) - to 
those with no restrictions on hours or days of work (scored as 0), as well as values of 0.25, 
0.5 and 0.75 for amounts in between. The disregard sub-indicator (5) captures the amount of 
earnings from work that are not counted in calculations of entitlement or eligibility, where a 
larger disregard indicates the policy is oriented towards combining more earnings with 
receipt of the benefit. Values given in local currency were calculated as a percentage of the 
average wage for that country and year (OECD, 2019c). 
Unfortunately, not all countries’ earnings disregards were defined in units of national 
currency. Some were defined as a percentage of the benefit the recipient is entitled to, or as 
a percentage of reference earnings (e.g. the wage level in the previous job). The proportion 
of reference earnings were treated the same as the proportion of average wage values. 
Average wages may be higher or lower than reference earnings, and thus requiring cautious 
interpretation of the results for these countries.  
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Table 4.5: The orientation of in-work policies towards non-standard work: Sub and Composite Indicators Overview   
 Composite indicators  
  (A) In-work cash transfers (B) Adjusted unemployment benefits (C) Earned income tax credits 
Sub-indicator   Description  Score  Weight Description  Score  Weight Sub-indicator Score Weight 
1. Employment status 
Employees only  0 1 Employees only  0 1 Employees only  0 1 
No restrictions  0.5  No restrictions  0.5  No restrictions  0.5  
Self-employed/ 
other only 
1   
Self-employed/ other 
only 
1   
Self-employed/ 
other only 
1   
2. Work hours 
minimum 
33+ hours/5+ days 0 1             
25-32 hrs/ 4 days 0.25              
9-24 hrs/2-3 days 0.5              
1-8hrs/ 1 day 0.75              
No minimum 1               
3. Work hours 
maximum  
      No restrictions 0 1       
      33+ hours/5+ days 0.25        
      25-32 hrs/ 4 days 0.5        
       0.75        
      9-24 hrs/2-3 days         
      1-8hrs/ 1 day 1         
4. Work hours 
eligibility  
            Yes 0 0.25 
            No 1   
5. Earnings disregard 
      
Earnings do not affect 
benefit 
0 1       
      ≥21+% AW/ RE 0.25        
      ≤20% AW/ RE 0.5        
      ≤10% AW/ RE 0.75        
      No disregard 1         




Table 4.5 (continued)                   
6. Withdrawal rate/ 
phase out rate 
Not phased out 0  
Benefit not withdrawn with 
earnings 
0 1       
≤25% 0.25  ≤50% 0.25        
26- 50% 0.5 1 51 – 74% 0.5        
51 - 75% 0.75  75 – 99% 0.75        
76-100% 1   100% 1         
7. Phase in  
Yes 0 0.25             
No 1               
8. Earnings min 
Yes 0 0.25       Yes 0 0.25 
No 1         No 1   
9. Earnings max 
         No max 0 1 
         > 200% AW 0.2  
         151 - 200% AW 0.4  
         101 -150 % AW 0.6  
         51 – 100% AW 0.8  
            <50% AW 1   
10. Eligibility earnings 
above AW 
Yes 0 0.5             
Depends 0.5              
No 1               
11. Earnings when 
phase out begins  
            No phase out 0 1 
            >112.5% AW 0.25  
            
75% AW – 112.5% 
AW 
0.5  
            37.5%AW – 74% AW 0.75  
            <37.5% AW 1   
12. Spouse earnings 
No 0 1 No 0 1 No 0 1 
Yes 1   Yes 1   Yes 1   
13. Spouse hours  
No 0 1             
Yes 1               
N sub-indicators  8 6 6 
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The withdrawal rate sub-indicator (6) is based on the rate at which the benefit is withdrawn 
as earned income increases, with higher scores for steeper withdrawal rates and lower scores 
for more gradual rates. A score of zero indicates earnings do not affect entitlement to the 
unemployment benefit. For policies with earnings disregards, the withdrawal rate is the rate 
at which the benefit is withdrawn when earnings are above the disregard.  
Sub-indicator (10), earnings max, compares the limits on the amount of earnings that can be 
combined with unemployment benefit receipt. Policies scored 0 if there was no max, 0.25 if 
earnings could be received that were over 100% of average wage or the reference wage, 0.5 
if between 75 and 100%; 0.75 if between 26 to 75%; and 1 if maximum earnings were equal 
to or below 25% of average wage or reference wage.  
The data for earned income tax credits (C) meant policies were compared using a binary 
indicator of minimum work hours (4) and earnings (8) requirements, whereby policies with 
minimum work hours/ earnings requirements scored 0 and those without scored 1. Yet, these 
indicators are less logical for earned income tax credits than for other similar rules in the 
other sub-types, as eligibility for tax credits could automatically ‘kick in’ at a certain level 
of earnings as a default part of countries’ tax systems. It was not possible to identify whether 
or not this was the case for some countries. Data were richer for maximum earnings (9), the 
range of which was much broader than for in-work cash transfers and adjusted 
unemployment benefits, as reflected in the scores. For example, policies scored 1 if the 
maximum earnings threshold was less than 50% of average wage (compared to 25% of AW 
for adjusted unemployment benefits). It was also possible to calculate the level of earnings 
at which the benefit starts to be phased out, sub-indicator (11), for most countries. 
The relative weighting of the sub-indicators for the calculation of the composite indicators 
are also shown in the table. The numerical weights used for the calculation of composite are 
in Appendix C. Weights are determined by the theoretical importance of the feature in 
restricting or enabling certain levels or kinds of labour market participation and the quality 
of the data available. The former is discussed below. On the latter, the data for some policies 
meant that the only consistent measure of a particular policy feature was binary. For 
example, the ‘phase in’ sub-indicator (7) is a binary indicator and will therefore mask 
differences between countries in the rate of the phase-in; as such, it was weighted at the 
equivalent of 25% in the calculation of the composite indicator.  
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Each policy received a score for the composite indicator by multiplying the scores sub-
indicators by weights, which were then summed. The score for each policy on the composite 
indicator is therefore also always a value between 0 and 1. In the case of missing data, the 
formula was adjusted so that observed values were given greater weight in the overall 
indicator, proportionate to their theorised importance.  





Where 𝑛 is the number of valid sub-indicators, 𝜔 is the specified weight for each sub-
indicator and 𝑥 is the value of the sub-indicator.  
The composite indicators provide a means of quantitatively comparing policies, countries 
and regimes. The theoretical interpretation of each composite indicator is therefore broadly 
the same: higher scores indicate policies are oriented towards very marginal work (in terms 
of earnings and non-standard employment types) and scores closer to zero suggests policies 
are oriented towards standard employment and more substantial earnings. However, actual 
scores are not comparable across sub-type. For example, an earned income tax credit policy 
with a score of 1 cannot be read as having the same labour market orientation as an adjusted 
unemployment benefit with a score of 1 because, as we saw above.  
The analysis is contextualised further using existing indicators of labour market context at 
the regime level, described in Chapter 8: rate of temporary employment, self-employment 
and part-time employment. The measures provide an indication of the extent of marginal/ 
non-standard work across welfare regimes. The results of the analysis of the labour market 
orientation of policies are displayed alongside these indicators to gauge whether policies are 
oriented towards those undertaking more marginal work, and, then, whether marginal 
workers represent a relatively large or minor group in the labour market for each regime.   
As with the rest of the investigation, the aim of the analysis is to describe policy variation 
and interpret this, with regards to the orientation of policies towards different forms and 
degrees of dependence on the labour market for recipient individuals or households. How 
and to what extent recipients participate in the labour market is likely to depend on more 
than policy design and rules, including how these statutory rules are enforced and applied in 
practice. There are also myriad factors beyond in-work benefit policies, which shape citizens 
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actual labour market participation, including the wider policy framework and labour market 
context. This analysis of the orientation of EUMS’ in-work benefits towards marginal/ non-
marginal labour market participation is intended, therefore, to serve as one part of a complex 
and multi-faceted set of policies influencing citizens’ forms and degrees of dependence on 
the labour market that has thus far not been examined in a comparative perspective. It is 
intended to supplement and nuance existing comparative research on labour market and 
social policy institutions.  
4.5 The challenges and lessons learned from conducting cross-national comparative 
research on in-work benefits  
There are many challenges involved in conducting cross-national research into in-work 
benefits, an inconsistently defined and under-researched area of social policy. The process 
of conducting the research thus led to several insights that could be useful for future research 
on in-work benefits and aid the interpretation of the investigation presented in this thesis. 
These are partly discussed above, but are summarised, elaborated and brought together in 
this section. There is a focus on the research process, the decisions made by the researcher 
and the tensions involved, all which shaped the research presented in this thesis.   
Many of the challenges for this research stemmed from the conceptualisation and 
operationalisation of in-work benefits per se, as well as the operation and conceptualisation 
of the dependency relationships aspect of the framework for analysing the salient aspects 
variation of in-work benefits. First and foremost, this applied to the conceptual development 
and then operationalisation of ‘in-work benefits’ and ‘possible in-work benefits’ categories 
as set out in the previous chapter. As outlined in chapter 2, there was no clear precedent to 
follow in terms of conceptualising and identifying relevant in-work benefit policies: different 
research aims and epistemologies appear to be behind different conceptualisations of in-
work benefits, leading researchers to include or exclude and even label policies differently, 
in existing national case studies and the grey, comparative literature. Other approaches also 
included in-work benefits in studies of broader policy developments. Yet these did not have 
to grapple with the specifics of identifying instruments because they comprised aggregate 
analysis combining multiple policies to look at outcomes (Marchal and Marx, 2018), or in-
work benefits were part of a wider set of provisions examined (Bonoli, 2010). 
Indeed, for this study, the conceptual framework presented in Chapter 3 was developed and 
refined throughout the research process following an iterative approach. Knowing which 
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provisions to include and exclude, on account of both theoretical and practical 
considerations, remained at the forefront of my mind throughout the research process. Not 
least because it was one of the aspects of my work that drew the most interest from other 
researchers. For example, when presenting my research at academic conferences and 
workshops at different phases in the research process, defining in-work benefits was one of 
the main aspects of my research that I received questions (and comments) on. In particular, 
researchers situated in the ‘evaluative paradigm’ were keen for me to expand my research 
focus to all benefit policies received by working households, including child benefits and 
housing benefits, as for them the important question concerned the entire suite of policies 
received by working households and the effects of these policies (e.g. poverty reduction), 
and not the evolution of and variation in a specific, novel area of policy, as was the focus in 
this research. On the other hand, case-oriented researchers suggested that I focus on one or 
two cases to understand how policies function and/or are interpreted within national context 
as a means of defining and identifying relevant policies.   
There is some coherence with the request from the evaluative researchers for a wider focus 
on all tax-benefits and the focus on state dependency in the framework informing the thesis, 
in that the provisions some researchers recommended also constitute forms of state 
dependency for working households. However, it was theorised that the distinctiveness of 
in-work benefits was that they constitute a novel form of state dependence in the form of 
income maintenance that was close to wages. Originally, I considered including only 
provisions with explicit in-work targeting i.e. policies that could only be received by working 
households.  Yet, given the apparent “evolution” of in-work benefits in the notable cases of 
Germany’s ALGII and the UK’s Universal Credit, and the publication of research on these 
provisions over the period of the research, led me to eventually decide to relax this criterion 
and include a subset of ‘possible in-work benefits’ allowing me to examine whether other 
countries have forms of part-time/adjusted unemployment benefits and merged in- and out-
of-work benefits. The explicit targeting criterion, it was decided, would then become a 
dimension of variation to be examined through comparative research. Similar tensions 
surrounded non-refundable tax credits. Again, my decision to include them was inspired by 
the significance of these provisions in certain contexts, whereby they were considered a 




In addition, I also considered policies targeting in-work households that appeared to be less 
like traditional income maintenance, e.g. social security contribution reductions and non-
refundable earned income tax credits. These policies were also classified as ‘possible’ in-
work benefits. The decision to examine non-refundable earned income tax credits and not 
social security contribution reductions or exemptions was in part motivated by the variation 
in description of these systems in the policy sources, many of which were highly complex, 
and hard to interpret without a degree of expertise about national systems. Although taxation 
systems are not necessarily any simpler to research in practice, earned income tax credits 
were more likely to be described as a standalone policy in the main sources, instead of being 
‘buried’ within complex descriptions of entire systems, as was the case of social security 
contribution reductions.  
Similarly, while there are clearly merits to defining in-work benefits on a case by case or 
contextual basis, the main motivation of this study was to assess claims about wider trends 
towards this novel area of policy development. Because of the challenges involved in doing 
this research, including the generation and collection of data, the scope for including case 
studies became more limited as the study progressed. That being said, alongside my thesis, 
I conducted research into public attitudes into the UK’s in-work benefits, which ended up 
being used for a separate project, and liaised with researchers who were familiar with or had 
themselves looked at in-work benefits in the French, German and Finnish in-work benefits, 
thus I developed knowledge of in-work benefits in specific contexts independently of the 
research presented in this thesis, which undoubtedly informed my thinking.  
Nevertheless, the research presented in this thesis is not at odds with case-study research into 
in-work benefits, and it could serve as a key reference point for contextualising cases cross-
nationally and temporally. On the flip side, cases could also speak to this research by probing 
the reliability and validity of the conceptual framework for defining and comparing in-work 
benefits, and the ideal-type frameworks and indicators of context used to contextualise the 
broad-brush findings in this study.   
Moreover, decisions about the scope and focus of the project were also based on the data 
available. I conducted a review of relevant data sources and ‘piloted’ a mapping of in-work 
policies. This process was a “rude awakening” but also a key motivating factor behind the 
aim and scope of the research. Through this process I found there were no readily available 
cross-national data available on in-work benefit expenditure and that there was some 
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variation in the classification of policies across standardised descriptions of tax-benefit 
systems, reflecting inconsistencies in reporting practices and in the labelling of policies.  
Indeed, it may be because of the data limitations that cross-national comparative research on 
in-work benefits is relatively limited.  
These challenges, however, were seen as appropriate to grapple with within the space and 
focus afforded to PhD research, but they meant that the research did not cover as much 
ground as I had initially thought it would. As described above, several procedures were 
followed to ‘overcome’ these challenges and boost the reliability of the research, e.g. the use 
of the transparent inclusion and exclusion criteria, a systematic process of searching country 
reports, and the use of two sets of country reports to validate data. Moreover, as data were 
available for all EUMS across two sets of descriptions of tax-benefit systems, all EUMS 
were included for a large and as diverse a sample as possible. Yet, this also made conducting 
a ‘simple’ mapping of policies a time-consuming process. Originally, the intention was to 
map policies over regular time points for a more fine-grained account of trends and variation. 
Instead, this was reduced to two time points once the scale of the task was realised.   
At the same time, the process of reviewing the data also alerted me to opportunities in 
mapping in-work benefit trends and variation with respect to including possible in-work 
benefits. Chiefly this was based on the realisation that descriptions of unemployment 
benefits (and some other income maintenance policies) in the OECD country reports 
followed a template that specifically asked the experts completing the reports to describe 
whether unemployment benefits can be received alongside earnings and/ or participation in 
paid work and the rules surrounding this. Hence it was possible to compare these provisions 
systematically looking at the amount and kinds of paid work that countries’ unemployment 
benefits were oriented towards, which could then inform decisions about whether such 
provisions can be considered in-work benefits.  
Another related point is that it was not until part way through the second year of the research 
process that I found I could use EUROMOD, the tax-benefit simulator, to generate 
expenditure data for ‘hand-picked’. The common use of tax-benefit models is, as the name 
suggests, to model policies and examine outcomes. The cost of policies to governments 
sometimes features as part of this analysis. But rarely are tax-benefit models used to as a 
means of comparing policy expenditures on a specific area of policy across countries in 
studies aligning with the more sociological and political economy perspective as is the case 
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for this thesis.  Studies usually rely on the ‘ready-made’ cross-national comparative datasets, 
e.g. OECD Social Expenditure. After being informed by a colleague that this would be 
possible and consulting the developers of EUROMOD, I attended EUROMOD training. 
There was then a period of applying for access to the relevant microdata that feed into the 
model. Thus, the analysis was not carried out until the third year of the research process.  
The use of EUROMOD to estimate expenditure like other parts of the research process 
involved considerable manual work on the part of the researcher in terms of identifying 
relevant policies and generating the expenditure estimates for individual provisions for each 
country and year, and then aggregating these by sub-type and year. Yet it allowed a level of 
control over the instruments used in the analysis. This was a problem with aggregate data on 
policy categories defined, for example, by the OECD, given the issues with defining and 
identifying relevant policies. There was also some scope for validating the data using 
available documentary resources and through consultation with national experts for some 
countries where the validation with the documents produced inconsistencies. Yet, for nearly 
half the countries, validation exercise was not carried out because documents were not 
available and there was not time within the study to contact all of the experts. Again, this 
relates to the timing of the analysis and the scope of the research project.  
There were also challenges in operationalising the dependency relationships framework for 
comparing the salient features of in-work benefit policies across countries. While the 
framework was intended to ‘simplify’ the complex notion of dependency on the labour 
market, state and the family, for cross-national comparison of policy design features and 
rules, inconsistencies in the information and descriptions of policy design and rules in the 
data meant that aspects of the analysis were ‘patchy’. In part, this relates to the different 
terminology used to describe policy features. Collecting and coding this data was also a 
manual process and thus time consuming. Again, I made use of both the main policy sources 
but also referred to some additional sources to corroborate the data. Furthermore, as a result 
of this complexity, and the patchwork data for other aspects of the framework, meant there 
was a need to find ‘pragmatic’ solutions to operationalise the conceptual framework. One of 
these was focusing the analysis of orientation on one-year, 2016. Thus, the study does not 
shine light on change over time in the variation of policies through this lens.  
Model family analysis was also considered as a means of comparing policies, namely the 
proportion of net incomes from in work benefits for different household types, and the 
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overlapping family dependency relationships aspect of the framework (Marchal and Marx, 
2018). This was ruled out in the early part of the research after I found the in-work benefit 
category in the OECD’s tax-benefit simulator did not align with the definition outlined 
above. Had I undertaken training in EUROMOD earlier in the research process, I would 
have realised that it was possible to create my own category of in-work benefit policy in the 
model. But given the timing of this part of the research, it was not feasible within the scope 
of the study to conduct such analysis by isolating out the policies I had identified as in-work 
benefits in the model. Future work could consider ways to operationalise this framework 
using model families and tax-benefit simulators.  
In sum, as is almost inevitable when conducting research on relatively unknown terrain in 
terms of policy area but also data, many lessons were learned during the research process. 
Had I had known what I know now at the start of the research process, the research would 
have probably looked different. I set out suggestions for future research based on my 
experience in Chapter 9. Yet, the insights into research process and methodology set out here 
also serve as a form of knowledge on in-work benefits, which may give researchers a better 
vantage point for future research in terms of the tools and data available to examine the 
policy from multiple angles for broad comparative research, in addition to the substantive 
content presented in the subsequent chapters.   
 
4.6 Conclusion  
This chapter outlined the research questions, aims and reasoning. It then described the study 
design and situated the methodology with reference to cross-national comparative welfare 
state and social research more widely. The focus on EUMS from 2007 and 2017 was justified 
on practical and theoretical grounds and the trade-offs outlined. A main requirement to 
address the research aims was the inclusion of a range of countries and a time frame that 
were broad enough to situate in-work benefits within the context of change and continuity 
across those capitalist advanced democratic countries for which there were multiple data 
sources available.  
The next parts of the chapter described the construction of the EU-IWB dataset and the 
operationalisation of key variables for the analysis and then outlined some of the details of 
the analysis that aid the interpretation of the empirical chapters. The collection and 
generation of data for these purposes was, as outlined, a time-intensive endeavour, drawing 
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upon multiple sources for collection, data triangulation and consultations about validity and 
reliability. It enabled a cross-national systematic analysis of in-work benefits over time from 
a range of angles using a theoretically informed conceptual framework to better understand 
whether, how and to what extent in-work benefits vary across EUMS.  
In particular, the expenditure analysis constitutes the most expansive analysis of in-work 
benefit expenditure to date, due to a lack of existing comparative data. While the expenditure 
analysis should be interpreted with caution because of the limitations described above, it 
marks a significant step forward in starting to understand the extent of variation in in-work 
benefits across EUMS and how this relates to changes in socio-economic and institutional 
context, specifically the liberalisation of countries’ political economy institutions and the 
socio-economic pressures associated with deindustrialisation. 
 Moreover, combining this with the analysis of the orientation of policies towards different 
kinds and forms of dependency relationships and the use of a welfare regime framework 
means the research moves towards a richer interpretation of policy variation with respect to 
social, political, economic and cultural dynamics that shape and are shaped by in-work 
benefits, both historically and in recent decades. There are many challenges involved in 
conducting cross-national research into variation in an inconsistently defined and under-
researched policy relating to the standardisation and availability of data, that also limit the 
types of analysis possible. I reflected upon these and the methodological lessons learned 





5 TRENDS AND VARIATION IN IN-WORK BENEFITS IN 
EU MEMBER STATES 2006 TO 2017  
This chapter aims to paint a broad picture of trends and variation in in-work benefits in 
EUMS. It presents the findings from two main aspects of the empirical investigation. The 
first is the preliminary mapping of in-work benefits, tentatively defined, in EUMS for 2008 
and 2016. This systematic search of EUMS’ tax benefit systems at the point of the financial 
crisis and just under a decade later capture variation in the prevalence and form of in-work 
benefits in EUMS as well as changes over time. The mapping covers both the archetypal in-
work benefits (in-work cash transfers and refundable earned income tax credits) as well as 
two possible in-work benefits (non-refundable tax credits and adjusted unemployment 
benefits).  
The empirical analysis of expenditure on in-work benefits is also presented in this chapter. 
At the time of conducting the research, there were no cross-national time series data on in-
work benefits. This chapter therefore presents time-series data generated specifically for this 
thesis, using a tax-benefit simulator (EUROMOD) to estimate the total costs of awards per 
year, as described in full in Chapter 4 (Section 4.3). Temporally, the analysis is more 
extensive and intensive than the mapping, showing changes in expenditure annually from 
2006 to 2017. However, the policy scope is narrower, as expenditure for adjusted 
unemployment could not be estimated using this method.  
The chapter also contextualises cross-national and temporal variation with reference to 
historical and contemporary context. The ideal-type frameworks presented in Chapter 3, 
namely welfare regimes, are used to structure the presentation and interpretation of the 
findings, facilitating exploration of the relevance of policy legacies and similarities and 
differences between groups of countries, in terms of the presence, form and expenditure on 
the different in-work policy types covered in this analysis. I also contextualise findings with 
reference to the socio-economic factors that are commonly assumed to drive in-work benefit 
reform (in-work poverty, unemployment and underemployment).  The systematic and 
comparative time-series and the snapshot data on in-work benefits generated for this thesis 
are also employed to explore the possible relationship between in-work benefits and changes 
in unemployment replacement rates, trade union density, and collective bargaining coverage, 
as key indicators of processes associated with liberalisation and recommodification.  
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Both parts of the investigation presented in the chapter address the first research question 
and sub-questions: 
1) What is the nature and extent of variation in in-work benefits in EUMS? 
a. Have in-work benefits become more commonplace in recent years? 
b. How common are archetypal in-work benefit policies associated 
with liberal regimes? 
Throughout the chapter, the policies analysed in the investigation are referred to collectively 
as ‘in-work benefits’, ‘in-work provisions’, or ‘in-work policies’. However, most parts of 
the analysis also break down the findings according to sub-type to examine variation in the 
provisions used.  
The findings are contextualised with reference to contemporary and historical institutional 
factors and socio-economic factors in order to examine the final research question: 
3) How does variation in EUMS’ in-work benefits policies map on to 
historical and contemporary context?  
The chapter is structured as follows: First, the systematic (preliminary) mapping of in-work 
benefits in EUMS in 2008 and 2016 is presented in Section 5.1. Section 5.2 adds to the 
picture of snapshot variation in the use and form of in-work benefits in EUMS by comparing 
expenditure on two broad sub-types of in-work benefits: earned income tax credits and in-
work cash transfers. It begins by describing trends at the EU level and then focuses on cross-
national variation.  Section 5.3 contextualises these findings with respect to socio-economic 
and institutional factors.   
5.1 Mapping in-work benefits in EUMS (2008 and 2016) 
The findings presented in this first section show the results of the preliminary mapping of 
the three in-work benefit sub-types across all EUMS for 2008 and 2016, followed by a cross-
national and welfare regime level comparison. For the initial mapping, refundable and non-
refundable earned tax credits were grouped into one sub-type: earned income tax credits.31 
5.1.1 The prevalence of in-work benefits in EUMS 
The initial mapping of in-work benefits found that the majority of EUMS had in place at 
least one of the in-work benefit provisions listed above at both time points. Table 5.1 
                                                     
31 A full list of in-work cash transfer policies identified in the mapping is provided in Appendix F; the list of earned income 
tax credits is in Appendix G. Adjusted unemployment benefit policies are listed in Chapter 6 (Section 6.1.3) 
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summarises the mapping, including a breakdown of the number of countries with each in-
work benefit by sub-type for 2008 and 2016. The mapping identified in-work provisions in 
17 out of 2732 (63%) EUMS in 2008, and in 20 out of 28 (71%) EUMS in 2016, indicating 
these policies were commonplace at the time of the 2007-08 financial crisis, becoming only 
marginally more prevalent in 2016 (+3 EUMS).  
The breakdown of sub-types indicates that adjusted unemployment benefits and earned 
income tax credits make up the bulk of the headline findings. Just over half of EUMS had 
adjusted unemployment benefits in place in 2008, increasing to 61% for 2016 (n=17). Earned 
income tax credits were found in 44% of EUMS in 2008 and 43% of EUMS for 2016. 
Strikingly, in-work cash transfers – one of the archetypal liberal in-work benefits – were 
used in only a small number of countries: 11% (n=3) and 18% (n=5) of EUMS for 2008 and 
2016, respectively.  
The number of countries with adjusted unemployment benefit increased from 14 EUMS in 
2008 to 17 EUMS in 2016. Although being the least common form of in-work provision, the 
number of EUMS with in-work cash transfers also increased from 11% in 2008 to 18% in 
2016. The number of EUMS with earned income tax credits remained the same at each time 
point.  
                                                     
32 Croatia joined the European Union as the 28th Member State in 2013.  





Proportion of EUMS 
with IWB  
2008    
Countries with in-work benefits  17 63% 100% 
In-work cash transfers 3 11% 18% 
Earned income tax credits 12 44% 71% 
Adjusted unemployment benefits   14 52% 82% 
2016    
Countries with in-work benefits  20 71% 100% 
In-work cash transfers 5 18% 25% 
Earned income tax credits 12 43% 60% 
Adjusted unemployment benefits  17 61% 85% 
Sources: EU-IWB dataset based on policies identified in OECD Tax Benefit Country Reports 2008 & 2016; 
EUROMOD Country Reports 2007-2009, 2014 – 2017; and MISSOC comparative tables (unemployment benefits, 2008 
and 2016). All findings presented hereon use these sources.  
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5.1.2 Cross-national and regime variation in in-work benefit policies 
Given the prevalence of in-work benefits in EUMS, it is unsurprising provisions were spread 
across countries and all four welfare regimes, plus CEE countries, for both time points. In 
2008, at least one of the three broad in-work benefit sub-types were identified for the 
following countries: Ireland, UK, Finland Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Belgium, France, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Hungary and Slovakia. 
For 2016, all of the same countries bar Hungary had in-work benefits. Additionally, policies 
were identified in Estonia, Slovenia and Malta. On the flipside, earned income tax credits, 
adjustable unemployment benefits and in-work cash transfers were not identified in Cyprus, 
Bulgaria, Czechia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania for both time points. And were 
not in the following countries for one of the two time points: Malta (2008 only), Estonia 
(2008 only), Hungary (2016 only).  
However, the dispersion of in-work benefits across EUMS is not even, and regional variation 
appears to be more salient in terms of the countries with or without in-work benefit 
provisions than welfare regimes.  This is illuminated in Table 5.2, which shows EUMS with 
and without in-work benefits and a breakdown by sub-types for both years. The table also 
organises countries according to four welfare regimes: Liberal, Bismarckian, Nordic, and 
Southern (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Ferrera, 1996). And, as per the framework outlined in 
Chapter 3, I treat the Central and Eastern European countries (CEE) as a regime.  
The findings presented in the table show that the in-work benefits mapped in this study were 
in place in all Liberal, Nordic and Bismarckian regimes at both time points. In contrast, two-
thirds of the Southern regime countries had in-work benefits in 2008 (n=4, 67%); but this 
increased to 87% of Southern for 2016. Malta did not have in-work benefits in 2008, but it 
did by 2016. Cyprus was an outlier as the only country with no in-work benefits for both 
time points. In even starker contrast, in-work benefits were identified in just a fifth of CEE 
countries for 2008. Yet, like the Southern regime countries, there was an increase in the 
proportion of CEE countries with in-work benefits by 2016. Slovenia and Estonia did not 
have in-work benefits in 2008 but both had in-work benefits in 2016.  Croatia was not part 
of the EU in 2008, but in-work benefits were identified in 2016. Slovakia is the exception as 
the only CEE country with in-work benefits in both 2008 and 2016. Finally, Hungary is the 

















  Years: 2008 2016 2008 2016 2008 2016 2008 2016 
Liberal Ireland ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
UK ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ 
















Nordic Finland  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Sweden ✓ ✓ 
 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Denmark ✓ ✓ 
  
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 














Austria ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Belgium ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
France ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ 
 
✓ ✓ 
Luxembourg ✓ ✓   
 
✓ ✓ ✓ 
Netherlands ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Germany  ✓ ✓   
  
✓ ✓ 














Southern Italy ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
Malta   ✓ 
 
✓ 
   
✓ 
Spain ✓ ✓ 
  
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Portugal ✓ ✓ 
    
✓ ✓ 
Greece ✓ ✓ 
    
✓ ✓ 
Cyprus      
      



















Bulgaria            
Croatia na ✓ na   na   na ✓ 
Czechia         
 
  
Estonia   ✓    ✓   
Hungary  ✓     ✓    
Latvia            
Lithuania            
Poland           
Romania           
Slovakia ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓   
Slovenia    ✓      ✓ 










Sources: See table 5.1  
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The ubiquity of in-work benefits across the regime types in 2016, aside from Cyprus and 
most CEE countries, suggests that their prevalence relates to how advanced a welfare state 
is rather than the distinct policy legacies of different regimes. However, there is some 
indication of regime clustering when comparing the combinations of in-work benefit sub-
types. 
There is the clearest congruence among the three Nordic countries included in the study 
(Sweden, Denmark, and Finland), which are identical in the sub-types and combination of 
policies found for both time-points: earned income tax credits with adjusted unemployment 
benefits. No Nordic country had in-work cash transfers in either period.  This combination, 
however, was also found for four out of six Bismarckian regime countries: Austria, Belgium, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The earned income tax credits identified in the Nordic 
countries and the Netherlands, however, were non-refundable (Table 5.3), whereas those in 
the Bismarckian countries were refundable.  
The other two Bismarckian regime countries had a different combination of policies: 
Germany was the only Bismarckian country with only adjusted unemployment benefits in 
place, while France’s combination of sub-types changed across the two time points. In 2008, 
it also had a refundable earned income tax credit but no in-work cash transfer policy. In 
2016, the reverse was true. France therefore also stands out as a dynamic case in terms of 
the changing use of sub-types over time.   
Both Liberal countries (UK and Ireland) had in-work cash transfers, which were rare 
elsewhere, supporting the idea that such policies are archetypal liberal benefits. However, 
adjusted unemployment benefits were also identified for these countries. Whether these 
provisions constitute ‘de facto’ in-work benefits in national contexts is therefore important 
for our understanding of what constitutes liberal in-work benefits. Ireland also was unique 
Table 5.3: Countries with refundable and non-refundable earned income tax credits   
Refundable Non-refundable 
2008: AT, BE, FR, SK 2008: IE, DK, FI, IT, NL, SE 
2016: AT, BE, LU, IT, ES, SK 2016: IE, NL, DK, FI, SE, IT, EE 
Sources: See Table 5.1 
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in some respects to all other EUMS in that it also had earned income tax credits (non-
refundable), making it the only country where all three sub-types were identified in either 
2008 or 2016.  
There was no clear pattern in combinations of sub-types among Southern regime countries. 
Adjusted unemployment benefits were the most common sub-type (as they were overall). 
However, Portugal only had adjusted unemployment benefits, Spain combined adjusted 
unemployment benefits with refundable earned income tax credits, while Italy combined 
non-refundable earned income tax credits with in-work cash transfers. Malta went from 
having no in-work benefits in 2008 to a combination of adjusted unemployment benefits and 
in-work cash transfers in 2016.  
Finally, of the CEE countries that had in-work benefits, all had only one sub-type, but they 
were not uniform. In 2008, when only Slovakia and Hungary had in-work benefits, these 
were both earned income tax credits. Yet, by 2016, earned income tax credits and adjusted 
unemployment benefits were equally common. Estonia introduced a non-refundable earned 
income tax credit policy by 2016 alongside Slovakia, while Croatia and Slovenia had 
adjusted unemployment benefits. Hungary eliminated its Employment Tax Credit in 2008. 
However, linking these countries is the finding that none of the CEE countries had in-work 
cash transfers in either period.  
It is however striking that adjusted unemployment benefits, a ‘tentative’ form of in-work 
benefit, were the most common sub-type in every regime and in-work cash transfers, a form 
of archetypal in-work benefit, were rarely used. Indeed, all Liberal, Nordic and Bismarckian 
countries and two-thirds of the Southern countries had adjusted unemployment benefits. 
Thus, the other two sub-types mostly distinguished the countries that had them in place. In 
particular, in-work cash transfers were not evenly distributed across regimes. While both 
Liberal countries had in-work cash transfers, none of the Nordic and CEE countries had 
them, while France had become the only Bismarckian country to have an in-work cash 
transfer in 2016. The Southern regime had the second highest prevalence of in-work cash 
transfers, with Italy and Malta in 2016. This suggests that path-breaking in-work cash 
transfers are a minor but significant part of the development of in-work benefits in EUMS, 
and that in-work benefits within unemployment benefits that can be received alongside paid 
work possibly a form of incremental change, if they are indeed new, so may be a key part of 
the development of in-work benefits in EUMS that is overlooked.  
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However, this mapping can only give a limited picture as to the significance, form and 
orientation of these policies. The issues with the (sub)categorisation of in-work benefits 
discussed in Chapter 4 suggest that there may be anomalous or problematic cases that skew 
the picture given above. The main examples of this are Italy’s Family Allowances (‘Assegno 
per il Nucleo Familiare’) policy and the UK’s Universal Credit, both of which are 
categorised as in-work cash transfers in this mapping but contain features that do not fully 
conform to archetypal models. It is therefore essential to zoom in on the policy details of in-
work benefits across EUMS to further understand these provisions, which is picked up in 
the next chapters. In the next section, however, the examination of expenditure for two of 
these sub-types, earned income tax credits and in-work cash transfers, is intended to 
supplement the above findings on variation in the use and form of these policies across 
countries and over time.   
5.2 Trends and variation in in-work benefit expenditure in EUMS 
The previous section showed that the majority of EUMS had at least one of the three 
provisions included in the initial mapping exercise in both 2008 and 2016. Thus, there also 
appeared to be little change in the years following the financial crisis in terms of the number 
of countries with these policies, and only a minor change was observed in the composition 
of countries with these provisions. It also illuminated a divide between the more advanced 
and less advanced welfare states and some similarities among countries belonging to Nordic 
and Bismarckian regimes in the combination of sub-types.  Yet, the findings do not capture 
variation in the levels of resources directed to in-work benefits over this time period.  
This section presents the part of the empirical investigation comparing annual government 
expenditure on in-work benefits in EUMS from 2006 to 2017, using the dataset constructed 
specifically for the thesis33. For reasons outlined in Chapter 4, the expenditure dataset 
includes the following 14 countries with earned income tax credits and/or in-work cash 
transfers: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and the UK. Earned income tax credits were identified 
for Finland, but it was not possible to estimate expenditure for this country and it was omitted 
from the analysis. Countries with only adjusted unemployment benefits (Germany, Greece 
and Croatia) are also excluded from the analysis. Where possible, policy reforms, as 
described in the main data sources, are discussed to aid the interpretation of changes in 
                                                     
33 The full list of policies included in the analysis including details of missing data are in Table 4.3 (Chapter 4).   
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expenditure within countries, as well as limitations related to the dataset that could skew 
expenditure data (e.g. partial or missing data). 
Annual expenditure is expressed as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) (Eurostat, 
2019d) and as a proportion of public expenditure (Eurostat, 2019e). Measures of expenditure 
as a proportion of GDP are commonly used instead of national currency to compare relative 
expenditure across countries and over time. However, a GDP-indexed measure is inevitably 
sensitive to changes in the size of the economy as during economic downturns social 
expenditures can appear to increase (Korpi and Palme, 2003). The public expenditure 
measure was used to ‘sense check’ the GDP measure by capturing variation in the salience 
of in-work benefit expenditure relative to other public expenditures but this also has 
limitations (e.g. public expenditure on certain kinds of policies may decrease or increase 
during economic cycles). The economic context is therefore discussed throughout the 
analysis to aid the interpretation of the data. Indeed, the time period covered by the analysis 
therefore includes the period immediately before the financial crisis of 2008, the crisis itself, 
the subsequent recession and, for some countries at least, the recovery period.  
5.2.1 Overview of in-work benefit expenditure in EUMS, 2006 - 2017 
This section presents the first part of the analysis of the in-work benefit expenditure data 
focusing on overall trends in 14 EUMS with either of the two sub-types of in-work benefits 
from 2006 to 2017. The summary of the expenditure variables in Table 5.4 captures broad 
trends in expenditure on earned income tax credits and in-work cash transfers in EUMS over 
the time period covered. The table shows the number of valid observations, the average value 
(mean), standard deviation as an indicator of the dispersion of the data from the mean for 
each year, along with the minimum and maximum values expressed as either a proportion 
of GDP or public expenditure for each year. Countries with partial data (e.g. expenditure for 
one but not all policies) were counted as valid for a given year. Thus, only countries with 
complete missing data for a given year are counted as ‘missing’. This amounts to valid 
observations for 14 countries for 2007 through to 2017, and for 11 countries for 2006. 
There appears to be a gradual positive trend in average in-work benefit expenditure in EU 
Member States from 2006 up until 2016, using these indicators. Average in-work benefit 
expenditure was 0.89 per cent of public expenditure, or 0.35 per cent of GDP, in 2006, 
increasing to over 2% of public expenditure and just under 1% of GDP in 2016. Average 
expenditure was marginally lower in 2017 on both indicators, but this (at least partly) reflects 
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partial missing data for the UK and Austria for that year. By way of comparison, average 
expenditure on social protection for unemployment across all EUMS in 2006 was 1.3% of 
GDP in both 2006 (EU27) and 2016 (EU28) (Eurostat, 2019f).  
However, the increase in average expenditure over this time period does not reflect a general 
increase in in-work benefit expenditure for all EUMS. Maximum in-work benefit 
expenditure reaches 6.25% of public expenditure by 2016, up from 4 % in 2006; or just over 
3% of GDP in 2016, up from 1.7% in 2006. Minimum in-work benefit expenditure stays at 
zero apart from in 2016. This range is partly attributable to the fact that there is only one 
year of expenditure for in-work benefits in Estonia (2016) and the introduction of Malta’s 
in-work benefit in 2015. Variation across countries and regimes is examined further in the 
next section. 
5.2.2 In-work benefit expenditure in EUMS and welfare regimes 
The cross-national and temporal variation in expenditure on earned income tax credits and 
in-work cash transfers is examined further in this section. Figure 5.1 displays the two 
Table 5.4 Summary of two in-work benefit (IWB) expenditure variables 2006 to 2017 
 
IWB expenditure/ GDP (%) IWB expenditure/ public expenditure (%)  
Year Valid Miss Mean SD Min Max Valid Miss Mean SD Min Max 
2006 11 3 0.35 0.59 0 1.68 11 3 0.89 1.53 0 4.02 
2007 14 0 0.59 0.73 0 2.00 14 0 1.36 1.68 0 4.27 
2008 14 0 0.67 0.78 0 1.94 14 0 1.46 1.70 0 4.06 
2009 14 0 0.78 0.86 0 2.12 14 0 1.54 1.69 0 4.03 
2010 14 0 0.77 0.87 0 2.29 14 0 1.48 1.67 0 4.52 
2011 14 0 0.76 0.86 0 2.32 14 0 1.54 1.74 0 4.63 
2012 14 0 0.76 0.88 0 2.37 14 0 1.54 1.76 0 4.63 
2013 14 0 0.81 0.96 0 2.51 14 0 1.64 1.88 0 4.55 
2014 14 0 0.91 1.13 0 2.84 14 0 1.88 2.23 0 5.46 
2015 14 0 0.91 1.14 0 2.95 14 0 1.94 2.29 0 5.41 
2016 14 0 0.95 1.16 0.03 2.99 14 0 2.09 2.42 0.09 6.14 
2017 14 0 0.92 1.17 0 3.09 14 0 2.08 2.49 0 6.25 
Notes: ‘Miss’ number of countries with missing data per year. Authors calculations. In-work benefit data 
expenditure estimated for in-work cash transfer and earned income tax credits only using EUROMOD. See 
Chapter 4 for full details and a list of countries and policies (Table 4.3, Chapter 4). GDP data (Eurostat, 
2019d). Public expenditure data (Eurostat, 2019e). Values rounded to 2 decimal places 
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expenditure measures as a proportion of public expenditure (A) and as a proportion of GDP 
(B). The lines are colour coded according to welfare regime: Liberal regime countries are 
gold; Bismarckian are blue; Nordic countries are red; Southern regime countries are green, 
and the CEE countries are purple. Moreover, ‘x’ markers on lines indicate there is partial 
data for that country and year34.   
Similar to the mapping, countries appear to be split into two main groups when looking at 
expenditure on these types of in-work provision across the entire period.  But the grouping 
of countries differs to that identified above. The first group consists of five countries with 
expenditure on in-work benefits of 1 to 3 per cent of GDP (or over 2 per cent of public 
expenditure) for most years: Denmark, Sweden, Netherlands, Italy and Ireland. The second 
group consists of the remaining nine countries which spend under 0.5 per cent of GDP per 
year throughout the time period. It includes the UK, Austria, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, 
Spain, Malta, Estonia and Slovakia.   
Similar to above, variation in EUMS’ in-work expenditure over this period partly maps on 
to welfare regimes. The first group therefore includes both of the Nordic regime countries 
(it was not possible to estimate data for Finland), or, if considering the Netherlands, the 
social democratic regime countries (Esping-Andersen, 1990). The second group spans the 
Liberal, Bismarckian, Southern and CEE regimes. Although the expenditure for the CEE 
countries and Malta comes later in the period studied, there is not the same divide between 
advanced and less advanced welfare states that was identified in the previous chapter when 
looking at countries with in-work benefits and the levels of expenditure. Many governments, 
even in advanced welfare states, are relatively low spenders on in-work benefits.  
Looking in more detail at trends in expenditure across these two broad groups, the high-
spend group’s expenditure trajectories are not uniform. First, there are different starting 
points among these countries. In-work benefit expenditure in the Netherlands and Ireland 
was already high in 2006, with both countries in-work benefits amounting to about 4 per 
cent of public expenditure on in-work benefits. In contrast, Denmark and Sweden had 
spending below 2 per cent of public expenditure in 2006/7, which increased quite markedly 
over the period studied, e.g. to between 4-5 per cent of public expenditure by 2014. Indeed, 
Sweden only introduced its earned income tax credit, Jobbskatteavdraget (or EITC), in 2007. 
Italy’s low expenditure in 2006 most likely reflects missing data for two earned income tax 
                                                     
34 See table 4.3 (Chapter 4) for full details of missing data.  
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credit policies. It is possible it started out at a similar point to Netherlands and Ireland rather 
than increasing expenditure rapidly at this point as there is no mention of expansion in the 
policy description data.   
Across all high spend countries, there are similarities in trajectories that may relate to 
cyclical economic factors. Expenditure flat lines and in some cases decreases from 2009 
during the recession following the 07/08 financial crisis until 2012/13 – the main ‘recovery’ 
period35. This is followed by increased expenditure, peaking from 2012/13 onwards. This 
does not necessarily signify in-work benefits were retrenched over the financial crisis and 
subsequent recession. Decreasing demand for in-work support (e.g. as unemployment 
increases) and/or increased expenditure on other social provisions, such as unemployment 
benefits, could lower expenditure and/or these measures. This is picked up in the next 
section. 
Sweden partly bucks the trend of the high spend group in that its expenditure on its EITC 
increases from 2007 to 2014 and during this time it overtakes other countries to become the 
highest spender. But expenditure similarly flattens between 2010 and 2013. The pattern of 
increasing expenditure is partly attributable to the expansion of the credit in 2008, 2009, and 
2010 but could also be due to increasing demand (Liang et al., 2012). 
Ireland is the only country where the trajectory of in-work benefit expenditure is noticeably 
different across the two measures (i.e. as a proportion of GDP and as a proportion of public 
expenditure). Ireland’s trajectory is distinctive in that expenditure started high and then 
gradually declined over the period when looking at the GDP measure, despite the 
introduction of an additional tax credit for the self-employed in 2016. However, Ireland’s 
economy grew substantially after being hit hard by the recession, mainly due to the activities 
of ‘multinational enterprises’ (OECD, 2018). As such, declining expenditure on in-work 
benefits in part reflects economic growth rather than substantially decreased expenditure in 
real terms.  
                                                     
35 It is difficult to pinpoint specific dates for recovery and crisis due to different experiences across countries 
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Notes: A: In-work benefit expenditure as a percentage of public expenditure. B: in-work benefit expenditure 
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Figure 5.1 In-work benefit expenditure in EUMS, 2006 to 2017 
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The absolute data for Ireland (Appendix I) shows expenditure increased 2006 – 2008 after 
which it declined sharply and then flat-lined until recent gradual growth from 2013 and looks 
more similar to the public expenditure measure. Nevertheless, Ireland still stands out from 
the other countries as being the lowest spender of the high spending countries from around 
2009 as the other high spend countries pull away.  
Most of the high spending countries increased expenditure between 2012 to 2015/ 2016. 
However, the most recent data highlights further variance in in-work benefit expenditure 
trajectories. As mentioned, Sweden’s expenditure peaks in 2014, and then falls back to near 
2013 levels after this point. Denmark follows a similar trajectory to Sweden in that it 
increased quite markedly over time. However, unlike Sweden, it fell/ flat lined between 2009 
and 2012 at around 2.7 to 2.9 % of public expenditure. After 2012, Denmark’s expenditure 
continued to increase sharply to overtake most of the others in the high spending group by 
2014. Netherlands’ expenditure increased in 2013 quite sharply until 2016. From 2016 to 
2017 it fell as a share of GDP but increased at a slower rate as a proportion of public 
expenditure. Increases in Italy’s expenditure from 2014 is in part likely to reflect the 
introduction of an additional tax credit in that year: the ‘Fiscal Bonus’. However, as a 
proportion of GDP and public expenditure, expenditure on in-work benefits in Italy very 
marginally declines from 2015.  
The high spending Nordic countries therefore saw the steepest increase in in-work benefit 
expenditure following the introduction of schemes in the early to mid-2000s. The 
Netherlands, Ireland and, it is assumed, Italy, were spending a considerable proportion of 
public expenditure on in-work benefits at the start of the time period covered. As such, in-
work benefits appear to be more established in these contexts. However, in Ireland, there 
was a sharp drop in expenditure during the time of the recession, but expenditure (as a 
proportion of public expenditure) has gradually increased over time. Even still, there is a 
sizeable gap between Ireland and the other high spend countries.  
The Netherlands and Denmark saw increasing in-work benefit effort in the later years 
covered by the data, whereas expenditure appeared to stagnate in Sweden and Italy. In 
Sweden, a phase out was introduced in 2016 for those with earnings above approximately 
SEK600000 per year for the EITC. Although 2016 was also the first year Netherlands’ Work 
Credit could not be received by higher earners as it is phased out completely when earnings 
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reach €111,590, the level of a provision in the Netherlands (‘Income Related Combination 
Credit’) was increased in 2014, which could be behind the increase in expenditure.  
Figure 5.2 presents the data for the lower spending countries only, using the GDP measure. 
It illuminates further variation among the lower spending countries and some evidence of 
regime clustering. First, the UK and Slovakia stand out as higher spenders (among the lower-
spending group). There is also missing data for the UK from 2013 onwards for Universal 
Credit, so actual expenditure is likely higher than captured here. Bismarckian countries, 
France, Luxembourg and Austria, make up a mid-range group with expenditure roughly 
between 0.15 and 0.20 per cent of GDP. Spain enters this range from 2015 onwards. 
Estonia’s expenditure is for one year only as its policy was abolished after one year. 
However, when the policy was active in 2016, expenditure was at a similar level to 
Luxembourg and Austria. Expenditure on in-work benefits is lowest in Malta.  
Unlike most countries in the higher spending group, expenditure in a handful of lower 
spending countries (Luxembourg, UK, Slovakia and France) increased in 2008-2009 around 
the time of the financial crisis. In many of these countries, this is in part attributable to the 
introduction or expansion of schemes. In the case of Luxembourg, two tax credit policies 
were introduced in 2009 (the Basic Employee Credit and Self-Employed Tax Credit). In the 
UK, Working Tax Credits were expanded in 2008 (Millar, 2009). France introduced an 
additional in-work benefit, Revenue de Solidarité Active (RSA), in 200936. The same pattern 
emerges when using the public expenditure measure in place of the GDP measure. The 
economic context could have factored into policy makers decisions to expand in-work 
benefits, or it could be that both the economy and other forms of public expenditure declined. 
If the latter is the case, it could indicate in-work provisions are immune to fiscal pressures 
applied to other policies. However, Austria’s increase over the same period is mainly 
because of missing data for two out of three policies up until 2008 (see Table 4.3, Chapter 
4).  
Across the lower spending countries, expenditure starts to fall as a proportion of GDP from 
2009. In Slovakia, the UK and Austria, spending does not exceed pre-2009 levels in later 
years. As above, the steep decline in Austria’s expenditure in 2016 is because of (partial) 
missing data for 2017. 
                                                     
36 The politics of this reform are examined in Vlandas (2013).  
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In-work benefit spending recovers eventually in Luxembourg, France, Spain and Belgium. 
In France, expenditure declines up until 2015, when the tax credit, Prime Pour l’Emploi 
(PPE), and in-work cash transfer, Revenue de Solidarité Active (RSAA), were abolished and 
replaced by the Activity Allowance, Prime d'activité (PDA). Secondary sources attribute 
this to retrenchment in the form of freezing of income thresholds limiting entitlement 
(Cousins, 2014, p.110). The increase in expenditure following the introduction of PDA has 
been attributed to higher take up of the benefit compared to its predecessors (Eurofound, 
2017, p.54), but it is less generous.  
Belgium, Spain and Malta’s trajectories are distinctive as policies are newer and/or 
expenditure increased later than the other lower spending countries.  Spain and Belgium are 
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Notes: In-work benefit expenditure as a proportion of GDP, Lower spend group only. For sources see Table 5.4. 
Figure 5.2 In-work benefit expenditure in EUMS (Lower spend group) 
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expenditure during the recession period. In Spain, expenditure on its ‘Working Mother Tax 
Credit’ flattened until 2014, and the increase in expenditure is most likely attributable to two 
additional earned income tax credits – Working Lone Parent Tax Credits and Working Large 
Families Tax Credit in 2015. On the one hand, it could be that limited change in the demand 
for these provisions among the relevant parts of the population meant expenditure remained 
stable over a period of socio-economic pressure and/or that this benefit was protected despite 
pressures for retrenchment.  However, according to secondary sources, the number of 
recipients of the Working Mother Tax Credit increased up until 2008, from which point it 
decreased (Ayala and Paniagua, 2018). Moreover, Belgium introduced an additional earned 
income tax credit, the refundable ‘Fiscal Workbonus’, in 2011. Malta did not have any in-
work benefit policies in place until 2015 and its introduction of its ‘In-Work Benefit’ 
increased gradually from this point.   
In sum, there appears to be a divergent trend among the lower-spending countries over the 
years covered. In the UK and Slovakia, which are situated in the upper margins of the group, 
expenditure appeared to decline after the recession and did not recover over the period. In 
the UK declining expenditure is attributed to deliberate retrenchment of in-work benefits but 
the data is also partial as Universal Credit expenditure was not estimated. On the other side 
of the coin, in some of the very low spending countries, or those with no expenditure at all 
in the mid-2000s, in-work benefit expenditure increased in recent years (Malta, Belgium, 
Spain, Luxembourg and France). Increases coincide with the introduction of additional 
policies, or reforms replacing previous benefits, in these contexts.  
Next, isolating expenditure on in-work cash transfers in Figure 5.3 for the three countries 
with this sub-type provides additional insights into trends and patterns in EUMS in-work 
benefits.  
First, expenditure on in-work cash transfer policies in EUMS did not exceed 0.41% of GDP 
in any country between 2006 and 2017. In contrast, the highest earned income tax credit 
expenditure amounts to approximately 3% of GDP over the same time period (e.g. for 
Denmark and Netherlands). Second, the UK and Italy spend considerably more than Ireland, 
France and Malta on in-work cash transfers, at least up until the increase in expenditure in 
2015 in France with the introduction of Activity Allowance (‘Prime d'activitie’). Moreover, 
Italy’s Family Allowances are received by working and non-working recipients, as such the 





Nevertheless, even if only accounting for expenditure on working households, Italy would 
still belong in the high spend group overall given most of its expenditure is on its earned 
income tax credits. Indeed, by isolating in-work cash transfer expenditure, it is clear that 
among all countries with both earned income tax credits and in-work cash transfers, earned 
income credits make up the bulk of expenditure (France, Italy and Ireland). One explanation 
for this could be that earned income tax credits are less targeted than in-work cash transfers 
(OECD, 2003).  
Overall, at the surface level, there is considerable cross-national variation in EUMS’ trends 
in in-work benefit expenditure, with two broad groups of countries identified in terms of 
average expenditure over the period. Welfare regimes hold limited weight with the exception 
that all Social Democratic countries were in the high spend group; the trajectory of 
expenditure in Southern regime countries shows increased expenditure from 2012 onwards 
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Notes: In-work benefit expenditure as a proportion of GDP. In-work cash transfers only. See Table 5.4 for 
sources and details. 
Figure 5.3 Expenditure on in-work cash transfers in EUMS, 2006 - 2017 
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Bismarckian regime countries with the exception of Netherlands. As the mapping of sub-
types indicates, the Netherlands aligns more with other Social Democratic countries in its 
use of non-refundable earned income tax credits. There are cyclical patterns to in-work 
benefit expenditure and there are many possible interpretations of this. The next section 
further probes variation in expenditure with respect to context.  
5.3 Contextualising trends and variation in in-work benefits in EUMS  
This final section of the chapter aims to contextualise variation in in-work benefits in EUMS 
with reference to the contexts that they are variably associated with in the literature. Many 
arguments refer to welfare regimes, e.g. that policies were originally the preserve of liberal 
regimes but subsequent ‘path-breaking’ reforms introducing in-work benefits have occurred 
in other countries since the late 1990s. Socio-economic context, especially labour market 
risks, are also positioned as problems or challenges that in-work benefits are a ‘response’ to.  
Similarly, in-work benefits are associated with the liberalisation of political economy across 
capitalist democratic countries.  
Assessing any of these claims requires a better understanding of the ‘dependent variable’, 
an overarching aim of this thesis. As the point of the investigation is to better understand in-
work benefits through comparison, and because of the limits with some aspects of the data 
generated and collected on in-work benefits, this exploration in itself is intended to be 
indicative, not conclusive, but could feed into the development of theory and shape future 
research examining the determinants of in-work benefit variation.  Moreover, the analysis 
refrains from a functionalist interpretation of the relationship between socio-economic 
context and in-work benefit expenditure.  
This section starts by contextualising in-work benefit variation in EUMS as set out above 
with respect to socio-economic factors commonly associated with in-work benefits: in-work 
poverty and unemployment. As in-work benefits are also viewed as a tool to boost 
employment at the intensive margin, in relation to work hours or earnings, underemployment 
is also considered.  It then employs the political economy oriented framework outlined in 
Chapter 3, bringing together the findings discussed already with respect to welfare regimes 
and the VofC framework, I look at variation in in-work benefits alongside indicators of 
labour market and social policy institutions that are often seen as indicators of liberalisation.  
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5.3.1 Problem pressures and socio-economic context 
The findings above, on the one hand, show little change in EUMS’ tax-benefit systems in 
terms of the presence of any of the provisions mapped in this thesis at 2008 and 2016, notably 
for the western and northern European countries. On the other hand, there were also some 
notable developments, including the introduction of policies in Southern European and CEE 
countries.  The mapping was also important for highlighting which countries do not have 
provisions. Could it simply be the case there is not a ‘need’ for in-work benefits in these 
contexts? 
When looking at a key problem pressure associated with in-work benefits, in-work poverty, 
this appears to not be the case. Table 5.5 shows the in-work at risk of poverty rates for full-
time and part-time households in EUMS for each year of the mapping carried out in Section 
5.1, as well as the year before each mapping time point to provide a broader picture of 
context (i.e. 2007 and 2008, 2015 and 2016).  The countries are ordered according to the in-
work at risk of poverty rate for full-time workers in 2016. The rates are shaded grey if at a 
level which is above the average for each year and work-intensity.  
Countries without in-work benefits include those facing very ‘high’ pressures in terms of in-
work poverty. For example, Romania, had the highest in-work at risk of poverty rate for full-
time and part-time workers for all years and did not have in-work benefits. On the other 
hand, Czechia, a country without in-work benefits (as per the mapping), had among the 
lowest rates of in-work at risk of poverty rates for all years and did not have any of the 
provision types in place. Yet, more countries without in-work benefits had above average 
rates of in-work poverty. One possible explanation is that such pressures have not led 
governments to adopt to in- work benefit policies because of the (in)capacity of their welfare 
states. It may also be the case that they have high rates of poverty because they do not have 
in-work benefits.  
Yet, there was high in-work poverty among countries with in-work benefits, notably the 
Southern regime countries (Italy and Portugal) and Luxembourg.  The latter had above 
average rates of in-work poverty, interestingly for full-time workers, across all four years. 
The risk for part-time workers also increased over this period. Although a low-spend 
country, Luxembourg was one of the countries to see an increase in expenditure from 2015 
onwards. Italy’s in-work at risk of poverty rate for part-time workers went from 15% and 
14% in 2007 and 2008 respectively, to 19% and 20% in 2015 and 2016. Italy belonged to 
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the high-spend group and has also introduced additional new provisions towards the end of 
the study period.   
Notably, in both countries the gap between the risk of poverty between part- and full-time 
workers increased. This is quite striking for Spain, where the gap was 5 percentage points in 
Table 5.5: IWBs and in-work at risk of poverty rates (%), full-time and part-time workers, 
EUMS  
Year 
2007 2008 2015 2016 IWB IWB 
Work intensity 
(hh) 
FT PT FT PT FT PT FT PT 2008 2016 € 
Romania 14 56 14 58 15 59 14 65 X X -  
Greece 13 27 14 26 12 28 12 30 Y Y - 
Spain 10 15 9 22 10 27 11 24 Y Y L 
Luxembourg 9 10 9 13 10 17 11 18 Y Y L 
Bulgaria 5 16 6 20 7 30 10 42 X X - 
Poland 11 20 11 20 11 18 10 20 X X - 
Italy 9 15 8 14 10 19 10 20 Y Y H 
Portugal 8 28 10 28 10 30 10 30 Y Y L 
Hungary 5 17 5 16 8 18 9 22 Y X - 
Estonia 7 16 7 13 9 18 9 15 X Y L 
Cyprus 6 10 6 9 8 17 7 12 X X - 
Latvia 8 24 9 24 8 18 7 23 X X - 
Austria 5 8 8 11 6 11 7 9 Y Y L 
Germany  6 10 5 11 7 15 7 15 Y Y L 
France 5 11 5 11 6 13 7 14 Y Y L 
Lithuania 7 28 8 23 9 28 7 29 X X - 
Slovakia 5 10 6 11 5 19 6 15 Y Y L 
UK 6 12 6 12 6 13 6 14 Y Y L 
Slovenia 4 11 5 8 6 15 5 16 X Y - 
Sweden 6 7 6 9 7 11 5 10 Y Y H 
Malta 4 9 5 7 5 16 5 14 X Y L 
Croatia : : : : 5 20 5 16 na Y L 
Netherlands 4 4 4 5 4 5 5 5 Y Y H 
Belgium 4 6 3 8 4 6 4 6 Y Y L 
Czechia 3 5 3 6 4 6 4 8 X X - 
Denmark 4 5 5 7 4 8 3 14 Y Y H 
Ireland 4 11 5 12 3 10 3 10 Y Y H 
Finland 3 15 4 14 3 9 3 6 Y Y - 
Average  6 15 7 15 7 18 7 19 -  - - 
Notes:  Data: Eurostat (2020) In-work at-risk-of-poverty rate by intensity of the household. Countries with a 
rate equal to or greater than average for that year and work type shaded grey. IWB: in-work benefit policies 
mapped in Section 5.1. Y= provision in place, X= provision not in place. €: country classification as high (H) 
or low (L) spend in Section 5.2.  
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2007 and 17 in 2015. However, this had declined in 2015. It may be that this inequality 
between full and part-time workers created pressures that led to the expansion of in-work 
benefits in these specific contexts.   
The other high-spend countries, Ireland, Denmark and Sweden, had low risks of in-work 
poverty compared to other EUMS. Denmark and Ireland had larger gaps than Sweden 
between the risk of poverty between full- and part-time working households. If provisions 
are targeted at part-time households this may express a particular concern about this gap.  
Just because the rates are below average for EUMS, however, this does not necessarily mean 
they will be a ‘minor’ pressure in these contexts, especially in the Nordic/Social Democratic 
countries, which have historically emphasised activation and full employment in order to 
support its more expansive welfare state.    
In-work benefits are understood to be a tool that is employed to tackle unemployment 
through work incentives and in some cases a means for increasing work intensity. Indeed, 
the goals of tackling poverty and increasing work incentives are said to be part of a tension 
in the design of in-work benefits, which are usually more oriented towards one of these goals 
over the other.  The rates of unemployment and underemployment in EUMS may help us to 
make sense of the conditions associated with variation in in-work benefits both within and 
across countries37. And a similar exercise was carried out to look at rates of un- and under-
employment in countries with and without any of the three in-work benefit types and whether 
they are high or low spend countries (see Appendix J). 
The picture differd quite markedely for underemployment. With the exception of Cyrpus, 
which had among the highest rates of underemployment in 2015 and 2016 (approx. 9 per 
cent), most of the countries without in-work benefits at the two time points had some of the 
lowest rates of underemployment in the EU, e.g. Czechia (0.5% in 2016), Bulgaria (0.8% in 
2016),  Poland (1.7%) and Lithuania (1.4%). Hungary, which abolished it earned income tax 
credit provision, had an underemployment rate of 1.1% in 2016. In contrast, 
undermployment was relatively high in Greece and Spain in 2015 and 2016, but also in 
Western  European countries, including some high spend countries, e.g. the Netherlands 
                                                     
37 In line with the theoretical framework, the assumption underpinning the analysis is that such pressures, under certain 
conditions, feed into political processes, e.g. they influence political actors’ decisions to introduce, expand, retrench or 
reform in-work benefits by creating new demands among socio-political groups. However, these factors could also capture 
changes in socio-economic context that also drive demand for policies without any action.  
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(6.1% in 2016), Ireland (5.1% in 2016), Denmark (4.5% in 2016)38. Rates of unemployment 
in countries with and without in-work benefits varied considerably, e.g. countries without 
included: 13% in Cyprus, 9.6% in Latvia, 7.9% in Lithuania, and 6.2% in Poland (all 2016) 
and countries with: 11.7% in Italy and 4.1% in Germany.  The higher spend countries also 
faced different levels of unemployment.  
The varied context for in-work benefit developments in EUMS is illuninated further when 
looking at trends in expenditure in 14 EUMS included in the expenditure analysis only and 
in-work poverty39 (Figure 5.4), unemployment40 and underemployment41 (Appendix K)42. 
The line graphs show the rates of each of the socio-economic indicators on the left axis (blue 
line) and expenditure on in-work benefits as proportion of public expenditure on the right 
axis (red line). They further illuminate the variation in the rates of in-work poverty across 
both higher and lower spending countries over the study period. Some trajectories stand out. 
In Denmark, for example, in-work poverty appears to decline before the sharp increase in 
expenditure on its earned income tax credit. The immediate context may not have influenced 
the reform or in-work poverty may not be a factor associated with its expansion, i.e. if 
employment goals were prioritised.  However, in-work poverty had been rising quite sharply 
before then so it could nevertheless be an important part of the context influencing political 
decision making in the Danish context.  
The trajectories for underemployment and unemployment further nuance this picture. 
Highlighting possible longer standing risks feeding into the context of increasing 
expenditure in Denmark, there is a gradual increase in unemployment but not 
underemployment before the sharp increase in expenditure. Both of which, along with in-
work poverty, decline as expenditure increases. Underemployment, however, peaks sharply 
again in later years. Underemployment rose drastically in the Netherlands before in-work 
benefit expenditure increased. A gradual yet similar pattern of increasing underemployment 
                                                     
38 When looking at proportion of part-time workers that are underemployed, the ordering of countries from highest to lowest 
changes. However, looking at underemployment as a proportion of total employment captures variation across countries in 
terms of the prevalence of underemployment, as only a small proportion of employment could be part-time.   
39 Eurostat (2019a): In-work-at-risk of poverty. The in-work (at risk of) poverty indicator is taken from Eurostat and shows 
‘the rate of 18-64-year olds who are classified as employed according to their most frequent activity status and are at risk 
of poverty’. 
40 Eurostat (2019b): Unemployment by sex and age - annual average.  
41 Eurostat (2019c): Underemployment and potential additional labour force statistics. Under-employment is a measure of 
part-time workers, recorded by individuals, who want (and are available to) work additional hours 
42 Full details of all variables in Appendix C. 
142 
 
before in-work benefit expenditure increases can be seen also for Italy and Belgium, 
although the latter spends considerably less on the provisions examined in this research.  
Figure 5.4 Trends in in-work benefit expenditure and in-work poverty in EUMS, 2006 
to 2017 
Notes: Expenditure data as above. IWB expenditure covers only earned income tax credits and in-work 
cash transfers. Some policies missing. Finland excluded from analysis because missing data. In-work at 
risk of poverty rates (Eurostat, 2019). 
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The differential impact of the financial crisis of 07/08 and subsequent economic recession 
on levels of unemployment can be seen in the line graphs also. Unemployment is particularly 
pronounced in Italy, Spain and Estonia. All three countries saw moderate increases in 
expenditure towards the end of the time-period studied as unemployment starts to decline. 
The one year of expenditure for Estonia coincides with an increase in unemployment.  
Moreover, correlational analysis was carried out for each country using the GDP in-work 
benefit expenditure measure and the socio-economic factors discussed above (Table 5.6). 
Malta and Estonia are excluded because there is only one year of expenditure data. Most of 
the correlations were weak to moderate. For most countries there was a positive relationship 
between in-work benefit expenditure and in-work poverty, and in-work benefit expenditure 
and unemployment, but not all. The coefficient for in-work poverty was highest in Spain, 
Italy and the Netherlands (all positive).  However, as shown above, while in-work poverty 
is broadly positively related to in-work benefit expenditure within countries, it does not 
appear to explain variation in expenditure between countries. Countries with high in-work 
at risk of poverty rates are not relatively high spenders on in-work benefits at any point 
during the years covered, e.g. Luxembourg, and Spain43. And vice-versa, countries with 
                                                     
43 All Estonian results should be caveated with the fact that there is only one year of non-zero expenditure data 
Table 5.6: Exploring the relationship between socio-economic pressures and in-work 
benefit expenditure in EUMS  
  Unemployment  Underemployment  In-work poverty  
In-work benefit 
expenditure 
EUMS PC N PC N PC N Mean Years = 0 
IE 0.292 12 0.594 9 0.623 12 3.54 0 
UK 0.687 12 0.231 10 -0.298 12 0.75 0 
AT 0.275 11 -0.177 10 0.265 11 0.23 0 
BE -0.017 12 0.709 10 0.486 12 0.15 0 
FR -0.04 12 -0.147 10 0.066 12 0.34 0 
LU 0.459 12 0.747 10 0.51 12 0.29 0 
NL 0.242 12 0.483 10 0.838 12 4.41 0 
DK 0.258 11 0.258 10 0.056 11 3.93 0 
SE 0.414 12 -0.17 10 0.252 12 4.07 1 
ES 0.134 12 0.329 10 0.858 12 0.27 0 
IT 0.588 12 0.827 10 0.654 12 4.06 0 
SK 0.477 11 -0.719 10 -0.486 11 0.78 0 
Notes:   Countries are organised according to welfare regime. Pearson correlation (pc) coefficients are 
reported for each country. The strength of the relationship is denoted by the coefficient (1= perfect 
positive, -1 perfect negative, 0 no correlation). Stronger relationships in bold. N’ number of observations. 
‘Years=0’ years included in analysis when country had no in-work benefit expenditure. In-work benefit 
expenditure on earned income tax credits and in-work cash transfers. Sources described in main text.  
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lower in-work at risk of poverty rates during the time period covered, namely Denmark and 
the Netherlands, are relatively high spenders on earned income tax credits over the time 
period. The results for under-employment were more mixed, with some strong positive 
(Belgium, Luxembourg and Italy) and strong negative (Slovakia and Luxembourg). 
However, these analyses are not immune to endogeneity issues, as in-work benefit 
expenditure could be affecting the rate of these factors (in either direction).  
The next section adds to this picture of the context of in-work benefit variation by looking 
at corresponding institutional variation. 
5.3.2 Institutional context and liberalisation  
The findings presented in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 all indicated that welfare regimes hold limited 
weight in terms of driving in-work benefit reforms in post-crisis Europe. The main 
‘clustering’ appeared to be around less developed and the more developed welfare states in 
terms of where provisions were in place and recent trends. There was also some indication 
that social democratic regime countries (at least historically speaking) are similar in terms 
of (high) expenditure and the types of provisions used (non-refundable earned income tax 
credits). This is surprising given that in-work benefits are mainly associated with a liberal 
political economy.  
This section thus explores the institutional context, namely policies that are indicators of the 
different balance of the state and market in the income maintenance and protection of 
workers during times of employment and unemployment. It includes indicators of 
institutions that are typically associated with social democratic and/or corporatist political 
economy (when high) and liberalisation (when low or declining): collective bargaining 
coverage, trade union density44 and unemployment benefit replacement rates4546.  
First, as above, an initial exercise is to consider the institutional variation in countries with 
and without in-work benefits. In terms of unemployment benefit replacement rates, the 
picture is again mixed among countries without (and with) in-work benefits. For example, 
replacement rates are among the lowest in Greece, Romania, the UK, Germany, Austria and 
Ireland, which includes countries with and without in-work benefits and with different levels 
                                                     
44 Collective bargaining coverage rate and the trade union density rate are taken from ILO Stat (Visser at al, 2015). 
45 OECDstat (2019) Net Replacement Rates measure the proportion of previous in-work income that is maintained after 6 
months unemployment for a single person without children earning 67% of the average wage for that country – a level 
close to those commonly defined as having ‘low wages’. The measure does not include housing benefits. 
46 See Appendix D for full description of sources and indicators. 
145 
 
of expenditure (OECDstat, 2019a). Moreover, most EUMS have seen a decline in trade 
union membership and density (a proportion of those in work) rates since the 1980s. 
However, both EUMS with low trade union density (e.g. France and the UK) and those with 
high trade union density (e.g. Sweden, Denmark and Finland) have in-work benefits 
(Eurofound, 2015; Visser et al., 2015). In-work benefit reforms have not been on an upward 
trajectory across all countries. Thus, the relationship may be complex than the liberalisation 
thesis would see it. There is a similar, mixed initial picture in terms of collective bargaining 
coverage and in-work benefit variation.  
Examining differences among countries, correlational analysis using the GDP and public 
expenditure in-work benefit measures (Table 5.7) highlights variation across European 
countries in the direction and strength of the relationship between in-work benefit 
expenditure and the ‘liberalisation’ indicators included in the analysis47. Most countries’ in-
work benefit expenditure is negatively correlated with replacement rates, with strong results 
in the Netherlands, Sweden and Slovakia. In Ireland, Belgium, Denmark and the UK, 
replacement rates are positively correlated with in-work benefit expenditure. However, for 
Ireland, when the public expenditure proportional measure of in-work benefit expenditure is 
used, this relationship is also negative (PC: -0.542). 
Offering some support to the liberalisation argument, trade union density was also negatively 
correlated with in-work benefit expenditure in the Netherlands and Sweden (in addition to 
replacement rates). In-work benefit expenditure was negatively correlated with trade union 
density in Luxembourg. The result for Ireland is positive but when using the public 
expenditure measure of in-work benefit expenditure there is a negative result for Ireland. 
There are fewer results for collective bargaining. However, there is a very similar general 
picture in that there is mostly a negative relationship, i.e. increasing expenditure on in-work 
benefits correlates with declining coverage of collective bargaining agreement but for many 
countries this is very weak. Luxembourg and Denmark, and to a lesser degree France and 
Sweden, stand out as having a stronger negative relationship between collective bargaining 
coverage and in-work benefit expenditure.   
Again, the line charts below (Figure 5.5) and in the appendices (Appendix K) highlight 
corresponding institutional trajectories and nuance the interpretation of this analysis.   
                                                     




Looking at these line graphs, as with in-work poverty (and the socio-economic indicators 
more generally), variation in replacement rates does not appear to relate to between-country 
variation in in-work benefit expenditure in the same way as within-country variation. This is 
because the highest spend countries, Denmark, Netherlands, Italy and Sweden have 
relatively high replacement rates, while the UK, Malta and Estonia have low replacement 
rates and relatively low spending. 
In some countries, the correlation coefficient also masks the relatively small overall change 
on one of the two indicators. For example, there is very little change in replacement rates 
over the years covered in Denmark and the Netherlands, despite the considerable increase in 
in-work benefit expenditure. In contrast, replacements rates change in Austria but in-work 
benefit expenditure remains more constant and is considerably lower. On the other hand, 
there is a clear negative relationship between in-work benefit expenditure and replacement 
rates in Sweden, but this appears to reverse in 2016.  
Table 5.7: Exploring the relationship between IWB expenditure and indicators of 











 EUMS PC N PC N PC N Mean Years = 0  
IE   0.867 11 0.608 12 3.54 0 
UK 
-
0.235 11 -0.247 11 0.424 12 0.75 0 
AT .a 10 -0.569 10 -0.22 11 0.23 0 
BE .a 11 -0.126 10 0.612 12 0.15 0 
FR 
-
0.674 4 0.088 10 -0.368 12 0.34 0 
LU 
-
0.979 5 -0.712 11 -0.043 12 0.29 0 
NL 0.049 11 -0.798 11 -0.972 12 4.41 0 
DK 0.923 7 0.046 10 0.609 11 3.93 0 
SE 
-
0.605 4 -0.968 10 -0.961 12 4.07 1 
ES 0.284 12 -0.672 10 -0.475 12 0.27 0 
IT .a 10 0.486 11 -0.212 12 4.06 0 
SK 0.553 6 0.314 9 -0.858 11 0.78 0 
Notes: Pearson correlation (pc) coefficients are reported for each country. The relationship is denoted by 
the coefficient (1= perfect positive, -1 perfect negative, 0 no correlation). N’ number of observations. 
‘Years=0’ years included in analysis when country had no in-work benefit expenditure. In-work benefit 
expenditure data from EU-IWB, GDP measure. Contextual variables described above. Countries are 




Figure 5.5 Trends in in-work benefit expenditure and unemployment benefit replacement 
rates in EUMS, 2006 to 2017 
Notes: Expenditure and contextual data defined above. IWB expenditure covers only earned income tax 




Looking at trade union density (Appendix L), as suggested above, this declines in most 
countries, notably in Ireland, Luxembourg, Sweden and Slovakia and less steeply in the 
Netherlands and the UK. These is not as much change in Denmark or Italy over the period. 
Finally, the data for collective bargaining coverage is very patchy. Yet, it highlights the stark 
differences between the countries. It is high/moderate in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, 
Spain and Sweden and remains so. The main country where there is a decline is Ireland, 
alongside a decline in in-work benefit expenditure (GDP measure).  
In sum, the question of whether in-work benefit expansion is occurring alongside 
liberalisation find some support in this data when looking at the trends in all three indicators 
for Sweden. In the Netherlands, increased expenditure has occurred alongside declining 
trade union density and collective bargaining coverage, but not replacement rates. In Ireland 
and the UK, liberal regimes, gradually declining in-work benefit expenditure appears to 
correspond with indicators of (further) liberalisation.  The lower and relatively stable 
spending in CME countries, including Austria and Belgium, has seen collective bargaining 
remain steady but liberalisation on other fronts. Slovakia and Estonia follow similar 
trajectories on institutional indicators, but varied trajectories of in-work benefit expenditure 
Variation across corresponding policy areas implies there may be different institutional 
dynamics across countries. Regimes appear to hold little weight given the divergent 
trajectories across regime types, apart from the possible demise of in-work benefits alongside 
further liberalisation in Liberal regime countries – and a partial picture of forms of 
liberalisation alongside in-work benefit expansion in the Social Democratic higher spend 
countries, with Sweden being the plainest example of this.  
5.4 Conclusion   
The chapter first mapped in-work benefits in EUMS, comparing across countries, including 
a breakdown of the prevalence of in-work benefits sub-types across EUMS at 2008 and 2016. 
The findings offer some support for earlier claims in the literature that in-work benefits are 
no longer unique to Liberal/Anglo-Saxon countries (Immervoll and Pearson, 2009, p.19). 
The prevalence of in-work benefits at 2008 illuminates that in-work benefits were already 
part of the tax-benefit framework when the financial crisis of 2007/08 hit. These in-work 
provisions may, therefore, be best understood with respect to longer-term political, economic 
and social changes in de-industrialised contexts, rather than the conditions associated with 
economic crises and recession.  
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Yet, the exception to this are what are often seen as ‘less developed’ welfare states of Central 
and Eastern Europe and some Southern regime countries. Indeed, in-work benefits were very 
new in these contexts: Malta introduced its in-work cash transfer (In-Work Benefit) in 2015 
and Estonia introduced its earned income tax credit (Non-Refundable Credit for Low Income 
Workers) in 2016. In-work benefits may therefore be used when welfare states reach a point 
of maturity and/or because the conditions associated with the late development of capitalism 
and democracy are conducive to the politics of in-work benefits. Interestingly, Hungary was 
the only country to abolish in-work benefits over these two time points, whereas one of 
Slovakia’s earned income tax credits (Employee Tax Credit) was rendered obsolete by 
concurrent minimum wage and benefit reforms. Politically, this could be indicative of fragile 
support for in-work benefits in these contexts. 
Elsewhere, the mapping did not pick up on much change between these two time points, but 
in-work benefits have undergone reforms in several other more advanced welfare states, 
notably France. The UK system was also undergoing radical reform with the introduction of 
Universal Credit. These broad findings therefore aid our understanding of in-work benefits 
in a comparative perspective and longer-term changes in the use of such provisions in 
capitalist democratic countries.  
Yet, there are limits to the conclusions that can be drawn from the mapping part of the 
investigation and further questions are raised. Given the prevalence of in-work benefits in 
EUMS has a lot to do with ‘adjusted unemployment benefits’, it is important to compare the 
amounts and types of work and earnings that can be combined with adjusted unemployment 
benefits to gauge whether such provisions can be considered a de facto in-work benefit, as 
has been argued for other contexts (e.g. Germany by Clasen (2019)).  
The mapping also did not capture variation in the scale or extent of provisions. The next part 
of the chapter thus looked first at trends in in-work benefit expenditure for the EU as a whole 
from 2006 to 2017, identifying a broadly upward trend in average in-work benefit 
expenditure. Looking within and between countries over time, the findings suggest a split 
between EUMS spending less than 0.5% of GDP and those mainly spending between 1-3% 
of GDP. The high-spend countries included Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Denmark and 
Sweden. The low-spend group includes the UK, the remaining Bismarckian regime countries 
(Belgium, France, Luxembourg and Austria), Southern regime countries (Malta and Spain), 
and Slovakia and Estonia from the Central and Eastern group.   
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The findings partly challenge the assumption that in-work benefits are most expansive in 
Liberal regime countries and supported more recent claims that expansive and costly reforms 
are in place in other regimes, notably Kenworthy’s (2016) point about Sweden’s expensive 
EITC. For example, Slovakia’s in-work benefit expenditure was close to the UK’s 
throughout much of the period covered (however data were missing for the UK’s Universal 
Credit, introduced in the later years covered by the analysis). Also, Italy ranked among the 
high spenders in of all EU Member States because of its earned income tax credit policies. 
Similarly, the Netherlands and Denmark are very similar to Sweden in having relatively very 
high expenditure on earned income tax credit policies. Indeed, the bulk of expenditure across 
all EUMS was on earned income tax credits and not in-work cash transfers. Yet, many 
countries in the lower spend group only had earned income tax credit policies. In other 
words, earned income tax credits are not always expensive. This is likely due to the targeting 
and the generosity of schemes, both of which are examined in the next section.   
In terms of changes over the 11 years included in the analysis, negative cyclical spending 
patterns were found for many EUMS during the financial crisis. Moreover, the findings 
highlighted variance within these groups in terms of the longer-term trends in in-work 
benefit expenditure. There was evidence of increasing in-work benefit expenditure in some 
countries (notably Netherlands, Denmark, Luxembourg, France and Spain) in later years of 
the analysis, which was linked in some cases to policy reform, such as the introduction of 
two additional earned income tax credit policies in Spain. Expenditure did not recover in the 
latter end of the period studied in the UK and Slovakia, both of which were the highest 
spending countries in the lower spending group. Similarly, Estonia’s in-work benefits were 
introduced and then effectively abolished. Thus, we cannot say straightforwardly there is a 
move towards in-work benefits across EUMS in terms of countries directing more resources 
to policies over time.  
Variance within and across countries was unpacked further with exploratory analysis of 
socio-economic indicators and whether countries had in-work benefits in place, and variation 
in in-work benefit expenditure. The findings indicated that countries with both above and 
below average rates of in-work poverty and unemployment have in place in-work benefits. 
Yet, there was a starker difference for under-employment, whereby most of the countries 
with higher levels underemployment also had in place in-work benefits (with the exception 
of Cyrus, where underemployment was among the highest). This could be something to do 
with the labour market risks of the more advanced welfare states.  
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Correlational analysis of expenditure and indicators of socio-economic context, and an 
examination of country trajectories, revealed some interesting patterns within countries that 
may help us to understand the conditions in which in-work benefits are used, including the 
positive relationship between in-work poverty and in-work benefit expenditure. Whether 
these factors actually create pressures or are driven by in-work benefits and corresponding 
reforms, however, cannot be gauged through this analysis. Thus, the interpretation of this 
analysis is limited but it provides leads for future research. The key point to be made here is 
that such pressures do not appear to explain differences in in-work benefit expenditure 
between countries. Moreover, it is possible that variation in the types of in-work benefits in 
place, including the goals and logics underpinning these, are part of the reason why 
‘uniform’ arguments about socio-economic context and variation have mixed relevance. 
Further exploratory analysis of the relationship between in-work benefit variation and 
corresponding indicators of social policy and labour market institutions was intended to 
further contextualise the findings. There were no overarching similarities on these 
institutional indicators and countries with and without in-work benefits, or levels of 
expenditure. But again, some interesting findings emerged with respect to individual and 
groups of countries.  
A closer look at the varied direction and strength of the relationship between in-work 
benefits and these indicators, offered some support for the notion that there are distinctive 
forms and degrees of liberalisation across countries. For example, in Demark, in-work 
benefit expenditure is positively correlated with replacement rates and collective bargaining 
coverage, but these changed very little over the period studied. The results could be capturing 
Denmark’s ‘embedded flexibilization’ approach, whereby in-work benefits are part of a 
system that is market-oriented but with high protections from the greater risk associated with 
flexible labour markets, as political coalitions have acted reflexively to maintain a more 
egalitarian form of capitalism (Thelen, 2014, p.147–8). In contrast, increasing expenditure 
in Sweden and Netherlands coincided with a decline in collective bargaining coverage, 
replacement rates and trade union density (albeit to different degrees).   
It is hard to tell, however, from these analyses how in-work benefit expenditure relates to 
different forms of liberalisation as they only scratch the surface. The indicators used are 
unlikely to capture the multi-faceted ways in which these institutions change and processes 
such as dualization (i.e. continued protection for insiders) could occur, whereby these 
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arrangements protected insiders and limited schemes, such as means-tested in-work benefits, 
are targeted on ‘outsiders’ (Thelen, 2014, p.147).  
Indeed, the findings could indicate that in-work benefits are likely to be informed by varied 
goals and logics across countries and interact differently with institutional factors, for 
example. Looking more closely at variation in the form and features of policies is likely 
therefore to help us make sense of the heterogeneity observed in this chapter. The next two 
chapters focus on the operationalisation of the dependency relationships framework to 
consider the varied orientation of in-work policies towards different degrees and forms of 
dependence on the state, labour market and the family, which are theorised as sites whereby 
we can observe the cross-cutting goals, interests and logics at play in countries’ in-work 





6 THE ORIENTATION OF IN-WORK BENEFITS IN 
EUMS: STATE AND FAMILY   
 
Building on the picture of trends and variation in EUMS’ in-work benefits, this chapter 
compares the policies identified for 2016 only. Using the dependency relationships 
framework set out in Chapter 3, it compares the orientation of provisions towards 
qualitatively and quantitatively different forms of dependence on the state and the family.  
The analysis presented in this chapter is split into two main sections. Section 2 compares the 
orientation of EUMS’ in-work benefits towards varied degrees and forms of dependence on 
the state. It begins with a comparison of the levels of in-work cash transfers and earned 
income tax credits, as the main indicator of the orientation of in-work benefits towards 
different degrees of state ‘dependence’ for income maintenance for working individuals and 
households. Adding to this, the analysis of the nature of this dependency relationship 
considers the social or fiscal form of the provision, the targeting of benefits, and the 
conditions for access and determining eligibility.   
Section 3 compares the orientation of EUMS’ in-work benefits towards different forms and 
degrees of dependence among members of a family unit. The main indicator differentiating 
countries’ provisions is whether the benefit is individualised or provided at the family/ 
household level. The analysis then looks at the rules and features within in-work policies 
concerning the family, including eligibility based on household composition and the rules 
concerning the labour market participation of couples within a household. The chapter ends 
with a summary of the main findings and raises some key discussion points to be followed 
up in Chapter 8.  
State and familial dependency are interrelated, but they are separated out here for analytical 
purposes in this chapter. For example, an in-work cash transfer might make up a substantial 
portion of an individual’s income (a form of state dependence), but the receipt of this is 
likely to be conditioned on them earning above a threshold through participation in paid 
work (market dependence). It could also be designed to encourage the sharing of resources 
with other members of the household (family dependency) by, for example, excluding other 
members for applying for the benefit as well. The relationship between different forms and 
degrees of dependency is considered throughout these two chapters and in the discussion.  
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6.1 In-work benefit policy orientation: state  
This section is concerned with the orientation of policies towards different degrees and forms 
of state dependence. The analysis is mainly of in-work cash transfers and earned income tax 
credits for 2016, as the data describing the relevant rules and features of adjusted 
unemployment benefits was limited in comparison. Moreover, adjusted unemployment 
benefits constitute a form of ‘possible’ in-work benefits and the extent and forms of work 
that can be combined with unemployment benefit receipt is the focus of the next chapter.  
6.1.1 Degrees of state dependence  
Levels of in-work cash transfers and earned income tax credits and the corresponding policy 
features that determine levels are analysed in this section. Benefit levels are the main 
indicators of policy orientation towards different degrees of state dependence for working 
households, with higher levels indicating policies oriented towards more state dependence.  
First, the comparison of levels of in-work cash transfers includes the policies identified in 
the 2016 mapping (Chapter 5) for following five countries: Ireland, the UK, France, Malta 
and Italy. The rules and calculations to determine the levels of in-work cash transfers are 
complex. All schemes are means-tested benefits, and entitlement is calculated on the basis 
of a range of income sources, work intensity and earnings, and household level variables 
(e.g. number and age of children). To facilitate comparison across countries, levels are 
calculated as proportion of annual average wage (hereon AW), using OECD wage data, for 
similar household types in terms of composition and earnings. As only maximum levels 
could be calculated for some policies, these are the focus of the comparison. While it is 
possible only a small proportion of recipients are entitled to the maximum amount of each 
benefit, these parameters are indicative of the upper end of the orientation of in-work benefits 
towards state dependence. Thus, the comparison is indicative rather than conclusive. 
The comparison of levels is summarised in Table 6.1. The levels of Malta’s in-work cash 
transfer, In-Work Benefit, serves as a reference point for other policies, as levels could be 
calculated for a range of different household types for the benefit, with the information in 
the main data sources. Three example households are set out for Malta (labelled A, B and 
C); the household examples given for the other countries are labelled with reference to the 
household described for Malta they most closely resemble.  
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Starting with Malta’s In-Work Benefit, a working couple with dependent children, together 
earning between €10,000 (46% AW) and €20,400 (93% AW), receive a maximum of 4.6% 
AW (€1000 per annum) per child (example A). Working couples with three children entitled 
to the maximum amount would therefore receive therefore €3000 (approx. 14% of AW) per 
annum (example B).  Lone parents with earnings between €6,600 (30% AW) and €15,500 
(70% AW) receive a maximum of 5.5% AW (€1200) per child (example C).  One earner, 
two adult households receive considerably less: the maximum benefit is just over 10% of the 
amount for lone parents. 
Like Malta, the level of Ireland’s Family Income Supplement (FIS) varies depending on 
earnings and household composition, with higher awards given for larger households. 
Roughly comparable to the earnings and children in the example A above for Malta, a 
household with three children and net income equivalent to 50% of AW would be entitled 
to €8490 per annum in in-work benefits, equivalent to 18.5% AW. As such, the level of 
Ireland’s FIS is higher than Malta’s In-Work Benefit for this household type (18.5% vs 14% 
of AW). If a household with one child had a net income equivalent to that of 30% of AW, 
they would be entitled to approximately €148 per week/ €7690 per annum, or 17% AW 
(rounded). This is also higher than the maximum level of Malta’s in-work benefit for a 
working couple with one dependent child. However, the level of earnings used to calculate 
the award were low in comparison because of gaps in the data, so it is not an equal 
comparison. 
Italy’s Family Allowances are paid to households with income below a threshold level48. 
Like Malta and Ireland, the level of the benefit increases with the number of children, up to 
a maximum of seven children. It declines as income increases in a non-linear way and the 
amount of benefit is also reduced in proportion of days not worked during the year. The 
maximum benefit level for households with one child is 5.3% of AW in 201849; which is 
slightly higher than the amount which can be received by a household with two parents 
working and one child in Malta (4.6%) and considerably lower than Ireland’s FIS for a 
similar household in terms of composition (17%). A household with three children under the 
age of 18 is entitled to an amount equivalent to approximately 6.3% of average wage50, 
                                                     
48 The threshold level is dependent on household composition: for a household with one member the threshold is 
approximately 36% of average wage48; for a two-member household the threshold is approximately 57% of average wages; 
and for working couple with two children the threshold is approximately 97% of average wage for 2016. 
49 It was not however possible to calculate the actual level of award received with the main data sources, so the OECD’s 
Employment Conditional Earning Subsidies tables for 2018 were used.  
50 This is the example given in the OECD Country Description report for Italy (2016), not the authors own calculation. 
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indicating Italy’s provision is oriented towards less state dependence than the other 
provisions, where higher benefits are available to larger working households.  
 
The Activity Bonus (‘Prime d'activitie’) in France varies with family composition and 
quarterly income. According to report for the European Commission (Legros, 2015), a 
couple with two children, in which one parent works full-time and the other works half time, 
Table 6.1 Comparison of levels of in-work cash transfers: Malta as reference point  
Country Provision  Example households Amount 
Malta In-Work 
benefit 
A) Working couple, joint earnings 
between 46% and 93% of AW, with 
dependent one dependent child   
4.6% AW (max) 
  
B) Working couple, joint earnings 
between 46% and 93% of AW, with 
three dependent children  
14% AW (max) 
  
C) Lone parent, earning between 30% 
and 70% of AW, one dependent child 
5.5% AW (max) 
France  Activity 
Allowance 
A/B) Working couple with two 
children, one parent working full-time 
and the other working half time at the 
minimum wage (approx. 72% AW) 
7.9% AW 
Ireland Family Income 
Supplement 
(FIS) 
B) Working household, 50% AW, with 




A) Working household one child with 
income below threshold (approx. 74% 
of AW) 
5.3% AW 
UK Working Tax 
Credit (WTC) 
A) Working household with income 
below threshold of 19% of AW 
Basic amount: 
5.7% AW; lone 
parent element: 
5.7 % AW; 
Couple element: 
5.8% AW; 30 
work hours 
element; 2.3% 




Notes: Combination of author’s own calculations using the main policy sources (see Chapter 4), OECD.stat 
(2019b) data on average wages, and the examples of calculated levels in sources. Provision names are in 
English based on those given in the main data sources.  
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both at the minimum wage, should receive an amount equivalent to 7.9% of AW51.  There is 
also a capped bonus for each family member undertaking paid work, with the amount 
increasing with earnings up until a certain level. The bonus amount ranges from €15 to 
€67.50 per month (approx. 2.2% of AW). The bonus itself is equivalent to approximately 
half of the overall benefit for a one child household in Malta.  
Entitlement to UK’s Working Tax Credits (WTC) is determined by several factors, including 
a means-test of a range of income sources (e.g. other benefits, earnings, private pensions). 
The amount of the award depends on whether relevant income is below or above a threshold, 
which was approximately 19% of AW for 2016. If below, then the household is entitled to a 
maximum benefit amount for a basic element of the credit worth approximately 5.7% of 
AW, which is close to the amount received by slightly higher earners in Malta and the same 
as the maximum benefit level in Italy. Earnings above the threshold taper away the level of 
award at 41% in 2016. 
But WTC is built up of several elements. On top of the basic element, there are additional 
elements based on: ‘family composition (basic, couple and lone parent element), health 
(disability and severe disability element), number of hours worked (30-hour element) and 
age of the claimant (50+ element)’52. Table 6.1 shows the maximum amount for each 
element for 2016/17, calculated as a proportion of average wage for that year. WTC appears 
more generous than Malta and Italy’s in-work cash transfers if combining multiple elements 
e.g. couple and basic. However, the basic earnings threshold to be eligible for these amounts 
is very low compared to the examples provided above (e.g. 46% of average wage for Malta 
versus 19% of average wage in the UK), meaning households with earnings of 49% of 
average would not be eligible for the full basic amount.  
Finally, the levels for Universal Credit, the merged in and out of work cash transfer for the 
UK that will eventually replace Working Tax Credits, were not detailed in the primary 
sources. Analysis suggests that some households will fare worse and some will fare better 
under Universal Credit compared with the previous system of means-tested benefits53 (Keen 
                                                     
51 There was not sufficient information in the main sources to calculate the levels. An additional source (Legros, 2015) was 
used instead. The amount, specified in Euros in Legros (2015), was calculated as a proportion of average wages using the 
OECD average wage data.   
52 EUROMOD UK Country Report (2017, p23) 
53 Universal Credit was a moving target during the research project with direct and indirect reforms affecting the calculation 
of levels. For example, there were changes to a limit on the amount of benefit based on the number of children and changes 
to the ‘work allowance’: the amount of earnings that affect the calculation of the benefit. There was not, however, sufficient 
detail to calculate levels for example households in the 2016 sources.  Moreover, Universal Credit is made up of multiple 
elements, including housing benefit, complicating comparison with other countries’ in-work cash transfers. 
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et al., 2016). Looking at government sources for 2019/2020, eligible households are entitled 
to basic monthly amount (‘standard allowance’), but this differs across household types. For 
example, using the rates for 2020, a single person under 25 is entitled to £251.77 (approx. 
11% of average pay) and a couple under 25 is entitled to £395.20 (approx. 18% of average 
pay). The amount for a single over 25 (£317.82) and a couple over 25 is higher (£498.89, for 
couple), approximately 14% and 23% of average pay (Gov.uk, 2020a). Compared what 
could be calculated for the other countries, the levels of the basic amount are at the higher 
end, suggesting the provision is oriented towards a moderate to high degree of state 
dependence for income maintenance.  
Unlike the other in-work cash transfers, however, Universal Credit entitlement does not 
increase in the same way for households with more children, as there is no additional amount 
given for additional children beyond two children. There is also a cap on the level of benefits 
in the UK, an austerity measure introduced in 2013, which applies to Universal Credit and 
limits the overall amount working age households can receive in benefits per year (Gov.uk, 
2020b).  Moreover, Universal Credit differs from the other in-work cash transfers in that a 
conditionality regime applies to some in-work recipients and their partners under which 
failure to comply with behavioural requirements can lead to a reduction in benefit levels, or 
the temporary or permanent suspension of the benefit. Additionally, the monthly amount 
households receive can be reduced in order to pay off debts to government, including those 
accrued through payment advances while access to the benefit is being processed.  Thus, 
while the standard allowance appears relatively high, the amount households can get overall 
is limited.  
In sum, across EUMS, in-work cash transfers are mostly oriented towards more state 
‘dependence’ for income maintenance for households with more dependent children. 
Ireland’s FIS appears to be most strongly oriented towards state dependence for working 
households with multiple children compared to in-work cash transfers in other EUMS. Italy 
and Malta’s in-work benefits can be oriented towards a higher degree of state dependence 
for households with multiple children but the amount for households with one 
child/dependent is considerably lower than Ireland’s. France’s Activity Allowance operates 
at a moderate level with an additional bonus for work. The findings are less conclusive for 
the UK with its move to Universal Credit. The base level indicates a relatively high state 
dependency orientation, but the application of conditionality, limits on the amounts for 
households with multiple children, and the repayment of government debts, could serve to 
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reduce this amount. The UK is markedly distinct to other countries with in-work cash 
transfers in that Universal Credit has a ‘two-child limit’ whereas levels typically increase 
with the number of children elsewhere.  
Turning now to earned income tax credits identified in for 2016. The maximum levels are 
compared in Table 6.2 for a total of 20 policies identified in the mapping. The amounts 
shown are the levels of annual entitlements, which are also shown as a proportion of average 
wages for each country for 2016. Earned income tax credits are also categorised as 
refundable or non-refundable, showing whether entitlements can only ever reduce tax 
liability (non-refundable), or whether they can lead to a refund or transfer (refundable).  
The calculation of the entitlement to earned income tax credits differed across EUMS. The 
levels of 17 earned income tax credits are means-tested and/or take into account household 
composition, and there are also three are flat rate policies (Luxembourg and Slovakia’s 
provisions). An anomaly, the level of Slovakia’s Employee Tax Credit is listed as 0% of 
AW, as changes in other policy areas (minimum wage and health insurance contributions) 
made the credit worth nothing in 2016. 
Excluding Slovakia’s obsolete policy, the levels were lowest for Ireland (Earned Income Tax 
Credit) at just over 1% of AW, Belgium at less than 2% of AW and Luxembourg at 0.5% of 
AW. In contrast, Sweden’s EITC is the highest level at 6.6% of AW for recipients under the 
age of 65 in 201654.  Similarly, in the Netherlands, Denmark, Spain and Italy (PAYE Credit), 
maximum earned income tax credits were worth above 4.5% of average wage in each 
country.  A middle group of countries’ maximum levels of earned income tax credits were 
worth between 2% and 4% of AW in Ireland (Employee Credit), Finland, Italy (Self-
employed Credit and Fiscal Bonus) and Slovakia’s Child Tax Credit55. As these are 
maximum levels, that average earned income tax credit levels in other countries may be less 
than the flat rate credits in Luxembourg and Slovakia.   
Levels were closely tied to household composition in Austria and Spain. Austria’s max 
earned income tax credit is worth 1% of AW for one child and could be increased by an 
amount equivalent to 0.5% of AW for each child. The maximum level of Spain’s Working 
Mother Credit, determined by both earnings and children, was 4% of AW per child, near to 
some of the in-work cash transfer policies.  
                                                     
54 The max level for over 65 is even higher at SEK 30000 or 7.5% AW 
55 The name of the provision is misleading. Households must be in work to be eligible for the tax credit.  
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Levels were highest for a narrow range of income in Belgium and Italy, indicating resources 
were targeted similarly to the in-work cash transfers above. Belgium’s ‘Refundable Tax 
Credit on Low Activity Incomes’ was highest for incomes between €6680 (15% AW) and 
€17040 (40% AW). A partial (lower) credit could be received by those with net incomes 
marginally outside of this range. Italy’s refundable tax credit, the Fiscal Bonus (aka €80 
bonus), was highest for employees with earnings below €24,000 (82% AW) and it phases 
out until a maximum of €26,000 per year (89% AW). Importantly, however, these provisions 
Table 6.2: Comparison of levels of earned income tax credits in EUMS in 2016 
MS Policy  RF Amounts  Amount /AW 
(%) 
IE 1. PAYE Credit  No Max: € 1,650 3.6 
IE 2. Earned Income Tax Credit  No Max: € 550 (in 2017 = 950) 1.2 
AT 1. Sole Earners’ Tax Credit Yes Rate based on children: 
1: € 494; 
2: € 669; 





AT 2. Lone Parent Tax Credit  Yes Rate based on children:  
1: € 494;  
2: € 669;  





BE 1. Refundable Tax Credit on 
Low Activity Incomes  
Yes Max general: € 680;  
Max working spouse: € 310;  




BE 2. Fiscal Workbonus  No Max €640 1.5 
LU 1. Basic Employee Tax Credit Yes Flat rate € 300 0.5 
LU 2. Tax Credit for Self-Employed  Yes Flat rate € 300 0.5 
NL 1. Work Credit  No  Max €2,220 per year 4.8 
NL 4. Income Dependent 
Combination Credit 
No  Max €2,152. 4.6 
DK 1.Beskæftigelsesfradrag (EITC) No  Max general credit max: 
28,000 






FI 1. Earned Income Credit No* Max € 1260 3 
SE  1. Earned Income Tax Credit 
(EITC) 
No  Max Under 65 SEK 26 471 
Max Over 65 SEK 30000 
6.6 
7.5 
IT 1. PAYE Tax Credit  No Max € 1880 6.4 
IT 2. Self-Employed credit  No Max € 1140 4 
IT 3. Fiscal Bonus Yes Max € 960 3.3 
ES 1. Working Mother Tax Credit  Yes Max € 1200 per child 4.2 
EE 1. Non-Refundable Credit for 
Low Income Workers 
No Full credit € 2,736 5.3 
SK 1. Child Tax Credit  Yes Flat rate: €256.92 2 
SK 2. Employee Tax Credit (ETC) Yes 0 0  
Notes: ‘RF’ refundable (yes/no), as per the main data sources of policy descriptions set out in Chapter 3. Source: 
EU-IWB, authors own calculations of levels as a proportion of average wage using OECDstat (2019b) 
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are individualised meaning the income reference applies to the individual not the earnings 
of a couple, unlike the in-work cash transfers above. 
Overall, average earned income tax credits were lower than in-work cash transfers, at least 
in terms of maximum levels, indicating such policies are oriented towards less state 
dependence than in-work cash transfers. However, maximum levels in Finland, Sweden, 
Denmark, Netherlands, Spain and Italy are akin to some in-work cash transfers, and, if 
received by two members in the same household, could be higher than in-work cash transfers 
outlined above for smaller households. Yet, not all of these provisions actually lead to a 
transfer, a point we return to below when considering the quality of the state dependency 
that in-work provisions are oriented towards. The calculations of levels across EUMS also 
illuminates variation in both how and upon which groups provisions are targeted on across 
countries, which is considered in relation to the orientation of policies towards qualitatively 
different forms of state (and family) dependency in the next sections.   
6.1.2 Forms of state dependence  
The above section outlined variation in the extent to which in-work provisions could, 
according to policy rules and design features, bring the state into the domain of income 
maintenance for working households. This section compares the orientation of EUMS’ 
towards qualitatively different forms of state dependence (for income maintenance).  
First, the mapping of sub-types comprises an initial picture of the orientation of in-work 
benefits in EUMS towards qualitatively different forms of state dependence for working 
households. The sub-types align with the distinction between social or fiscal welfare set out 
in the theoretical framework, with earned income tax credits constituting fiscal welfare and 
adjusted unemployment benefits and in-work cash transfers constituting social welfare. 
Means-testing and conduct conditionality were assumed to be more common to social in-
work benefits, and fiscal in-work benefits were assumed to be less invasive in assessing the 
needs of recipients and privileged form of welfare because of its targeting on higher income 
groups, and because comprises a less visible form of ‘state dependence’ than social welfare. 
Also, cutting through the fiscal-social dimension, sub-types are proxies of implicit or explicit 
targeting on the basis of ‘in-work’ status. In-work cash transfers and earned income tax 
credits are, by definition, more explicitly targeted on households or individuals ‘in work’ or 
with earned income, associated with ‘deservingness’ and/or a privileged status in some 
contexts. Whereas adjusted unemployment benefits implicitly target those undertaking paid 
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work (i.e. the employment status of working recipients is not acknowledged), a target group 
that is variably construed as undeserving and therefore subject to retrenchment and more 
punitive reforms56.   
Considering these dimensions, EUMS’ in-work benefits vary as follows: The Nordic regime 
countries, the most uniform of all EUMS in terms of sub-types, combine fiscal-explicit in-
work benefits (earned income tax credits) with social implicit in-work benefits (adjusted 
unemployment benefits). The majority of Bismarckian countries align with the Nordic 
format of combining fiscal-explicit in-work benefits with implicit social benefits (Austria, 
Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) as does Spain. In contrast, liberal regime 
countries and Malta use of both social explicit and social implicit policies. However, Ireland 
also has fiscal explicit policies also. Malta also followed the main liberal model. The picture 
is mixed for the remaining EUMS. Five countries had only social implicit policies: Greece, 
Portugal, Croatia, Slovenia and Germany. The remaining central and eastern European 
regime countries used fiscal explicit only (Slovakia and Estonia). France and Italy combined 
social and fiscal in-work benefit policies that were explicit in the targeting of working 
households.  
But how useful are sub-types as proxies for the orientation of EUMS’ policies towards 
qualitatively different forms of state dependence? All in-work cash transfer policies (social-
explicit) identified for 2016 are means-tested, with entitlement and eligibility determined by 
a multitude of factors, including the employment status, earnings, work hours, composition 
and age of all members within a household. These provisions therefore combine several 
features that are indicative of a more invasive and potentially stigmatising form of state 
dependence for working households than fiscal measures. At the same time, the in-work 
status of recipients was acknowledged in the eligibility rules and in some of the policy names 
(the English version, at least), thus reinforcing the deservingness status of recipients (relative 
to out-of-work recipients). Moreover, cutting through policies are eligibility and/or 
entitlement rules about families, whereby households with more children are entitled to 
higher benefits. The emphasis on working families and their additional needs in policy 
design could therefore serve to dilute the stigma associated with means-tested benefits in 
some contexts. Yet, the specific rules and design features concerning families varies across 
countries – these are examined in the next section.  
                                                     
56 As per the theoretical framework, the explicit targeting of in-work households signals a recognition (and reinforcement), 
institutionally, of the different status of working households or individuals in the tax-benefit system in some countries.  
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There are, however, two main exceptions to the assumptions about explicit in-work 
targeting, which in part reflects issues with the sub-categorisation of in-work benefits for the 
investigation.  First, the UK’s move from Working Tax Credits to Universal Credit de-
emphasizes ‘deservingness’ by targeting both in- and out-of-work recipients in one policy 
(van Oorschot, 2000b)57. In this vein, the provision also brings in ‘conduct conditions’ for 
working households who must evidence they are seeking to improve their work or pay if it 
is below a set threshold (Clasen and Clegg, 2007). The limit on levels concerning the number 
of children also indicates a move away from the emphasis on the need or deservingness of 
children/ parents. It is therefore the main example of in-work provision oriented towards a 
punitive relationship with the state for recipients engaged in paid work and their families.  
Moreover, Italy’s Family Allowances are also for both in- and out-of-work households. 
While the targeting only on current or former employees (i.e. those in or previously in 
dependent employment) implies a stronger emphasis on the worker status (and therefore 
possibly the deservingness) of recipients, the name of the provision does not explicitly 
reference work, rather the notion of family dependence is emphasized. The targeting of the 
benefit on low income or disadvantaged families may link receipt of the benefit to stigma 
(van Oorschot, 2000a). At the same time, for recipients that are currently in employment, 
the allowances are paid with the wage packet – the social security administration pays the 
employer if employees apply for the allowance - suggesting an intention to make the receipt 
of the allowances less like a social security payment and more like wages, as was the case 
with in-work cash transfers for a period in the UK.  
Next, not all fiscal in-work benefits aligned with the assumptions set out above. Notably, 
earned income tax credits were narrowly targeted in some countries. Provisions were 
targeted on lower income groups in Belgium and Italy in particular, thus earnings would be 
tested. Eligibility and entitlement to earned income tax credits were determined by 
household composition in Austria, Spain and, to a much lesser degree, household 
composition had some bearing on the entitlement in Denmark, Belgium and Netherlands – 
these are also set out below. There are also separate schemes for employees and the self-
employed in Italy and Ireland that are not narrowly targeted on earnings. The targeting of 
earned income tax credits is therefore typically on the basis of one characteristic or condition, 
and not multiple factors, as is the case with in-work cash transfers. Overall, the design 
                                                     
57 This argument is advanced in Chrisp and Abbas (forthcoming).  
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features and position in the tax system (associated with the dignity of work) of earned income 
tax credits indicate they are less likely to be invasive and stigmatising. Yet, provisions in 
some countries could be more so than others because of the assessment of earnings and/or 
household characteristics. This of course could depend on the application process, but it was 
beyond the scope of the research to investigate this aspect of policy design.   
However, another key distinction between countries’ earned income tax credits is their 
“refundability”. Provisions in the following countries are refundable, meaning they can 
result in a transfer (or rebate or refund) for those whose credit exceeds their income tax 
liabilities: Austria, Belgium (Refundable Tax Credit on Low Activity Incomes), 
Luxembourg, Italy (80 Euro Bonus), Spain and Slovakia. All or some of the earned income 
tax credits are non-refundable and therefore cannot reduce the final tax liabilities below zero 
in Ireland, Belgium (Fiscal Workbonus), Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Italy 
(PAYE and Self-Employed Tax Credits) and Estonia. The latter group of provisions are 
therefore closer to a cut in income taxation and could be distinctive, socially and politically, 
to the form of dependency brought about by the refundable tax credits in the former group58. 
In this vein, non-refundable earned income tax credits effectively ‘reduce’ citizens’ tax 
liabilities to the state, unless awarded as a refund (i.e. a transfer from the state to recipient) 
and therefore arguably encapsulate a more indirect form of state dependence than provisions 
that lead to a transfer from state to the working recipient, even though the cost of provisions 
are still borne by the state (and the tax-payer). The ‘visibility’ and perception of a refund as 
a form of transfer could shape both the experience of receiving it but also its social standing, 
if it is more apparent that households that receive the refund are receiving income 
maintenance alongside their earnings.  
Finally, turning to implicit, social benefits, adjusted unemployment benefits in EUMS take 
the form of both contributory and earnings-related benefits (also known as ‘first tier’), those 
for when and those for insufficient contribution records (also known as ‘second tear’), and 
many EUMS combine both contributory and non-contributory benefits. Although the 
question of how much work and earnings can be received alongside unemployment benefit 
receipt is addressed in the next chapter, in-work benefits in this form are arguably the most 
                                                     
58 Earned income tax credits were used to define a ‘no tax area’ of earned income, after which tax could be calculated in 
Italy. Denmark’s EITC Denmark is described as a ‘general personal allowance, which is converted into a non-refundable 
tax credit’ (OECD Country Report for Denmark, 2018, p20).  This raises questions about the social and political 




likely to expose recipients to conditions of conduct, whereby they are required to 
demonstrate certain behaviours and attitudes in order to be eligible for the benefit and face 
punitive responses for non-compliance.  
As per the framework, social in-work benefits run the risk of being more invasive, in terms 
of for example the monitoring of behaviours and means-tests, and punitive, in terms of 
punishing what are considered to be wrong behaviour, including inaction in searching for 
work. Such features are increasingly common to unemployment benefits, and thus is in-work 
benefits are ‘within’ these, the form of dependence on the state they represent may be very 
different to those a minimally invasive form of earned income tax credit. 
Research systematically comparing the ways and extent to which conditionality 
requirements in unemployment benefits are demanding for recipients in OECD provides a 
means for assessing the possible dependency relationship that those combining part-time 
work and unemployment benefits are likely to enter (Immervoll and Knotz, 2018).  Two 
relevant indicators developed for comparing countries – the strictness of requirements for 
unemployment benefit recipients to document their job search activities (invasiveness) and 
the severity of sanctions (punitive) – are displayed for all countries with ‘adjusted 
unemployment benefits’ in Table 6.3. For example, provisions appear to be more invasive/ 
demanding in the UK, Sweden, France and Malta, but more punitive in Portugal, Greece and 
Slovenia. Interestingly, there is little difference between the differently tiered benefits on 
key indicators (Immervoll and Knotz, 2018). Thus, the distinction between tiers of benefits 
may not be salient in terms of understanding the dependency orientation of adjusted 
unemployment benefits in EUMS.  Yet, it may matter more for the degree of state 
dependence (levels).  
However, the inclusion of these provisions in the initial mapping rested on a low bar in terms 
of the inclusion criteria specifying policies must have at least one of the “in-work levers” set 
out in the previous chapter. The subsequent analysis in Chapter 7 is dedicated to systematic 
comparison of the levels and types of earnings of work that can be carried out alongside 
receipt of unemployment benefits, as a means of assessing whether they constitute de-facto 




Table 6.3 Overview of possible in-work benefits in EUMS (adjusted unemployment 
benefits) and their conditions  
MS Scheme Type 
Documentati










lower tier 3 2 
UK 
Jobseekers Allowance (Contribution Based) Tier 1 5 3 
UK 
Jobseekers Allowance (Income Based) 
First 
lower tier 5 3 
FI 
(Adjusted) Unemployment Insurance Tier 1 3 2.5 
FI 




(Adjusted) Labour Market Subsidy 
First 
lower tier 3 2.5 
SE 
Income Related Unemployment Insurance Tier 1 4 1 
SE 
Basic Unemployment Insurance 
First 
lower tier 4 1 
FR 
Unemployment Insurance (ARE) Tier 1 4 1 
FR 
Unemployment Assistance (ASS) 
First 
lower tier 4 1 
DE 
Arbeitslosengeld (ALG I) Tier 1 3 1 
DE 
Grundsicherung für Arbeitslose (ALG II) 
First 
lower tier 3 1 
LU 
Unemployment Insurance Tier 1 4 5 
NL 
Unemployment Insurance (WW-uitkering) Tier 1 2 1 
NL 
Supplementary benefit (SW) Add on -  - 
MT 
Special Unemployment Benefit (assistance) 
First 
lower tier 5 4 
ES 




lower tier 1 3 
PT 




lower tier 3 5 
EL 
Unemployment Insurance Tier 1 1 5 
HR 
Unemployment Insurance Tier 1 3 2 
SI 
Unemployment Insurance Tier 1 3 5 
Notes: Classification of schemes according to tier for 2017 from Immervoll and Knotz (2018). Items 5 
(Documentation of job search activities) and Item 8 (Sanctions -first refusal of job offer) also from 
Immervoll and Knotz’ (2018). Policies scores from 1 (most lenient) to 5 (most strict).  
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6.1.3 Summary and context  
These is considerable variation among EUMS in the orientation of provisions towards 
different degrees and forms of state dependence. Overall, the fiscal-social and explicit-
implicit, distinctions captures broad differences across provisions, but they are not perfect 
proxies for the orientation of in-work benefits towards qualitatively different forms of state 
dependence. For example, there was variation among the countries with earned income tax 
credits in the orientation of provisions. Higher maximum levels, less targeted and non-
refundable fiscal-explicit in-work provisions were found in the Nordic countries and, to 
some extent, the Netherlands, which helps to interpret the variance in expenditure in the 
previous chapter.  
Although the differences in approaches are stark, the significance of this variation in terms 
of what it means for the qualitative and quantitative dependency relationship recipients of 
these policies have with the state, is hard to gauge without consideration of the institutional 
context in which they are used. For example, the more universal and higher level earned 
income tax credits could be, one the one hand, in keeping with some of the principles of 
social provisions in the social democratic countries in which they were most common (e.g. 
avoiding stigma and fostering solidarity). At the same time, they could be used to reduce 
taxation in these systems and/or be seen to privilege working households, thus potentially at 
odds with the logics and institutional arrangements of these contexts (e.g. reducing solidarity 
and the fiscal base for more universalist social policy). However, the composition of direct 
and indirect (e.g. social security contributions) and the financing of social policies varies 
across European welfare states e.g. Denmark’s welfare state is financed mainly through 
general taxation, whereas other Nordic countries combine personal income taxation (which 
albeit is high at the top rate at least) with social security contributions (European 
Commission, 2019).  
Similarly, Ireland and Italy’s combination of in-work cash transfers and earned income tax 
credits could suggest these countries straddle objectives concerning (large) working families 
and adjusting financial incentives in the tax system. In terms of taxation, the starting point 
for these countries is different, with Ireland’s ‘tax wedge’59 being among the lowest in 
EUMS, and Italy’s being among the highest60.  The high tax wedge in Belgium, especially 
                                                     
59 OECD (2020), "Taxing Wages: Comparative tables", OECD Tax Statistics (database), https://doi.org/10.1787/data-
00265-en (accessed on 23 February 2020). 
60 The average ‘tax wedge’ for a sole-earner married couple with average earnings and 2 children was 16.9% in Ireland in 
2016 and 38.59% in Italy. For different households types, the tax wedge for Italy and Ireland is also relatively far apart.  
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for lower earning single households, is potentially a reason for targeted tax credits (on lower 
earnings) in this context. Although targeted, the fiscal nature of this provision implies a 
different orientation in terms of the form of state dependence than, for example, targeted 
social provisions. Italy also has a fairly high tax wedge for low income workers and thus that 
could help to make sense of the use of a targeted fiscal instrument in this context.  
Moreover, how stigmatising an invasive means-tested in-work cash transfers and the 
adjusted unemployment benefits are in the countries where these approaches were prevalent 
(e.g. is likely also to vary by the institutional context in which they are used and the ways in 
which they are implemented). Despite an overall move towards more demanding and 
punitive requirements over a longer period, as we saw above, unemployment benefits are 
variably demanding across countries and punitive across EUMS (Immervoll and Knotz, 
2018, p.16). The next section looks in more detail at the rules and design features that 
illuminate the varied emphasis on familial interdependence in EUMS’ in-work benefits, 
including those that were common to in-work cash transfers. 
6.2 In-work benefit policy orientation: family  
The previous sections indirectly picked up on the orientation of policies towards different 
degrees and forms of dependence among family members. This section sets out the relevant 
rules and design features to further examine variation in the orientation of in-work benefits 
on this dimension.  
6.2.1 Individualised or household  
The table below (6.4) sorts the in-work cash transfer and earned income tax credit policies 
identified in the 2016 mapping according to whether the ‘benefit unit’ (i.e. the unit at which 
entitlement and eligibility is assessed) is at an individual or a household level, a key indicator 
of the orientation of in-work benefits towards different degrees and forms of dependence on 
the family. This provides the starting point for the comparison of policy rules and designs, 
which focuses predominantly on the household provisions, as the individualised provisions 
are more clearly oriented towards independence. As we saw above, household provisions 
include all of the in-work cash transfers in EUMS and earned income tax credits in five 
countries. In addition, earned income tax credits in Denmark and Belgium have some 
relevant rules concerning the family of the main recipient that are discussed here. Note that 




6.2.2 The features of household policies  
First, there is a strong emphasis on inter-family dependence in in-work cash transfers in all 
EUMS. Across all in-work cash transfers, in-work targeting intersected with family-based 
criteria and rules. These are summarised in Table 6.5. As the summary shows, only in Ireland 
and Malta was eligibility to in-work cash transfers wholly dependent on households having 
dependent children. However, households without children were not eligible for the UK’s 
Working Tax Credits if under the age of 25. There were also different definitions of 
dependents across countries. In Malta those under the age of 23 count as dependents for the 
assessment of benefits. In Ireland, children are defined as those under 18, or 22 if in full-
time education. The rules are less encompassing for young people in the UK, as dependents 
for purposes of calculating entitlements are those under the age of 16.  
Italy’s Family Allowances are for employees with dependents, however, the rules around 
dependents are much broader, and include the spouse, children and grandchildren of direct 
ascendant, if they are under 18. However, across all provisions, even where households 
without children are eligible, income thresholds determining eligibility and benefit levels are 
typically higher for households with children.  
Moreover, EUMS’ in-work cash transfers are more favourable towards or indeed require 
both members of a couple to undertake paid work. One-earner couples are eligible for in-
work benefits in Malta, Italy and France. In Malta, the maximum amount for one earner 
families is, however, considerably lower. Additional elements or higher benefit levels are in 
provisions in Malta for dual earning households. Lone parents are also eligible for all in-
work cash transfers 
Table 6.4: Household and individualised in-work provisions in EUMS (2016 only) 
Provision type Individualised Household 
IWCT  IE, UK (x2), FR, IT, MA 
EITC  IE (x2), IT, BE (x2), EE, DK, 
FI, LU, NL, SE 




Table 6.6 provides an overview of family-based rules and design features in EUMS’ EITC. 
All schemes are oriented towards households with children, but there are also seemingly 
different objectives concerning the worker model of households.  
 
Table 6.5 Family-specific rules within in-work cash transfers  
Country  Policy  Familial rules and design features  
Ireland  Family 
Income 
Supplement   
Eligibility: Households with children only. Earnings limits 
set by family size, increasing with each child up to 8 
children.  
Levels: increase with children. 
Couples and work: 38 hours/fortnight, can be split in 
between couple.   
UK Working 
Tax Credits  
Eligibility: Under 25s not eligible unless has child.  
Couples and work: Couple with 1+ children at least 24 
hours, with 1 in couple working at least 16 hours. 
France Activity 
Allowance 
Eligibility: Earning limits lowest for single person without 
child (€ 1500/month) and highest for couples with children 
where both parents work (€ 2900/month). Income limit the 
same for: lone parents, 1 earner couple without children, 
and 1 earner couple with children (€2200/month).   
Levels: Higher benefit for households with children. 
Individual work bonus (approx. 67€/month) for each family 
member is capped for each member.  
Italy  Family 
Allowances  
Eligibility tied to dependents and earnings: Scheme 
covers households with dependents (not necessarily 
children) as well as orphaned, separated and divorced and 
widowed recipients. Income threshold higher for 
households with more dependents and parents.  
Levels: Varies with number of dependents. Increased for 
lone parents (with dependent child) and couples with 
children where both parents are working.  
Malta  In-Work 
Benefit  
Child-based eligibility: Families with both parents in work 
with children under 23. Single parents with children under 
23. From 2016: Families with one parent in employment 
with children.  
Levels: increase with children. Higher levels for lone 
parents. Levels considerably lower for one earner 
households.  
Couples and work: annual earnings/ net profit from a 
couple with one working below part-time cannot be below 
€3000.  
Sources: OECD reports 2016 apart from Ireland (2017); EUROMOD reports 2015 – 2018 tax benefit 
systems. Notes: Policies contain additional rules and amounts for disabled recipients, but it was beyond 
the scope of the study to include these.  
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First, Austria’s Sole Earners Tax credit allows for the spouse to be undertaking a minimal 
amount of work capped with an earnings threshold and is arguably more oriented towards a 
breadwinner model. Spain’s Working Mother Tax Credit is specifically for working mothers 
with young children (under the age of three)62. The earnings of other members of the 
household are not affected by the benefit, and such the emphasis appears to be on 
encouraging the labour market participation of mothers with young children. Slovakia’s Tax 
Credit on Dependent Child can only be received by one parent with earnings at least six 
                                                     
61 Spain also has a working tax credit for single parents and large families.  
62 In Slovakia’s tax system, the age classification of a dependent varies from 16 to 26 if they have not yet finished post-
secondary education in ‘an approved institution’. 
Table 6.6 Overview of family-based rules and design features in EITCs 
Country Policy  Additional entitlement/eligibility criteria  
Austria  Sole Earners Tax 
Credit  
Eligibility: Single earners with children 
liable to tax who are married or cohabited 
for more than 6 months/year. Income of 
spouse must not exceed €6000/year.  
Levels: higher with more children.  
Austria Lone Parent Credit Eligibility: Lone parents liable for tax with 
maintenance obligations towards children. 
Eligibility based on eligibility for family 
allowance. Cannot cohabit for more than 6 
months a year.  
Levels: higher with more children.  
Belgium  Refundable Tax Credit 
on Low Activity 
Income  
Calculation of levels: Married couples 
taxed jointly, there is a maximum amount 
for the co-working spouse  
Netherlands  Income Dependent 
Combination Credit 
Eligibility: Single parents or partner with 
the lowest income. Children below 12. 
Earnings from work must exceed € 4881 
per year. 
Spain  Working Mother Tax 
Credit61  
Eligibility: Working mothers with 1+ 
children below the age of 3 with 
contributions over the level of the tax credit.  
Levels: 1,200 per year, per child.   
Slovakia  Tax Credit on 
Dependent Child 
Eligibility: One parent of a dependent child 
only if they are employed or self-employed 
and earned/ gross revenue at least 6x 
minimum wage in a year.  
Sources: OECD reports 2016 and EUROMOD reports for 2015 – 2018 tax benefit systems.  
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times the minimum wage. The main beneficiary can change hands (e.g. between members 
of a couple). Yet, the provision is clearly oriented towards interdependence among members 
of a household. Moreover, Netherlands’ provision is only for single parents or one earner in 
a couple with earnings above a threshold of EUR 4881 with the maximum level of the credit 
reached at earnings of EUR 32,970.  The provision for one earner couples appears therefore 
to be oriented towards at least a 1.5 model for the family.  
Moreover, Belgium’s Refundable Tax Credit on Low Activity Incomes also includes an 
element for the spouse of the main recipient, if they are working, at a much lower level. This 
implies that only one member of a married couple can be eligible for the full benefit, a variant 
of the design for Slovakia.  There were also special provisions for single-parent households. 
For example, Denmark’s EITC includes an additional element for single providers (lone 
parents), which was introduced into the policy in 2014. In addition, Austria’s Lone Parent 
Tax Credit and the Netherland’s Income Dependent Combination Credit were either solely 
for or incorporated lone-parent households. 
6.2.3 Summary and context   
In the trade-off between work incentives and redistributive aims, household provisions are 
generally understood to be more oriented towards the latter, specifically poverty alleviation, 
and individualised provisions better oriented towards employment objectives, especially for 
second earners (Immervoll and Pearson, 2009). As well as the broader distributional 
outcomes, however, household in-work benefits can serve to restrict the labour market 
participation of the second earner, which is typically women, thus potentially exacerbating 
gendered inequalities in terms of women’s labour market participation and the extent to 
which women are potentially more dependent other members of the household (and the 
state).  
The design of in-work cash transfers in most EUMS indicated a particular concern with 
directing resources towards households with greater needs in the form of more children. The 
implications for ‘work incentives’ for women/ second earners was harder to gauge from 
these details but most policies had in place rules that meant levels were higher if both couples 
were participating in work. It is not clear, however, from this analysis what this means for 
the share of work between members of a household e.g. whether they encourage a 1.5 earner 
model or adult worker model. The overarching conclusion to be drawn about these 
provisions is they bring the state into the domain of direct income maintenance in a way that 
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is oriented towards the sharing of resources among members of a household. Earned income 
tax credits were predominantly individualised and not targeted on specific family types, 
possibly reflecting individualised taxation systems and an emphasis on employment 
objectives. Earned income tax credits were targeted on specific household types in a small 
number of EUMS, including lone parent households (a group often seen as being most in 
need and increasingly a target of activation reforms). Yet, some policies seemed to be more 
oriented towards one earner or 1.5 earner households.  
Household provisions may therefore be employed in context where levels of in-work poverty 
for households with dependent children is a socially or politically salient issue. But they may 
also reflect other social and political interests concerning family models and women’s labour 
market participation. Looking at in-work poverty for households with and without dependent 
children in contexts with either in-work cash transfers or earned income tax credits 
illuminates a number of possible links between context and the family-orientation of in-work 
provisions. Rates for households with dependent children (blue bar) and without (orange 
bar) are displayed in Figure 6.1 for countries with earned income tax credits or in-work cash 
transfers for 2016. The difference between the in-work at-risk-of-poverty rate for households 
with and without children is also shown (grey bar).  
Most countries with in-work benefits administered at the household level have higher rates 
of in-work poverty among households with dependent children e.g. Spain (16%), UK (10%), 
Slovakia (9%), Malta (8%), France (9%) when compared with countries with individualised 
provisions e.g. Denmark (5%), and Finland (3%). The exceptions to this are Luxembourg, 
which has high rates of in-work poverty among households with dependent children (13%), 
but individualised earned income tax credits and; Ireland, where the risk of in-work poverty 
for working households with dependent children is relatively low (5.4%) but both individual 
and household provisions are in place. The Netherlands also has both household and 
individualised provisions and with a moderate risk of in-work poverty for households with 
dependent children. 
Second, countries where there is a greater difference in the in-work poverty risk between 
households with dependent children and households without dependent children are also 
more likely to have household/family in-work provision. For example, the first seven 
countries from the left have in place household provisions. 
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Third, the countries with the largest gap in the in-work poverty risk between households with 
and without dependent children are also those that with in-work benefits with child-based 
eligibility. For example, Spain has the largest gap of these countries and all of its provisions 
are targeted on households with dependent children. Slovakia and Malta have the second 
and third largest ‘gap’ and provisions are solely for working households. At the other end of 
the chart, households with children in Denmark are less likely to be at risk of poverty than 
those without and the gap is very small in Finland and Sweden.   
As with the context presented in the previous chapter, there are multiple possible 
interpretations and the limits to the in-work benefit data should be kept mind. However, it 
could suggest that in these countries, the wider institutional arrangements, including supports 
for households with children that are not tied to in-work status, may be effective at limiting 
the risk of poverty among these households, thus making in-work benefits more likely to be 


































































Dependent children No dependents Difference
Figure 2.1 Risk of in-work poverty for households with and without dependent children (2016) 
Notes: Countries with earned income tax credits and in-work cash transfer, ordered by difference 
between rate of in-work at risk of poverty for households with dependent children and those no 
dependent children (grey bar). Data: Eurostat (2020b): At-risk-of-poverty rate of households with at 
least one dependent child by work intensity 
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where the risk of poverty is high for working households with children, the context may be 
one where certain kinds of social expenditure or reform e.g. universal child provisions/ 
services and/or wage regulation, is constrained, and tying eligibility to income support 
policies to in-work status is a feasible route policy makers go down in an effort to reduce 
risks. On the other hand, the way these factors are influenced by in-work policies, and vice-
versa, could be different across contexts. The association between poverty risks for certain 
groups (and inequalities between them) and differently oriented in-work benefits is one that 
could be explored in individual cases. 
6.3 Conclusion  
This chapter presented the parts of the empirical investigation that compared the orientation 
of in-work cash transfers and earned income tax credits to different degrees and forms of 
state dependence for working households, focusing mainly on the in-work cash transfer and 
earned income tax credit policies for 2016 in EUMS. It also discussed the possible use of 
unemployment benefits as de facto in-work benefits and considered the conditionality 
regime applied to these benefits that could also apply to the working recipients in receipt of 
these benefits. The limitations of the analysis, including the operationalisation of the 
framework with the available data, are discussed in Chapter 9. A key limitation is that the 
analysis focuses on policy rules and design in isolation. The interaction of policies with the 
national context could lead to effects that differ to the orientation of policies e.g. some 
countries may have additional provisions that foster financial independence among members 
of a household. Even still, the rules and design features of policies provide one means of 
understanding policy intention, which can be examined further in future research.  
Nevertheless, the findings highlight some broad contours in the models of in-work benefits 
in use in EUMS. First, in addition to the relatively high expenditure identified in these 
countries (bar Finland, which was excluded from the analysis), earned income tax credit 
policies in Denmark, Finland and Sweden, as well as the Netherlands, all appear to be 
similarly oriented in terms of the degree of state dependence. Maximum levels of benefits 
were among the highest in EUMS. Provisions were more universal; eligibility was not 
restricted to specific employment relationships or household types. They are also non-
refundable and thus do not lead to a transfer. They were also mostly individualised i.e. 
oriented towards independence among members of a household/ family unit. If the 
theoretical assumptions in the literature hold, the in-work provisions in these countries are 
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likely to be less invasive (because there are fewer eligibility requirements), less visible 
(because of the lack of transfer) and less stigmatising (because of the universalism) form of 
in-work support than means-tested in-work provision delivered through the social security 
system, for example. They also appear to be oriented towards adult worker model in most 
cases. Experientially and politically, this could constitute a ‘privileged’ and solidaristic form 
of in-work support, received by a much wider base.  
This grouping of countries is also salient as it aligns with Esping-Andersen’s (1990) social 
democratic regime and some of the principles and/or technical aspects of policy associated 
with income maintenance in this regime historically follows through into in-work benefits 
e.g. universalism and individual activation. At the same time, there may be paradox, in that 
these ‘tax cuts’ could be seen to erode the fiscal base to support these principles (and 
redistribution) and feed into the slow upward trend in inequalities in Nordic countries 
(Aaberge et al., 2018). Moreover, these countries also had in place ‘adjusted unemployment 
benefits’ so the analysis in the next chapter will add to our understanding of the overall 
approach in these countries.     
The Netherlands also deviates from this model somewhat in that one of the groups eligible 
for its Income Dependent Combination Rebate are second earners with income over a set 
range in households with children. If the second earners are women, this could, on the one 
hand, disincentivise earnings above a certain level and could be oriented towards a 1.5 earner 
model, with implications for gender equality. Indeed, part-time work accounts for a 
substantial amount of female employment in the Netherlands63 and the Netherlands has a 
historical legacy of a male breadwinner model (Hartog and Salverda, 2018). On the other, 
however, the explicit goal tied to the policy is that it is intended to encourage parents to take 
up work in line with a broader activation logic, and female labour market participation in the 
Netherlands was historically lower than the Nordic countries but it began to catch up from 
2012, indicating of a social and possibly a policy shift that these provisions could be a part 
of.  
Another group of countries were those with targeted earned income tax credit schemes.  The 
earned income tax credits were targeted either more narrowly on earnings (all in Belgium, 
one in Italy and Slovakia) or on household types (e.g. Austria, Spain, Netherlands). With the 
exception of Spain, maximum earned income tax credit levels were also much lower than 
                                                     
63 In 2016, 76% of all female employment was part-time (26% for men). However, men’s part-time employment grew more 
rapidly between 2001 and 2016 than women’s part-time employment (Hartog and Salverda, 2018).   
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the Nordic provisions, but they were refundable, thus the policy may be more ‘visible’ in 
experiential and social terms for the recipient and the association with ‘welfare’. 
The specific targeting of these policies could be significant with respect to policy legacies. 
On the one hand, this could be seen to reinforce past logics, e.g. there appeared to be a 
continuation of conservative policy logic in Austria’s sole earner credit in the possible 
reinforcement of a male breadwinner model. On the other hand, provisions could be 
interpreted as tool that resemble a (partial) break with previous logics e.g. Spain’s Working 
Mother Tax Credit with its emphasis on women’s activation after childbirth. 
Third, France, Malta, Ireland and the UK (in the case of its outgoing benefit, Working Tax 
Credits) were alike in their use of the social security system to explicitly target mainly 
working families through means-tested benefits, which were also typically combined with 
adjusted unemployment benefits. Again, questions remain about the latter but the use and 
design of explicit social and means-tested in-work benefits in these contexts implies some 
overlap in logics about dependence on the state and but the reliance on the family, especially 
among low-income working families with children. The testing of resources among 
members of a household and the higher levels for households with children are indicative of 
a strong needs-based logic underpinning these provisions; features which are also more 
associated with stigma and invasiveness. In the UK and Ireland, this would indicate path-
dependence, but not in France, as Vlandas (2013) argued.  
Deviating from this model slightly, Ireland also had earned income tax credits, which are 
individualised and broad in coverage of income groups. However, these are non-refundable, 
and, like the Nordic provisions, could be part of a broader agenda to reduce income taxation 
and retain the use of the tax system to provide benefits to working households more broadly. 
Italy somewhat resembles Ireland in its combination of explicit fiscal and explicit social in-
work benefits. It also has non-refundable earned income tax credits for employees and the 
self-employed that appear to be more about broader taxation of income. Italy’s Family 
Allowances are also only for employees and their dependents. In line with the political 
economy of southern European welfare states, Italy has a broad definition of dependents of 
employees e.g. to include grandchildren. Family Allowances therefore emphasize the wider 
family as a source of welfare (Papadopoulos and Roumpakis, 2013).   
The fourth group largely depends on the further investigation into adjusted unemployment 
benefits. At the moment, the UK with Universal Credit, is the main country belonging to this 
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group – which uses the social security system to blur differences between in and out of work 
households and constitutes a punitive dependency relationship between the state and 
working households. It also goes against the redistributive logic in other social in-work 
benefits in terms of curbing entitlement to larger families. If adjusted unemployment benefits 
are used as de facto in-work benefits in some countries, and conduct conditions are applied 
to in-work groups, they may also be seen as applying this punitive form of state dependence. 
The EUMS with ‘social implicit’ (i.e. unemployment benefits) - Greece, Portugal, Croatia, 
Slovenia and Germany – could therefore also belong to this group.   
These four approaches and associated EUMS are to be revisited and built upon in the next 
phase of the investigation focusing on the labour market orientation of policies.    
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7 THE ORIENTATION OF IN-WORK BENEFITS IN 
EUMS: LABOUR MARKET 
The findings in Chapter 5 chapter indicate that in certain national contexts in-work benefits 
have coincided with a weakening of institutions that are broadly understood to maximise 
(some) workers’ rights and protections, but the patterns are by no means uniform across 
countries. The analysis in Chapter 6 of the orientation of policies towards different forms 
and degrees of dependence on the state and families, further illuminated some of the 
seemingly different logics underpinning in-work benefits in EUMS relating to these forms 
of dependency. While some researchers, using a different lens, similarly point to varied rules 
and design and form of in-work benefits, there is a general assumption that such policies are 
targeted on labour market outsiders64.  
This chapter interrogates this assumption by examining the orientation of in-work benefits 
towards different forms and degrees of ‘labour market dependence’. The main aim of the 
chapter is to compare the kinds and amounts of work and earnings in-work provisions ‘top 
up’ or ‘subsidise’. In other words, it asks: What is ‘work’ in in-work benefits?  
Exploring this question, this chapter presents a systematic cross-national and regime level 
comparison of how much work (e.g. levels of earnings and work hours) and what kinds of 
work (e.g. self-employment or dependent employment) these policies are oriented towards. 
Attention is also paid to restrictions and rules concerning the labour market participation 
within households (e.g. limits on spouse earnings/ work hours), as these can shape the extent 
to which individuals within a household or family unit participate in paid work. The analysis 
includes all 20 EUMS with one or more of the in-work benefit sub-types identified in the 
mapping exercise for 2016.   
The analysis is structured so that the details of policies are examined first, drawing out the 
nuanced forms of variation across countries’ provisions. This information is also condensed 
into composite indicators of the labour market orientation of in-work policies towards 
standard and non-standard work. To this end, policy features are scored using sub-indicators 
measuring the orientation of in-work benefits regarding work and earnings, which are 
summed and weighted based on theoretical importance, to generate composite indicators of 
the orientation of in-work benefits towards different kinds of labour market dependency 
                                                     
64 Different arguments are associated with this claim, including whether provisions alleviate or exacerbate the risks faced 
by labour market outsiders.   
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relationships. The findings are contextualised again applying a welfare regime framework 
as a heuristic device and using indicators and secondary sources on the structure of European 
labour markets.  
The chapter precedes as follows: Section 7.1 outlines how the labour market orientation of 
in-work policies was conceptualised for this analysis. Section 7.2 describes the range and 
balance of work and earnings restrictions and rules concerning employment status, work 
hours, earnings and other restrictions that make up the sub-indicators of the labour market 
orientation. Section 7.3 compares in-work benefits across countries and regimes based on 
the three composite indicators of ‘labour market orientation’ for each sub-type. Section 7.4 
contextualises the analysis with reference to the labour market context in EUMS. Section 
7.5 concludes, highlighting three main points to be followed up in Chapter 8. 
7.1  Facilitating non-standard work? The labour market orientation of in-work 
benefits   
Risks and inequalities in post-industrial labour markets are commonly associated with the 
prevalence of forms of non-standard work, typically defined as work that deviates from the 
‘standard’ of full-time, permanent work, including in part-time work, fixed-term contracts, 
temporary agency work and self-employment without dependent employees (Schmid, 2010). 
Concepts such as precariousness, labour market dualization and segmentation refer to the 
risks some workers are exposed to, usually in comparison to other workers in the same 
context, and the inequalities this produces. Such concepts although often referring to non-
standard or standard work, consider a wide range of risks, including in pay, the role of social 
protection and other institutions, skills development and re-training opportunities that 
reinforce or alleviate divisions (Kretsos and Livanos, 2016; Rubery et al., 2018; Rueda, 
2014). These concepts provide more nuance, as not all forms of non-standard work are 
insecure (and vice-versa), and this is context dependent. 
The first part of the analysis presented in this chapter is fine-grained enough to capture the 
nuances of the targeting of in-work policies, considering a range of features and rules, that 
could be used to situate in-work benefits with respect to distinctive patterns of labour market 
inequality in individual contexts. The second part of the analysis, however, necessarily 
simplifies these idiosyncrasies by scoring policy features on whether they orient the benefit 
(recipient) towards ‘standard’ (0) or ‘non-standard employment’ (1). These are defined with 
reference to earnings, employment status/ relationship, and work hours. Figure 7.1 represents 
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a stylized overview of the framework. For example, if eligibility to an in-work cash transfer 
was restricted to employees only, it would be scored as being oriented towards standard 
employment on that indicator (a score of 0). Policies restricting access to the self-employed 
would receive a score of 1, and those where there no restrictions on employment status would 
receive a score of 0.5. The multiple components of features make up the final score so, if 
two policies were oriented towards non-standard employment as a self-employee but one 
restricted earnings to a very low level and the other could be received by those with moderate 
earnings, the former would receive a higher score.   
   
This framework could also be characterised as a distinction between insider- and outsider-
oriented in-work benefit policies, but as per the literature above, this depends on the national 
context. For example, policies are considered to have a strong standard (insider) orientation 
































































Figure 7.1 Stylized overview of the orientation of in-work benefits towards standard and non-standard 
work and key features (labour market dependency) 
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orientation if they are exclusively for temporary service workers with very minimal earnings. 
The findings are thus contextualised in the final part of the chapter.  
Ideally, there would be one indicator for all policies i.e. using equivalised measures so that 
a score of 1 for earned income tax credits represents the same labour market orientation as a 
score of 1 for adjusted unemployment benefits. However, there is a separate composite for 
each of the three main sub-types because of institutional idiosyncrasies across the provisions 
included in the analysis, as well as the variation in the data.  
For example, many adjusted unemployment benefits contained eligibility rules about 
maximum hours of work whereas in-work cash transfers were more likely to contain 
eligibility rules about minimum hours of work. Yet, the analysis of all provisions follows 
the same broad framework, facilitating the subsequent comparison of sub-types across 
countries and regimes, and allowing us to build a picture of the orientation at the country 
level. The sub-indicators, scoring system, weights and method for calculating the composite 
indicator are detailed in Chapter 4, Section 4.4.3, for each sub-type of in-work benefit.  
7.2 What is ‘work’ in in-work benefits?  
This section describes the range and balance of restrictions and rules within in-work benefits 
concerning work and earnings that underpin the three composite measures of labour market 
orientation, discussing each sub-type in turn. This part of the analysis engages in more depth 
with multi-faceted ways policies vary that is necessarily simplified in the analysis of the 
composite indicators in Section 7.3.  
7.2.1 In-work cash transfers – sub-indicators of work orientation  
First, Table 7.1 provides an overview of the rules and design features that make up the 
composite indicator of the labour-market orientation of in-work cash transfer policies 
identified in 5 EUMS’ in the initial mapping exercise presented in Chapter 5. This includes 
rules and features concerning the employment status, working hours, earnings of the main 
recipient, and the work hours or earnings of the spouse or partner of the main recipient. 
Unweighted scores for each sub-indicator are also shown.  
Across all in-work cash transfer policies, there was not a clear orientation towards (very) 
non-standard or (very) standard labour market participation. Most policies specified a 
minimum threshold of work hours or earnings to be eligible for the benefit. Eligibility was 
also mainly capped around the level of average wages in each country. There were however 
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other ways in which policies varied which could be significant in terms of offsetting of 
exacerbating labour market inequality in EUMS.  
Starting with employment status (‘a’), eligibility to the schemes in Ireland and Italy were 
restricted to employees only. In contrast, both employees and the self-employed were 
eligible for in-work cash transfers in the UK, France (Activity Allowance) and Malta, 
indicating no clear orientation towards standard or non-standard employment in terms of the 
employment status of recipients.  
A feature unique to Liberal regime countries’ in-work cash transfers was the restriction of 
entitlement based on work hours (‘b’). Provisions in Ireland and the UK included minimum 
working hours requirements which meant that workers undertaking (very) marginal work 
(i.e. less than approximately 2 days per week of work), would not be eligible.  In the UK, 
eligibility to WTC requires minimum working hours of up to 16 to 30 hours per week, 
depending on the household type. Ireland’s Family Income Supplement requires recipients 
to work at least 20 hours per week or 38 hours per fortnight to be eligible for the benefit.  
The use of minimum working hours requirements indicates policies were more explicitly 
oriented towards workers that were low-paid, rather than workers with low income because 
of working fewer hours. However, minimum working hours requirements in the liberal 
provisions also vary according to household composition. Single households with children 
were required to work a minimum of 16 hours per week and the higher work hours 
requirements of 24 hours per week applied to recipient households containing two adults of 
working age, whereby the work of both contributed towards the work hour requirements.  
Universal Credit (UK) also included requirements based on minimum work hours, but these 
were not within the eligibility rules as the benefit combines both in and out of work benefits. 
Instead, there are requirements for certain household types to increase their work hours or 
earnings up to the level of full-time at minimum wage. As a lack of compliance could lead 
to sanctions in Universal Credit, it is the only in-work cash transfer in the study where near 
full-time working hours or hours searching for additional work are enforced through punitive 
mechanisms. Despite an emphasis on full-time hours for many household types, recipients 
are encouraged to combine multiple part-time or temporary jobs to meet the hours or earning 
thresholds. Therefore, despite ‘standard’ work hour requirements, the policy is not 
necessarily oriented towards ‘standard’ work as a full-time employee.  
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Table 7.1 Labour-market orientation of in-work cash transfers in 2016, sub-indicators scores (unweighted) 

























E only 0 
20 hrs/ week, 
38 hrs 
/fortnight 
0.5 No 1 60% 0.75 No 1 
Varies 
with hh 







16 to 24 
hrs7week 
0.5 No 1 41% 0.5 No 1 
Varies 
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0.5 No 1 No 1 80% 1 No 1 
49 - 
95% 
1 Yes 1 No 0 
Southern 




0 No 1 No 1 - NA No * 0 Yes** 0 Yes 1 No 0 
MA In-Work Benefit  
E or 
SE 
0.5 No 1 Yes 0 
20 - 
30% 
0.25 Yes 0 No 1 Yes 1 No 0 
Notes (General): Author’s own analysis of policies. See Appendix A for data sources. ‘E’= employees; ‘SE’ =self-employed. Darker blue = stronger non-standard orientation. ‘. `missing 
8. Notes (Specific countries): UK: There are no minimum work hours in Universal Credit, but recipients required to earn equivalent to 35 hours @ minimum wage. IT: Phase out depends 
on household type and children and is a step-wise decreasing function of household income; no minimum earnings data but description states that least 70% of income must be from 
employment for working recipients. IE: Analysis uses 2017 data due to missing 2016 data.  
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While there were no minimum working hours requirements for in-work cash transfers in 
Malta, Italy and France, all provisions included rules concerning minimum earnings (‘e’). 
These could have a similar effect of requiring a minimum degree of labour market 
participation. For example, eligibility for the working recipients of Italy’s Family 
Allowances required at least 70% of their income to be from employment. Although the 
exact amount was not specified, the level of earnings would therefore need to be sufficient 
to be topped up with other sources of income, instead of earnings being a secondary or 
supplementary source of income. The provision also included a financial incentive 
mechanism regarding working hours, in that the benefit was reduced if recipients work part-
time, which implied an orientation towards standard employment.  
It was not possible to calculate the level of earnings at which in-work cash transfers were 
the highest, partly because entitlement is affected by multiple factors. Instead, the analysis 
looked at the rate at which the benefit is withdrawn as earnings increase, or ‘phase out rate’ 
(‘f’). More gradual phase-out can widen the earnings range determining eligibility, and thus 
reduce the non-standard orientation of the in-work benefit. Comparing across countries, 
France’s phase-out was considerably steeper than the rest at 80%, followed by the UK’s 
Universal Credit (63%) and Ireland (60%). The steeper phase-out in the UK’s later in-work 
benefit implies the benefit would be withdrawn more quickly as earnings increased, even 
though the requirements to work more hours (and therefore earn more) had increased and 
were backed up with conditionality (Millar and Bennett, 2017). 
Yet, in addition to the steepness of the phase-out rate, the amount of earnings at which the 
benefit was phased out also determined the range of earnings of recipients65. This was 
calculated with reference to the average wage for each country. The UK and Ireland were 
the same in that households with earnings above and below average wage, depending on 
composition, were eligible for the benefits in these countries, with maximum earnings 
capped at approximately 150% of AW for FIS. However, in Malta and France, those with 
earnings between approximately 50% of the average wage up to the average wage of each 
country were eligible.  
Finally, as household means-tested benefits, the earnings of couples as a whole determined 
eligibility to all five provisions. Such rules could therefore restrict one or both members’ 
                                                     
65 The levels at which in-work cash transfers were phased out were estimated using the description of policy design and 
rules in the data sources based on the main rules – this does not take into account any specific rules or exceptions based 
on household composition etc.  
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labour market participation as the earnings thresholds will apply to both66. Policies in the 
UK and Ireland only included spouses’ work hours in determining eligibility to the benefit. 
The assumption in made here is that such policies are more oriented towards non-standard 
work by at least one member in a couple, as entitlement and/or eligibility is intertwined. 
Minimum earnings and work hours requirements in all in-work cash transfers indicated 
policies were not for households at the very margins of the labour market but rather a low to 
average income bracket of part-time working households, whose low incomes and dependent 
children determine the level of support (as we saw in Chapter 6). Italy and Ireland had more 
of a standard work orientation on the employment status (a) indicator. Only provisions in 
liberal regime countries included specific eligibility rules about work hours indicating a 
clearer orientation to low-paid work as opposed to low earnings than the other countries. 
However, Italy’s allowance was also reduced for lower ‘work effort’. Although potentially 
pushing workers towards ‘standard’ employment relationships (e.g. full-time work), the 
explicit goals within Universal Credit to facilitate the combination of multiple jobs indicate 
that the UK’s provisions had become more clearly oriented towards non-standard forms of 
employment over time. Yet, the treatment of earnings was likely to create disincentives for 
some workers to earn more.  
7.2.2 Earned income tax credits – sub-indicators of work orientation  
The sub-indicators of the labour market orientation of in-work benefits for earned income 
tax credits is shown in Table 7.2 for a total of 19 policies across 12 countries identified in 
the mapping in Chapter 5. There appears to be more variation in the labour market orientation 
of earned income tax credits in EUMS than for in-work cash transfers, especially in the 
targeting of provisions on earnings.  
One group of countries, Belgium, Italy and Estonia, appear to be oriented towards similar 
degrees of labour market participation as the in-work cash transfers above. Belgium’s Fiscal 
Workbonus and Refundable Tax Credit on Low Activity Incomes, Italy’s Fiscal Bonus and 
Estonia’s Non-Refundable Credit for Low Income Workers, stood out from the other 
measures for being targeted on a fairly narrow range of earnings
                                                     
66 Chapter 6 set out the additional policy rules and design features concerning family members and children in in-work cash 
transfers, showing that benefits were higher for households with any/more children in most cases. Recipients had to have 
children to be eligible for the in-work benefit in Ireland and Malta. 
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Table 7.2 Labour-market orientation of earned income tax credits in 2016, sub-indicators and scores (unweighted) 
Regime EU
MS 









Max earnings  
(e) 
Earnings where 




Liberal IE Employee Credit (Formerly PAYE) E 0 N 1 No 1 N 0.0 N  0 N 0 
IE Earned Income Tax Credit  SE** 1 N 1 No 1 N 0.0 N  0 N 0 
Bis-
marckian 
AU  Lone Parent Tax Credit   SE or E 0.5 N 1 No 1 N 0.0 N 0 N 0 
AU Sole Earners Tax Credit  SE or E 0.5 N 1 No 1 N 0.0 N  0 Y 1 




0.5 N 1 12% AW 0 51% AW 0.8 38% AW 0.75 N 0 
BE Fiscal Workbonus  E 0 Y 0 N 1  62% aw 0.8  40%AW 0.75 N 0 
LU Tax Credit for Employees E 0 N 1 1.5% AW 0  130% AW 0.6 66% AW 0.75 Joint 
tax 
1 
LU Tax Credit for Self-Employed SE 1 N 1 N 1 130% AW 0.6 66% AW 0.75 Joint 
tax 
1 
NL Work Credit  E or SE 0.5 N 1 N 1 241% AW 0.2 82% AW 0.25 Joint 
tax 
1 
NL Income Dependent Combination Credit E or SE 0.5 N 1 11% AW 0 N  0.0 71% AW 0.75 Y 1 
Nordic DK Beskæftigelsesfradrag (EITC) E or SE 0.5 N 1 Y (min 
sscs) 
0 N 0.0 N 0 N 0 
FI Earned Income Credit E or SE 0.5 N 1 7% AW 0 290% AW 0.2 80% AW 0.5 N 0 
SE Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) E or SE 0.5 N 1 N 1 339% AW 0.0 150% AW 0.25 N 0 
Southern IT PAYE Tax Credit  E 0 Y 0 N 1 189% AW 0.4 96% AW 0.5 N 0 
IT Self-Employed Credit  SE 1 N 1 N 1 189% AW 0.4 15% AW 1 N 0 
IT Refundable Tax Credit  E 0 N 1 30% AW 0 89% AW 0.8 82% AW 0.5 N 0 
ES Working Mother Tax Credit  E or SE 0.5 N 1 Y (min ssc) 0 N 0.0 N 0 N 0 
CEE EE Non-Refundable Credit Low Income 
Workers  
E 0 Y  0 N** 1 55% AW 0.8 40% 1 Optiona
l  
0 
SK Tax Credit on Dependent Child E or SE 0.5 Y 0 19% AW 0 N  0.0 N 0 Y 1 
Notes (general): Yellow highlight = 2018 data used in place of missing data; Earnings minimum and maximum calculated as a proportion of average wage (AW) using OECD (2019b).  
‘E’ employee, ‘SE’ self-employed, ‘CS’ civil servant. Darker blue shading indicates stronger non-standard orientation. Notes (country specific): IE no minimum earnings but tax credit 
phased in as earnings increase; IT tax credit for employment income cannot be lower than 1,380€ per year if the individual has a temporary contract or lower than 690€ per year otherwise; 




All included rules based on work hours, minimum earnings and maximum earnings. The 
credits were phased out from approximately 40% of the average wage in Belgium and 
Estonia, and from 80% of average wage for Italy, and the maximum level of earnings was 
approximately 10% above this in these three countries. Looking at the details of policies, as 
the scores are not comparable, these are similar in orientation to the in-work cash transfers 
above when it comes to earnings. However, a major difference is that provisions are 
individualised, and thus the orientation is towards more substantial participation across a 
household with two adults able to work than in in-work cash transfers. 
Moreover, unlike in-work cash transfers, restrictions on employment status (‘a’) (Table 7.2) 
in earned income tax credits were largely due to separate schemes for employees and self-
employed, rather than there being a clear standard or non-standard orientation of the in-work 
policies in a given country. Estonia was the only country where eligibility was restricted to 
employees and there was no separate scheme for the self-employed, whereas Ireland, 
Belgium, Luxembourg and Italy had separate provisions for employees and the self-
employed. Eligibility for one of Belgium’s earned income tax credits (Refundable Tax Credit 
on Low Activity Incomes) was restricted to those with income categorised as ‘low activity’ 
who are mainly self-employed or civil servants. The variation within countries in schemes 
for employees and self-employed within countries is explored further below.  
At the other end of the spectrum, earned income tax credits in the Nordic regime countries, 
as well as Austria, Spain, Italy (two out of three provisions), Ireland, Slovakia and the 
Netherlands had no or low minimum earnings floors and very high or no maximum earnings 
thresholds. Denmark’s EITC had no maximum earnings level67. Sweden’s was 339% of 
average wage and Finland’s was 290% of average wage for 2016. However, Sweden’s EITC 
is highest for earnings approximately between 31 to 88% of average wage (the range varies 
depending on municipal tax rates) and in Finland between 32 to 90% of average wage. In 
Denmark, the credit reaches its maximum value when earnings are at 84% of average wage 
but this did not phase out and it was phased in, so higher earners benefited more. All Nordic 
tax credits were individualised (i.e. not tied to spouse’s work/earnings), could be received 
by both employees or self-employed, and did not have work hours requirements.  Ireland’s 
credits had no maximum thresholds. In Italy, two policies were received by either employees 
or the self-employed with earnings above average wages (up to 189% of average wage), but 
                                                     
67 Based on data from employment-conditional earning subsidies table for 2018 (OECD, 2010) 
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they were phased out below average wages in both cases, suggesting the credits were more 
targeted on those with earnings below average wages, but, importantly, the value of the credit 
does not drop off completely once average wages had been reached. The provisions were 
therefore more universal in terms of earnings. Yet, the Nordic countries were the most 
universal when looking across all features. For example, Italy and Ireland had separate 
schemes for employees and self-employed; and the levels were marginally lower for the self-
employed (see Chapter 6), indicating an orientation towards ‘standard’ employment in these 
countries. 
Moreover, in mostly Bismarckian countries, entitlement to earned income tax credits was 
tied to the employment status and/or earnings of the spouse (Austria, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands and Slovakia). For example, Austria’s Sole Earner Tax Credit was not given if 
the spouse’s earnings exceed EUR6000 (approximately 14% of average wages). As such, 
the credit was oriented towards marginal work on the part of one earner, while there were 
no maximum earnings thresholds for the main recipient.  Moreover, earned income tax 
credits could be shared between partners in the Netherlands, if the entitlement to the credit 
exceeded the amount of tax one part of the couple was liable for. It was coded as more 
oriented towards non-standard work as it could provide financial incentives for the lower 
earner not to increase work effort.  
7.2.3 Adjusted unemployment benefits – sub-indicators of work orientation  
Next, Table 7.3 gives an overview of the rules and design features that make up the 
composite indicator of the labour-market orientation for the 24 adjusted unemployment 
benefit policies identified in EUMS for 2016. The indicators cover rules on working hours 
or days that were allowed alongside the receipt of benefit, the amount of earnings 
disregarded in the calculation of eligibility or entitlement for the benefit, and the rate at 
which the benefit was reduced. The latter kicks in after the earnings disregard, should there 
be one in place. There is also a binary indicator for whether spouses’ work affects entitlement 
to the adjusted unemployment benefit. A total of 17 out of 24 adjusted unemployment 
benefits were contributory. There is missing data for one or more sub indictor across 9 
provisions; notably data are missing on two indicators for policies in Sweden and Malta. 
There are some general findings about the orientation of adjusted unemployment benefits as 
a whole, some specific findings about individual countries and some possible avenues to 
explore concerning welfare regime. Generally, the majority of adjusted unemployment 
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benefits were oriented towards very marginal work, evident in the tight restrictions on work 
hours and earnings (disregards, withdrawal rates, and spouses’ earnings). This is not 
surprising as adjusted unemployment benefits were included in the study if they had at least 
one of the in-work levers described in Chapter 468.  
A group of countries stood out for having the most restrictive unemployment benefits in 
terms of work or earnings. All or some of the policies in the following eight countries 
combined high withdrawal rates with minimal or no disregards: Ireland (Contributory), UK 
(both policies), Sweden (both policies), Luxembourg, Malta, Spain (both policies), Portugal 
(both policies) and Greece.  
Thus, the Southern regime countries in particular were not oriented towards combining 
earnings with receipt of unemployment benefit. Most provisions (with the exception of 
Portugal’s unemployment insurance benefit) did not include any earnings disregards 
(column ‘c’), and earnings reduced the benefit at a rate of 100% (column ‘d’), even though 
the rules technically allowed recipients to carry out some work while receiving the benefits. 
Strong restrictions on earnings were, however, also found in Sweden, Luxembourg 
(contributory) and most policies in the UK and Ireland. For example, there were very limited 
disregards in the UK, varying from 0.7% to 3% of the average wage, depending on the 
household composition. Beyond this, earnings reduced unemployment benefits in the UK 
pound for pound. The earnings of other members of the household also counted towards the 
means-test for assistance unemployment benefit in the UK. 
Jobseekers’ Benefit in Ireland (contributory) was similarly restrictive in that benefit 
entitlement for the week was reduced by a fifth for every day worked and benefits were 
stopped if recipients worked for four consecutive days (out of seven). Ireland’s assistance 
unemployment benefit (Jobseeker’s Allowance) restricted work to three days per week for 
each member of the couple in a household. However, its disregards and means test indicated 
a more favourable treatment of earnings than the UK’s adjusted unemployment benefits: 20 
euros of earnings per day (approximately 10% AW) were disregarded, and just 60% of the 
earnings on top of this count towards the means-test, up to the three-day maximum. 
                                                     
68 1. Earnings disregards (some earned income does not count towards assessment of eligibility or entitlement); 2. Eligibility 
criteria/ policy rules state that participation in paid work is allowed alongside receipt of benefit; 




















Liberal IE  Jobseeker's Benefit  E or SE 0.5 Max B 0.75 No 1 100%* 1 N 0 0 
IE Jobseeker's Allowance E or SE 0.5 Max B 0.75 10%AW + 40% earnings/ day 0.25 100% 1 Y 1 0 
UK  Jobseekers Allowance (Contribution Based) E or SE 0.5 Max B 0.75 0.7 - 3% AW 0.75 100% 1 N 0 0 
UK Jobseekers Allowance (Income Based) E or SE 0.5 Max B 0.75 0.7 - 3% AW 0.75 100% 1 Y 1 0 
Nordic FI  Adjusted Unemployment Insurance   E or SE  0.5 Max D 0.25 9 -30% AW 0.5 50% 0.25 N 0 0 
FI  Adjusted Basic Unemployment Allowance  E or SE 0.5 Max D 0.25 9 - 30% AW 0.5 50% 0.25 N 0 0 
FI Adjusted labour market subsidy E or SE 0.5 Max D 0.25 9 - 30% AW 0.5 75/50% 0.5 N 0 0 
SE Basic Unemployment Insurance   .  . . . No 1 100% 1 N 0 2 
SE  Income Related Unemployment Insurance   .  . . . No 1 100% 1 N 0 2 
Bis 
marckian 
FR  Unemployment Insurance (‘ARE’)  .  . Max C 0.5 unlimited if age 50+ 0.5 100% 1 N 0 1 
FR Unemployment Assistance (‘ASS’)  E or SE 0.5 . . 21 - 37% AW 0.25 Staggered 0.5 Y 1 1 
DE  Unemployment Insurance I (‘ALG I’) . . Max B 0.75 22% AW 0.25 100% 1 N 0 1 
DE Unemployment Benefit II (‘ALG II’) . . No  0 13% AW 0.5 80-100% 0.75 Y 1 1 
LU  
Unemployment Insurance  
Access
ory  
1 No  0 No 1 100% 1 N 0 0 
NL  Supplementary Benefit (‘SW’) E  0 Max A  1 30% earnings  0.25 100% 1 Y 1 0 
NL  Unemployment Insurance  E  0 No  0 30% earnings  0.25 . .  N 0 1 
Southern MT  Special Unemployment Benefit  .  . . . No  1 100% 1 Y 1 2 
ES  Unemployment Insurance E 0 Max C 0.5 No  1 100% 1 N 0 0 
ES Unemployment Assistance  E  0 Max C 0.5 No 1 100% 1 Y 1 0 
PT  Unemployment Assistance  SE 1 . . No 1 100% 1 Y 1 1 
PT  Unemployment Insurance  E or SE 0.5 Max C 0.5 35% benefit 0.75 100% 1 N 0 0 
EL  Unemployment Insurance  E 0 Max B 0.75 No 1 100% 1 N 0 0 
CEE HR  Unemployment Insurance T 1 No  0 10% AW 0.75 100% 1 N 0 0 
SI  Unemployment Insurance E or SE 0.5 Max C  0.5 20%AW 0.5 50% 0.25 N 0 0 
Notes: ‘.’ Missing; ‘E’ employment; ‘SE’ self-employment; ‘T’ temporary employment only. Darker colour = stronger non-standard orientation. Working hours per week indicator: A (1-8 




However, the following countries stand out for provisions that are were, relatively, oriented 
towards more work and earnings: Finland, France, Germany and Slovenia. For example, all 
three of Finland’s adjusted unemployment benefits included relatively loose restrictions on 
work hours, larger earnings disregards (dependent on household composition) and more 
gradual withdrawal rates. Germany combined moderate earnings disregards (13-22% of 
AW) with no or moderate restrictions on hours. France’s unemployment insurance permitted 
the equivalent of two to three days’ work per week, with unlimited disregards for recipients 
over the age of 50; and the Netherlands disregarded 30% of earnings in both of its 
unemployment benefits, but its supplementary benefit (for additional needs) had tight 
restrictions on work hours.  
Other forms of variation were also evident. For example, restrictions based on employment 
status (e.g. employment, self-employment and other relationships) were not in 
unemployment benefits in liberal or Nordic regime countries. Southern regime countries 
restricted work on the basis of status, mostly permitting employment (not self-employment). 
Moreover, restrictions based on work hours were among the strongest in liberal regimes. In 
the UK, the outgoing system of unemployment benefits and the outgoing Working Tax 
Credits, had, in the case of the former, rules capping work hours, and in the latter, minimum 
work hours requirements, thus serving to separate out the recipients of in-work cash transfers 
and unemployment benefits. 
There were restrictions based on the earnings of the spouse (Column E) in assistance/non-
contributory unemployment benefits in Ireland, the UK, France, Germany and Spain and in 
contributory benefits in the Netherlands and Portugal. Nordic or Central and Eastern regime 
countries provisions were individualised.  
As partly outlined above, there were differences in work restrictions between contributory 
and non-contributory adjusted unemployment benefits within and across countries. 
Contributory schemes in four countries permitted only self-employment (Netherlands, 
Portugal, Greece and Spain). Only Luxembourg and Croatia’s unemployment benefits had 
rules in place that meant recipients could only combine their unemployment benefit with 
work as an employee. However, there was near uniformity in rules concerning work type, 




and Sweden), even though Sweden’s benefits were oriented towards very marginal/limited 
labour market participation and Finland’s appeared closer to de facto in-work cash transfers. 
While there were some regime patterns with regards to the details of policy features, the 
overarching orientation of adjusted unemployment provisions towards more or less marginal 
participation appeared not to be regime driven. Most countries had tight restrictions on 
earnings and/or work hours. Yet there were some stand out cases which could operate like 
de facto in-work benefits. The work permitted in the latter is far from ‘standard’ employment 
as the emphasis across unemployment benefits was about permitting some but not a 
substantial degree of work alongside unemployment benefit receipt. The overall (weighted) 
scores for each sub-type across countries and regimes capture this complex variation more 
succinctly.   
7.3 The labour market orientation of in-work benefits: composite indicators  
This section compares the labour market orientation of countries’ in-work benefits using the 
composite indicator made up of all the sub-indicators outlined in the previous section. The 
full set of sub-indicator and composite indicator scores are shown in Tables 7.4, 7.5 and 7.6 
Policies received higher scores if the rules and design features of the policy are oriented 
towards marginal labour market orientation e.g. temporary part-time work with very low 
earnings. Lower scores indicate policies are oriented towards standard labour market 
participation, such as full-time work as an employee69.  
Composite indicator scores are not comparable across sub-types due to differences in the 
make-up of the composite indicators (see: Chapter 4). For example, a score of 0.7 for an 
earned income tax credit policy and 0.7 for an in-work cash transfer policy does not mean 
these policies are oriented towards the same degree and forms of labour market participation, 
as the sub-indicators are coded differently for the reasons outlined above. Nevertheless, the 
composite scores facilitate comparison across countries and regimes and as a group comprise 
a multi-faceted picture of the orientation of in-work benefits towards different degrees and 
forms of labour market participation, considering each sub-type in turn.  
                                                     
69 This distinction is somewhat crude given the differences in standard and non-standard employment across EUMS but 




7.3.1 In-work cash transfers  
Table 7.4 shows the composite scores for in-work cash transfers for each policy as well as 
the country and regime average. As argued above, there is little variation in scores for the 
six policies in this category on the composite indicator meaning provisions are similar in 
their labour market orientation.  The average score across all policies was 0.62. France’s 
Activity Allowance received the highest score at 0.75, indicating the provision is more 
oriented towards non-standard work, whereas Italy’s Family Allowances received the lowest 
score at 0.45 indicating it was more oriented towards standard work.  France’s high score 
reflects its steep phase-out of the policy and earnings restrictions. In contrast, Italy’s policy 
is for employees only.  
Table 7.4: Labour market orientation of in-work cash transfers (composite scores) 








IE Family Income Supplement  0.67 0.67 
0.67 
UK 
Working Tax Credits  0.71 
0.67 
Universal Credit  0.63 
Bismarckian FR Activity Allowance  0.75 0.75 0.75 
Southern 
IT Family Allowance  0.45 0.45 
0.50 
MA In-Work Benefit  0.54 0.54 
Notes: Authors own calculations 2016 policies only. Data described in Appendix A. See Methodology 
(4.4.3) and Appendix E for more details. Scores closer to 0 indicates policies are oriented towards standard 
work (full-time, work as employee, wages above average) market participation and scores closer to 1 
indicates policies are oriented towards non-standard work.  
There is however little difference in the scores for Ireland (0.67) and the UK (WTC: 0.71, 
UC: 0.63). The UK’s WTC score was higher than Universal Credit, as Universal Credit 
contains more rules and features that are intended to encourage or enforce greater labour 
market participation. Yet, as we saw above, this can actually mean combining multiple non-
standard forms of employment to make up the working hour requirements. 
As France was the only Bismarckian regime country with an in-work cash transfer, the 
average score reflect this; whereas the average score for the liberal regime countries is 0.67, 
indicating provisions are slightly more oriented towards standard work than France. The 
lowest regime score is therefore the Southern regime (0.50) countries (Malta and Italy), 
implying provisions in these countries were more oriented towards ‘standard’ labour market 




7.3.2 Earned income tax credits  
The scores for each earned income tax credit policy are given in Table 7.5, including the 
country and regime average. Five countries had more than one earned income tax credit 
policy in place. The remaining countries had only one earned income tax credit policy. The 
average policy score on the earned income tax credit indicator is 0.4 (rounded). Ireland’s 
Employee Credit received the minimum score (0.11) indicating it is the most oriented 
towards standard employment. The maximum scoring policy is Luxembourg’s Self-
Employed Tax Credit at 0.86.  
Overall, policy and country scores are more dispersed than for in-work cash transfers.  The 
narrow targeting of Luxembourg’s Tax Credit for the Self-Employed on partly explains its 
high score. This is not to say that the policy was only received by those with very minimal 
earnings. However, it is among one of the more targeted provisions as only those with 
earnings up to the poverty/low wage threshold were eligible (two thirds of average income). 
Of the countries with multiple earned income tax credits, greatest variation can be seen in 
Italy and Luxembourg.  Even still, Luxembourg had most of the highest scoring policies 
implying a stronger non-standard orientation in its earned income tax credits. In addition, 
Belgium, Italy and Estonia had above average scores, mirroring the finding above that their 
provisions that are more targeted on specific types of work and lower earnings. In contrast, 
Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Ireland and Spain’s earned income tax credit policies all scored 
below the average reflecting the overall standard orientation of their provisions.   
The Bismarckian regime had the highest average score (0.51), reflecting the above average 
scores in all three countries. As discussed above, eligibility for earned income tax credits in 
a number of Bismarckian countries depended on the employment status and earnings of other 
household members. However, targeting on earnings was inconsistent across Bismarckian 
regime countries. For example, in Belgium, policies were targeted on earnings below 65% 
of the average wage. In contrast, eligibility for Netherland’s Work Credit reaches up to 
approximately 2.4 times the average wage. However, the level of earnings at which credits 
were phased out were lowest among Bismarckian countries, even if in some cases it was 





At the other end of the scale Ireland, the only Liberal regime country included in the analysis, 
received the lowest average score (0.22); closely followed by the Nordic regime (0.26) and 
the Southern (0.29), implying provisions in these countries are oriented towards more 
substantial and standard labour market participation. There was, however, greater variation 
among the Southern regime countries compared to the Nordic because Italy combined a 
broader and a more targeted credit. But, as we saw above the Nordic regime countries did 
not differentiate on the basis of employment status, whereas Italy and Ireland did, and Nordic 
regime countries were not for specific types of workers (e.g. mothers), whereas the lower 
scoring provisions in Spain and in Austria were. The Central and Eastern European regime 
average was 0.39 and thus policies in these countries were oriented towards more substantial 
labour market participation than many Bismarckian countries, but they were not as clearly 
oriented towards more standard participation as Liberal, Nordic and most of the Southern 
regime country provisions. 
Table 7.5: Labour market orientation of earned income tax credits (composite scores) 








Employee Credit  0.11 
0.22 0.22 




Lone Parent Tax Credit   0.22 
0.33 
0.51 
Sole Earners Tax Credit  0.44 
BE 
Refundable Tax Credit Low Activity  0.51 
0.46 
Fiscal Workbonus  0.40 
LU 
Tax Credit for Employees 0.58 
0.72 
Tax Credit for Self-Employed 0.86 
NL 
Work Credit  0.54 
0.55 
Income Dependent Combination Credit 0.56 
Nordic 
DK Beskæftigelsesfradrag (EITC) 0.17 0.17 
0.26 FI Earned Income Credit 0.32 0.32 
SE Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)  0.28 0.28 
Southern 
IT 
PAYE Tax Credit  0.26 
0.42 
0.29 
Self-Employed Credit  0.64 
Fiscal Bonus 0.34 
ES Working Mother Tax Credit  0.17 0.17 
CEE 
EE Credit for Low Income Workers 0.46 0.46 
0.39 
SK Tax Credit on Dependent Child 0.33 0.33 
Notes:  Authors own calculations using data detailed in Appendix A. 2016 policies only. See Methodology 
(4.4.3) and Appendix E for more detail. Scores closer to 0 indicates policies are oriented towards standard 
work (full-time, work as employee, wages above average) market participation and scores closer to 1 




7.3.3 Adjusted unemployment benefits  
The composite indicator for adjusted unemployment benefits also echoed the mixed picture 
set out above. Eight countries had more than one adjusted unemployment benefit scheme 
and six countries had one policy. The average policy score is 0.6 (rounded) and policies were 
dispersed to a similar extent as earned income tax credits (standard deviation: 0.2).  
The lowest scoring policy is the Netherlands’ unemployment insurance policy at 0.063. This 
score indicates it is more oriented towards standard work compared to other adjusted 
unemployment benefits. There was, however, one missing indicator for this provision 
meaning that other features have more bearing on the final policy score. The highest scoring 
provisions were Malta’s special unemployment benefit and Portugal’s unemployment 
assistance benefit. Both scored 1 indicating they are oriented towards very marginal/non-
standard labour market participation. Malta’s unemployment benefit is completely 
withdrawn if earnings exceed EUR 365 (20% average wage) per month and earnings below 
this amount reduce the benefit Euro for Euro (i.e. there is no disregard and 100% withdrawal 
rate).  Similarly, Portugal’s unemployment assistance was also very restrictive as there were 
no disregards, a 100% withdrawal of the benefit with earnings and spouses’ earnings counted 
towards entitlement calculations. Again, however, data were missing on two sub-indicators 
(work hours and work type) for Malta, and on one for Portugal, meaning restrictions where 
data were available have greater weight in the overall score. As such, it is recommended that 
these extreme cases are interpreted with caution.   
Relatedly, within-country variation is greatest in the Netherlands and Portugal. On the one 
hand, this captures the within-country variation in the labour market orientation of assistance 
and insurance schemes in Portugal. The rules in the insurance benefit concerning work hours 
and work type were more oriented towards standard work than in the assistance benefit. 
However, on the other hand, missing data could also be pushing the scores further apart. 
Beyond this, Germany’s unemployment assistance benefit provided a useful benchmark for 
deciding whether benefits constitute ‘de facto’ in-work cash transfers in terms of whether 
provisions are simply oriented towards very marginal/non-standard work, as some assume: 
this provision is considered a de facto in-work cash transfer in the literature (Clasen, 2019). 
Scoring 0.563 on the composite indicator, Germany’s unemployment assistance provision is 




indicating it not strongly oriented ‘very’ non-standard or standard work. Provisions in France 
(0.53), Finland (0.32), Spain (0.5, insurance only), Croatia (0.55) and Slovenia (0.35) scored 
below this. 
Table 7.6 Labour market orientation: adjusted unemployment benefits (composite 
scores) 









Jobseeker's Benefit  0.65 
0.68 
0.69 
Jobseeker's Allowance 0.70 
UK 
Jobseekers Allowance (Contribution Based) 0.60 
0.70 
Jobseekers Allowance (Income Based) 0.80 
Nor 
FI 
Adjusted Unemployment Insurance   0.30 
0.32 
0.49 
Adjusted Basic Unemployment Allowance  0.30 
Adjusted labour market subsidy 0.35 
SE 
Basic Unemployment Insurance   0.67 0.67 
Income Related Unemployment Insurance   0.67  
Bis 
FR 
Unemployment Insurance (‘ARE’)  0.50 
0.53 
0.51 
Unemployment Assistance (‘ASS’)  0.56 
DE 
Unemployment Insurance I (‘ALG I’) 0.50 
0.53 
Unemployment Benefit II (‘ALG II’) 0.56 
LU Unemployment Insurance  0.60 0.60 
NL 
Supplementary Benefit (‘SW’) 0.65 
0.36 
Unemployment Insurance  0.06 
Sou 
MT Special Unemployment Benefit  1.00 1.00 
0.73 
ES 
Unemployment Insurance 0.50 
0.60 
Unemployment Assistance  0.70 
PT 
Unemployment Assistance  1.00 
0.78 
Unemployment Insurance  0.55 
EL Unemployment Insurance  0.55 0.55 
CEE 
HR Unemployment Insurance 0.55 0.55 
0.45 
SI Unemployment Insurance 0.35 0.35 
Notes:  Authors own calculations using data detailed in Appendix A. Policy names as given in main 
sources. See Methodology (4.4.3) and Appendix E for more detail. Scores closer to 0 indicates policies are 
oriented towards standard work (full-time, work as employee, wages above average) market participation 
and scores closer to 1 indicates policies are oriented towards non-standard work. 
 
As we saw above, adjusted unemployment benefits were all oriented towards non-standard 
or marginal employment (e.g. part-time or temporary), but these provisions stand out for 
constituting features that make them more like de facto in-work cash transfers. For example, 




employment alongside benefit receipt, and they included fairly sizeable earnings disregards, 
and were gradually phased out as earnings increased. They were also individualised so that 
spouses’ work and earnings do not affect entitlement70. In contrast, higher scoring countries 
included Ireland (0.68), the UK (0.70) and Sweden (0.67), which had in place in-work cash 
transfers, earned income tax credits, or both in the case of Ireland, oriented towards more 
substantial labour market participation, which could explain the very marginal/non-standard 
labour market orientation of these policies.  
Considering regimes, the Southern European regime had the highest average score (0.73 
rounded) indicating adjusted unemployment benefits were most oriented towards marginal 
work in this regime. All countries scored ‘1’ on the disregard and withdrawal rate sub-
indicators, suggesting high disincentives to combine paid work with unemployment benefits 
in these countries, restrictions on employment status and spouses’ earnings varied. Indeed, 
Greece71, Spain and Portugal permitted considerable work, in terms of hours, alongside 
receipt of unemployment benefit. But rules concerning earnings rules effectively limited the 
amount of work recipients could do alongside unemployment benefit receipt as the benefit 
will be withdrawn.  
However, differences between provisions were evident in terms of employment status and 
spouse earnings, hence the variation among Southern regime countries (even though this 
variation is at a higher level than most other provisions). For instance, Spain and Greece 
only permitted work as an employee alongside receipt of unemployment benefit, whereas 
Portugal’s assistance scheme only permitted independent work (e.g. self-employment) with 
the receipt of unemployment benefit.  
The Liberal welfare regime had the second highest average score (0.69) with limited within 
country variation, reflecting the similarities in both countries’ provisions outlined above.   
Policies in the Bismarkian countries had some of the lowest disregard sub-indicator scores, 
suggesting a favourable treatment of earned income in these policies. Other than 
Luxembourg, all scored less than or equal to 0.5 on this sub-indicator, meaning they had 
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was reformed in 2013 so that earnings of the partner are completely excluded from the means-test, making it 
less restrictive than previous iterations. 
71 2018 data shows this rule was abolished in 2017 from which point was no longer feasible to combine 




earnings disregards of at least 20% of average wages or reference earnings. However, this 
was typically combined with a 100% withdrawal rate, and thus unemployment benefits in 
these countries appear to be geared towards facilitating some marginal labour market 
participation, but not earnings beyond this. Spouses’ earnings were typically counted in 
assistance but not contributory policies in these schemes, reflecting the means-testing in the 
former. 
The average score for Croatia and Slovenia – the only Central and Eastern European 
countries with these policies - was the lowest (0.45 rounded) of all regimes. Both countries 
scored below the average, but Slovenia was more clearly oriented toward standard 
employment: recipients of unemployment insurance can carry out work through any type of 
contractual relationship, for which the first EUR200 is disregarded, while earnings over this 
reduce the benefit by 50%. Croatia’s unemployment benefits were more clearly oriented 
towards marginal work in that ‘temporary service contacts’ could be combined with 
unemployment benefit receipt, and earnings from this kind of employment had to be below 
the average unemployment benefit from the previous year, akin to 10% of average wages. 
In both countries, spouses’ earnings did not affect entitlement. 
There was, unlike for earned income tax credits, little consistency among the Nordic regime 
countries, with Finland’s provisions scoring well below average (0.32) and Sweden’s among 
the highest (0.67).  
Although the parameters of the analysis of adjusted unemployment benefits are narrow, there 
were clear differences between countries in terms of the amounts of earnings and types of 
work that could be combined with unemployment benefit receipt. Some or all of the adjusted 
unemployment benefits in Germany, France, Finland, Slovenia, Netherlands and Croatia 
appeared to be the closest to de facto in-work cash transfers. Whereas Southern and Liberal 
regime countries’ adjusted unemployment benefits were, on average, more clearly oriented 
towards very marginal earnings and work. 
7.4 Contextualising variation in the labour market orientation of in-work benefits 
This section aims to contextualise the three composite indicators presented in the preceding 
section. The discussion is structured around each welfare regime, outlining the similarities 
and differences in the labour market context within each regime, which helps to interpret the 




First, starting with the Central and Eastern European countries included in the analysis.  
Compared to other EUMS, these countries have relatively low part-time employment rates, 
considered broadly to be a form of non-standard work, ranging from 5.6% in Croatia to 9.5% 
in Estonia.  However, temporary employment varied from just over 3% in Estonia to 21.4% 
in Croatia. The adjusted unemployment benefits in Croatia were specifically oriented 
towards temporary employment, which could indeed reflect a goal to facilitate and/or 
support this kind of work in a context where it is high. Earned income tax credits did not 
appear to be targeted on those at the very margins of the labour market in Slovakia and 
Estonia e.g. Slovakia’s tax credit for working parents has both minimum earnings and hours 
requirements. Estonia’s credit was targeted on full-time employees, as such there is more of 
an insider-orientation for its fiscal in-work benefits. Again, the relatively low prevalence of 
part-time work in these countries could be reflected in the policy design, which aims to 
support and/or facilitate more standard employment.  
Next, adjusted unemployment benefits were very restrictive in Liberal regimes and in-work 
cash transfers were more oriented towards non-standard employment than in some other 
EUMS. In terms of non-standard employment, the temporary employment rate was well 
below the EU average of 13.3% for 2016 at 5.3% and 7.8% in the UK and Ireland 
respectively. Self-employment was near to the EU average of 14% for 2016. Yet, the UK 
had the fifth highest rate of part-time employment in the EU in 2016 at 23.8 per cent. Ireland 
was also above the EU average of 18.9% with approximately a fifth of employees working 
part-time. Indeed, it is part-time employment that in-work cash transfers in these contexts 
appear to be most oriented towards. There was however a split in the access to in-work cash 
transfers for the self-employed in Ireland and the UK. Ireland’s in-work cash transfer is for 
employees only and has in place separate earned income tax credit schemes for employees 
and the self-employed (the latter, as we saw in Chapter 6, was less generous). In contrast, 
self-employed are eligible for in-work benefits in the UK. Moreover, Universal Credit 
moved the UK partly away from the emphasis on part-time work but not necessarily non-
standard work in its requirements for recipients to possibly combine multiple non-standard 
jobs to reach earnings and hours requirements, if alternatives are not available. 
The share of part-time employment was relatively high in Nordic regime countries, ranging 
from 13.4% in Finland to 22% in Sweden and Denmark. Temporary employment was also 




approach observed in Nordic regime countries comprised earned income tax credits that 
were encompassing in terms of employment types and earnings. Earned income tax credit 
policies in these countries were not only targeting non-standard workers. The ratio of three 
earned income tax credit policies to three countries reflects that, unlike in many other 
regimes, earned income tax credits were not separated out for different employment 
relationships.  
The Nordic regime countries, Sweden, Denmark and Finland, had very similar earned 
income tax credit provisions, but they diverged when it came to the use of adjusted 
unemployment benefits. Sweden’s can hardly be considered a de facto in-work benefit and 
adjusted unemployment benefits were not identified for Denmark. On the other hand, 
Finland operated three adjusted unemployment benefit policies that were oriented towards 
more substantial (but still ‘non-standard’) labour market participation. The share of part-
time work was lower in Finland than in Sweden and Denmark, whereas temporary 
employment was fairly high (above the EU average of 13.3%). Adjusted unemployment 
benefits in Finland specifically targeted part-time workers and temporary full-time workers. 
This could imply a dualism in Finland in the use of the unemployment benefit system to 
support outsiders that was not apparent in Denmark or Sweden’s in-work benefit strategies.  
The Bismarckian regime had the highest number of earned income tax credit policies (eight 
over five countries), which reflected the ‘fragmented’ provision, targeted on employment 
status and household attributes (e.g. sole parents/earners).  Part-time work is relatively high 
in these countries, and is the highest in EUMS for the Netherlands. The Netherlands’ lowest 
scoring adjusted unemployment benefit policies and the highest part-time employment rate 
in the EU could indicate that this policy is oriented towards facilitating part-time 
employment.    
The overall picture of the labour market orientation of in-work benefits in Southern regime 
is one of very restrictive adjusted unemployment benefits alongside a mix of targeted and 
more encompassing tax credit provisions regarding earnings. Given the high scores for 
adjusted unemployment benefits in Southern regime countries, these policies were the 
farthest away from ‘de-facto’ in-work benefits within unemployment benefits. Amid a 
context of high self-employment and temporary employment, in-work cash transfers (in 




forms of work even though it is prevalent. There were, however, tax credit provisions for the 
self-employed in Italy.  
7.5 Conclusion   
This chapter first compared the qualitative rules and design features of in-work benefits and 
their respective scores on the sub-indicators of the labour market orientation of policies. This 
fed into a cross-national comparison of policies using the composite indicators, which aimed 
to compare the orientation of in-work benefits towards non-standard and standard 
employment, relatively speaking, looking at each sub-type independently because of the 
idiosyncratic features of policies. Finally, the scores were compiled at the regime level, along 
with three key indicators of non-standard work in European labour markets, to paint a 
broader picture of the range of in-work benefits in use across regimes, flagging possible 
connections between the orientation of policies and labour market context.  
These findings from the chapter feed into the discussion in Chapter 8. There are three main 
conclusions to make here, however. First, the analysis highlights that a blanket 
understanding of in-work benefits as targeting labour market outsiders and/or those in non-
standard work is limited when comparing across an extensive number of countries. Across 
EUMS, some in-work benefits were restricted to employees only, e.g. Ireland’s Family 
Income Supplement, whereas some had minimum earnings and hours requirements. Those 
with earnings well above average wage were eligible for earned income tax credits in some 
countries (e.g. Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Ireland).  
Second, in-work benefit sub-types appear to be a good but not a perfect proxy for the labour 
market orientation of policies.  For example, earned income tax credits in several countries 
were more encompassing in terms of the range of eligible earnings and the employment 
status of recipients. Yet, in Bismarckian countries but also elsewhere (e.g. Spain) earned 
income tax credits were more targeted in terms of work, earnings and other criteria 
concerning the employment status and the earnings of the other members within a household. 
Similarly, in-work cash transfers across EUMS were more targeted on household means but 
rules varied with regards to the types of workers than can access schemes e.g. some we for 
employees and not the self-employed. 
 In a few standout cases (e.g. Finland, Netherlands and Slovenia), adjusted unemployment 




and/or temporary full-time workers. But these were the exception to the rule. Most 
unemployment benefits were far from in-work cash transfers in terms of the amount of work 
and earnings that could be ‘topped up’ with these benefits.  The idea that unemployment 
benefits may be being used across countries in the way they are used in Germany to 
supplement part-time work did not hold for many of these policies in EUMS but the other 
instances of this use of these provisions are not insignificant in terms of understanding the 
varied role of the state in income maintenance for ‘working’ households and feeds into 
debates about defining in-work benefits.  
Finally, the findings offer some support for the role of policy legacies across regimes. This 
was strongest in the Nordic countries where earned income tax credits were less restrictive, 
more universal and individualised. The limited number of Central and Eastern European 
countries included in the analysis made it hard to draw conclusions, but policies received 
similar scores even though the types of restrictions within policies differed. The Bismarckian 
regime countries were the most varied across all sub-three types but tended to be more non-
standard oriented than average and had a familial slant in several cases. Liberal regime 
countries were more likely to be restrictive and geared towards part-time, low income work 
across the majority of policies apart from tax credits in Ireland. Southern regime countries’ 
adjusted unemployment benefits were not conducive to combining unemployment benefits 
with earnings from work. 
There are also several shortcomings of the analysis to mention at this point. Limited data on 
certain aspects of in-work benefit design put restrictions on the construction of sub- and 
composite-indicators. The composite indicators – each of which broadly captured the level 
of work-based restrictions in countries’ in-work benefits – could be adapted to better reflect 
country variation, especially with regards to the levels of earnings at which in-work cash 
transfers are received for different household types. Moreover, separate composite indicators 
reflected the institutional idiosyncrasies of policies and the data, but a more fine-grained set 
of sub-indicators that were equivalised across all provision types could lead to more 
meaningful cross-national comparisons of the multiple provisions used by EUMS. As the 
analysis of the orientation of in-work benefits is confined to the rules and design features, it 
does not capture the full range of factors determining the precarity or insecurity of workers 
that is likely to vary across contexts (Eardley and Corden, 1996; Schwander and 




assumptions about standard and non-standard work: the interpretation the findings could 
therefore be nuanced with closer examination of specific labour market contexts and 
inequalities.   
Nevertheless, the analysis constitutes a systematic comparison of in-work benefit design. It 
illuminates the varied orientation of in-work benefits in EUMS towards different kinds and 
degrees of work in line with the analysis of variation in the orientation of provisions towards 
different degrees and forms of labour market dependence. It also feeds into suggestions for 
using other methods and data sources to operationalise the framework – these are set out in 









8 DISCUSSION  
The discussion and interpretation of the findings in the previous chapters have focused 
mainly on each strand of the research in isolation. The aim of this chapter is to comment on 
the interpretation of the findings as a whole. The empirical investigation mapping out in-
work benefit policies also aided the search for secondary sources about specific in-work 
benefit policies in select contexts and other relevant resources about, for example, the 
context of reforms. These feed into the discussion, helping to nuance the interpretation of 
the findings.  
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 8.1 outlines a summary of the findings as they 
were presented across the three preceding chapters. Section 8.2 discusses what the findings 
mean for broader arguments about trends and variation in in-work benefits in capitalist 
democratic countries, including questions over what constitutes in-work benefits when 
comparing across contexts (both space and time). The significance of some of the debates 
about context outlined in Chapter 3 that were explored in the research are also discussed, 
including the arguments that associate in-work benefits with socio-economic pressures and 
the more critical perspectives that position in in-work benefits as neoliberal instruments.   
Section 8.3 nuances the points made in the previous section by discussing the findings 
showing the extent of variation in in-work benefits across countries. It outlines five typical 
in-work benefit approaches or models of in-work benefits, each with distinctive attributes 
concerning policy orientation towards forms and degrees of dependence on the state, family 
and/or market. While provisions across countries are linked by the seemingly distinctive 
logic in-work benefits in broad terms, there also appears to be a range of different logics 
underpinning in-work benefit policies in national contexts, which makes universal 
arguments about the determinants of in-work benefits less tenable. It outlines some of the 
ways variation across countries relates to social policy legacies, as well as some aspects of 
contemporary context, which, it is argued, is likely to helpful for building theory about the 
role of institutions in shaping cross-national variation in in-work benefits. Finally, 8.4 





8.1 Summary of main findings  
The multiple components of the empirical investigation examining in-work benefits from 
different angles led to a number of key findings. First, the preliminary mapping of two 
archetypal in-work benefits and two possible in-work benefits identified policies in a 
majority of EUMS: 63% of EUMS in 2008 to 71% of all EUMS in 2016. There was, 
however, a split between the more and less advanced welfare states. Such policies were in 
place in all of the Bismarckian, Nordic and Liberal regime countries, less common among 
CEE and Southern European regime countries. Yet, the 2016 mapping captured an increase 
in Southern European countries, leaving only one country within this regime without in-
work benefits (Cyprus). In contrast, a minority of CEE countries had in-work benefits for 
both time points. This increased from two (Hungary and Slovakia) in 2008 to four (Croatia, 
Estonia, Slovakia and Slovenia) in 2016, as Hungary abolished its earned income tax credit 
provision in 2011.  
The mapping also captured variation in the form of these policies across countries. In-work 
cash transfers were found in just five EUMS (18%) for 2016. Earned income tax credits were 
in place in 12 countries for each time point. Five countries’ tax credits were refundable 
earned income tax credits (AT, BE, LU, ES and SK) and six were non-refundable (IE, NL, 
DK, FI, SE, EE). Italy had both refundable and non-refundable earned income tax credits in 
place in 2016. Adjusted unemployment benefits were the most common sub-type. They were 
identified in 52% of EUMS in 2008 and 61% of EUMS in 2016. Combinations of sub-types 
across other countries/regimes also differed. Nordic and most Bismarckian regime countries 
had both earned income tax credits and adjusted unemployment benefits. In-work cash 
transfers were found in both Liberal regime countries, Italy, Malta and France.  
The analysis of expenditure data covered 14 countries with in-work cash transfers or earned 
income tax credits (except Finland) from 2006 to 2017. Average expenditure in these 14 
EUMS increased from less than one per cent of public expenditure in 2006 to approximately 
2.5 per cent of public expenditure in 2016. One group of countries - Denmark, Italy, Sweden, 
Ireland and the Netherlands - spent three to six per cent of public expenditure on in-work 
benefits from 2012 onwards. In contrast, expenditure did not surpass one per cent of public 
expenditure for the whole study period in UK, Slovakia, Estonia, Malta, Luxembourg, Spain, 




Expenditure flat lined or declined between 2008 or 2009 and 2012 in most EUMS, 
coinciding with the 2008 crisis and subsequent recession. From 2012, expenditure on in-
work benefits in the higher-spending group of EUMS continued to increase on average, 
whereas the spending trajectories of the lower-spending group were mixed. Expenditure on 
earned income tax credits was on average higher than expenditure on in-work cash transfers.  
Beyond the regime framework applied above, the findings were contextualised with 
reference to socio-economic factors commonly associated with in-work benefits, in-work 
poverty, unemployment and underemployment. Countries with both relatively high and 
relatively low rates of unemployment had in place the provisions examined in this thesis. 
Unemployment was not strongly correlated with in-work benefit expenditure in all countries 
apart from the UK (pc: 0.687). Countries with the highest rates of in-work poverty were less 
likely to have in-work policies, but in-work poverty was also positively correlated with in-
work benefit expenditure among some of the countries included in the expenditure analysis 
(i.e. those with earned income tax credits and in-work cash transfers). Moreover, countries 
with both low and high rates of in-work poverty risk had high and low expenditure on in-
work benefits. In-work poverty therefore did not explain differences between countries in 
in-work expenditure.  
The risk of under-employment was higher among many of the countries with in-work 
provisions, and it was very low in many of the countries without, the main exception being 
Cyprus, reflecting that the risk of underemployment, when measured as a proportion of total 
employment, is higher in the more advanced welfare states. High and low spending countries 
had high rates of underemployment. Yet, individual trajectories were interesting, for 
example, a sharp increase in Netherlands’ underemployment rate preceded a sharp increase 
in in-work benefit expenditure.  
Turning to the ‘liberalisation’ variables, there was again a mixed picture among countries 
with and without the in-work provisions mapped (i.e. countries with both high and low trade 
union density, replacement rates and collective bargaining coverage). The strength and 
direction of the correlation between in-work benefit expenditure and these variables also 
differed across EUMS but there are some notable findings. In-work benefit expenditure was 
negatively correlated with unemployment replacement rates in most EUMS, and strongly so 




bargaining, a strong negative association was found for France, Luxembourg and Sweden, 
yet a strong negative correlation was found for Denmark. Strong positive correlations 
between expenditure and trade union density was found for Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and Spain. Thus, the indicators of in-work benefit expansion and liberalisation 
applied to the more coordinated countries.    
However, again replacement rates were not consistently associated with differences between 
countries’ in-work benefit expenditure. Countries that were the highest spenders on in-work 
benefits also had some of the highest replacement rates over the period studied and the 
correlation coefficients masked the relatively small change in either one of the indicators. 
For example, replacement rates (based on the indicator used for this study) hardly changed 
in Denmark and the Netherlands over the study period, whereas in-work benefit expenditure 
increased markedly.   
The analysis of the orientation of in-work benefits towards different degrees and forms of 
state-family-market dependence shone light on further cross-national and regime variation. 
Although limited, indicative analysis of levels, an indicator of policy orientation towards 
more or less state dependence, identified the highest levels in countries with in-work cash 
transfers, especially for households with multiple children or dependents (e.g. Ireland and 
Malta). Non-refundable earned income tax credits in the Nordic regime countries and Spain 
also appeared to have similar maximum levels to the in-work cash transfers. Refundable tax 
credits in continental European countries were oriented towards a much lower degree of state 
dependence. Levels could not be calculated for adjusted unemployment benefits.  
The sub-types of policies and certain design features and policy rules (e.g. means-tests and 
targeting criteria) were the main indicators of the different forms of state dependence policies 
were oriented towards. The fiscal and more universalist in-work provisions in the Nordic 
countries were thus seen to be the most privileged form of in-work benefit, that would be 
minimally invasive, more likely to be shielded from debates and stigma associated with 
means-tested benefits. At the other end of the scale, adjusted unemployment benefits, were 
seen to be oriented towards more punitive and stigmatising form of state dependence, 
because of the (often strict) conditions of entitlement and punitive mechanisms in 
unemployment benefits in EUMS, and because they do not have the same deservingness 




were found across many countries but it was not until the analysis of the labour market 
orientation of policies was it clear that many of these were highly restrictive in terms of the 
amounts of earnings or kinds of work that can be done, making them less likely to be 
considered a de facto in-work benefit, at least in a comparative sense. The exceptions were 
provisions in Germany, Slovenia, Portugal, Finland, Croatia and Slovenia.   
In the middle of these were targeted and means-tested social welfare policies (in-work cash 
transfers) that contained some privileging mechanism in the explicit targeting of households 
in work. The additional entitlements for households with more children could be seen to 
signify a recognition of need that is more socially accepted than that of unemployment, 
especially in contexts when the latter is framed as the fault of the individual and not a 
structural issue. More targeted tax credits possessed the privileged features of fiscal welfare 
but the targeting on certain household types or parts of the labour force indicates they may 
be somewhat more invasive and possibly stigmatising than the more universalist tax credits.  
The family orientation of in-work benefits was established by separating out individual and 
household level provisions. Looking only at in-work cash transfers and refundable and non-
refundable earned income tax credits, individual provisions were found for Ireland, Italy, 
Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Denmark, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Sweden (2016 
policies). Household policies were found for Ireland, the UK, France, Italy, Malta, Austria, 
Netherlands, Spain, Slovakia and the Netherlands. All in-work cash transfers were 
household benefits and the majority of earned income tax credits were household. The 
majority of the former directed resources towards households with greater needs in the form 
of more children. The implications for ‘work incentives’ for women/ second earners was 
harder to gauge from the data, but most policies had in place rules that meant levels were 
higher if both couples were participating in work. Yet, work requirements in some policies 
indicated provisions were more oriented towards a 1.5 earner family model. Some of the 
earned income tax credits were targeted on specific household types in a small number of 
EUMS (AT, NL, BE, ES, SK). Working lone parents were explicitly targeted in Austria and 
the Netherlands. The Working Mother Tax Credit in Spain was the only provision targeting 
women explicitly. Policies in Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium and Slovakia had features 




Finally, as stated above, in general in-work cash transfers were targeted on earnings below 
and only slightly above average wage and were oriented towards a substantial degree of 
work hours, but this could be among members of a household. In-work cash transfers in Italy 
and Ireland were not available to the self-employed.  Earned income tax credits were targeted 
on a broader range of earnings and did not restrict on the basis of employment status in the 
Nordic countries. Targeted earned income tax credits were oriented towards a moderate level 
of earnings and participation and/or on specific employment types, namely employees or 
self-employed.  
Finally, many of the adjusted unemployment benefits included in the initial mapping were 
found to be oriented towards very marginal earnings or non-standard employment. 
Germany’s Unemployment Benefit II was used as a benchmark for a de facto in-work benefit 
(Clasen, 2019), and it was established only five additional countries scored equal to or below 
this provision on the labour market indicator (France, Finland, Spain, Croatia and Slovenia). 
Very high scoring policies, indicating they are oriented towards very low earnings and/or 
very non-standard forms of employment and were the furthest from the de facto in-work 
benefits of the countries mentioned above, were found in Ireland, the UK and Sweden.  
The further interpretation of these findings and the conclusions that can be drawn from them 
are discussed further in the remainder of the chapter.  It brings together all parts of the 
analysis to set out five model approaches that vary on the different elements of the 
dependency relationships framework. Before that, however, it discusses what the findings 
tell us about broad trends and developments in in-work benefits in EUMS and the relevance 
for understanding wider trends and developments across capitalist democratic countries.   
8.2 The rise (and demise) of in-work benefits  
As discussed in Chapter 2, in-work benefits, broadly defined, are understood to have become 
more common among advanced capitalist democracies from the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
The research addressed a lack of systematic cross-national research into in-work benefits 
over time in order to interrogate this claim, focusing on trends and variation in what were 
identified as archetypal and possible in-work benefits in EUMS in recent years. All EUMS 
were included in the analysis to facilitate exploration of variation in in-work benefits across 
diverse political economy and social policy contexts. Including all EUMS also meant the 




work benefits e.g. CEE and some Southern European countries. Moreover, the time period 
spanned a period of economic crisis, recession and ‘recovery’, facilitating exploration of in-
work benefit variation across varied economic contexts, which have been link to certain 
types of reform (e.g. retrenchment). 
As outlined above, a large proportion of EUMS had either archetypal or possible in-work 
benefits over both time points, confirming claims made elsewhere that such policies are 
commonplace in capitalist democratic countries (Kenworthy, 2015). At the same time, more 
dynamism was observed among CEE and Southern regime countries, with schemes 
introduced very recently in some of these countries (e.g. Malta) or abolished/ effectively 
abolished over the study period. The inclusion of these countries was partly validated by the 
research because in-work benefit policies were in place.  However, the trajectory of in-work 
benefits in these contexts indicates political support for the state’s role in the domain of 
direct income maintenance is newer and possibly less stable than for the more advanced 
countries included in the analysis.  
The analysis of expenditure adds further complexity to our understanding of the trends and 
variation in in-work benefits. There were stark differences between countries’ in-work 
benefit expenditure. This split did not map on to the advanced and less advanced welfare 
states, as observed for the patterns of countries with and without in-work benefits, but instead 
appears to relate to the ‘targetedness’ and levels of credits or benefits, as compared in 
Chapter 6. While earned income tax credits were, on average, costlier, it is not necessarily 
the case that expenditure on earned income tax credits are costlier than in-work cash 
transfers, as is implied in some studies, as some earned income tax credits were very targeted.   
Considering changes over time, increasing average expenditure over the 11 years of the 
analysis masked varied trends in expenditure across countries, with divergent trajectories 
apparent among both advanced and less advanced welfare states. Partly, changes in 
expenditure from 2008 onwards appeared to capture different forms of cyclical spending: 
Indeed, a key question for future research is whether the decline or flat lining of expenditure 
over the recession period for most countries reflects decreasing demand for provisions (e.g. 
due to a decline in people in work and eligible for benefits), the politics of retrenchment or 
indeed other factors.72 Beyond cyclical patterns, however, in-work benefits increased in 
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costs quite rapidly in some contexts while costs stagnated or declined in some. Most of the 
increase in average expenditure from 2011/12 onwards was from the higher spend countries 
(e.g. Sweden, Netherlands, Denmark), which can partly be attributed to expansionary 
measures e.g. In Sweden, there were several expansionary reforms to its Earned Income Tax 
credit since it was introduced in 2007. Yet, even in these contexts, the latter years of the 
analysis suggest that expansion is not going to continue at the same rate; Both Sweden and 
the Netherlands have implemented reforms in 2016 which made their provisions marginally 
less universal, phasing out eligibility for higher earnings.  
Of the lower-spending countries, expenditure did not always recover a recovered after the 
crisis, indicating the decline was not necessarily related to cyclical context. For example, in 
both the UK and Slovakia, expenditure on in-work benefits did not recover from pre-crisis 
levels. In the UK, this is attributed to the retrenchment of in-work benefits from 2012 by a 
centre-right coalition (Clegg, 2015). Thus, given the trends identified in the study, we cannot 
assume that in-work benefits are on an upward trajectory that is only stunted by cyclical 
pressures, nor can we assume that they are as prominent in terms of public budgets across 
all the EUMS where they are in place.  
These findings pose problems for arguments that in-work benefits are a form of liberal social 
policy. Indeed, the UK, as argued by Clegg (2015) and others (e.g. Sloman, 2018), at the end 
of the time period of the study, was undergoing drastic reforms of its social security system 
(to Universal Credit) and there has also been a greater emphasis by both left- and right-wing 
political parties on pre-distributive strategies. Granted, this emphasis differs, as the 
Conservative party is focusing on higher minimum wages, whereas the Labour party has 
emphasized more coordinated measures, including collective bargaining, alongside higher 
minimum wages (Sloman, 2018). If the UK is a leader in in-work benefits and is starting to 
break with its former balance of pre- and re-distribution, then it may indicate that in the 
longer run, the politics of in-work benefits are unstable there, too (Clasen, 2019). At the 
same time, these political preferences could indeed be associated with changes in political 
economy in the UK, in which in-work benefits have a different function or role.  
As mentioned above, there were other examples of instability captured in the study: the 
abolition of an earned income tax credit in Hungary between the two time points and the 




nobody was eligible. France’s in-work policies were also abolished, and new provisions 
introduced over the time period studied. So, while at the very top level we may see a picture 
of stability in the countries with in-work benefits and increasing expenditure, there is 
considerable within and cross-country variation in expenditure and the reforms occurring 
within these time points, which makes universal arguments about in-work benefits hard to 
grapple with.  
In this vein, the research also offers limited support for the idea that there has been rise of 
the liberal approach to in-work benefits73 in EUMS. The low incidence of in-work cash 
transfers, akin to traditional in-work benefits in the UK, underlines this point. While the 
second archetypal liberal in-work benefit, refundable earned income tax credits (associated 
predominantly with the US’ Federal EITC, were more common among EUMS, further 
examination of the form of these policies revealed substantial differences between earned 
income tax credits in these countries and the US’ family-oriented, means-tested EITC. This 
is discussed further below. 
Moreover, the prevalence of adjusted unemployment benefits among EUMS as indicated in 
the initial mapping requires careful interpretation. A low bar was set for counting adjusted 
unemployment benefit policies in the initial mapping (see Chapter 3) and, as outlined above, 
removing all policies with a score equal to or above Germany’s benchmark benefit would 
reduce the number of EUMS with adjusted unemployment benefits for 2016 from 14 to 6 
(including Germany).  Yet, in a broad sense, the prevalence of adjusted unemployment 
benefits, even though many are very restrictive in the amount of work and/or earnings that 
can be combined with the benefit, is an important finding. It shows that there is the scope 
within many EUMS’ unemployment benefits for these policies to operate as de facto in-work 
cash transfers. The parameters of unemployment benefits could be shifted to be more 
accommodating to work or earnings without necessarily having to introduce what would be 
path-breaking in-work cash transfers or earned income tax credits in many countries. It 
therefore may be important to ‘look under the bonnet’ to understand more about the state’s 
role in direct income maintenance of working households.  
Yet, as argued in the theoretical framework, the objectives and political processes 
underpinning the adjusted unemployment benefits are likely to be somewhat distinctive to 
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the archetypal in-work cash transfers and earned income tax credits, but there are still many 
unknowns about this sub-type. They may be about allowing recipients of unemployment 
benefits to retain some attachment to the labour market while unemployed, without being 
penalised or losing entitlement to unemployment benefits, rather than the wider use of 
schemes to incentivise or indeed enforce participation in precarious or very marginal work. 
On the other hand, the finding that the number of countries with adjusted unemployment 
benefits increased over the study period could indeed be indicative of more convergent 
pressures, such as high unemployment during the recession, reforming ‘passive’ benefits and 
ongoing austerity (Theodoropoulou, 2018). A more fine-grained tracking of reforms to 
unemployment benefits over a long period would help us to understand whether such policies 
are indeed de facto in-work benefits and the objectives underpinning them. Another 
significant question, which was beyond the scope of this study (and not in the data), was 
whether the conditionality outlined in Chapter 6 that has become more prevalent in 
unemployment benefits also applies to those combining benefit receipt with earnings/ part-
time work.  If so, the objectives (and interests) underpinning policies could be more clearly 
read as the erosion of rights and the conditioning of income maintenance on participation in 
precarious work (a re-commodification/ workfare approach) (Rubery et al., 2018).  
A related point for interpreting the findings with respect to questions about the rise (or 
demise) of in-work benefits is that these provisions on their own were not seen to represent 
an exhaustive list of in-work benefits. Other provisions, such as employee social security 
contribution reductions or exemptions, could be considered in-work benefits within the 
framework outlined in Chapter 3. Including these provisions could alter the patterns of 
expenditure across countries. Similarly, the provisions included may be too broad from 
certain perspectives.  
Similarly, the findings complicate some of the arguments set out in Chapter 2 about the use 
and expansion of in-work benefits and context.  As some of the highest spending countries 
had the lowest rates of in-work poverty during the time period covered and vice versa, the 
findings offer little support for the notion that governments introducing in-work benefits 
‘react’ in a uniform way to changes in socio-economic context. While it could be argued that 
high spending countries are effective in reducing in-work poverty, there were some instances 
where policies were introduced part-way through the period in countries where in-work 




arguments about in-work benefits in the literature (Clasen, 2019). That being said, the 
problem of underemployment did appear to be salient among many of the countries with in-
work benefits compared to those without, which, when considering also the longer standing 
history of these provisions in advanced welfare states could indicate that it is something to 
do with certain kinds of labour market risk associated with the more advanced economies 
that lead governments to implement in-work benefit policies (Bonoli, 2006; Wren, 2013).    
Longer term processes associated with liberalisation (e.g. declining trade union membership) 
have occurred in many EUMS since the 1980s, and the increase in in-work benefit 
expenditure in some contexts could feed into the liberalisation thesis, if policies do indeed 
reduce the onus of employers to pay adequate wages and contribute to inequalities between 
capital and labour, for example. The research was not oriented towards exploring these 
outcomes. Yet, the exploration of the relationship between in-work benefits and indicators 
of liberalisation brought to the surface some possible avenues for theory building and future 
research.  
For example, considering two of the high spend countries: Denmark and Sweden. The fairly 
rapid increase in expenditure on the earned income tax credit in Denmark, while replacement 
rates and collective bargaining coverage remained fairly stable, could be further evidence of 
‘embedded flexibilization’ in which there is a strong emphasis on labour market participation 
through in-work benefits but protection from the risk of unemployment remains high 
(Thelen, 2014). The presence of skills development and training in this context would also 
support this argument (Ibid). In contrast, Sweden’s expenditure on earned income tax credit 
expansion occurred alongside a decline in replacement rates and, although not as drastic, 
collective bargaining coverage. This could be seen as a starker form of liberalisation as social 
rights for the unemployed are eroded as well as the coverage of institutions that negotiate 
pay on behalf of labour.  
Yet, the analysis of the relationship between liberalisation and in-work benefits only 
scratches the surface in terms of indicators of both in-work benefit expenditure and of 
liberalisation. The latter is often measured and analysed from multiple dimensions, including 
changes in the shape and form of collective bargaining which are not captured by these 





Moreover, arguments about trends based on the expenditure analysis should be interpreted 
with caution.  As detailed in Chapter 4 of this thesis, issues concerning validation of data 
and the method to estimate expenditure was somewhat ‘experimental’ given the lack of 
precedent for this approach to compare expenditures on in-work benefits. Moreover, there 
are also issues with interpreting expenditure data without knowing the reasons behind 
changes for all countries. For a number of examples, the main data sources described the 
relevant policy reforms, including the abolition (e.g. in the Netherlands) or introduction of 
provisions (e.g. in Spain), and the changing of policy parameters, that could lead to increase 
costs. Yet, expenditure could also decline because of changes in demand, for example.   
Helping to make sense of this complex picture, the variance in the in-work benefits in 
EUMS’ discussed below illuminates that there are other-cross cutting objectives and ideals 
that are likely to reflect the national political dynamics at play in in-work benefit reforms. 
This includes those relating to social policy legacies.   
8.3 The varied orientation of in-work policies 
The comparison of the design features, rules and expenditure on in in-work policies, through 
the lens of the dependency relationships framework, led the identification considerable 
variation in EUMS’ in-work benefit policies. However, it is important to stress that the 
headline finding that countries’ in-work policies vary is not new. Many of the studies 
reviewed in Chapter 2 describe the ways in which policies are designed differently across 
countries, looking at similar design features and rules examined in this study, albeit for 
different groups of countries or time points (e.g. OECD, 2003; Cousins, 2015; Kenworthy, 
2016). Indeed, the findings on the varied orientation of in-work policies presented in this 
thesis reiterate and indeed confirm some of the main findings about policy design and the 
salient features in these other studies.  
Yet, much of the existing comparative analysis, sitting within the grey literature, has applied 
a technocratic or economistic lens, chiefly to assess whether policies are likely to meet their 
stated employment and redistribution aims, and/or the possibilities for introducing or 
reforming in-work benefits in select countries. The identification of trade-offs involved in 
in-work benefit design in this literature illuminates mainly the technical decisions that policy 
makers are likely to take into account when deciding on in-work benefit strategies, including 




wage distributions or a high minimum wage (e.g. OECD, 2003). Yet, the focus on 
technical/practical ‘costs’ (Gingrich, 2014) overlook the political and sociological dynamics 
associated with in-work benefit reforms identified in studies looking at specific contexts 
(Marx et al., 2012; Clasen, 2019; Grover and Stewart, 1999; Vlandas, 2013). And thus, the 
approach in this study was to develop a way of assessing the varied logics and objectives 
across a diverse range of countries that facilitates an exploration of in-work benefits with 
respect to historical and contemporary context74.  
Given these aims, it is therefore fruitful to extract from the research a stylised summary of 
variation in-work benefit policies. Based on the application of this framework to the 
empirical investigation into EUMS’ policies in this thesis, five ideal-type models of in-work 
benefits are summarised in Table 8.1 below. After outlining the characteristics of each and 
the countries where these approaches were found, I discuss how and the extent to which 
countries align with each approach and consider how historical and contemporary contextual 
factors may feed into this variance. More specifically, I consider the role of social policy 
legacies and attempt to characterise the use of provisions in terms of what kind of change or 
continuity they represent in the countries in which they are used, in line with the broad 
framework presented in Chapter 3, Section 3.1.3.  
The first can be summarised as the archetypal, means-tested social in-work benefit that 
explicitly target working households. They have a relatively high orientation towards state 
dependence, especially among households with multiple children, seemingly towards the 
goal of redistribution in order to reduce poverty among working families with children 
through the transfer system. Such policies are oriented towards a relatively invasive and 
visible form of state dependence within the social security system. The targeting and means-
testing require an assessment of resources, household composition, relationships between 
adults and children, and the labour market participation of adults considered able to work. 
Yet, the targeting on in-work households, and emphasis on children, likely taps into ideas of 
deservingness based on participation and need (Oorschot and Roosma, 2015).  
Such provisions are oriented towards a moderate degree of labour market participation, 
typically around or above full-time work among a couple, that is sufficient to bring families 
above the poverty line. The latter is shaped mainly through minimum and maximum earnings 
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thresholds, but some provisions (e.g. the UK and Ireland) have rules concerning hours of 
work (to prevent low ‘work effort’). Interdependence among members of a household for 
resources is enforced in the design of these policies, as is the tying together of the labour 
market participation of adults within a household.  
The second approach is low to moderate (in terms of the size of the award) refundable earned 
income tax credits, which emphasize small financial incentives to structure the balance of 
familial and labour market dependencies for specific household types, e.g. sole earners or 
lone mothers. As a form of fiscal welfare, this form of dependence on the state is likely 
minimally invasive, the levels among of these credits also indicate they are oriented towards 
a fairly minimal level of state dependence for the households that receive them. However, 
they can be received as a transfer and thus are possibly more visible in terms of a form of 
state dependence than reductions in liabilities. Although a focus on certain family types links 
these policies, there was a split among provisions that appeared to hark to more conservative 
logics, facilitating a male breadwinner or a 1.5 model, offering some additional financial 
support to the second earners, whereas other policies were about lone parent households or 
the activation of mothers specifically (in the case of Spain). 
The third model was similar in the degree and form of state dependence provisions were 
oriented towards to the second model75. Yet, the emphasis on these policies was the level of 
earnings or type of employment, typically these take the form of separate schemes for 
different types of employment (e.g. self-employed and employees). The earnings thresholds 
are narrower than those in the earned income tax credits in the fourth model outlined next 
(e.g. credits were phased out at a lower rate of income). Typically, provisions were 
individualised. The emphasis appeared to be more about financial incentives to work for 
select groups of workers defined in both earnings and employment status. The levels of 
earned income tax credits were also relatively low in most of these countries indicating a 
limited orientation towards state dependence for income maintenance among recipients.
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several key design features and their overall level of expenditure. The main approach observed in these countries are more 






Table 8.1 Five versions of in-work benefits oriented towards distinctive combinations of dependence on the labour market, state and the family   
 Summary State Family  Labour market  EUMS 









Social welfare. Invasive, 
targeted, but in-work status 
and need acknowledged  
High  
Interdependence between all 
members of household premised 

















Fiscal welfare. Minimally 
invasive, targets select 
household types, in-work 
status acknowledged. 
Moderate 
Partial dependence, either 
between spouses and/or between 
one member of household and 
dependent children 










income work  
Low - 
moderate 
Fiscal welfare. Minimally 
invasive, targeted, in-work 
status acknowledged. 















Fiscal welfare.  Minimally 
invasive, more universalist, 
in-work status 
acknowledged  
None/ Low  Individualised  













punitive   
? 
Social welfare. Punitive, 







Individualised (contributory) or 
interdependence among 
household members for 








Slovenia, Finland  
 
Notes: Stylised summary of the analysis of in-work benefits in EUMS in this thesis, applying the dependency relationships framework developed in Chapter 3 of the thesis, 




The fourth approach again has the privileging features associated with earned income tax 
credits: fiscal welfare that is less invasive, the association with work and the explicit 
recognition of work in the targeting of working households and/or those with earned income. 
Yet, this policy is also non-refundable, as such it is assumed to be a less visible and obvious 
form of state dependence for the households that receive them and it therefore further away 
from an association with welfare than refundable tax credits. At the family level, policies are 
individualised, thus they emphasize individual activation and are not oriented towards 
interdependence among members of a household. Finally, in terms of labour market 
participation, such provisions are widely received, those with low and high earnings are 
eligible.  They are typically phased out at around about average earnings but can be received 
far up the earnings distribution, as such they are the most universal of all provisions. In a 
similar vein, do not have a clear standard or non-standard orientation and encompassing in 
terms of the form of labour market dependency that they are oriented towards.  
The fifth model of in-work benefits was identified by the further investigation into adjusted 
unemployment benefits, but it consisted of countries, which predominantly used social 
security measures that grouped in-work recipients with out-of-work recipients under the 
same benefit. These countries are grouped together due to their use of social in-work benefits 
and the implicit targeting of in-work households.  The approaches in these countries are 
similar to the means-tested in-work cash transfer schemes – although we know very little 
about the levels of benefits and thus the orientation of policies towards different degrees of 
state dependence. Yet a key difference is that such provisions do not acknowledge in-work 
status of recipients, nor is there a clear emphasis on children, like in the in-work cash transfer 
model. Theoretically, this distinction is likely to matter, as it moves away from the targeting 
on working families, that could be considered more deserving than the unemployed.   
Countries are listed next to the approach they most closely resemble. If countries combine 
approaches, they are listed next to all that provisions in that context resemble. Moreover, 
countries in italics are those with policies that mainly align with the approach but has an 
idiosyncratic feature that is considered important for understanding the precise orientation 
of provisions in each country towards different forms or degrees of dependence on the state, 




provisions resembling the first type. In the case of the UK, this is Working Tax Credits76. 
Next, the second type reflects policies in Austria, Spain, Slovakia, Netherlands. Policies in 
Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy resemble the third. The fourth model is based on provisions in 
Sweden, Denmark, Netherlands, Finland, and to a lesser extent, Italy, Ireland. The fifth 
approach represents policies in the UK, Germany, Slovenia and Finland.  
There is some overlap with existing typologies in the literature. For example, Kenworthy’s 
(2015) oft-cited discussion paper argues that among OECD countries there are three main 
types of in-work benefit: (1) large refundable tax credit or cash transfer with phase-in and 
phase-out ranges; (2) large reduction in employee tax payments; and (3) large tax credit or 
cash transfer with no phase out. The plainest overlap is with Kenworthy’s third type and type 
four here. Indeed, Kenworthy’s (2015) example of the third approach is Sweden, so the 
findings are complimentary and provide further evidence of the Swedish approach in other 
Social Democratic regime countries. Yet, noteworthy type one combines types 1 – 3 here. 
This section discusses in more detail the examples of these approaches in EUMS and 
considers the historical and contemporary context that may help to characterise their role 
and significance in select contexts.  
The countries with a variant of the first approach include France, Ireland, Malta, Italy and 
the UK (outgoing in-work benefits). The relevant in-work benefits in these countries are 
alike in the use of social security measures explicitly targeting working households with 
moderate to strong orientation towards state dependence and dependence among members 
of a household. They are closest to the historical schemes of the UK with an orientation 
towards moderate state dependence but conditioned on the basis of need.  
As Vlandas (2013) has already argued, such reforms are path-breaking in Bismarckian 
France as they target outsiders (and are funded by general taxation), in a country where social 
provisions have a strong insider orientation and an insurance-based logic. The Activity 
Allowance appears to be a continuation of the previous reform. Malta is not always included 
in regime research. The continuation of policy logics is therefore hard to assess.  Yet, later 
benefit reforms in Malta made it so that sole earner households also became eligible for the 
benefit. This could reflect ongoing religious (Catholicism) preferences for provisions that 
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tested benefit all in all but name only(Clegg, 2015). However, the framing of the policy is likely to be important to its 
politics and the could impact upon the experiences of receiving it. The disconnect between framing and actual policies is 




facilitate breadwinner model despite ‘activation’ and poverty reduction agendas of which a 
goal is two earner households (Briguglio and Bugeja, 2011, p.15). However, the sole earner 
benefit is at a considerably lower level than the benefit for two-earner or lone-parent 
households, indicating a clash of objectives and a later curtailing of the activation logic but 
only minimally.  
The targeting on employees and their dependents, broadly defined, in Italy implies some 
continuation of a Conservative-Corporatist policy logic rather than the introduction of a 
Liberal-style in-work cash transfer. A number of secondary sources actually date the original 
version of the policy to before in-work benefits were implemented in the US and the UK, 
which is at direct odds with the idea that wage subsidisation during periods of employment 
is a Liberal phenomenon. According to (Guerra, 2015, p.245) the family allowance was: 
 ‘...introduced in the 1930s in order to assist workers with dependent children. It was 
financed mainly by the employer… It was therefore a categorical instrument of an 
insurance type, and its characteristics were maintained until the beginning of the 
1980s’.   
The author goes on to explain, however, that from 1983 the benefit was reformed ‘from an 
insurance instrument to a welfare one’, based on a number of key characteristics: (1) it 
became funded from taxation, not contributions; (2) it became focused on vertical 
redistribution between higher and lower income groups as it became means-tested at the 
household level and; (3) recipients therefore did not have to have dependents to be eligible 
(Guerra, 2015, p.246). Yet, it retained its categorical emphasis on employees.  
The longer history of this benefit is one of categorical entitlements and encouraging 
interdependence among families and therefore very different to the liberal model (ibid). 
While reforms in the 1980s did away with many of these characteristics, and the provision 
became closer to addressing poverty among low-income working households associated 
with the Liberal regime countries, the continuation of categorical eligibility is evidence of 
the constraints imposed by policy legacies in this context.  
Policies informing the second model were those in Spain, Slovakia and Austria, where 
eligibility and entitlement is tied to number of children and/or earners. A broad logic 




social policy legacies in these countries. All bar Slovakia have been categorised as 
Corporatist-Conservative regimes in welfare regime analysis. Slovakia is similar to the other 
countries given its religious composition as a predominantly Catholic country (Ebbinghaus, 
2012, p.18). The familial dimension of policies can therefore be understood with reference 
to the traditional breadwinner care-work models and the principle of subsidiarity associated 
with Conservative regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Lewis, 1992).   
In this vein, Austria’s sole earner credit appears in part to be oriented towards preserving a 
family model which puts the emphasis on there being one main breadwinner (Lewis, 1992) 
as the income of the recipient’s spouse is restricted at a low annual level and only one 
member in a household can claim the benefit. The level of the credit increases with the 
number of children. Indeed, women’s part-time employment in Austria is very high among 
EUMS and, in line with other studies; the policy could be part of a wider package reinforcing 
this pattern of gendered labour market dualism associated with the Conservative welfare 
regime (Häusermann and Schwander, 2010).  The scope for some labour market 
participation of the spouse does suggest a slight deviation from the model into what is called 
‘an adapted male breadwinner model’ or ‘dual breadwinner model with female part-time 
work’, which Leibetseder (2013, p.558) argues has become increasingly common in Austria 
for women with caring responsibilities, especially among those with higher education. At 
the same time, the lone parent credit implies more of a ‘sameness’ ideal between men and 
women, whereby either are considered able to look after the child (Leibetseder, 2013).  
In contrast, the objectives behind the Working Mothers Tax Credit in Spain, which has low 
rates of women’s employment relative to other EU member states, could be an attempt to 
offset a male breadwinner model by activating mothers specifically (Lombardo, 2016). The 
emphasis on mothers is at odds with one branch of feminist ideals that argue women and 
men should be treated as equal citizens in tax and benefit systems and all encouraged to 
participate in the labour market (Leibetseder, 2013, p.545), but it could align with those that 
stress that social policy should support women’s role as caregivers and workers, if that is 
what they choose.  
Evaluations of the policy shine more light on the possible policy goals, with some indicating 
the policy slightly softens the taxation system, which is oriented towards single-earner 




also found a significantly positive effect on fertility (Ayala and Paniagua, 2018). The 
orientation appears to be towards increasing the labour market participation of women but 
the limits of the policy to do so could reflect constraints of institutionalised conservativism 
in the form of the joint taxation system and a wider institutional, social and cultural context 
limiting women’s participation in the labour market. These provisions may be the result of 
‘feedback effects’ whereby the taxation system is seen as producing undesirable outcomes 
in terms of women’s employment but the costs of overhauling it are seen as too great 
(Weaver, 2010). Again, the findings pave the way for further research into the institutional 
constraints on in-work benefit policymaking, specifically with regards to historically 
institutionalised gendered inequalities.  
Turning to the third model, in some ways, these schemes are similar to the first approach 
because of the needs-based logic apparent in the targeting on restricted ranger of low to 
moderate earnings. Yet, policies are individualised and phased in as earnings increase 
implying employment goals may trump poverty-reduction (Immervoll and Pearson, 2009). 
Moreover, as Marx et al. (2012, p.20-21) posit, there are considerable barriers to introducing 
path-breaking reforms that resemble those associated with the archetypal schemes in 
Bismarckian ‘regimes’. First, in social protection they argue ‘there are specific limits to the 
extent to which need-based elements can be introduced’ because ‘…the primacy of the 
contributory and equivalence principles may limit the extent to which this is feasible’ (ibid, 
p20). They also state that the social partners involvement in socials security and wage setting 
mean that goal of poverty alleviation would have to be reconciled with ‘other considerations 
and interests’ (ibid, p21). However, they argue that in the Belgian context, such measures 
have limited effect on poverty because individualised provisions do not effectively target 
households in poverty (ibid, p39).  
Moreover, eligibility to provisions is tied to occupational and employment status, which 
likely reflects the fragmented tax benefit systems. Targeting based on occupational status 
within these countries could imply a continuation of categorical differentiation within tax 
and social security reinforced in Conservative regimes. For example, the separate scheme 
for civil servants (in Belgium) and employees and the self-employed, appears to be an 
example of policymaking occurring within institutional parameters of separate tax regimes 
for these groups. Ireland and Italy also have separate earned income tax credits for 




conform to the third model because they are not as targeted. Yet, the later development of 
Italy’s earned income tax credit policy – the ’80 Euro Bonus’ introduced in 2014 – is targeted 
on a narrower range of earnings than its other earned income tax credits, making it more like 
the Belgian ‘Fiscal Work Bonus’.  
Fourth, the study contributes further evidence of similarities among the Nordic regime 
countries and the Netherlands. This group of countries is particularly striking as it aligns 
more with Esping-Andersen’s (1990,1999) social democratic regime than with Ferrera’s 
(1996) framework. When looking at policy design and rules, there appears to be a broad 
historical contingency to the flavour of in-work benefits in the Social Democratic countries. 
In-work benefits in these countries mainly comprised of earned income tax credits of a 
relatively high level (maximum levels, relative to other countries’ earned income tax credits) 
that were for the most part individualised and could be received across a wide range of 
earnings. While it was not possible to estimate expenditure for Finland, the universality (in 
terms of the range of earnings up until which individuals are eligible) underpinning policies 
and the moderate levels were reflected in the high expenditure on in-work benefits in 
Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands. There were not, unlike some countries, separate 
earned income tax credit policies for certain households or employment status in Finland, 
Sweden or Denmark. Individualised provisions in these countries deemphasize the family as 
a source of welfare in line with the logic of Social Democratic states, which have prioritised 
both men and women’s labour market participation, as per the framework set out in Chapter 
3. The relative generosity and the fact that provisions can be received by a wide spread of 
the earnings distribution reflect the universalism and solidaristic underpinnings of social 
democratic provision. The use of fiscal welfare could imply an intention not to subject 
recipients to stigma or invasiveness of a means-tested social security benefits.  
Yet, stepping back, provisions could imply a (further) break with the broader logics and 
institutional form of this model. Earned income tax credits could effectively be considered 
a wide-ranging income tax cut and could be used when more coordinated wage regulation 
approaches are weakened (Picot, 2018). Thus, while the ‘micro-institutional features’ imply 
a continuation of social democratic policymaking, the broader impetus of policies could be 
at odds with this. The form of tax credits in these countries also leads to a more fundamental 
suggestion that such policies may be best understood as income tax cuts as opposed to in-




democratic countries have interpreted such reforms as incremental change rather than 
wholesale erosion or unravelling of the social democratic welfare state in line with a 
liberalisation/globalisation agenda (Steinmo, 2002; Lindbom, 2001).  Whether or not this 
change is transformative – shifting the goals and logics of policy – also depends on changes 
in other institutions. In the case of Sweden, in-work benefits did coincide with the 
unravelling of protections and corporatist arrangements based on the indicators employed in 
the study. Yet, in Denmark, the changes may be less significant from a liberalisation lens, 
given that protections appeared to remain stable. Indeed, further efforts to contextualise the 
role of in-work benefits in these countries, paying attention to corresponding labour and 
social market policy, will aid the interpretation of implications and drivers of these 
provisions.   
Further, variation among Social Democratic regime countries in the overall package of in-
work benefits is also significant from the perspective of regime theory as it supports the idea 
of hybridisation in the Netherlands and Finland (Ebbinghaus, 2012, p6; Arts and Gellissen, 
2002). Both countries combined earned income tax credits with adjusted unemployment 
benefits, which were found to be conducive to combining a relatively substantial amount of 
work and earnings with unemployment benefit receipt7778. Earned income tax credits in the 
Netherlands also had a familial slant reflecting its conservative/Bismarckian heritage.  
The Finnish case is particularly interesting. Finland’s welfare state has parallels with 
Conservative regime countries, but the use of adjusted unemployment benefits arguably 
better captures a more Liberal approach in the increased emphasis on ‘activation and 
competitiveness’ in Finnish social policy with less investment in active labour market 
policies than in other Social Democratic countries. In Finland, eligibility for unemployment 
insurance provisions has been made more stringent, creating a hole, which has been ‘filled’ 
by means-tested unemployment assistance (Halmetoja et al., 2019, p.321). While Halmetoja 
et al. (2019, p322) describe Finnish reforms as the ‘increased behavioural control of labour 
marker outsiders and the imposition of a harsher sanctioning regime’, the adjusted 
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unemployment benefits identified in this study were in both contributory and assistance 
unemployment benefits and likely to be received by both insiders and outsiders.   
Therefore, reforms could signal a weakening of social rights across both insiders (recipients 
of contributory benefits) and outsiders (recipients of assistance benefits) and thus 
deregulatory liberalisation instead of dualization (Thelen, 2014).  Key to understanding this, 
however, is how adjusted unemployment benefit rules operate in practice across both groups 
– an important question for future research. 
In terms of the fifth model, such approaches could imply a more incremental shift, instead 
of a path-breaking option such as in-work benefits, in contexts where these have not been 
previously used and could be at odds with logics that earnings from work should be adequate 
and an opposition to extending means-tested benefits to working households. Political actors 
wanting to pursue wage subsidies may therefore opt for ‘hidden’, ‘invisible’ or ‘implicit’ in-
work benefits. The insights from Clasen’s (2019) case study of Germany highlights that the 
adjusted minimum income scheme, Unemployment Benefit II, part of the Hartz IV reforms, 
was a compromise between political actors where there was not support for a traditional in-
work cash transfer policy. Yet, the adjusted scheme eventually became high-profile and 
widely criticised as the number of working claimants receiving the benefit (who became 
known as ‘Aufstocker’ meaning ‘people who top up’) exceeded expectations (Clasen, 2019, 
p.6-7). This eventually led to calls for ‘cost containment and retrenchment’ but the reality of 
such reforms were ‘miniscule’ (ibid, p7-8). Despite this, the case leads Clasen (2019, p.10) 
to argue that in-work benefit policy preferences in Germany are ‘unstable and party-political 
agreements all but solid’. More specifically, he questions whether ‘integrated’ (or implicit) 
in-work benefits are less politically legitimate compared with in-work cash transfer schemes 
(ibid, p.12).  
Indeed, there is further evidence of this instability in the UK, as discussed above, which 
might be considered an ‘integrated’ or implicit in-work benefit because it combines in-work 
support with additional benefits, including unemployment benefits. However, the politics of 
Universal Credit has focused more on other aspects of the reform, indicating the instability 
linked to in-work provisions that may arise indirectly because of the benefits in which they 
are housed (Abbas and Jones, 2018). As discussed above, Finland also signalled a hybrid 




has been the subject of protest and debate (Halmetoja et al., 2019). Therefore, associated 
features of adjusted unemployment benefits or indeed features they take on because of their 
integrated status (e.g. more punitive elements) may also drive instability.  
In contrast, the more universal-fiscal provisions in the Social Democratic regime countries, 
could have more staying power because they are more ‘solidaristic’ (albeit in a way that 
could also paradoxically undermine other forms of solidarity over time) (Esping-Andersen, 
1990; Palier, 2010). In -work provisions that are based on historical policy logics, such as 
those supporting sole earner households or mothers, may also have more staying power if 
they signal continued logics despite the drastically different context of contemporary 
capitalism.   
In sum, the analysis of EUMS’ in-work policies, employing a framework to compare their 
orientation towards different forms and degrees of dependence on the family, labour market 
and the state, highlighted seemingly cross-cutting objectives and interests that could be 
shaping diverse in-work benefit reforms across these countries. Considering the extent to 
which the distinctions between countries resembled or break from the characteristics and 
logics associated with EUMS’ in ideal-type models of welfare capitalism shone light on the 
likely role of existing social policy legacies in shaping some countries’ in-work benefit 
pathways. It provided further support for the argument that archetypal in-work benefits were 
rare, but not insignificant. More specifically, this led to the identification of five model 
approaches, which partly aligned with, but also nuanced and extended, existing typologies 
of in-work benefits in the literature (e.g. Kenworthy, 2015).  
This typology served as a springboard to integrate secondary sources that had been 
developed in relation to individual country cases into a broader discussion of the historical 
and contemporary political and social dynamics of in-work benefit reforms in a comparative 
perspective. Across the five models of in-work benefits, there are aspects of policies that 
appear to retain logics and/or ‘micro-institutional features’ (Clegg, 2014, p.160) of past 
social policy making that are related to the organisation and regulation of capitalism, the role 
of the family, specifically women, and the status and rights of working households. 
Paradoxically, the starkest example of this was in the Social Democratic countries with more 
universal, individualised and relatively high-level provisions, which at a more fundamental 




wage regulation (Farnsworth, 2015; Picot, 2018). Similar examples of in-work benefits that 
at once echo past policymaking while also breaking with some of the fundamental aspects 
of policy logics were found in Spain, Austria, Italy and the UK. In this sense, social policy 
and/or other institutions may been seen to exacerbate problems for political actors (e.g. 
women’s low labour market participation) but radical overhaul may not be an option 
(Weaver, 2010; Béland and Powell, 2016; Béland, 2019). Instead, policies retain some of 
the characteristics of past policymaking, indicating a more incremental approach.  
8.4 Conclusion  
This chapter firstly summarised the main findings from the empirical components of the 
research. It then discussed what these findings mean considering claims about the rise, 
spread and demise of in-work benefits in capitalist democratic countries. In concluded that 
the findings offer further support to claims that tax and benefit policies bringing about a 
‘novel’ role for the state in the domain of direct income maintenance for working households 
are in place across a diverse range of EUMS, and that recently there has been an increase in 
the countries with these provisions because of the introduction of policies in Southern, 
Central and Eastern European countries between the 2008 and 2016 mapping. However, for 
the countries often considered to be the more advanced welfare states among the EUMS, 
there was no overall change in the number of countries with these provisions.  
Moreover, the trajectories of expenditure differed quite markedly across countries with 
earned income tax credits and in-work cash transfers (the only provision types included in 
the expenditure analysis). In some countries, expenditure was a lot higher (e.g. over 1.5% of 
GDP) and had increased over the time period (e.g. Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, and, to 
a lesser extent Ireland and Italy).  In countries with more targeted earned income tax credits 
or in-work cash transfers, expenditure was a lot lower, declining in some contexts (e.g. the 
UK and Slovakia) but increasing in others, especially from 2015 onwards (e.g. Luxembourg, 
France, and Spain). Moreover, contextualising these findings with respect to socio-economic 
and institutional context illuminated that different processes and determinants may be behind 
in-work benefit reforms in across EUMS.  At the same time, there are limits to what we can 
take from this analysis on multiple counts. These are discussed further in the final chapter.    
The next part of the chapter brought together the separate insights from the application of 




five stylised models of policies that had been identified in the empirical investigation and 
discussed the potential logics and objectives underpinning these models, reflecting mostly 
on how they relate to social policy legacies across European welfare regimes. Bringing in 
additional insights from secondary sources enriched the discussion, including to understand 
whether and why/ why not policies have been effective in achieving the stated or assumed 
aims in national contexts. In many cases, the form and design of policies in national contexts 
indicated that provisions were shaped by the intuitional context, either in terms of social 
policy legacies or the wider regime constraining or creating opportunities for particular kinds 
of in-work benefit. This consideration of policy legacies also provided a base line with which 
to describe the character of reforms more dynamically.  
For example, France and Italy’s in-work cash transfers both appeared to be cases of path-
breaking policy making, even though Italy’s occurred over a longer period (incremental), 
with the gradual reconfiguration of Family Allowances, which actually have a longer history 
than the archetypal schemes associated with liberal welfare regimes. In contrast, some 
Nordic regime countries were characterised as potentially paradoxical in that they possessed 
features associated with income maintenance in these countries (e.g. higher levels, 
individualised, more universalist) yet they were also a form of income tax cut. Similar 
limitations to those outlined above apply to this part of the research in terms of the scope of 
the empirical investigation and issues with data. More specifically, there were some limits 
to the operationalisation of the dependency relationships framework and missing data, which 
was discussed in each individual chapter, and again requires some degree of caution, as 
missing data could shift the conclusion about the orientation of policies towards labour 
market, state and familial dependence.  
The next chapter summarises the thesis as a whole, sets out the answers to the research 
questions and states the contributions of the thesis. Importantly, it elaborates on some of the 
limitations discussed in this chapter and discusses broader limitations of the study, which 





9 CONCLUSION  
This thesis examined trends and variation in-work benefits in an empirical investigation that 
spanned all EUMS, and the time period 2006 to 2017. In-work benefits were deemed a 
distinctive area of policy that speak to ongoing normative and intellectual debates in 
comparative political economy and welfare state research, including the viability of existing 
institutional arrangements and societal expectations regarding the ideals about paid work 
bringing independence from the state (and, in some contexts, the family), the responsibility 
of employers (and governments) to ensure that wages are sufficient and debates about (neo) 
liberalisation,  as well questions about the extent and nature of policy convergence and 
divergence in post-industrial societies.   
Yet, despite broad claims about in-work benefits becoming more commonplace from the late 
1990s onwards, the literature review chapter identified a number of interrelated gaps in 
comparative in-work benefit research, including: lack of systematic research into countries 
use of in-work benefits cross nationally and over time; inconsistencies in the ways in-work 
benefits were conceptualised and defined for comparative research; the predominant 
application of  a technical or economistic lens in comparative work; and, as a result, limited 
consideration of the social and political dynamics of in-work benefits that likely underpin 
in-work benefit variation.  
The gaps in the evidence base on trends and variation in in-work benefits were, however, 
considered significant obstacles that needed to be addressed prior to developing and testing 
theory about how and why countries in-work benefits vary and the consequences of this 
beyond policy outcomes relating to the stated or assumed objectives of in-work benefit 
policies. This led to the first research question about trends and cross-national patterns of in-
work benefit policy development, along with sub-questions about the nature of trends and 
the form policies take:  
1) What is the nature and extent of variation in in-work benefits in EUMS? 
a. Have in-work benefits become more commonplace in recent years? 
b. How common are archetypal in-work benefit policies associated 
with liberal regimes? 
The second literature review chapter developed the framework further in two parts. Drawing 




in-work benefits is at odds with the broad ideal that paid work guarantees independence from 
the state, at least in the domain of direct income maintenance. At the same time, it 
acknowledged that the logics and arrangements concerning the role and balance of the state, 
market and family have not been uniform across countries, nor have they remained static 
over time, and many view the social, economic and political transformations from the latter 
half of the 20th century as profoundly unravelling the institutions and logics of industrial 
capitalism. Using ideal-type frameworks and stylized arguments about convergent pressures 
on policy making in EUMS culminated in a conceptual framework for interpreting cross-
national differences and similarities in countries provisions that would take into account the 
historical and contemporary pressures potentially shaping in-work benefit variation.  
Moreover, the second part of the framework considered the concept of ‘dependency’ as a 
key fault line across capitalist democracies, that had been conceptualised in existing 
literature not focusing on in-work benefits as reflecting interests and logics concerning the 
role and responsibility of the state, family and the market. I thus set out a ‘dependency 
relationships’ framework, which was used to tentatively define in-work benefits and 
compare the salient features of policies, considering the ways and extent to which provisions 
are oriented towards fostering or reinforcing different forms and degrees of dependence on 
the state, the labour market and the family for working households.  
This chapter thus led to the development of the second and third research questions:  
2) To what extent and in what ways do EUMS’ in-work benefit policies vary 
in their orientation towards dependence on the labour market, state and the 
family?   
3) How does variation in EUMS’ in-work benefits policies map on to 
historical and contemporary context?  
Employing a cross-national comparative methodology, focusing on all EUMS as a starting 
point for theoretical and practical reasons, the thesis addressed the questions through a 
number of separate yet overlapping components in the empirical investigation. A summary 
of the findings from the thesis and the interpretation of these findings was the focus Chapter 
8. They are summarised briefly with direct reference to the research questions here.  
First, in terms of the nature and extent of variation in in-work benefits in EUMS (RSQ1), 




range of welfare states represented by EUMS already in 2008, the first year of the mapping 
exercise. It also showed that the countries often characterised as being the less advanced 
welfare states were also less likely to have in-work benefits and that schemes were 
introduced more recently in some Southern and Central and Eastern European countries 
between 2008 and 2016, indicating policies may be used as a welfare state ‘evolves’ but also 
that such provisions have come more common place. These findings thus pointed to a slight 
yet potentially important (because of the countries involved) increase in the prevalence of 
in-work benefit policies in capitalist democratic countries (RSQ1a). Yet, this was contingent 
on the broader definition encompassing of both archetypal and possible in-work benefits that 
set the policy parameters of the research. Of the archetypal provisions (RSQ1b), in-work 
cash transfers and refundable earned income tax credits were relatively rare, but the number 
of countries with these provisions increased over time. Similarly, the expenditure analysis 
showed average expenditure on in-work cash transfers and earned income tax credits 
increased between 2007 and 2016, but this was not the case for all countries, with 
expenditure stagnating in some contexts.  
Second, the research outlined the extent and ways in which EUMS’ provisions vary in their 
orientation towards degrees and forms of dependence on the labour market, state and the 
family (RSQ2). These were summarised in five overarching approaches to in-work benefits 
identified across EUMS in the previous chapter (RSQ2). Model one comprises the 
archetypal, means-tested social in-work benefit explicitly targeting working households, 
associated with historical policies in liberal contexts that encourage interdependency within 
families and tie together the labour market activity of recipients within a household. It 
implies a moderate degree of state, family and labour market dependence for working 
households. Countries represented by this model include the UK (outgoing in-work 
benefits), France, Malta, Italy and Ireland.  
The second model takes the form of fiscal in-work benefits targeted on the basis of familial 
and gender considerations. Such provisions are mainly oriented towards a modified 
breadwinner model (some activation for the second earner) (Lewis, 1992; Leibetseder, 
2013). At the same time, they comprise a less invasive and most likely privileged form of 
state dependence as a fiscal benefit (refundable earned income tax credits). Countries where 




The third is also a fiscal in-work benefit but targeted on the basis of earnings and/or 
employment relationship and also takes the form of refundable tax credits.  Such policies 
were identified in Belgium, Luxembourg, Ireland and Italy. These provisions are oriented 
towards minimal to moderate state dependence and are typically individualised. The 
targeting within these schemes implies a somewhat more invasive role for the state and the 
separate targeting on occupational or employment status indicates policies are oriented 
towards maintaining some differences between types of work. The fourth model is 
summarised as fiscal, universalist non-refundable earned income tax credits, premised on an 
active worker model. Sweden, Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands had provisions that 
aligned with this model. The fifth model – implicit in-work cash transfers – are characterised 
by their orientation towards a punitive and potentially stigmatising form of state dependence 
and more precarious or marginal forms of work. The main examples were found in the UK 
(incoming in-work benefit), Germany, Slovenia and Finland. Thus, some countries (e.g. 
Finland, Italy and Ireland) combined these models.  
This variation helped to make sense of the complex picture that emerged from exploring 
broader trends and variation in in-work benefits and indicators of context (RSQ3). Historical 
context, namely social policy legacies, appeared to play out in some countries’ in-work 
benefit reforms, namely in the micro-institutional features, such as the extent and nature of 
targeting, that are associated with certain interests and ideals (e.g. about acceptable levels of 
inequalities between groups of citizens). Yet, there were also some clearer examples of path-
breaking policies. Contemporary context was explored with two main groups of factors: 
liberalisation and labour market risks (socioeconomic) that are often assumed to be behind 
countries’ in-work benefit reforms.  The findings painted a complex picture, which is not 
surprising given the variation identified in the orientation of policies, and the likely 
importance of social policy legacies in informing the type and scale of in-work policies. 
In broad terms, underemployment appeared to be associated with whether countries had in-
work benefits or not. Yet, variation in expenditure across countries did not clearly map on 
to differences in the socio-economic context. Moreover, countries with both low and high 
levels of collective bargaining, replacement rates and trade union density had in place in -
work benefits. Change associated with liberalisation occurred as in-work benefit expenditure 
increased in some countries, but there were also cases of little variation on the liberalisation 




theoretical framework, liberalisation and socio-economic pressures are likely to influence 
in-work benefit variation differently depending on the context (Beramendi et al., 2015; 
Thelen, 2014). Yet, there may be some congruence if breaking down in-work benefits further 
to look at the different models identified here. Thus, the analysis of context flags a number 
of possible relationships to be explored in future research, which may be generalisable to 
other institutionally similar contexts.  
9.1 Contribution  
This section briefly summarises the main contributions of the thesis. First, the thesis builds 
on multiple perspectives and bodies of literature in order to conceptualise and define in-work 
benefits for cross-national comparison. It thus aimed to provide a solution to the 
inconsistencies in the literature which focused primarily on the technical features or goals of 
policies and thus ran into problems when defining the policy parameters of the research. In 
this vein, in-work benefits were conceptualised at a broad level as policies constituting a 
direct role for the state in the domain of income maintenance that is distinctive from other 
social policies, including wage setting strategies such as minimum wages (Picot, 2018) and 
benefits earmarked for specific services (e.g. childcare) or targeted on the basis of other risk-
groups or categories (e.g. child benefits) (Oorschot and Roosma, 2015). The distinctiveness 
of in-work benefits is that they comprise a form of income maintenance that can be spent 
‘freely’ that are similar to receiving wages. They thus combine dependency on the state for 
with dependency on paid work (the labour market) to maintain income levels during periods 
of paid work.  
These qualities were apparent in the archetypal in-work benefit policies, predominately 
associated with liberal welfare states, in the form of refundable earned income tax credits 
and in-work cash transfers. At the same time, developments in other areas of policy, 
including within unemployment benefits and non-refundable earned income tax credits, 
were also considered forms of possible in-work benefits, which had some but not necessarily 
all of the same qualities as the archetypal provisions. This typology constituted the starting 
point for the comparison across countries that was intended to tap into the socially and 
political distinctiveness of these measures.  
Examining these provisions empirically across countries provided more evidence with which 




benefits included in the initial mapping were, if using a threshold based on Germany’s 
ALGII, too restrictive. However, the framework developed in this thesis to compare 
countries could be used by researchers to set their own threshold for the point at which 
unemployment benefits become de facto in-work benefits, and provide a means of 
understanding reforms in a given context relative to those used elsewhere.  
In addition, the thesis developed a theoretically informed framework for comparing in-work 
provisions across countries and over time that drew extensively from existing comparative 
social policy literatures into order to make inferences about the varied logics and interests 
underpinning broad institutional configurations across welfare states that were also expected 
to play out in the design features, form and rules of in-work benefit policies (Esping-
Andersen, 1990; Ferrera, 1996; Arts and Gelissen, 2002; Titmuss, 1958).  This materialised 
in the form of the ‘dependency relationships’ analytical framework for comparing the 
orientation of in-work benefit policies towards different degrees and forms of dependence 
on the state, labour market and the family.  
Analysing policy variation through this lens intended to provide a means of making 
inferences about the relationship between in-work benefits and historical and contemporary 
context, e.g. social policy legacies and socio-economic pressures. The application of this 
conceptual framework, albeit with limits, in the empirical investigation, led to a variegated 
analysis of in-work benefits, which had the advantages of considering the multiple and at 
times competing aims and interests that appear to be embedded within national policy 
specifications. The framework was also cautious in its emphasis on policy orientation and 
did not use concepts typically considered to be or associated with outcomes, e.g. de- or re-
commodification, as the focus of the research was predominantly on in-work benefits in 
isolation.  
Addressing the research questions and executing this framework empirically was no easy 
feat but the thesis nevertheless also comprises an empirical contribution. First, the mapping 
of select policy sub-types systematically across countries and over time, employing a clear 
methodology and using multiple data sources for triangulation, added to the existing 
patchwork evidence of in-work policies at different time points, which typically do not have 
a clear methodology outlining how and on what grounds policies were identified. Moreover, 




marks a significant step forward in comparative, standardised time-series data on in-work 
benefit expenditure which is, to the best of my knowledge, not presently available for in-
work benefits the same way it is for many other areas of social policy.  The contextualization 
of these findings using indicators of contemporary and historical context was also new and 
although explorative, it identified some possible avenues for future research and theory 
building.  
In a similar vein, the thesis also comprises a contribution in terms of the methods employed 
for comparing in-work benefits. Notably, the use of EUROMOD to estimate in-work benefit 
expenditure comprises the first attempt to generate standardised, time-series data on in-work 
benefits for multiple countries. The methodology itself describes in detail the strengths and 
drawbacks of different sources of data on in-work benefit policies, itself the result of lengthy 
review of data. The comparison of the labour market orientation of policies could also be 
developed and repeated for future research, including those conducted at different time 
points to compare changes over time in the scope within unemployment benefits to combine 
receipt of these benefits with participation in paid work.  
In sum, the combination of conceptual, empirical and methodological development in cross-
national comparative in-work benefit research that this thesis contributes paves the way for 
future research in what is currently an under-researched area of policy. Aspects of this thesis 
can be built on in future research; the typology distinguishing between in-work benefits and 
related policies and the framework for comparing the salient features of policies across 
contexts could set the focus or parameters of future research. The methods and tools used to 
compare policies could be employed and developed in future research, e.g. the collection of 
additional data to better operationalise the dependency relationships framework. The 
findings could feed into theory building about why in-work benefits vary across countries 
and be used to establish the ‘dependent variable’, e.g. researchers may decide to focus on 
explaining one or a number of the five approaches outlined here. In this vein, the findings 
can also serve as a means for selecting and situating national case studies of in-work benefits.  
The next section weighs up both the contributions and the limitations of the study and 




9.2 Limitations and Future Research  
This thesis combined multi-faceted analysis of varied aspects of in-work benefit policy 
design, rules and government expenditure, and the relationship between variation in EUMS’ 
in-work benefits and contemporary and historical context. The aim was to better understand 
the development of in-work benefits, an under-researched, elusive and controversial area of 
policy development, in a comparative perspective across diverse welfare states at a time of 
‘convergent pressures. While the limitations of the data and study design were raised in the 
methodology (Chapter 4) and in the empirical chapters (Chapters 5-7), this section discusses 
the main limitations in the empirical components of the research that applies directly to the 
aims, questions and framework addressed in the thesis, and the limits of the study more 
generally for understanding in-work benefits in a comparative perspective. The suggestions 
for future research alluded to previously are elaborated in this section.  
Regarding the research aims and questions about the nature and extent of in-work benefit 
variation in EUMS’, the first set of limitations and suggestions revolves around the 
conceptualisation of in-work benefits and the focus on three main sub-types (four if splitting 
up refundable and non-refundable tax credits) for the empirical investigation.  
While earned income tax credits, in-work cash transfers and adjusted unemployment benefits 
were identified a priori as provisions that are likely to be key to understanding the 
development and use of in-work benefits across EUMS and time, the conceptualisation of 
in-work benefits as imposing a direct role for the state in the domain of income maintenance 
for working households could be operationalised more broadly than in the empirical 
investigation for this thesis, e.g. to include social assistance/minimum income schemes with 
features such as earnings disregards and reductions in social security contributions for 
employees could be included. If included, both the mapping of where and when provisions 
were used and the expenditure profiles across countries could look somewhat different, with 
implications for the analysis of policy variation and context. Additional policies could alter 
the conclusions made above about the orientation of countries’ in-work benefits towards 
different forms of state, market and family dependence and how this relates to social policy 
legacies; and those about the relationship between expenditure and changes in socio-




The research as it stands has some element of (deliberate) institutional bias in its selection 
of provisions based primarily on those in Liberal regimes. Governments in contexts with 
higher social security contributions may indeed have in place more, and spend more on, 
provisions that reduce these. Although beyond the scope of this study, research seeking to 
further understand the (changing) of the role of the state in the domain of direct income 
maintenance for working households across EUMS could include these additional policies 
and further characterise differences in in-work benefit variation with respect to these 
approaches.  However, data on expenditure may also be hard to come by.  
In a similar vein, a more comprehensive account of the multiple policies that ‘support’ 
households or individuals participating in paid work could extend the net further to include 
other social policies, e.g. child and housing benefits. As with social provisions, there may 
also be ‘implicit’ tax credits that are received by working households because they are 
eligible de facto by paying a certain level of taxation, even if the in-work status or earned 
income of these recipients is not explicit in the policy label or eligibility rules. Similarly, 
occupational welfare comprises an important source of welfare for individuals in work that 
was not considered in this thesis that is also linked to inequalities between working and non-
working households, and among those in work (Titmuss, 1958; Chung, 2018). Yet, a broader 
net in terms of policy instruments arguably loses the social and political distinctiveness 
important to this study in that provisions are closer to, and therefore could more clearly 
‘offset’, the earnings typically paid by employers. Indeed, in some cases, social assistance 
benefits are sometimes categorised into benefits for different needs and include housing 
supports, so adding these into comparative analysis could muddy the waters further.  
On the flipside, the conceptualisation and inclusion criteria could also be perceived as too 
broad and complex, especially for research that aims to develop and test explanatory theories 
about why and when governments use in-work benefits. For example, as discussed above, 
non-refundable earned income tax credits could be categorised as a ‘tax cut’, or some or all 
adjusted unemployment benefits could be excluded from future analyses because they are 
perceived to be too restrictive in terms of work and earnings and/or because they ‘implicitly’ 
target working households. This variation within the provisions included in the investigation 
is not considered a limitation of the research per se because it is precisely through the 




diversity of approaches across states and therefore are better able to situate one or more 
countries’ reforms comparatively. 
The insights from this research can, therefore, aid narrowing the focus for future research on 
in-work benefits in terms of the selection of provisions, countries and time period or the 
design and focus of the research. For example, future research aiming to further investigate 
the idea that certain political dynamics lead to the introduction and/or expansion of in-work 
benefits (e.g. support from centre-left and centre-right parties) under certain conditions (e.g. 
high unemployment in de-industrialised societies) (see Vlandas, 2013) could examine if such 
explanations hold for all or some of the five approaches outlined above. This would be 
surprising, given the likely variation in logics and interests in some EUMS’ in-work benefits, 
seemingly related to historical policy legacies.  
The limitations and suggestions concerning the inclusion or exclusion of certain provisions 
in this study also chimed with a related issue common to cross-national comparative policy 
research in terms of the transferability of administrative labels and social policy categories 
across countries (Kennett, 2001; Clasen et al., 2015b). Although ‘standardised’ comparative 
descriptions of policies formed the main data source, even within these, the (occasional) 
varied use of administrative labels and categories across countries meant decisions about 
which provisions to include were not always straightforward.  
This hurdle was particularly pronounced for earned income tax credits; these were included 
if policy descriptions referenced earnings from work or the employment status of recipients 
in eligibility rules and in the name of the provision (e.g. ‘working tax credit’). While 
categorised as tax credits in some countries, there was some suggestion in the description 
that policies were more like what are widely referred to as ‘tax allowances’, defining a no 
tax zone, instead of reducing tax liabilities once calculated. Whether this technical difference 
matters for our wider understanding in the public cost of provisions (in the form of lost tax 
revenues) to ‘make work pay’ is debatable. Indeed, a wider range of tax provisions could be 
interpreted in this light. However, it matters for the mapping of provisions and expenditure 
analysis comparatively as inconsistent categorisation and labelling could mean similar 
policies in other contexts are not included.  
The way to ‘overcome’ this limitation in future research is likely to involve consultation of 




Although experts produced the policy descriptions which formed the main data source for 
the report, future research could use the data collected for this thesis as a starting point and 
follow up with experts and political actors in national contexts79.  
Regarding the aims and questions about the nature and extent of in-work benefit variation in 
EUMS overtime, the snapshot mapping of provisions at two points, one in the midst of the 
financial crisis, and just under a decade later following a period of recovery in many EUMS 
does not capture reforms prior to or within this period (European Commission, 2016). And 
the analysis of policy design using the dependency framework was static, looking at 2016 
only, due to the constraints of the study. Future research could continue to fill the gaps in 
terms of mapping provisions in EUMS before and after this time, if data permits and/or 
comparing policy rules and design from 2008 with contemporary schemes.  
A fruitful avenue for better understanding the relationship between in-work benefits and 
context would to trace the policy reform process within one or a number of countries to 
examine why there is increasing or declining expenditure, e.g. cost containment/expansion. 
Analysis of in-work benefit recipient data could also aid this. Specific temporal questions 
from the research include: Will more Southern and CEE regime countries introduce in-work 
benefits over time following trends identified here? Has earned income tax credit 
expenditure reached its peak in the Nordic countries? And what will be the impact of 
Universal Credit be on later expenditure in the UK?  
In a similar vein, this approach would allow for an understanding and identification of how, 
when and why external agendas and governance (e.g. from the EU) filter into national 
decisions about in-work benefit policymaking, using the agenda setting and policy transfer 
frames that could not be incorporated into this study (De la Porte, 2017; Peck and Theodore, 
2001; Birkland, 2006). Given that in-work benefits are promoted as one of several options 
to ‘make work pay’, a key question is whether and member states would opt for in-work 
benefits and if these are used independently or alongside other approaches, such as minimum 
wages (Picot, 2018). Or indeed whether and how in-work benefits are conceived of alongside 
other agendas, such as social investment? On the latter, some advocates of social investment 
                                                     
79 For example, researchers could compare disconnect between the descriptions in data sources such as OECD Country 
Descriptions and the legislation and/or other policy documentation on which they are based to understand more about the 
codified policy intent; or more discursive approaches could examine the discourse and language in policy documents, 
specifically whether and how the language used to talk about the recipients of such policies and if their earning or in-work 
status is salient. The researcher intends to validate the findings through consultation with national experts in future 




employ the neo-liberal critique of in-work benefits (Hemerijck, 2013), whereas others argue 
that those combatting child poverty in particular are in keeping with the ideals and tools of 
social investment.  The frameworks applied in this study could also be extended to countries 
that are not EUMS to build a broader picture of in-work benefit trends and variation over 
time.  
Second, some aspects of benefit design and rules that were key to operationalising the 
dependency relationships framework could not be fully integrated into the analysis mainly 
because of limits to the data in terms of inconsistency in the details within policy descriptions 
across countries. This applied mainly to benefit levels, behavioural requirements and 
sanctions in adjusted unemployment benefits, the levels of earnings disregards in some 
adjusted unemployment benefits and detail on restrictions on the earnings/work of the 
spouse/other members of the household. In particular, there are ways that analysis of the 
degrees and forms of dependence among members of families could be strengthened beyond 
what was feasible in the scope of the thesis. For example, research could examine the 
definition of families within tax-benefit frameworks in more depth and the interaction of 
instruments, especially tax instruments, which could either limit or facilitate certain models 
of care and work.  
Alternative approaches for comparing the (varied) orientation of EUMS’ in-work benefits 
towards degrees of dependence on the state include model family analysis, which can be 
used to compare more accurately households of interest (in terms of composition, earnings, 
etc.) across countries, using a tax-benefit simulator, such as EUROMOD (Marchal and 
Marx, 2018; Jonathan Bradshaw and Finch, 2002). The relevant components of the income 
from in-work benefits could be identified using the mapping in this study in order to pinpoint 
the policies of interest in select countries and then the proportion of income that has come 
from the benefits of interest. Furthermore, with more standardised data across sub-types and 
countries, approaches for identifying linkages between groups of countries in terms of design 
features could be employed (e.g. fuzzy sets) (Kvist, 2007b; Kowalewska, 2017).  
The study also made several inroads on advancing comparative knowledge of the 
relationship between in-work benefits and contemporary and historical context. Yet, data 
and practical limitations (one researcher working within time-constraints) meant the analysis 




contribution is still a valuable one that shines light on some of the key arguments about in-
work benefits and socio-economic pressures, liberalisation and the role of historical 
institutions. However, there are multiple directions for future research that advance 
‘explanation’.  
On the one hand, further quantitative analysis could be undertaken to examine the 
relationship between in-work benefits and country contexts. A major factor holding back the 
analysis here was that the limited number of data points (countries and years) and the 
theorised importance of national contexts were incompatible, in that country fixed-effects 
model would be based on too small a dataset (Spicker, 2018). Moreover, statistical 
techniques when there are a higher number of zeros, which is necessary when including 
countries over a longer time period that introduced in-work benefits at some point during 
that period, also involve splitting the dataset and these problems are exacerbated. 
Fundamentally, the expenditure data was also only for two provision types, and there were 
some issues with over- and under-estimation with EUROMOD (detailed in individual 
Country Reports) (EUROMOD, 2019). As argued above, one approach could be to focus on 
one of the five model approaches and develop and test models but again this limits the data 
available in terms of countries and possibly years. Overtime, comparative data on in-work 
benefits may become better if the organisations producing comparative expenditure datasets 
harmonise policy categorisation. As argued above, more contextual variables that capture 
additional changes in corresponding institutions that may be masked by those such as 
‘collective bargaining coverage’ could feed into research seeking to further examine the 
(two-way) relationship between in-work benefits and liberalisation.   
Similarly, analysis of the politics is also key for advancing our understanding of the 
relationship between context and in-work benefit variation through case study or qualitative 
research as has already been done for some contexts (Vlandas, 2013; Clasen, 2019). Probing 
which actors support in-work benefits and their rationale for doing so will shine further light 
on the interests and logics underpinning policies, and provide further means to examine the 
role of historical institutions and contemporary pressures.   
As the first cross-national time-series data on in-work benefit expenditure were collected for 
this thesis, it contributes new insights into trends in spending before the 2008 financial crisis 




thesis began to explore the relationship between in-work benefit expenditure, socio-
economic pressures and processes associated with liberalisation within and between EUMS. 
Both sets of variables regularly feed into explanations for why in-work benefits have become 
more widespread. This analysis only scratched the surface and was limited by the data, which 
is still in its infancy. Yet, one of the main implications of the analysis is that it challenges 
the functionalist assumptions in the literature about the drivers of in-work benefits, and 
provides tentative evidence of the varied forms of liberalisation across capitalist countries, 
which are associated different levels of (in)equality and solidarity (Thelen, 2012; 2014). 
Indeed, the effects of in-work benefits on Corporatist or coordinated forms of capitalism and 
support for other forms of welfare are important questions for future research. The latter 
question stems from the argument that certain tax credits are hard to differentiate from broad 
cuts in income taxation and could therefore erode the fiscal base for welfare expenditure.  
In sum, the research as a whole led to several specific questions for future research on in-
work benefits, which are a prominent yet under-researched part of tax-benefit systems in 
deindustrialised societies in recent decades. The use of political economy and sociological 
lenses in this thesis provided a means for conceptualising, defining and comparing in-work 
policies across diverse contexts, which tapped related to fundamental questions about the 
relationship between the market, families and the states in capitalist democratic countries. 
There are many more avenues for future in-work benefits research, including further research 
into the characteristics and form of in-work benefits in different contexts, and research which 
attempts to explain policy variation and analyse in more detail the processes of reform and 
the role of actors and institutions. Research could also aim to better understand the 
implications of in-work benefits beyond policy effectiveness with relation to stated goals. 
Indeed, in-work benefits tap into debates about the responsibilities of employers to their 
employees, as well as society more broadly, which pays for in-work provisions through 
taxation. In-work benefits could also either undermine or prop up other welfare state and 
labour market institutions and alter the future of industrial relations. Finally, there is a 
question about the reproduction of gendered inequalities and other forms of inequality 
between citizens, both in- and out-of-work, which in part rests on their status and rights as 
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Appendix A: Data countries’ tax-benefit systems 
 
1. OECD Country Policy Descriptions for all European Union Member States, descriptions 
for 2008 and 2016 (Ireland 2017). Available online from: 
https://www.oecd.org/els/soc/benefits-and-wages-country-specific-information.htm.  
2. EUROMOD Country Reports, all countries, multiple authors. Available online from: 
https://www.euromod.ac.uk/using-euromod/country-reports/f3-g4  
a. 2015-2018 Tax-benefit systems 
b. 2014 – 2017 Tax-benefit systems 
c. 2013 – 2016 Tax-benefit systems  
d. 2007 – 2010 Tax-benefit systems  
e. 2005 – 2008 Tax-benefit systems  
3. OECD Employment Conditional Earning Subsidies Tables. Available online from: 
https://www.oecd.org/social/soc/Employment-conditional%20benefits.xlsx  
4. Mutual Information System on Social Protection (MISSOC)Comparative Tables. 





Appendix B: Input data EUROMOD, access and acknowledgements 
Table B1: EUROMOD input data  
EU-SILC (1) datasets  National datasets   Other non-SILC (5) 
• Belgium 2016 2015 2012 
2010 2008 2007 2006  
• Denmark 2016 2015 2012 
2008  
• Estonia 2016 2015 2012 
2010 2008 2007 2006  
• Ireland 2016 2015 2012 
2010 2008 2007 2006  
• Spain 2016 2015 2014  
• France 2016 2015 2010 
2007  
• Luxembourg 2016 2015 
2012 2010 2008  
• Malta 2016 2015 2012 2010 
2009 
• Netherlands 2016 2015 
2012 2010 2008 2007  
• Slovakia 2015 2014 2012 
2010 2008 2007  
• Sweden 2016 2015 2012 
2010 2008 2007 
• Italy (2)2016 2015 
2014 2012 2010 2008 
2007 2006  
• Austria 2016 2015 
2014 2012 2009 2008  
• Slovakia 2016  
• France 2012 (3) 
• Spain 2012, 2010, 
2008, 2007, 2006 (4) 
• UK 2015 (_a1) 
• UK 2014 (_a3) 
• UK 2013 (_a3) 
• UK 2012 (_a3) 
• UK 2009 (_a2) 
• UK 2008 (_a4) 
Notes: 
(1) Access granted for European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-
SILC) for research proposal no RPP 391/2018-EU-SILC for the period 01/03/2019-
01/10/2020. The list of EU-SILC data in table includes only those countries that were 
used in the final expenditure analysis.  
(2) EU-SILC made available by I-STAT 
(3) Provided by Reseau Quetelet (Statistiques sur les ressources et les conditions de vie 
(INSEE) 
(4) Data made available by INE  
(5) UK Family Resources Survey accessed through the UK Data Service.  
(6) As stated in the acknowledgements in the front matter of this thesis, the conclusions and 
the interpretations drawn from the data are the responsibility of the author and any 





Appendix C: Socio-economic indicators full information  
Table C1: Description of socioeconomic indicators  
Indicators Description from data source Source  
In-work at risk of 
poverty 
Individuals (18-64) who are classified 
as employed according to their most 
frequent activity status and are at risk 
of poverty. 
Eurostat. 2019a. In-work-at-risk 
of poverty. 
Unemployment The unemployment rate is the number 
of people unemployed as a percentage 
of the labour force. The labour force is 
the total number of people employed 
and unemployed. 
Eurostat. 2019b. Unemployment 
by sex and age - annual average.  
Underemployment  Underemployed part-time workers are 
persons working part-time who wish to 
work additional hours and are 
available to do so. Part-time work is 
recorded as self-reported by 
individuals. 
Eurostat. 2019c. 
Underemployment and potential 




Appendix D: Liberalisation indicators full information  
 
  
Table D1: Description of ‘liberalisation’ indicators  
Indicators Description from data source Source 
Trade union 
density  
‘A trade union is defined as a workers' organization 
constituted for the purpose of furthering and defending 
the interests of workers. This trade union density rate 
conveys the number of union members who are 
employees as a percentage of the total number of 
employees. For the purpose of this indicator in particular, 
trade union membership excludes union members who 
are not in paid employment (self-employed, unemployed, 
retired, etc.), unless otherwise stated in the notes.’ 









‘The collective bargaining coverage rate conveys the 
number of employees whose pay and/or conditions of 
employment are determined by one or more collective 
agreement(s) as a percentage of the total number of 
employees. Collective bargaining coverage includes, to 
the extent possible, workers covered by collective 
agreements in virtue of their extension. Collective 
bargaining coverage rates are adjusted for the possibility 
that some workers do not have the right to bargain 
collectively over wages (e.g. workers in the public 
services who have their wages determined by state 
regulation or other methods involving consultation), 
unless otherwise stated in the notes.’ 








‘Net Replacement Rates in unemployment measure the 
proportion of previous in-work income that is maintained 
after 1, 2, …, T months of unemployment.’  The rate was 
set by the researcher at that for a single person without 
children, unemployment spell of 6 months, 67% of 
average wage previous earnings in work. Does not 








Appendix E: Numerical weights: labour market composite indicators 
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Appendix F: Policies categorised as in-work cash transfers in mapping (2008 & 2016) 
Table F1. Programme/ policy names in English and local language (In-work cash transfers) 
Country  Mapping years  Programme name - English translation  Programme name - local language 
France  2016 1. Activity Allowance  Prime d'activitie" 
Ireland 2008 & 2016 1. Family Income Supplement (FIS) . 
Italy 2008 & 2016 1. Family Allowance  Assegno per il Nucleo Familiare 
Malta  2016 2. In-Work Benefit  . 
 2008 & 2016 1. Working Tax Credits (WTC) . 
UK 2016 2. Universal Credit (UC) . 
Notes: Programme names in local language and English listed as they appear in main sources (Sources 1 & 2 Appendix B). English not necessarily a direct 




Appendix G: Policies categorised as earned income tax credits in mapping (2008 & 2016) 
 
Table G1. Programme/ policy names in English and local language (Earned Income Tax Credit)  
Country  Mapping years  Programme name - English  Programme name - local language 
Austria 2008 & 2016 1. Sole Parent's Tax Credit/ Lone Parent Tax Credit  Alleinerzieherabsetzbetrag 
  2. Sole Earner's Tax Credit/ Single Earners' Tax Credit Alleinverdienerabsetzbetrag 
 2008 3. Employee's Tax Credit/ Wage Earners' Tax Credit  Arbeitnehmerabsetzbetrag 
Belgium 2008 & 2016 1. Refundable Tax Credit on Low Activity Incomes  .  
 2016 2. The Fiscal Workbonus .  
Denmark  2008 & 2016 1.  Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) Beskæftigelsesfradrag 
Estonia  2016 1. Non Refundable Credit for Low Income Workers/ Low Activity Income Credit  Madalapalgaliste tagasimakse 
Finland 2008 & 2016 1. Earned income tax credit  .  
France 2008 1. Work Premium  Prime pour l'emploi (PPE) 
Hungary  2008 1. Employment tax credit .  
Ireland 2008 & 2017  1. Employee Credit/ PAYE Credit . 
 2016 2. Earned Income Tax Credit  . 
Italy 2008 & 2016 1. PAYE Tax Credit  .  
 2016 2. Fiscal Bonus/ €80 Bonus 80 Euro 
  3. Tax Credit for Self-Employed  
Luxembourg 2016 1. Basic Employee Tax Credit/ Tax credit for employees . 
  2. Self-Employed Tax Credit/ Tax credit for self-employed  . 
Netherlands  2008 & 2016 1. Work Credit  . 
 2008 2. Combination credit  . 
 2008 3. Additional combination Credit  . 
 2016 4. Income Dependent Combination Credit . 
 2008 5. Additional Single Parent Credit  . 
Slovakia  2008 & 2016 1. Child Tax Credit/ Tax credit on dependent child  . 
 2016 2. Employee Tax Credit (ETC) . 
Spain  2008 & 2016 1. Maternity Tax Credit/ Working Mother Tax Credit (WMTC) Deducción por maternidad 
Sweden  2008 & 2016 1. Earned Income Tax credit (EITC)   
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Notes: Programme names in local language and English listed as they appear in main sources (Sources 1 & 2 Appendix B). English not necessarily a direct translation and the 
programme name in the local language is not given in most sources. Some policies are referred to using more than one programme name in English across the two main sources and 




Appendix H Descriptive Statistics Expenditure Variables 2006 to 2017 
Table H1: Descriptive Statistics – expenditure variables, 2006 to 2017 
EUM

































N 12 11 11 12 11 11 
Min 0 0.03 0.03 0 0.06 0.0638 
Max 0 0.17 0.17 0 0.32 0.31835 
Mean 0 0.1167 0.1167 0 0.2257 0.225717 






N 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Min 0 0.04 0.04 0 0.08 0.07864 
Max 0 0.12 0.12 0 0.23 0.23277 
Mean 0 0.0793 0.0793 0 0.1494 0.14937 
SD 0 
0.0247






N 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Min 0 0.94 0.94 0 1.89 1.89025 
Max 0 3.09 3.09 0 6.04 6.03994 
Mean 0 2.1263 2.1263 0 3.926 3.925979 
SD 0 
0.7596






N 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 0 0.16 0.16 0 0.41 0.41485 
Mean 0 0.0136 0.0136 0 0.0346 0.034571 
SD 0 
0.0472






N 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Min 0 0.09 0.09 0 0.19 0.19333 
Max 0 0.18 0.18 0 0.42 0.42253 
Mean 0 0.1158 0.1158 0 0.2691 0.269103 
SD 0 
0.0378






N 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Min 0 0 0.16 0 0 0.28975 
Max 0.22 0.19 0.22 0.39 0.36 0.39103 
Mean 0.069 0.1204 0.1894 0.1216 0.2175 0.339127 
SD 0.07433 
0.0617






N 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Min 0.05 0.93 0.98 0.14 2.26 2.40539 
Max 0.1 1.57 1.62 0.24 4 4.14599 
Mean 0.0734 1.2843 1.3577 0.1898 3.3504 3.540269 
SD 0.0181 
0.2125
4 0.22172 0.03451 0.45825 0.463549 




Table H1 (continued) 





























N 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Min 0.3 0 0.3 0.64 0 0.6359 
Max 0.41 2.17 2.57 0.82 4.33 5.12147 
Mean 0.3859 1.6269 2.0128 0.78 3.2804 4.060427 






N 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 0 0.19 0.19 0 0.44 0.43871 
Mean 0 0.1237 0.1237 0 0.2865 0.286454 






N 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 0.04 0 0.04 0.12 0 0.12 
Mean 0.0091 0 0.0091 0.0245 0 0.024495 






N 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Min 0 1.66 1.66 0 3.81 3.80786 
Max 0 2.68 2.68 0 6.25 6.24711 
Mean 0 1.9764 1.9764 0 4.4066 4.406561 






N 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 0 2.79 2.79 0 5.46 5.46475 
Mean 0 2.0611 2.0611 0 4.0733 4.073283 






N 12 11 11 12 11 11 
Min 0 0.28 0.28 0 0.66 0.65593 
Max 0 0.39 0.39 0 0.88 0.88061 
Mean 0 0.3176 0.3176 0 0.7759 0.775937 






N 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Min 0.2 0 0.2 0.49 0 0.4874 
Max 0.4 0 0.4 0.86 0 0.85805 
Mean 0.3314 0 0.3314 0.7547 0 0.754713 
SD 0.06145 0 0.06145 0.10873 0 0.108726 
Notes: Authors own calculation using EUROMOD and input data. Data sources and calculation detailed 
in Chapter 4 (Section 4.3 and 4.4). Input data detailed in Appendix A. 
273 
 







Table I1: Ireland expenditure and recipient data     






















2006 148,000,000 39,963 2,370,000,000 1,792,438 0 0 148,000,000 2,370,000,000 2,518,000,000 
2007 106,000,000 27,664 2,830,000,000 1,784,011 0 0 106,000,000 2,830,000,000 2,936,000,000 
2008 108,000,000 27,629 2,940,000,000 1,784,011 0 0 108,000,000 2,940,000,000 3,048,000,000 
2009 134,000,000 39,617 2,480,000,000 1,463,267 0 0 134,000,000 2,480,000,000 2,614,000,000 
2010 154,000,000 40,169 2,470,000,000 1,463,267 0 0 154,000,000 2,470,000,000 2,624,000,000 
2011 161,000,000 35,689 2,350,000,000 1,540,341 0 0 161,000,000 2,350,000,000 2,511,000,000 
2012 162,000,000 35,689 2,350,000,000 1,540,341 0 0 162,000,000 2,350,000,000 2,512,000,000 
2013 173,000,000 39,476 2,350,000,000 1,540,341 0 0 173,000,000 2,350,000,000 2,523,000,000 
2014 148,000,000 34,421 2,520,000,000 1,625,271 0 0 148,000,000 2,520,000,000 2,668,000,000 
2015 146,000,000 34,421 2,530,000,000 1,625,271 0 0 146,000,000 2,530,000,000 2,676,000,000 
2016 151,000,000 34,421 2,530,000,000 1,625,271 144,000,000 267,002 151,000,000 2,674,000,000 2,825,000,000 
2017 146,000,000 34,039 2,530,000,000 1,625,271 242,000,000 267,002 146,000,000 2,772,000,000 2,918,000,000 
















Table J1: Unemployment rate in EUMS, 2007, 2008, 2015 and 2016 and identification of in-
work benefit policies in mapping exercise  
GEO/TIME 2007 2008 2015 2016 IWB 
Greece 8.4 7.8 24.9 23.6 Y 
Spain 8.2 11.3 22.1 19.6 Y 
Croatia 9.9 8.6 16.1 13.4 Y 
Cyprus 3.9 3.7 15 13 X 
Italy 6.1 6.7 11.9 11.7 Y 
Portugal 9.1 8.8 12.6 11.2 Y 
France 8 7.4 10.4 10.1 Y 
Slovakia 11.2 9.6 11.5 9.7 Y 
Latvia 6.1 7.7 9.9 9.6 X 
Finland 6.9 6.4 9.4 8.8 Y 
Ireland 5 6.8 10 8.4 Y 
Slovenia 4.9 4.4 9 8 Y 
Lithuania 4.3 5.8 9.1 7.9 X 
Belgium 7.5 7 8.5 7.8 Y 
Bulgaria 6.9 5.6 9.2 7.6 X 
Sweden 6.1 6.2 7.4 6.9 Y 
Estonia 4.6 5.5 6.2 6.8 Y 
Luxembourg 4.2 4.9 6.5 6.3 Y 
Poland 9.6 7.1 7.5 6.2 X 
Denmark 3.8 3.7 6.3 6 Y 
Netherlands 4.2 3.7 6.9 6 Y 
Austria 4.9 4.1 5.7 6 Y 
Romania 6.4 5.6 6.8 5.9 X 
Hungary 7.4 7.8 6.8 5.1 Y 
United Kingdom 5.3 5.6 5.3 4.8 Y 
Malta 6.5 6 5.4 4.7 Y 
Germany 8.5 7.4 4.6 4.1 Y 
Czechia 5.3 4.4 5.1 4 X 
 Notes: Unemployment data Eurostat (2019b). Countries ordered from highest to lowest 
unemployment in 2016. IWB column: ‘Y’ in-work policies identified in the mapping of either 
2008 and 2016, ‘X’ no relevant policies identified in 2008 or 2016. See Table 5.2 for full 
details of mapping. ‘Y’ part of higher spending group identified in section 5.2. Countries with 




Table J2: Underemployment rates in EUMS, 2008, 2015 and 2016 and presence of in-work 
benefit policies  
GEO/TIME 2008 2015 2016 IWB  
Cyprus 2.0 9.2 9.0 X 
Spain 4.0 8.5 7.7 Y 
Greece 2.1 6.8 7.3 Y 
France  4.8 6.3 6.1 Y 
Netherlands 1.1 6.8 6.1 Y 
Ireland : 5.7 5.1 Y 
UK 4.3 5.6 5.1 Y 
Portugal 1.9 5.3 5.0 Y 
Denmark 2.3 2.3 4.5 Y 
Austria 3.4 4.4 4.5 Y 
Finland 2.9 4.1 4.2 Y 
Sweden 4.7 4.4 3.7 Y 
Belgium 0.8 3.7 3.5 Y 
Germany  6.4 3.9 3.5 Y 
Latvia 2.2 3.0 3.5 X 
Italy 1.7 3.3 3.2 Y 
Slovenia 1.4 3.4 3.1 Y 
Slovakia 0.8 2.4 2.6 Y 
Romania 2.3 3.1 2.5 X 
Luxembourg 0.7 2.5 2.3 Y 
Croatia 1.9 2.7 2.2 Y 
Malta 1.9 2.3 1.9 Y 
Poland 1.6 2.0 1.7 X 
Lithuania 1.2 1.7 1.4 X 
Estonia 0.7 1.3 1.3 Y 
Hungary 0.2 1.6 1.1 Y 
Bulgaria 0.6 0.9 0.8 X 
Czechia 0.3 0.6 0.5 X 
Notes: Underemployment data Eurostat (2019c). France is for metropolitan area. Countries 
ordered from highest to lowest underemployment in 2016. IWB column: ‘Y’ in-work policies 
identified in the mapping of either 2008 and 2016, ‘X’ no relevant policies identified in 2008 
or 2016. ‘Y’ part of higher spending group identified in section 5.2. See Table 5.2 for full 





Appendix K: In-work benefit expenditure and socioeconomic context, change over 
time 
Figure K1: Estimates of in-work benefit expenditure and unemployment rates in EUMS, 2006 to 
2017  
Notes: Unemployment data (see Appendix C). In-work benefit expenditure data author’s own 
estimates using EUROMOD. See Chapter 4 for full details. Earned income tax credits and in-work 






Figure K2: Estimates of in-work benefit expenditure and underemployment rates in EUMS, 2006 to 
2017 Notes: Underemployment data (see Appendix C). In-work benefit expenditure data author’s 
own estimates using EUROMOD. See Chapter 4 for full details. Earned income tax credits and in-





Appendix L: In-work benefit expenditure and indicators of liberalisation, change 
over time  
Figure L.1: Estimates of in-work benefit expenditure and collective bargaining coverage in EUMS, 
2006 to 2017 Notes: Collective bargaining data (see Appendix D). In-work benefit expenditure data 
author’s own estimates using EUROMOD. See Chapter 4 for full details. Earned income tax credits 
and in-work cash transfers only.  
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Figure L2: Estimates of in-work benefit expenditure and trade union density in EUMS, 2006 to 2017 
Notes: Trade Union Density Data (see Appendix D). In-work benefit expenditure data author’s own 
estimates using EUROMOD. See Chapter 4 for full details. Earned income tax credits and in-work 
cash transfers only. 
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Appendix M: Comparison of correlational analyses using different in-work benefit measures 
Table M1: Comparison of correlational analysis using different in-work benefit expenditure measures  
Country IWB expenditure measure Collective Bargaining Coverage  Trade Union Density Replacement Rates  
   PC Sig.(2-tailed) N PC Sig. (2-tailed) N PC Sig. (2-tailed) N 
AT GDP .a . 10 -0.569 0.086 10 -0.22 0.515 11 
  public expenditure  .a . 10 -0.608 0.062 10 -0.254 0.451 11 
BE GDP .a . 11 -0.126 0.729 10 .612* 0.035 12 
  public expenditure  .a . 11 -0.135 0.711 10 0.501 0.097 12 
DK GDP .923** 0.003 7 0.046 0.9 10 .609* 0.047 11 
  public expenditure  .905** 0.005 7 -0.054 0.882 10 .616* 0.044 11 
EE GDP .a 0 5 .a 0 10 -0.135 0.676 12 
  public expenditure  .a 0 5 .a 0 10 -0.135 0.676 12 
ES GDP 0.284 0.371 12 -.672* 0.033 10 -0.475 0.119 12 
  public expenditure  0.301 0.343 12 -.787** 0.007 10 -0.558 0.06 12 
FR GDP -0.674 0.326 4 0.088 0.809 10 -0.368 0.239 12 
  public expenditure  -0.86 0.14 4 -0.149 0.682 10 -0.2 0.534 12 
IE GDP       .867** 0.001 11 .608* 0.036 12 
  public expenditure        -0.265 0.43 11 -0.542 0.069 12 
IT GDP .a . 10 0.486 0.129 11 -0.212 0.509 12 
  public expenditure  .a . 10 0.418 0.201 11 -0.278 0.382 12 
LU GDP -.979** 0.004 5 -.712* 0.014 11 -0.043 0.894 12 
  public expenditure  -.979** 0.004 5 -.736** 0.01 11 -0.006 0.986 12 
MT GDP .a 0 3 -0.317 0.372 10 -0.482 0.112 12 
  public expenditure  .a 0 3 -0.317 0.372 10 -0.491 0.105 12 
NL GDP 0.049 0.886 11 -.798** 0.003 11 -.972** 0 12 
  public expenditure  -0.159 0.641 11 -.745** 0.009 11 -.978** 0 12 
SE GDP -0.605 0.395 4 -.968** 0 10 -.961** 0 12 
  public expenditure  -0.577 0.423 4 -.969** 0 10 -.961** 0 12 
SK GDP 0.553 0.256 6 0.314 0.411 9 -.858** 0.001 11 
  public expenditure  .985** 0 6 .830** 0.006 9 -.763** 0.006 11 
UK GDP -0.235 0.486 11 -0.247 0.463 11 0.424 0.17 12 
  public expenditure  -0.374 0.257 11 -0.394 0.23 11 0.445 0.147 12 
Notes: Compares results using in-work benefit expenditure measure as a proportion of GDP or public expenditure. In-work benefit expenditure estimated using EUROMOD, own 
calculations using GDP (Eurostat 2019d) and Public Expenditure (2019e). Collective bargaining coverage, trade union density and replacement rate data detailed in Appendix D  
